A structure for architectural innovation: Mindshaping by Lim, N
 
 
 
 
A STRUCTURE FOR ARCHITECTURAL INNOVATION 
 
MINDSHAPING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A project submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
Ngiom Lim 
MSc (Arch) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School of Architecture and Design 
College of Design and Social Context 
 
RMIT University 
 
August 2009 
  
Declaration 
 
I certify that where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of the 
author alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to 
qualify for any other academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of 
work which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the 
approved research program; any editorial work carried out by a third party is 
acknowledged; and, ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ngiom Lim 
August 2009 
Contents            
 
 
 
Abstract                  1 
 
Preamble                  2 
 
1.   Wittgensteinian Background               3 
 
2.   The Topology of Innovation               8 
            
3.   Changing the Mental Geography             10 
 
4.   Creating Mental Contexts             15 
                       
5.   Changing the Mental Context             17 
 
6.   Innovation in Context of Practice             18 
 
7.   Mindshaping in Practice              21 
 
      7.1 Mistaking Architecture: Search for Singular Statements (1992-1995)       22 
     
      7.2 Search for Significant Form: Merely Game Playing With Light and Shapes  
                  (1996-1999)       26 
    
      7.3 Search for Critical Meanings: Phenomenology the Only Offer  
           (2000-2004)        30 
 
      7.4 Search for the Structure of Innovation: Letting the Fly Out of the Fly Bottle 
                   (2005-Present)     35 
 
8.   Mindshaping: Wittgenstein’s Perspective           38 
 
9.   Shaping the External Context             48 
 
10. Conclusion               52 
 
11. Epilogue: Speculation On Architecture Of Thick Time          64 
 
Notes                 67 
 
Selected Bibliography               73 
 
 
 
APPENDIX           
 
Hypothesis            1 
 
Preface             3 
 
METHODOLOGY           5 
 
ONE: INTRODUCTION  
Literature Review A           7 
Preamble             7 
Ostensivity            7 
Language Games            8 
Context             9 
Ostensivity of Interpretation         10 
Mastering is Ostensive          11  
Cultural Dimension (Capital)         12 
Shared Practices as Form of Life         13 
Locality of Innovation          13 
Solipsism in Innovation          14 
Flow            15 
Background           16 
Weakness and Antagonistic View        17 
Corroborative Supports          18 
Pedagogical   Spin-Offs          20 
Considered Questions          20 
 
TWO: EXISTENTIAL IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review B          23 
Preamble            23 
Image as Consciousness          23 
Image as Perception          24 
Intention            25 
Custom and Habit           25 
Imaginative Knowledge          26 
Imaginative Meaning          27 
Visual Imagination          28 
Imaginative Consciousness         30 
Perception            31 
Mental Acts of Architectural Innovation        32 
First and Second Acts of Architectural Innovation      34 
Unreal and Real Exclusion         34 
In Cultural and Historical Contexts          35 
Existential Imagination in Architectural Innovation      36 
 
THREE: INTERACTION RITUAL THEORY (PROTAGONIST) 
Literature Review C          39 
Preamble            39 
Innovation in IR Chain          40 
Collective Motivation          40 
IR Emblem           41 
IR Network           43 
Traits             44 
Flow States            46 
KLPAC – Case Study of IR in Architecture 
Background           47 
IR Architecture           48 
Further Description          49 
 
FOUR: PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review D          51 
Preamble            51 
Phenomenology a product of Consciousness       52 
Perception Bridges Imagination With Reality       53 
Truth in Imagination          53 
Network of Evidence is in the Context        55 
Intention Separates Imagination From Perception      55 
Creativity Lies in the Non-ostensive        56 
‘Noemata’ and ‘Noesis’          57 
Classification           59 
Singular Stratum and Possibilities        61 
Phenomenological Space          64 
Space and Context          66 
Body and Sensory Fields          68 
House X1: Light and Shadow         69 
Sound            69 
Hapticity            70 
Intention and Site Circumstance         70 
 
FIVE: COMPUTATIONAL IMAGINATION (PROTAGONIST) 
Literature Review E          73 
Preamble            73 
Conceptual Spaces          73 
AI Concepts                      74 
Hindrances Over AI Creativity         74 
Beyond Intuition            76 
P-creativity and H-creativity         76 
Computational Creativity          77 
Generative Systems          79 
Scripts, Frames and Nets          80 
Mind-body Paradox          82 
Computational Psychology         85 
Myths            86 
Twelve-year Rule           87 
Computational creativity in Architecture        88 
House X3            91 
 
SIX: HERMENEUTICAL IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review F          93 
Preamble: From Visual to Literary Image       93 
Engagement of the Mythical         94 
Textual Over Visual Semantics         95 
Requirement of Context          95 
Ontological Necessity          97 
Culture           98 
Taste           98 
Aesthetic Differentiation         99 
Extra-aesthetic Elements        100 
Architecture as Play        100 
Temporality         101 
Historical Significance        102 
Practice and Experience         104 
Wickham Apartments        106 
 
SEVEN: CRYSTALLISATION OF THE MENTAL PROCESS  
(PROTAGONIST) 
Literature Review G        109 
Preamble          109 
Themata          110 
Feeling Tones         112 
Individual-universal Equation or Implicate Order    115 
Synesthesia         117 
Structure to Thought Crystallisation      119 
Extended Standard Theory       121 
Deep Structure, Surface Structure Symmetry     123 
Extended Standard Theory for Visual Innovation    124 
Creating Mental Contexts        125 
House X4          126 
 
EIGHT: POSTMODERN IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review H        129 
Preamble          129 
Difference and Repetition        131 
Deleuze’s Idea of Postmodern Creativity      136 
Essentiality of Process        137 
Little Narratives and Open System      137 
Character of Postmodern Urbanity      137 
Premises for Postmodern Creativity      140 
Heterarchy System        140 
Self-organisation         142 
Ethics of Postmodernism        142 
Gallery Evason Hotel        145 
From Mohamed Sultan Road to Clarke Quay     145 
 
NINE: DISCUSSION 
Preamble          149 
Distillation – Questions and Answers      150 
Science Filter to Bacon        156 
Bacon’s Method of Induction       157 
Bacon’s Ideas Manifested Through Heterogeneous Influences   159 
Heterogeneous Linkages Between Architecture and the Arts   159 
Behren’s Significant Influences       161 
Bacon’s Utility and Power in Advertising Posters    162 
Bernhard, the Accidental Minimalist      162 
Malevich to El Lissitzky        163 
Merger Between Art and Architecture      164 
Objective Analysis Group and Scientific Modernism    165 
Bacon’s Method Realised With Constructivism     166 
Breaking the Classical Paradigm       167 
Constructivism to Deconstruction      169 
Dadaist State of Mind        170 
From Freedom to Imagination       171 
Question of Language        172 
Time Context – Cybernetics Theory      176 
Mutuality           178 
Undivided Wholeness in Flowing Movement     179 
From Flow to Socio-culture       183 
Interaction Between and Within Domains     186 
Collective Interaction Rituals       188 
Self-curation         192 
Themata as Motivation        194 
Nuances in Mental Processes       195 
Innovator’s Individual-universal Equation     197 
Nuance of Sense and Intelligence       198 
Nuances in Mental Crystallisation      199 
Beyond Chomsly, Contexts in Mental Crystallisation    202 
Emotional and Intuitive Contents in Reason     203 
Background for Second-order Narratives      205 
Synthetic Imagination        206 
Constitutive and Descriptive Orders      207 
Historical Testimonials        208 
Projective Empathy        210 
Summary of Discussion        211 
 
TEN: CONCLUSION 
Recalling Summary of Discussion      213 
Attitudes of Creativity        214 
Environment that Encourages (Third Place)     214 
Network Culture         215 
Pedagogy in Network Culture       216 
Autopoiesis         217 
City as a Complex Adaptive System      218 
Dynamics of Everyday Spaces       221 
Practice in Context        224 
Wickham Apartments        224 
Review of Hypothesis        226 
Notes          229 
References         235 
 
 1 
A STRUCTURE FOR ARCHITECTURAL INNOVATION: 
MINDSHAPING 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In the process of research, it is noticed that practice works are morphing from 
one design emphasis to another.  
 
It is speculated that we are inadvertently mindshaped by our activities and by 
our environment, and by our actions we reshape the environment and create a 
culture. 
 
Through concentrated practice, we convert these experiences into metaphors 
and through heightened combinatory cognitive skills we reassemble these 
metaphors to arrive at innovation. 
 
The process of innovation is developed from ordinary thinking. 
 
The PhD seeks to clarify the forces that shape our minds and ways to harness 
these forces through the avenue of practice. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
Preamble 
 
This submission contains the concluding thrust of the PhD, which frames the 
body of research in its relation to practice, whereas the main content of the 
research, which is contained in the APPENDIX, is a systematic account of an 
academic research. 
 
Refer also to the APPENDIX for: 
- The methodology adopted for the construction of hypothesis. 
- The series of literature reviews. 
- Research questions. 
- Discussion. 
- Theoretical conclusion. 
- Detailed bibliography. 
 
This submission provides a further sketch of the body of work but directed 
toward practice in the following manner: 
- Wittgensteinian Background. It uses Wittgenstein’s later remarks to 
provide legitimacy to the thinking adopted for this submission. 
- The Topography of Innovation. This summarises the chain of selected 
contemporary scholarship and provide definitions to terminologies. 
 3 
- Changing the Mental Geography. It uses contemporary ideas to explain the 
structure of mental geography in the act of innovation, taking away the 
myths. 
- Creating Mental Contexts. This summarises the theoretical basis for 
mindshaping in individual practitioners, using Boden’s work to represent 
collective thinking behind the theories. 
- Changing the Mental Contexts. It summarises the role that experience 
plays in mindshaping. 
- Innovation in the Context of Practice. It summarises the theoretical 
position for innovation in practice. 
- Mindshaping in Practice. This section uses the examples of personal 
experiences to fortify the theoretical points made in the research: that if any 
innovation were to happen, it happens out of ordinary thinking and they are 
externally influenced and changes are incremental. 
- Mindshaping: Wittgenstein’s Perspective. A loop-back to the 
Wittgenstein’s perspective to further the discussion of mindshaping in 
practice. 
- Shaping the External Context. This discusses the necessity of shaping the 
external context and the ways it is done. 
- Conclusion. A picture of the findings in relation to present culture, a 
summary of what takes place in mindshaping, and calling upon of 
metaphors to reach beyond the mental limits. 
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1. Wittgensteinian Background  
 
 4 
The search for a structure for architectural innovation as contained in the 
APPENDIX started as a logical process, which was intended to be objective and 
rigorous. At the start, the logical process was influenced by Wittgenstein’s early 
work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), adopting Wittgenstein’s method 
of categorising his explanation into numerals and sub-numerals. The contents 
eventually followed the attitude of Wittgenstein’s later work, Philosophical 
Investigations (1953), which was like a practical guide to knowing, able to 
encompass the subjective as well as logical matters. The use of Wittgenstein 
aphorisms as a springboard was adopted as a continuum of my Masters 
thesis, which was about critical meanings in architecture, and it was felt that 
Wittgenstein was suitable to launch the PhD. 
 
Early on in the research, it was felt that Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations alone had little to contribute to the search for the structure of 
innovation and instead had more to do with the search for meaning. So, 
Philosophical Investigations was at first abandoned early on, however, as the 
search deepened, Wittgenstein was rediscovered and his even later remarks, 
such as those found in Zettel (1980), which was published posthumously 
decades later, were found to contain ideas that resonated with contemporary 
scholars like Csikzentmihalyi, who would popularise the word ‘flow’, for example, 
which rang close to Wittgenstein’s ‘Fluβ’. Another modern scholar, Collins, 
talked about ‘emotional energy’, the description of which was similar to 
Csikzentmihalyi’s ‘flow’ (APPENDIX, p 48). 
 
It is still ‘commonly’ assumed that Wittgenstein personifies logical descriptions. 
This assumption is made due to the logical construction of his first thesis, 
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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, to the point that it became a factor for the 
emergence of logical positivism in the early twentieth century. Wittgenstein 
early thesis also contained many metaphysical axioms, which were curiously 
overlooked by the positivists. This became more profound toward his later years 
when metaphysical descriptions began to overtake logical descriptions to the 
point that Wittgenstein’s later descriptions could only be appreciated from the 
percipients own experience and intuition. 
 
For example, with the use of the word ‘flow’, Wittgenstein infers that words 
have ‘flow’ in the train of thought during a conversation – there is something 
that goes on in the speaker’s head to make spoken or written words significant. 
He counsels that, “Words only have meaning in the river of thought and life” 
(Wittgenstein, 1980: S 174) – The river metaphor infers that the significance 
of a particular utterance is placed within the stream of conversation in the 
ordinary use of language. In Wittgenstein’s ways all constructs of meaning 
happen in the mind.  
 
It is in another posthumous collection of Wittgenstein sayings, in On Certainty 
(1969) that he used visual equivalence that is closer to the visiocentricity of 
architecture. Here he sets his river image as a visual illustration of the nature 
of boundary of every assertion and also why the background is so hard to 
describe. The passages begin with the sketch of a word-picture, which is a 
graphic depiction of his understanding of the world and our place in it. The use 
of imagery is a consequence of his conception of the word-picture, which can be 
described in terms of myth, or of the rules of a game that we know mentally but 
not articulated. This is not explicit analysis because the rules are implicit and 
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normative rather than explicit and factual: any explicit formulation will not draw 
out the mentally embedded (ref. APPENDIX, p 16). 
 
Wittgenstein suggests that we did not get the picture of the world by satisfying 
ourselves with correctness; instead we distinguish between true and false 
against the ‘inherited background’. Skirting on the metaphysics, Wittgenstein 
describes the word-picture as part of mythology (therefore unstable and 
changeable) and the role of the word-picture is like that of rules of a game, 
which is learned purely practically (through experience), without learning any 
explicit rules. 
 
He suggests also that propositions (literary, visual, or otherwise) were not 
hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that: “the fluid 
propositions hardened, and the hard ones become fluid…. The mythology may 
change back into a state of flux; the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I 
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift 
of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other” 
(Wittgenstein, 1969: SS 96, 67).  
 
And to further strengthen the idea of indeterminacy instead of the certainty of 
logic, he suggests that: “But if someone were to say ‘So logic too is an empirical 
science’ he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same propositions may get 
treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of 
testing…. And the bank of the river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no 
alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which is one place now 
in another gets washed away” (Wittgenstein, 1969: SS 98, 99).  
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Through the assertions above, Wittgenstein holds that change is always 
possible against a background. It implies indeterminacy in the world; however 
some things must remain constant. Wittgenstein is to later point to the 
primacy of the background and its indeterminacy: “If a pattern of life is the basis 
for the use of a word then the word must contain some amount of 
indefiniteness. The pattern of life, above all, is not one of exact regularity 
(Wittgenstein, 1982: S 211). Once indeterminacy is introduced into the picture, 
the boundary between the subjectivity of the background and the signifiers in 
the foreground is blurred. He then says in another posthumous collections of 
axioms in Philosophical Grammar, “…. In our study of symbolism there is no 
foreground and background; it isn’t a matter of tangible sign with an 
accompanying intangible power of understanding” (Wittgenstein, 1969a: S 43). 
The background that Wittgenstein discusses about is an indeterminable 
pattern of life, which is causal to our thoughts: “Behind our thoughts, true and 
false, there is always to be found a dark background, which we are only later 
able to bring into the light and expressed as thought” (Wittgenstein, 1979: 36).  
 
From the layperson’s perspective, what then is this ‘background’ that 
Wittgenstein speaks about? The idea is repeated in several of Wittgenstein’s 
posthumous publications. Again in a later publication, Wittgenstein is to 
similarly assert that: “We judge an action according to its background within 
human life, and this background is not monochrome…. The background is the 
bustle of life. And our concept points to something within this bustle…. And it is 
the very concept ‘bustle’ that brings about this indefiniteness. For a bustle only 
comes about through constant repetition…. How could human behaviour be 
described? Surely only by showing the actions of a variety of humans, as they 
are all mixed up together. Not what one person is doing now, but the whole 
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hurly-burly, is the background against which we see action, and it determines 
our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions” (Wittgenstein, 1980a: SS 624-
626, 629). 
 
Wittgenstein’s later works assert that the boundary between the background 
and the explicit foreground of symbols is uncertain, shifting and changing. The 
uncertainty provides a framework for literature reviews in the APPENDIX based 
on pitting the ostensive against the hidden. The ostensive, which has its basis 
on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations becomes the protagonists and 
the hidden become the antagonists. These are contained in the APPENDIX. 
 
 
2. The Topology of Innovation 
 
In parallel to the chain of investigation along philosophical works that started 
with Wittgenstein, Leon van Schaik’s Mastering Architecture (2005) sparked 
another chain that was linked to Randall Collins and Howard Gardner, and then 
to several others. Margaret Boden seemed to provide the clearest picture to 
what the scholars of this shared perspective were collectively saying. 
 
With reference to the works of contemporary scholars, the APPENDIX at pages 
152-158 has arrived at such a conclusion: That the process of innovation is 
accessible to anyone and that innovators are made and not born. This was first 
felt in the works of Randall Collins, particularly his Interaction Ritual Theory (ref. 
Collins, 2004: Interaction Ritual Chains; 1998: The Sociology of Philosophies). 
This also came across unabatedly in the works of Csikszentmihalyi (eg. 
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Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: Creativity), Howard Gardner (eg. Gardner, 1993: 
Creative Minds; 1999: Intelligence Reframed; 2004: Changing Minds), 
Weisberg (Weisberg, 2006: Creativity) and Margaret Boden (Boden, 2004: 
The Creative Mind). Boden represents clearly the current trend of scholarship 
that the innovator’s mind being externally shaped and surmised: “…. not by any 
special power, but greater knowledge (in the form of practised expertise) and 
the motivation to acquire and use it. This motivation endures for long periods, 
perhaps shaping and inspiring a whole lifetime” (Boden, 2004: 35).  
 
Asserting further that innovators are made, Boden distils and asserts that 
creativity requires the hidden combination of unconscious ideas, with four 
phases of creativity: Preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification and, 
she points out that the arts and the sciences achieve their innovations in 
broadly comparable ways (ref. Boden, 2004: 29, 31). Distilling and clarifying the 
mechanisms of creativity further, she points to the necessity of context/culture 
that supports either: psychological creativity, which she calls ‘P-creativity’ or, 
historical creativity, which she calls ‘H-creativity’. Both, to her, define creative 
ideas created by people: “The psychological sense concerns ideas (whether in 
science, needle work, music, painting, literature….) that are surprising, or 
perhaps even fundamentally novel, with respect to the individual mind which had 
the idea…. The historical sense applies to ideas that are novel with respect to 
the whole of human history…. But whichever type of creativity is involved, it’s 
historically creative only if no one has thought of it before…. Similarly, people can 
be credited with creativity in two senses. Someone who is P-creative has a 
(more or less sustained) capacity to produce P-creative ideas. A H-creative 
person is someone who has come up with one or more H-creative ideas 
(Boden, 2004: 43). 
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3. Changing the Mental Geography 
 
Boden suggests that most of artistic innovation is P-creativity (psychological 
creativity), rarely reaching H-creativity (historical creativity). When H-creativity is 
arrived at, it often falls by the wayside due to cultural resistance. Boden 
suggests the change of mental geography for its acceptance: “An H-creative 
idea sometimes involve such radical change in mental geography, requiring 
such a different sort of map to represent the new range of computational 
possibilities, that many people minds cannot immediately accommodate it. And 
artists of course, cannot bludgeon their critics with independently verifiable 
facts. They can only seek to persuade them that the mental exploration is 
intelligible, and therefore – like climbing Mount Everest – justified for its own 
sake (Boden, 2004: 74-5). 
 
As inferred by Boden, artistic innovation just as architectural innovation is 
justified for its own sake; it is not verifiable nor can it provide tangible benefit to 
mankind. It takes a cultural change, or a change of mental geography that can 
result in the acceptance of an innovation that has no quantifiable value. Boden 
considers the mental geography as ‘structured space of computational 
possibilities’. Echoing Wittgenstein, she correlate the movements in the mental 
geography to a game of chess: “…. ways of selectively – insightfully – moving 
through the space and/or of transforming it, sometimes by changing their 
heuristics. ‘Protecting your queen’ directs you into some chess-paths and away 
from others. And ‘consider the negative’, if applied at a deep level of generative 
 11 
system, can transform the space so fundamentally that very different sorts of 
location are created and many previous locations, indeed whole regions, simply 
cease to exist” (Boden, 2004: 89).  
 
For an innovative idea to be accepted, the architect relies heavily on the scripts 
in the minds of the audience. To accept even a basic innovative idea, there are 
many mental gaps that need to be filled as the project is presented explicitly. 
Reciprocally, without the script-based expectations, the audience would not be 
able to grasp the creative twists. The audience’s own creativity is to map the 
conceptual space propositioned by the architect onto a novel, although 
fundamentally similar mental spaces that are previously defined. To arrive at H-
creativity, Boden suggests looking beyond the physical to the program, for 
example, she suggests a focus on function, which creative architects normally 
already do: “An architect can focus on functional instead of physical issues. If 
what one needs to fulfil the various domestic functions carried on in a house is 
a number of clearly-defined and interconnected spaces, then physical walls are 
not always necessary. Indeed ‘focus on the function’ is a heuristic that is very 
often used by architects, designers, and creative engineers to escape from 
stereotyped thinking” (Boden, 2004: 113). 
 
Gardner says practically the same thing as a strategy to persuade a resisting 
audience with the offer of an innovative work: “It is not difficult to make an 
innovative work of art, but it is challenging to create a work or a series of works 
that resonate with informed audience members and, eventually, with a larger 
public. Indeed, the twentieth century witnessed any number of artists who were 
a success with the most sophisticated connoisseurs but who never resonated 
with the general audience. In our terms, the resistances to these innovative 
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works prove too great. The artist who would break through to popular 
acceptance must somehow neutralise the resistances – much as a persuasive 
storyteller manages to undermine the prevailing counterstories” (Gardner, 
2004: 123). 
 
Boden’s prevailing interest is artificial intelligence and her explanation on the 
workings of the creative mind and means of convincing an audience to accept 
innovation is slanted toward computational psychology. Pages 80-90 of the 
APPENDIX explain this in detail. She however draws upon recent knowledge of 
neural networks, and as Frith (ref. Frith, 2007) suggests through medical 
research, that everything we know, whether it is about the physical or mental 
world, comes to us through our brain. From the perspective of computational 
psychology, creativity is universal and non-magical, and it is natural feature of 
the human mind, which can be understood in psychological terms. To Boden, 
creativity is non-mystical, it is part of a common mental process which rely on 
the ability of neural networks: “We must consider the ability of neural networks 
to learn to associate (combine) patterns without being explicitly programmed in 
respect to those patterns…. A computational system that could pick up a 
regularity, perhaps a very subtle one, without such pre-knowledge…. Likewise a 
mechanism that could spontaneously link – or even merge – concepts from 
different sources” (Boden, 2004: 137). 
 
Taking away myths about creativity, Boden suggests that innovators do not 
have ‘special powers’; only a highly developed version of the power we all share 
(ref. Boden, 2004: 267). Boden suggests that creativity draws from ordinary 
human abilities such as: noticing, remembering, seeing, speaking, hearing, 
understanding language and recognising analogies. “We apply the ability to 
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redescribe our existing procedural skills on successive representational levels, 
so that we can transform them in various ways” (Boden, 2004: 261). In any 
event, we need to do all the above in order to manage our everyday lives, as well 
as the ability to recognise things all at once. Boden suggests that the difference 
between the innovator and the rest is that he or she could do it better. 
Referencing to the field of art (and therefore architecture), Boden suggests 
that the innovator firstly has more extensive knowledge of the relevant 
structures. Memory, as noted earlier, stores items in the conceptual spaces 
within the mind, “The more richly structured (and well-signposted) the spaces, 
the more possibility of storing items in a discriminating fashion, and recognising 
their peculiarities….” (Boden, 2004: 268). 
 
Sharing the same perspective as Csikszentmihalyi, Weinsberg, Collins and 
Gardner, Boden suggests that H-creative people have a better sense of domain 
relevance than P-creative people. Within the domain, she deduces that their 
mental structures are more “wide-ranging, more many-levelled, and more richly 
detailed than ours. And their exploratory strategies are probably more subtle, 
and more powerful” (Boden, 2004: 270). Elaborating on this, “These rare 
individuals, then, can search – transform – high-level spaces much larger and 
more complex than those explored by the other people. They are in a sense 
more free than us, for they can generate possibilities that we cannot imagine. 
Yet they respect constraints more than we do, not less. Where we can do 
nothing, or at best mentally toss a coin, they are guided by powerful domain-
relevant principles onto promising pathways which we cannot even see” (Boden, 
2004: 270). 
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Although Boden eschews anything supernatural about creativity, she however 
accedes that there is something about the innovator’s brain that makes it 
exceptionally efficient at picking up domain regularities and exploring them at 
that and that there is some evidence that artistic ability is to some extent 
innate. She explains that inborn factors may help certain individuals to develop 
the conceptual structures required and that some structures may even be 
inaccessible in the absence of the innate ability. In the absence of the innate 
ability, no amount of education or commitment can make the person into an 
innovator. Boden thinks that the innate abilities are more efficient mechanisms 
that everyone shares – not something profoundly different (ref. Boden, 2004: 
275). 
 
To demonstrate this in architecture, Boden takes Frank Lloyd Wright as an 
example, taking away the myths. She explains that Wright’s works are explicit 
and can be explained. Boden first of all dismisses the notion that Wright’s 
works are intuitive. She derides the view of other scholars (eg. Koning and 
Eizenberg) that there is something mysterious (‘occult’) about Wright’s ability. 
She instead argues that Wright’s works merely capture the shape grammar of 
prairie-style designs. Wright’s architectural grammar allows a range of choices 
allowing the architect to move into various regions of conceptual space. For 
example, as the ‘grammarians’ responsible put it, varying the number of 
fireplaces generates ‘a veritable prairie village of distinct but interacting prairie-
style designs’, all within a single building (ref. Boden, 2004: 310). 
 
To Boden, what Wright had done was to show “the full potential of a given 
genre even though he did not invent it in the first place” (ref. Boden 2004: 269). 
Taking another architectural example, she describes the Palladian villa as a 
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general class of conceptual space, having a rectangular outline and preferred 
numerical proportions and dimensions, with the internal walls dividing the plan 
into smaller rectangles, and the rooms are positioned and proportioned only in 
certain ways. Similar to Wright, Palladio essentially used his basic theme to 
design many variations. To Boden, the Palladian program wants a ‘shape 
grammar’ that will generate only allowable (‘grammatical’) structures (ref. 
Boden, 2004: 308-9). 
 
In Boden’s texts, ‘shape grammar’ and ‘grammatical structures’ are 
operational through conceptual spaces, mental maps, frames and semantic 
nets. All of these are visually interpreted, just as the examples used by Boden 
are visually orientated. Her interpretations are also categorical, structural and 
ostensive in the sense that the discussions do not bleed into matters that are 
subjective, such as discussions on consciousness. Her goal is to provide a 
material and ostensive description of creativity so that it can be accessible and 
attainable to everyone. Refer to APPENDIX, pages 111-127 for technical 
interrogation on thought structures, particularly to works by Briggs and 
Chomsky. Briggs work on ‘Feeling Tones’ and Chomsky’s ‘Deep Structure’ and 
‘Surface Structure’ resonate closely with Boden’s computational psychology. 
 
 
4. Creating Mental Contexts 
 
Contemporary scholars on creativity, including Boden and the others already 
mentioned, advocate a period of concentrated practice by the creators before 
innovation is achieved. “In short, a persons needs time, and enormous effort to 
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amass mental structures and to explore their potential” (Boden, 2004: 270). 
According to Boden the time needed is around 12-years. It is unimaginable that 
inborn factors do not play a part to develop the conceptual structures required, 
so Boden suggests that the innovators simply have more efficient versions of 
the mental mechanism we all share, stressing that the ability to innovate is not 
a mysterious one. Leon van Schaik in Mastering Architecture mentions the 
period of concentrated practice as the 10-year rule. Collins, Gardner, 
Weinsberg and Csikszentmihalyi suggest the same. The 10-year rule is traced 
back to the work of Chase and Simon from their work on chess mastery as an 
extension of De Root’s earlier work on the same subject (ref: Weinsberg, 2006: 
173). 
 
Briggs suggests that generally ‘a long time’ is required before the creator’s 
context shifts enough for the magnum opus to emerge. Cultivating the ability to 
think oppositionally allows the motivator to transform contexts, break prevailing 
operating mindset to plumb the materials from new angles. For example in 
architecture, Wright had taken 12 years from his first break from classicism to 
the first Prairie House (ref. McCarter, 1977: 35) and Palladio’s formative years 
was 12 years (ref. Ackerman, 1966: 31). Briggs description of what happens 
echoes Boden’s ‘conceptual spaces’ in greater detail. What is achieved through 
the shift of mental context according to Briggs, with reference to the ‘inward 
voice that decides’ is that: “The whole movement to evolve that inward voice 
entails linking feedback loops which join talent and vision, with the problem or 
material the creator is focussing on, with insight strategies, and with the 
tradition of the creative field. These interlocking loops, at a certain point 
(indicated in some creators by a ‘crystallising’ moment) interact to form what 
system theorists call a ‘self-organising structure” (Briggs, 2000: 265). 
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The shift of the mental context is a continuous one, evolving from one magnum 
opus to the next. Towards the end anything can happen – the vision may be 
different in the early stages from the late stages. Many things happen during 
the slow shift of the mental context according to Briggs: “Vision evolves, the 
creator evolves, the magnum opus leads to a new magnum opus – otherwise 
the creative life dies. The completion of a work, the acceptance of a work by its 
intended audience, changes in the creator’s personal life, historical changes – 
all have an effect on the further development of the creative enterprise…. 
Anything can happen. The vision may be different in the early stages from the 
later stages” (Briggs, 2000: 268). 
 
 
5. Changing the Mental Context  
 
In simplified worldview, what was described as exemplified by Briggs and also by 
Boden, was heightened experience and building up of mental capital. Both 
acknowledge that innate ability or talent play a part. Real world practice 
suggests that these are incomplete to arrive at the point of innovation. What 
the scholars have offered are merely theoretical positions. Gadamer, for 
instance suggests that, “The truth of experience always implies an orientation 
toward a new experience. That is why a person who is called experienced has 
become so not only through experience but is also open to new experience” 
(Gadamer, 2004: 350). Here, Gadamer infers that a person can be radically 
undogmatic because of the many experiences and knowledge he has drawn 
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from them. From this perspective the dialectic of experiences enable openness 
and invention. 
 
Similar to Boden’s P-creativity and H-creativity, Gadamer suggests that 
historical distance validates innovation, but it is psychological experiences that 
produce innovation. With this comes the importance that he places on 
‘practice’, which he regards as a necessity over ‘method’. Compared to 
practice, method merely creates confusion. Practice could negotiate with things 
that are considered as indeterminate to arrive at the ‘concreteness of the 
case’ with ‘highest of universality’, to guard against ‘technological self-
understanding’, which he associates with method. This is a continuum of 
Bacon’s laboratory method, which leads to knowing by experience and 
observation, as opposed to speculation through logical deduction. This is 
generic in Asian thinking as exemplified by Lin Yutang’s writings (Lin, Y: 1935, 
1937) and also in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: “Thoughts rise to the surface 
slowly, like bubbles. (Sometimes it is as though you could see a thought, an idea, 
as an indistinct point far away in the horizon; and then it often approaches with 
astonishing swiftness)” (Wittgenstein, 1977: 63e). For further amplification, 
refer to Richard Nisbett’s The Geography of Thought (2003). 
 
 
6. Innovation in Context of Practice 
 
With regard to architectural practice, the dominant thinking that has 
emerged from the studies made on contemporary scholars as recorded in the 
APPENDIX and as outlined above is that:  
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Design in architecture emerges out of ordinary thinking and that experience 
serves as the crucial component on which creative thinking operates.  
 
Ordinary thinking involves the following: 
1. Remembering. 
2. Imagining. 
3. Planning. 
4. Deciding. 
 
The general characteristics of ordinary thinking are as follows: 
Our thinking has a structure in the sense that our thoughts follow one from 
another and are related to one from another. 
1. Our thoughts have a past and ordinary thinking depends on our knowledge 
capital. 
2.  Concepts direct ordinary thinking and it is a top-down process. 
3.  Our thoughts are conditioned by the external environment. It could equally be 
said that our ordinary thinking is culturally influenced. 
 
What then does an encouraging environment need to have? (Ref. van Schaik, 
2005: 235): 
 
1. “An enchainment between mentors, beginners and emerging innovators. 
2. A patron who understands the need for formal ritual behaviours of a     
community. 
3. A process of knowledge-capture that ensures that cultural capital is not lost. 
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4. A cockpit for the discourse that feeds the development of three clearly 
different positions or fields within the domain”. 
 
What are the characteristics of architectural innovation? 
 
1. The architecture is novel and has value for both the practitioner and for the 
culture. (Contemporary scholars also qualified that all creative products are 
less than completely novel). 
2. The architecture is unconventional in that it has rejected or modified 
prevailing ideas. (Contemporary scholars also qualified that all creative 
products are incremental advances). 
 
What distinguishes an innovator to that of the ordinary person is as follows 
(see also page 220 of the APPENDIX): 
 
1. The innovator has a developed expertise in problem finding and that the 
process is heuristic (rather than systematic). 
2. There is a period of coaching, incubation and mastery, sometimes known as 
the 10-year rule (or, 12-year rule). It is an extended period of analysis and 
experience. 
3. Having a high degree of self-discipline, the ability to delay gratification, a 
tolerance for ambiguity, and perseverance in the face of frustration and lack 
of success. 
4. Independence of judgment, a high degree of autonomy, an internal locus of 
control, a high level of self-initiated striving of excellence and absence of 
dependence on social approval. 
5. Willingness to take risk. 
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6. Motivation. 
7. Openness. 
 
Costa and McCrae (1985) made distinctions among several different kinds of 
openness, depending on the type of experience that was the focus (ref. 
Weinsberg, 2006: 509): 
 
1. Openness to fantasy: refers to a willingness to explore one’s inner world and 
to let one’s mind wonder. 
2. Openness to aesthetics: refers to an appreciation for artistic expression. 
3. Openness to feelings: involves a willingness to accept one’s emotions, both 
positive and negative. 
4. Openness to actions: refers to willingness to try new activities. 
5. Openness to ideas: is intellectually curious and willingness to consider new 
ideas. 
6. Openness to value: refers to a willingness to examine the fundamental values 
on which one bases one’s life. 
 
 
7. Mindshaping in Practice 
 
In linking practice with research, I would use my own practice to examine the 
remark that has emerged out of this research. That: 
 
 22 
Design in architecture emerges out of ordinary thinking and 
that experience serves as the crucial component on which 
creative thinking operate. 
 
During the course of the PhD, I had to occasionally examine the historical works 
of the practice while attempting to make practical sense of the body of writing – 
particularly the writing that now appears in the APPENDIX. Nearing the end of 
the writing, it gradually appeared that the character of practical work was 
changing in tandem with my own psychological state as well as with the 
prevailing cultural milieu. Some of the changes had to do with my prevailing 
activities outside of practice. Wittgenstein aptly described what seemed to have 
happened when he remarked that: “Thoughts rise to the surface slowly, like 
bubbles. (Sometimes it is as though you could see a thought, an idea, as an 
indistinct point far away in the horizon; and then it often approaches with 
astonishing swiftness)” (Wittgenstein, 1977: 63e). 
 
In capturing the characteristics of the office’s works, I have categorised them 
into the following:  
1. Mistaking Architecture: Search for Singular Statements (1992 -1995). 
2. Search for Significant Form: Merely Game Playing with Light and Shapes 
(1996 – 1999). 
3. Search for Critical Meanings: Phenomenology the Only Offer (1999 – 2004). 
4. Search for Structure of Innovation: Letting the Fly Out of the Fly Bottle (2005 
– present). 
 
 
7.1 Mistaking Architecture: Search for Singular Statements (1992-1995) 
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This was during the early years of the practice, when Malaysia underwent 
massive industrialisation and the country was having a GDP growth rate of over 
10% between 1990 and 1997. It was a time when the construction industry 
was led by governmental ambition, fuelled by the vision and an economic target 
that the country could reach first world status by the year 2020.  
 
At the time the Kuala Lumpur city skyline was filled with tower cranes to the 
point that the Prime Minister remarked in jest that the country ought to adopt a 
new logo, that of the ubiquitous tower crane. It was also a time that the 
industrialised countries were undergoing an economic slow down, and many 
expertise and skills found their way to the country. There were floods of 
migrants seeking work in the country, with blue-collar workers coming mainly 
from Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines and white-collar workers from 
mainly Europe, Australia as well as the Philippines. Malaysia became one of the 
popular destinations for the international architectural carpetbaggers. 
 
It was during this time that a new generation of architectural practices, with 
their own individual identity emerged from a generic kind of corporate 
architecture that dominated the Malaysian architectural field. A handful of 
medium-size practices were already making an impact in the Asian region. Our 
practice was then identified as one of the emerging young practices. In 1995, 
our practice was identified by the Malaysian Institute of Architects as among 
‘The New Generation’ together with 10 other emerging practices in a 
publication that coincided with an exhibition at the Institute. 
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Architectural activities in the country captured the attention of the international 
architectural media. Together with several other Asian practices our work 
appeared in the September 1994 issue of the Architectural Review. The 
project that was featured was the Jerai International Park project which 
remained unbuilt. 
 
Being inclined toward logical deduction, and in the pursuit of the ‘perfect’ grand 
narrative, we were then reducing architecture to the optimal ‘singular 
statement’. It was the quest of the single story line that ‘tells a perfect story’. On 
hindsight it was a mistake as it had taken away the variety of narratives in 
architecture. Architecture was treated as objects rather than experiences and 
form was taking precedence over spatial quality. It was the architecture of the 
spectacle, being thin on meanings. 
 
Jerai International Park was to be the first comprehensive experiment on 
sustainability in the country and one of the first in the world at the time. It was 
the time before worries over global warming became an issue and the time that 
preceded the ‘green building index’. The various components that make up the 
measurement of the ‘green building index’ today, such as rainwater harvesting, 
ways of producing energy for local use, local farming and the production of 
energy crops, low energy transportation and the control of radiant and 
convectional heat were all part of the programme for this development in the 
early 1990s. It was a typically ‘visionary’ and ambitious project, which was also 
to be self-funded – it was to be one of the projects that typified the ambition of 
the country at the time. Due to opposing political interest, the project did not 
materialise but caused political upheaval at the local state level instead. 
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Influenced by Girardet’s The Gaia Atlas of Cities – New Directions for 
Sustainable Urban Living (1992), together with British engineers, we conceived 
the theme of sustainability for the development. The practice was appointed to 
lead a team of designers, scientists and engineers to realise the green ambition 
of the project up to the point when the project was called off. While the master 
plan was conceived by the practice with input of expertise from various parts of 
the world, the intention was to firstly devise a framework with guidelines, and 
then only coordinate and let other designers carry out most of the packages. 
However, the projects which the office had design interest were the main 
stadium and the indoor stadium, which were to be the iconic buildings of the 
project. 
 
Project Description: The Main Stadium at the Jerai International Park 
The main stadium at the Jerai International Park was the flagship of the project 
and it was to exemplify the theme of sustainability. It was to be constructed with 
local materials within the site. The site on which the project sat was a large 
paddy field, which was soggy and flat with deep underlying bedrock.  
 
The outer body of the stadium was to be built up with soil excavated from its 
immediate vicinity, forming a shallow cone, with external circulation formed out 
of a series of spiralling ramps, leading to entrance pods at various levels 
alongside the external surface of the cone. The cavities left behind by the 
excavations would become lakes for recreation around the site. The inner core 
of the stadium was to be an inverted concrete shell. This would become the 
stadium terraces for seating.  
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The stadium would eventually have a capacity of 60,000; however as there was 
no initial need for such a capacity, the stadium would be built up in phases, 
starting with a capacity of 20,000. When the stadium reaches its maximum 
capacity, it would be capped by a concrete roof made up of compression rings, 
and reinforced by teardrop indentations.  
 
The stadium was reduced to a perfect, symmetrically spiralling plan, taking its 
cue from the spiral galaxy. It turned out also that the building was reminiscent 
of a volcano rising out of an exotic tropical setting, although this was not part of 
the design agenda. The shape was entirely formal and metaphorical – it 
anxiously avoided nationalist symbolism, which was popular with public buildings 
in Malaysia at the time. Still it was another symbolic building, an unconscious 
reflection of cultural norms at the time for public buildings. The building stood 
monumentally over a flat landscape, with the visual power that can derive with 
singular statements. 
 
Devoid of phenomenology qualities, and devoid of multiple meanings, and 
without contextual prominence, a building of this kind is regarded as mistaken 
by the practice today. Other than its probable poetic symbolism, there isn’t 
much else to say about a building of singular statements. All other descriptions 
are technical, particularly, its structure of inverted shell and a ring roof, and its 
ecological qualities, which had yet to be tested at the time. 
 
 
7.2 Search for Significant Form: Merely Game Playing With Light and 
Shapes (1996 – 1999) 
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With the calling off of the Jerai International Park project after extensive 
resources were ploughed into the project, a psychological vacuum was created 
in the practice, with a sense of dissatisfaction over the mere production of 
architecture without meaning. There was a psychological need to slow down the 
design process in search for a more fulfilling design agenda, moving away from 
instantaneous design solutions. 
 
Examining past works, and the state of Malaysian architecture at the time, it 
was thought that part of the problem was the regular descent into symbolism 
and reductive forms that resulted in the loss of layers of meanings. The 
practice consciously looked toward an alternative formal approach, and we 
experimented with layered formal meanings.  
 
This was the period when the country’s most iconic buildings were built. Two 
among them were the Petronas Twin Towers and the Kuala International 
Airport, both of which were completed in 1998. Having experienced the failure 
of large projects, the practice avoided large projects and was contented with 
pursuing small projects and, for the first time, the practice began to design 
small houses. It was however a small industrial building (Wisma Laju) that 
gained international prominence, with its appearance in a 1998 issue of the 
Domus magazine. 
 
Project Description: Pat’s House 
However, the building that gained international attention first, and then 
widespread local attention was Pat’s House, which was completed in 1999. 
Pat’s House had specific philosophical, environmental and aesthetic agendas, 
where the function of the house was merely a by-product. It looked to the works 
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of past modernist masters but infused the work in a specific geographical 
locale. It was an experiment in formal inflection, where some of the major 
components of the building, like floor and walls were inflected to draw emotive 
responses on the part of the observer. The idea was that: as the walls turned 
upward and inflected in plan, the tonality of light would likewise change, causing 
a poetic rendition to what was seen. Tactility was avoided to keep the intention 
pure, in that it was to do with light on pure plane and form. Very atypical of 
Malaysian buildings at the time, the spaces were completely flexible and the 
house was considered as one large space when the large sliding panels for 
rooms were opened. The building appeared in several international publications. 
It did not fit in with recognisable Malaysian paradigm at the time and there was 
an obvious lack of refinement as far as tactility went, so when it was presented 
for local architectural awards, it did not receive any. 
 
It was also the time when I expanded my own cultural milieu from local to a 
more global one. This was largely encouraged by William Lim through various 
activities in AA Asia. I also began to establish liaison with several Japanese 
architects of similar age at the time, particular a group led by Tetsuo Furuichi. 
Included in the group were Waro Kishi, Hiroshi Naito, Koh Kitayama, Hisashi 
Hara and Nobuaki Furuya. I organised an exhibition for them at the Institute of 
Architects in 1995 and visited their works in Japan the following year. All the 
while Frank Ling and Pilar Gonzales were in the picture as fellow learners and 
companions. When Furuichi and Furuya invited us as architectural critics at 
Waseda University in 1996, I realised that that there was essentially no 
difference in ability between Japanese students and Malaysian students, or for 
that matter, students from anywhere else. The studio sessions and the critique 
sessions seemed the same as in most other schools. It appeared that it was 
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cultural differences that set practitioners apart when they begin to operate in 
the real world after graduation. I had also just started a school of architecture 
at the University of Malaya in 1994 together with Professor Ghauth Jasmon, 
who was then the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering. I subsequently detached 
myself from the school except for taking studio classes for the later year 
students and occasional lectures. It is now reduced to occasional lectures. 
Although administration work was one of the main repellent for avoiding further 
involvement with the school, the other reason was the psychological need for 
time and freedom to make possible discoveries in architecture and to remain 
connected with practice. 
 
The recognition of Pat’s House in the local field had taken several years 
although the Journal of the Singapore Institute had published it in 1999. With 
the appearance of Pat’s House in publications, and especially, works of those of 
the ‘New Generation’, modern works began to reappear in Malaysia, gradually 
replacing the then popular corporate vernacular. Being deep in formal games 
at the time, and not understanding the wider meanings of formal games, I 
began to be disillusioned with my own limitations, and the limitations of the 
industry to produce works of greater refinement. Patronage for experiments 
were limited at the time, most of which were given to better connected 
practices. Pat’s House exemplified the limits of the practice’s ability at formal 
games and in the end it was just a repeated play of the light and shapes. 
Options began to appear to take off from architectural practice, however, 
instead of taking up the options, I began an academic journey to find out for 
myself what entails critical meanings in architecture – I thought that it was the 
most important thing that architects need to do: That is, find out the critical 
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meanings of their work; otherwise, could there be gratification in the work of 
architecture at all? 
 
 
7.3 Search for Critical Meanings: Phenomenology the Only Offer (2000 – 
2004) 
 
The search for critical meanings in architecture became a work of a Masters 
thesis with the University of Malaya. There were enormous difficulties in the 
beginning as the university was unable to identify a suitable supervisor 
anywhere in the country. The only seemingly suitable supervisor was a 
professor of linguistics at the University of Malaya. This liaison was a complete 
failure as the work was not understood nor appreciated. The thesis was 
embarked without regular supervision, but two drafts were presented at 
different times and passed to several professors, including those from other 
universities. James Steele, who was visiting the university in 2002 together 
with his students from the University of Southern California, provided helpful 
comments.  When the work was finally examined, one of the key examiners was 
a professor of graphic design from another university who had taken a year to 
examine the thesis. 
 
The key inspiration at the early part of the research for the Masters thesis was 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), which resonated with 
my frame of mind at that moment. All the while, I had the impression that the 
ideal process of architectural design was a logical construction, and that there 
was a certainty about the process of architecture, and that the key was to get 
the process right – In other words, state the intentions and then follow the 
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intentions like a logical guide toward the end. Contrary to popular assumptions 
(example, by the positivists) that Tractatus epitomised logical construction; it 
was not the case at all – instead it was more like a logical description of 
essence. Simply put, for example, Wittgenstein asserted that the ‘picture’, 
which we construct in our head, is uncertain – in other words, an illusion, which 
I saw with the assumed merits of architectural aesthetics at the time. 
 
He said that the ‘picture’ had an uncertain nature and inferred that signs of 
communication are uncertain: There is no certainty in appearance, and by 
inference, there is no objective certainty. Ultimately he inferred that true 
meaning could not be constructed in a logical deterministic way. Hence, while 
generic society tended to give linguistic meanings to aesthetic things, including 
works of architecture as the way to quantify experience, there was something 
underlying the aesthetics that was indeterminate, incomprehensible and 
impossible to conceptualise through the mind. However, the early Wittgenstein 
left us with an opening, a path towards subjective reasoning: “What a picture 
represents is its sense” (Wittgenstein, 1921: S 2.221), and: “The agreement 
or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity” 
(Wittgenstein, 1921: S 2.222), and that we cannot rely on objective reality to 
depict truth: “In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we cannot 
compare it with reality” (Wittgenstein, 1921: S 2.223). This inferred in 
architecture that, a picture of a work of architecture represented only the 
sense of it. The appearance of architecture told us neither its truth nor its 
falsity: we cannot depend on appearance. This discovery in Wittgenstein 
launched the Masters thesis in a journey which concluded with his later work, 
Philosophical Investigations (1953). 
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Wittgenstein’s reasoning that truth lies in the senses: “What a picture 
represents is its sense” opens the way to have architectural meanings through 
the senses instead of logical constructions. In practice, the architecture of the 
senses is translated into phenomenological architecture that gives priority to 
visceral experiences rather than logical deduction. It was during the writing of 
the thesis that the practice’s work shifted from intentional simple logical 
aphorisms toward a more complex and layered architecture with meanings laid 
over one another. House X1 was representative of this approach, although the 
games with light and shapes still remained in the design vocabulary. 
 
Project Description: House X1 
The house started as a logical construction: with an imaginary spatial cube 
used as a generator for other forms of the house. The generating cube was the 
courtyard and main entrance was located right at the middle of the house, at 
the centre of a sloping site. The most important room, being the living room 
was also a cube, which mirrored the invisible one next to it. The living room was 
then floated over another spatial cube, which was the undercroft. Another cube, 
being the family room floated over the courtyard. Passageways were then 
constructed to pass by the spatial and formal cube, and the other areas were 
either parked behind the passages or wrapped over or below the series of 
cubes.  
 
While doing the logical constructions, we were mindful about the experiences 
that could come along with each individual space. The central courtyard 
became a tropical courtyard, with the inclusion of a pond and water feature 
emanating sound of water to gently break the silence. The sound and sight of 
water, foliage and sunlight at the courtyard permeate into all the other living 
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spaces and the spaces become connected. Compared to the previous buildings, 
this building has tactility along the walls and floors. When the rays of light wash 
against the walls or floors, the texture come across like the rough canvass of a 
painting.  
 
Its formal expression contains a variety of meanings. The metal struts echo the 
bamboos that are planted along the fringe of the site to provide privacy. The 
more public elevation is fragmented and broken, allowing visual and spatial 
penetration, whereas the utility and private elevation is coherent but closed. 
 
The route through the building contains a variety of experiences, with the route 
to the basement an external one, brushing against the leaves of the bamboo 
trees on the way to the floors below the living room. While the main route is 
straight, at the two ends of the house where the stairs turn, an unexpected 
experience is created. 
 
The building is created from its context. The terrain provides the main 
constraint as the house straddles on the slope completely. The tropical climate 
enables the house to remain open most of the time. The large overhanging 
eaves enable the rain to be kept out while allowing ventilation to pass through. 
When all the doors and windows are shut, the house becomes a natural 
breezeway, with air discharging through a wind funnel at the top. 
 
It could be argued that all the while, games are played in the design of the 
house – whether they are formal semantic games or experiential games. 
However, these are probably more than ‘mere games’ as they seem to have 
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phenomenological qualities about them. The deeper meanings that the house 
might have appear to contain phenomenological qualities. 
 
The house was completed at around the time that the Masters thesis 
concluded.  The studies of Wittgenstein remarks in Philosophical Investigations 
in the end also clarified the philosophy of ‘games’, which earlier was a point of 
grief in architectural practice when I thought that it was no more than ‘merely 
games’, which was not particularly meaningful. Wittgenstein’s revelation was 
simple, in that ‘games’ were simply an inextricable part of the mental makeup. It 
is rule-following and there is something commonsensical and obvious about it. 
He dismissively referred to it as simply ‘psychological compulsion’. At the end of 
the discourse on rule-following, he summarised the solution to the paradox of 
rule-following as follows: “The rule can only seem to me to produce all its 
consequences in advance if I draw them as a matter of course” (Wittgenstein, 
1953: S 238). 
 
Drawing further on Wittgenstein’s ‘games’, there were parts of the conclusion 
of the Masters thesis which were to become a springboard to interrogate 
innovation for this thesis. Wittgenstein’s insight affected the Masters thesis’ 
prognosis between ‘appearances’ and ‘beyond appearances’; between ‘external 
meanings’ and ‘internal (critical) meaning’; between ‘meaning’ and ‘a meaning’…. 
It is more than the change from mere rule-conforming to rule-obeying. The 
isolated innate model of architecture is not viable, as we cannot make sense of 
a rule independently of the matter of course reactions that we share with 
others.  
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In Wittgenstein’s ‘games’, whether the novice performs correctly or not is the 
central issue. Only under social contingent is the action of the novice 
correctable, wherein the ideological community is the arbiter of what is correct. 
This is possible due to the fact that the master’s own inclinations are in 
harmony with the inclinations and judgments of the community of which he is a 
part. His judgments have authority because they are representative of the 
judgment of the community. Therefore what we take as shared skills are 
obvious ways to proceed in the use of rules, paradigm and standards; otherwise 
nothing can function as a rule, paradigm or standard. Therefore there is no 
avoiding the inference that meaning is cultural. 
 
 
7.4 Search for Structure of Innovation: Letting the Fly Out of the Fly Bottle 
(2005 - Present) 
 
It was pointed out that aspects of the conclusion of the Masters are similar to 
Leon van Schaik’s Mastering Architecture (2005). Both touched on 
architectural innovation although Mastering Architecture had a clearer 
rendition of it. The PhD was to interrogate architectural innovation and to clarify 
its constants. The route toward the discoveries is found in the APPENDIX. 
 
Although innovation is understood as having novelty and value, doing the PhD on 
the structure of innovation does not imply that it could be translated into 
practice in a magical manner. If anything, whatever innovation the practice 
could achieve is more like those of P-creative rather than H-creative – in other 
words the innovation is incremental rather than revolutionary. It is still the case 
that the architect works within the limits of cultural and material resources. 
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The case that we have chosen to remain in practice in Malaysia meant that we 
are limited by the culture and the abilities of the land. Let alone the limits 
imposed by technological limitations and the expectations of a still developing 
country.  
 
There also is the complexity of choice. Some of the choices are driven by beliefs, 
especially those that pertain to style. It is the case that there is no absolute 
truth in styles (or ideologies). Historically, as with scientific revolutions, a 
dominant style eventually gets replaced by another, so style is not the issue with 
innovation. The practice has chosen a style that first began with the practice’s 
early involvement with industrial buildings, which usually concerned large spans 
and the use of lightweight and low-budget materials. Due to familiarity with that 
kind of semantics, the architectural idiom continued with other types of 
buildings and eventually to houses. 
 
What has emerged is that the current research has enabled clarity of thought 
in practice and the description of practice activities could likewise be clearer. 
The clarity of thought permeates all of life’s activities rather than that of 
practice alone. As Wittgenstein said: It is like letting the fly out of the fly bottle 
(ref. Wittgenstein, 1953: S 309). Hence the rules of the ‘game’ that the 
practice chooses to play with has not changed. Instead, it is hoped that the 
game can be played better. If the architecture of the practice were to change, it 
would not be due to deliberate action, but due to something that has emerged 
over the course of concentrated practise of particular rules. 
 
Project Description: Amarin Wickham 
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The earlier games with ‘light and shapes’, which were the raison d’etre for 
design for the office in the 1990s, have shifted into games with ‘shadows and 
spaces’ as an intentional approach for architectural design. Form became 
subservient to the effects of space. This was a conscious shift as priority was 
given over to phenomenology from the depthless simulacra. The Amarin 
Wickham project exemplified this shift.  
 
The brief was relatively simple in that we only needed to achieve a specific nett 
saleable area for a condominium project. There was however a height limit of 
four stories for the project and the site was rather small for the saleable area 
to be achieved.  
 
With priority given to spatial experiences, the project was designed from 
sections. The initial design agenda was to have each living unit having multiple 
volumes of spaces over several split floors. Also breezeways were to be created 
for each unit to avoid air-conditioning to the living areas. Landscape was to form 
an inextricable part of the living units, with each one accessible to its own 
garden. Pools and water were weaved into the landscape and connected to the 
units. 
 
As the project progressed, it evolved into a ‘green’ project, with environmental 
concerns superseding other concerns. It then became a priority to be self-
sustaining in energy use, with most of the energy harvested with photo-voltaic 
cells, which were then placed over the roof. Rainwater was harvested for filling 
up the pools and for irrigation purposes. Light wells were introduced into the 
basement car park to avoid artificial lighting during the day. 
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An expressed wish then evolved to have the building achieve a high ranking in 
the ‘green building index’. The main advantage at the time when the figures 
were being worked out for green certification was that the building had already 
faced away from the low angled sun, which was usually the major concern when 
designing for thermal comfort. The breezeways that were initially conceived at 
inception were also helpful when points for certification were to be compiled. 
 
At the time when the Amarin Wickham was designed, the global culture for 
architecture was shifting from architectonic narratives to the green narrative. 
The project was one of those that was caught up with pressing cultural tends. 
The earlier projects like Pat’s House and House X1 were already designed with 
environmental concerns, but the attitude then were regarded as suitable 
response to climate and context. However this time, the green concern was 
seen as a scientific challenge with measurements taken to gauge its level of 
compliance with the ‘green building index’. 
 
As form was secondary to spatial experiences and then to responses to 
climate, energy use and other green issues, the building became understated. 
The building was expressed only as far as the other issues were met. Even then, 
formal semantics could not be avoided, indeed: it was desirable that the building 
had a desirable formal language about it, which was fulfilled by meeting the 
functions. Hence, the building still had a modernist theme about it although style 
was not the issue. 
 
 
8. Mindshaping: Wittgenstein’s Perspective 
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Practice matters above have demonstrated that we are mindshaped by our 
environment and by the culture around which the practice operates. Just as 
design in architecture normally emerges out of ordinary thinking and that 
experience serves as the crucial component upon which creative thinking 
operates, mindshaping is an ordinary event which shape every aspect of human 
lives. It is gradual and not instantaneous, and it is associated with practice and 
training. 
 
Wittgenstein provides explanations for the gradual ordinary process of 
mindshaping: 
 
From the perspective of his later philosophy, for example, Philosophical 
Investigations (1953), as opposed to Tractatus (1921), logical purity is 
diminished whilst normal everydayness is increased, in order to satisfy real 
human needs: unreal problems in the real world thus gives way to the 
rearrangement of what we already know. 
 
In practical terms, we are thus required to be open, to accept for instance that: 
works of architecture belong not to what we are led to think in logical terms, 
but to something else, that belong to the natural world. For example: 
 
- Architectural knowledge or belief does not have a high degree of 
certainty; it is instead a normal construct of things that are taken 
for granted. 
- Natural architectural languages emerge from corporeal 
responses to phenomenon. 
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In the ordinary ways of doing architecture, we are relieved of having to pursue 
unreal, cerebral problems. Therefore, following Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, 
if the descriptions of the ordinary ways of doing things are done with careful 
considerations, there is no inclination to pursue unreal problems. This follows 
Wittgenstein’s remark that, “A six-year old boy knows as much about the 
foundation of mathematics as Bertrand Russell does”, suggesting that 
analytical logic is completely on the wrong track. 
 
In his ‘new’ way of thinking, Wittgenstein suggests that logical purity misleads 
us, as its direct piecemeal applicability is unsuited to the ordinary ways of 
thinking, which has greater formal universality. Natural creativity can only come 
about from a whole system whereas logical purity imposes an abstract picture 
that must drift further and further from reality, whereas in the rearrangement 
way, reality is considered as a whole. 
 
Practitioners often find the dichotomy between theory and practice perplexing. 
Often enough, the practitioner is unappreciative of architectural theory due to 
its lack of relevance in the real world, as Wittgenstein suggests, things are 
done as a matter of course. On the other hand, knowledgeable observers are 
aware that knowledge of theory does not necessarily result in commendable 
architecture or habitat, such as those pointed out by Jane Jacob and Tom 
Wolfe. The twentieth century has witnessed the resistance to architectural 
purity turning into ambivalent talk of ‘humanistic’ and ‘ethical’ architecture, 
whereas pure theory remain part of the making of mathematics and science. 
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Through Wittgenstein’s ‘new way’, architecture is offered a way to cohabit 
theory and practice. Wittgenstein infers that Russell’s analytical way, or for that 
matter, the Tractatus’ way, which are unquestionably followed in mathematics 
and in much of science are wrong because they get further and further from 
practice for the sake of arithmetic and logic. By remarking that, “a six-year old 
boy knows as much about the foundation of arithmetic as Bertrand Russell”, he 
is expressing an idea that there is no real unity between the common sense 
world and mathematics and logic: There is only theoretical unity.  
 
From the perspective of Wittgenstein’s ‘new way’, the pitfalls of the Tractatus’ 
or the analytical ways are as follows: 
 
- It falls apart the public and the theoretical private, each into its 
own different world. 
- It falls apart in theory and practice. 
- It falls apart logical points of the objects and the percipient. 
- It falls apart even the theory and the (say, between mathematics 
and logic). 
- It falls apart the ideal and the logical derivations. The illustration 
for this in architecture is as follows: 
 
If we were to take an ordinary architectural sentence, Concrete is as good as 
bricks and, let us ignore for now, the technical complications of (and between) 
concrete and bricks in terms of their qualities and just treat them as point 
objects. As good as is the symbolic essence of the sentence; we however have 
an insurmountable task of translating the symbolic essence into real relations. If 
we were to translate this in abstract terms, it becomes: 
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  Concrete is as good as bricks as C-GA-B, 
this is unsatisfactory in saying what is meant in ordinary terms. Thus logical 
reduction of ordinary reality to simple abstract logical points, although 
structurally correct, nowhere near represents what is meant. 
 
Logically reductive method does not work for things of the aesthetics: it is 
impossible to find a simple coordinate space for colours, which would otherwise 
be a simple thing in space and time, in ordinary human terms. Wittgenstein 
remarked: “But don’t we at least mean something quite definite when we look at 
a colour and name our colour-impression? It is as if we detached the colour-
impression from the object, like a membrane. (This ought to arouse our 
suspicions.)…. ‘I know how the colour green looks to me’ – surely that makes 
sense! – Certainly: what use of the proposition are you thinking of?” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: SS 276, 278). 
 
Wittgenstein’s remark points to an agreement between thought and reality, 
and in order for thought to reach up to reality, it must be correlated to objects 
of the world. For instance, to establish the colour of an object we point to it to 
say, ‘this is red’ or, ‘this is not red’: what one points at establishes the 
connection between a thought and the object of the world. In other words, the 
percipient decides on what is the case, if the object pointed at serves as the 
sample of the colour (ref. Wittgenstein, 1953: S 429). 
 
Hence, in design, intentionality would lead us to mental states that involve 
systems of ‘belief’ and expectation’. Intentionality in design is therefore 
psychological, even if the word is not used in the normal exposition of 
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Wittgenstein’s thoughts. Rules are then made to underpin the subjectivity of 
interpretations in conditions of psychological state. 
 
If design innovation is the result of insight, it must then have been attained 
through the process of learning; instead of say, through a mystical encounter. 
But first of all, learning is seen as a process of rule following: “The rule can only 
be seen to me to produce all the consequences in advance if I draw them as a 
matter of course” (Wittgenstein, 1953: S 298). 
 
Hence the process of learning is being trained in a technique, and to ensure 
reifying the technique, mastery of the technique is required. “It may now be said: 
‘The way the formula is meant determines which steps are being taken’. What 
is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of 
way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it” (Wittgenstein, 1953: S 
190). 
 
By the process of training and learning, an individual comes to master a 
technique of using signs. There is thus a social angle to this suggestion as there 
is a master and there is a novice who learns from the master.  What it meant 
for architecture is as follows: 
- The architectural novice is dependent on the rules of the 
community of masters. In architectural performance, it is not 
merely the interpretation of the rules, there must also be an 
exercise of the right kind of disposition – acting from one’s own 
competency and understanding. 
- The novice is not required to justify; he needs only to get the rules 
right – the rules provide for the legitimacy. 
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- Questions of knowledge and justification arises only against the 
background (of the ideological community) of which is fully taken 
for granted. This provides the bedrock for practice. 
 
In architecture, the novice’s submission to the community’s rules is both what 
happens in fact and what is required to constitute a form of life, and thus 
provide the context in which knowledge proper can be pursued. In 
Wittgenstein’s perspective, the master speaks for the community, without the 
necessity to justify, as he is autonomous, although the autonomy is grounded in 
the ideological community (ref. Wittgenstein, 1953: SS 196-239). 
 
Therefore in the Wittgenstein’s perspective, where insight is passed from 
master to novice through rules and training, we have no way of understanding 
how insight is acquired except through a process of training: instantaneous 
acquisition of insight, or spontaneous ‘awakening’ is unfeasible. Instead, the 
acquired skilled is patterned activity of the individual within the appropriate 
context. Rule-following is structured social practise of the community – the 
‘ideology community’ as described above, where activity is normative activity. 
 
The individual alone hasn’t the resources for creating the context within which 
the action can be deemed correct or incorrect; it is only in relation to the 
structured social practice of the (ideological) community that the individual can 
engage in normative activity. Therefore, with regard to insight, insight cannot 
take place without a stage setting, without a relevant context. Wittgenstein 
infers that the novice is trainable only within a social (or ideological) context in 
which the ability or competence to being taught in that already mastered by the 
teacher. When learning occurs, it involves norms and stage setting. 
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It follows that it is necessary to have the system of background beliefs, actions 
and competencies, the complex pattern for the normative practise of 
architecture forms part of the culture, and understood within the culture. It is 
physically necessary for the culture to provide for the actual training and 
disciplining of the novice without which the novice simply would not, as a matter 
of fact be able to continue. Ostensive training is the causal ground for the 
development of knowledge capital necessary for the mastery of any genuine 
normative practice. 
 
Rule-following infers regularity over time, and the novice behaves like the 
master in thought and in action as part of the pattern.  A single instance of 
following a rule is merely a superficial resemblance. In architecture, the reality 
of rules requires that they be part of actual practices. Rules that have never 
been acted upon can only be the exception, and their intelligibility turns on 
assimilating them to rules that are part of actual practice. The collective 
following of rules is the cultural practice. 
 
Solitary practices are cultural practices in that the context of regularity and 
agreement must be provided by a community: that is by a group of people 
acting, judging and behaving in harmony. They owe their identity to this shared 
background even though an individual may carry them out at a time – hence, 
without conformity to a group at bedrock level, normative is impossible. 
 
From the Wittgenstein perspective, there is something commonsensical and 
obvious about rule-following: he dismissively refers to this as ‘psychological 
compulsion’: “For we might also be inclined to express ourselves like this. We 
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are at least under a psychological, not a logical compulsion” (Wittgenstein, 
1953: S 140). At the end of the discourse on rule-following, Wittgenstein 
summarised as follows: “The rule can only seem to me to produce all its 
consequences in advance if I draw them as a matter of course” (Wittgenstein 
1953: S 238).  
 
Hence, from the Wittgenstein’s perspective, it can be deduced that:  
1. Insight is learned and is not innate, nor is it mystical.  
2. In architecture, it is developed out of agreement within a community of 
shared ideology. It infers that meaning is legitimised within a social and 
cultural context and not something that is known in isolation. Architectural 
training into practice is the means by which the individual is brought into the 
ideological community: the training is as much a matter of testing (judgment) 
as it is teaching. There is no matter of fact as to what is learnt, as this is 
dependent on the master-novice relationship: this is due to the absence of 
objective process of testing the effects of teaching, as there is no fact of the 
matter as to what is learned. As an extension, the novice cannot know what 
he has mastered independently of his context, especially with respect to 
bedrock practices where is no criterion of use and no justification 
independent of what practitioners find obvious.  
3. Evolving from this, although innovations are regarded to be above rule-
obeying, they are still governed by practice patterns.  
4. Hence, what the innovator does is to construct new rules within the practice 
patterns that are recognised by the ideological community, which is the 
architectural field.  
5. Architectural innovation is still a learning; not something innate. 
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In the act of mindshaping, to first obtain mastery, and then become an 
innovator, the novice undergo the following inner processes: 
1. The training is the causal trigger for innate developing cognitive 
competencies and rules. 
2. The training provides evidential feedback to the novice necessary for 
inductive extrapolating of rules. 
3. The novice has all the requisite cognitive abilities and background knowledge 
necessary to construct the set of rules used by the master. 
4. The novice thus obtains mastery.  
5. He then sharpens the same cognitive abilities and expands the background 
knowledge to evolve a new set of rules not previously used by the master. 
 
In the Wittgenstein’s perspective, innovation is a paradox because: 
1. He sets himself away from the contingencies of social practice, away from 
prevailing culture.  
2. The isolated model seems not viable, as according to the Wittgenstein’s 
perspective, we cannot make sense of a rule independently of the matter of 
course reactions that we share with others.  
3. Only under social contingent is the action of the novice correctable, wherein 
the ideological community is the arbiter of what is correct. This is possible 
due to the fact that the master’s own inclinations are in harmony with the 
inclinations and judgments of the community of which he is a part. His 
judgments have authority because they are representative of the judgment 
of the community.  
4. Therefore what we take as shared skills are obvious ways to proceed in the 
use of rules, paradigm and standards; otherwise nothing can function as a 
rule, paradigm or standard. 
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It follows that because the ideological community of architecture is socially 
embedded, the innovator is not able to set himself away from the field. The new 
set of rules that the innovator contends with is merely techniques. These 
techniques are socially engendered and sustained. It is a mistake of classical 
psychologism, which takes architecture to be empirical propositions. 
Wittgenstein argues that these propositions look like they are fact-stating. This 
is what has led scholars to treat them as either metaphysical or empirical 
generalisations. They are neither. Their necessity resides in the fact that they 
are normative propositions. Their normative functioning lies in the background 
techniques and word pictures, which create logical space for our judgments, 
and actions concerning what are obviously the same and what must be so. 
 
The ‘techniques’ that is spoken about above is acquired through the shaping of 
the mind. As the techniques are socially engendered and sustained, they are 
like propositions in Wittgenstein’s language games, which are acquisitions of 
the relevant background and their associated word pictures through 
concentrated training. It is through the acquisition of the bedrock of practices 
that the novice grasps the obvious and the necessary. It is the expectant 
standard that first shapes the mind of the novice where he had been 
mindshaped to view things in a certain way. It is also gradual mindshaping, in 
many small acts and adjustments that take him toward the threshold of 
innovation. 
 
 
9. Shaping the External Context 
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Following the Wittgenstein’s perspective, and Boden’s P-creativity, the 
innovator’s development occurs in myriads of small acts, adjustments, insights 
and shiftings of perspective. In other words, the mind is shaped in numerous 
directions before arriving at the state when it is crystallised: it is a slow process 
by which the innovator constructs the mental circumstances of his own insight 
– the 10-year or, 12-year rule. Although Wittgenstein gives the normative 
background to the mental process, that is culturally shaped, each creator’s 
development is unique and unpredictable. The person evolves a special point of 
view within which to view a problem. 
 
Building that point of view is mindshaping the amorphous inner vision to unite 
the internal context with the external context – that outward field and the 
audience. Usually, as inferred in Wittgenstein’s remarks, an external context 
does not exist to accept things that are completely novel. The innovator may 
have to wait for the context to evolve to accept the novel work, or the context 
may never exist at all, or he creates the context, all of which are time 
determined: Generally a long time is required before the creator’s context shifts 
enough for the magnum opus to be accepted. 
 
The external context is changed by first changing external minds. Practitioners 
rarely wield theories when offering their ideas to the external world. Tipping 
points for acceptance of ideas occur when fellow practitioners alter their 
practices and when audiences alter their taste. We see this time again in the 
architectural field when an innovator is adopted, usually after a long period of 
activity in the field. 
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In each change of architectural taste, which usually manifests themselves as 
architectural movements, a few individuals stand out as having ushered in the 
movements. Boden identifies them as H-creative individuals, after a period of 
being P-creative. We have seen them in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
classicism, in nineteenth century romanticism, in the early twentieth century 
modernism and the late twentieth century postmodern deconstruction. 
 
When it comes to these H-creative practitioners, they rarely describe their 
ideas in words, as it is not in the nature of practice to do so. The practitioners’ 
media of expression are the materials of construction, their formal and spatial 
intelligence and, their skills at arranging these things both mentally and 
externally. Those who understand the nature of their media or symbolic 
systems – the forms of expression, and appreciate the breakthroughs that 
these innovators have fashioned, apprehend their visions in books and 
publications. 
 
How do the visionaries change the external mindsets, and hence the external 
context? The practitioners do so by practising as a matter of course in their 
practice, and usually not by making claims or propositions and in architectural 
practice, they usually do not have the resources to theorise. The shift occur in 
practice rather than in theory in three ways: 
 
1.  Expand the external acceptance. They firstly shape the external context by 
expanding the external acceptance of what is possible in architectural 
expressions. This is seen time and again in the births of new architectural 
movements. The P-creative individuals develop new skills over a period of 
concentrated practice and call on the audiences to develop a 
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complementary ensemble of perceptual skills. This usually coincides with 
equivalent movements in other forms of art: the classical period in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries coincided with similar movements in 
other representational arts, and so did the nineteenth century romantic 
period and the modern movement in the early twentieth century, and it is the 
same now in the postmodern period. 
 
2.  Help define spirit of the era. This brings the second point that H-creative 
individuals help to define the spirit of an era that awaits the emergence of 
the representational arts and architecture to represent the era. In this case, 
the external environment first shapes the minds of the creators, who then 
redefine and reshape the environment, encrusting a new paradigm. The 
problem is of course; the works of the H-creative individuals become iconised 
as the correct model to follow. These models then become paradigmatic 
establishments that become obstacles for future innovations. 
 
3. Enchainment. The third way that changes the external context is by 
enchainment with other fields to create novelty within the ideological 
community. The themes from other forms of artistic expressions are often 
used, particularly from the fields of painting and sculpture: most of the time, 
they are intersubjective in that they influence one another. However 
architecture is also influenced by advancement in engineering, and often, the 
boundary between architecture and engineering is indistinguishable. Today, 
the electronic media and stage designs are additional fields that influence a 
new wave of depthless simulacra that includes architecture.  
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There are three levels at which the external context are shaped by the H-
creativity individuals: 
 
1. Redescription. Where the innovator is redescribing accepted norms with his 
innovation: he is rearranging conventional representations. The architectural 
innovator does this as a habit: he continually experiments with the media of 
his expressions.  
 
2. Resonate. To change external minds, he needs to resonate with an informed 
audience, and then with the larger audience. It is thus essential that the 
innovator first convince a select group, where, in architecture it is most likely 
the critic. 
 
3. Overcoming resistance. By convention, cultures are normally resistant to 
change – the reason for the presence of cultures in the first place. Unlike 
scientific or engineering advancement, architectural novelties are not 
quantifiable necessities, therefore, resistance are harder to break. The 
architectural innovator who aspires to break into popular acceptance must 
neutralise the resistance. He must firstly be able to undermine the counter-
stories that are offered in opposition. Secondly, he has to convince the 
audience about the value of the new work, which usually is a subjective 
matter. 
 
 
10. Conclusion 
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Architectural innovation is a culturally embedded mindshaped belief, as the 
fundamental principles of architecture have remained unchanged since its 
beginnings. Architectural innovation is a game of rearrangement of these 
fundamental principles. As Vitruvius had stated, architectural invention is 
merely the discovery of arrangement of fundamental principles (ref. Vitruvius, 
C1 B.C.: 13). Unknowingly, Wittgenstein carried Vitruvius remark to the 
twentieth century. 
 
What is culturally determined as innovation in architecture is time-determined 
that has no measurable value to society – its value is artistic, which either is to 
advance good taste, or to offer an alternative to the prevailing taste. Where 
there is tangible value to architectural advancement, it always is accompanied 
by technological advancement; however having tangible value does not 
necessarily equate with good architecture. ‘Good’ architecture must at least 
have a sense of proportion and executed with spatial intelligence. Other 
attributes like tactility, poetics, phenomenology and meaning contribute to the 
quality of the architecture. In innovation, there must however be novelty, but not 
necessarily accompanied by quantifiable value. It is usually innovation for its own 
sake and it is by persuasion that society is brought to the view of the innovator.  
 
True, measurable innovation therefore remains with science. Innovations in the 
arts and in architecture are fundamentally rearrangement of fundamental 
principles. In the replacement of prevailing architectural paradigm it usually 
involves the change of taste, culturally. Most of the shifts are incremental, 
which is P-creative; H-creative architecture must always be a collective, with 
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several players. H-creative shifts have mass and momentum, and it is 
intersubjective, resulting in the involvement of the other arts.  
 
Unlike the sciences, H-creative shift in architectural innovation is never an 
individual act. It must come from at least a section of the ideological community, 
which has built up the shared value over a period of time. The external 
community needs to be persuaded by this shift and this requires mindshaping 
of the external community to accept the shift.  
 
Historical evidence from the past points to architectural innovations being a 
part of the spirit of an era rather than being the force that drives the era. 
Usually, there is no clear distinction as to which artistic domain takes the lead in 
reflecting the spirit of an era. During the renaissance, the romantic and the 
modern periods, the visual arts seemed to have influenced architecture. In 
China, architecture had all the while been led by literature, poetry and the 
environment, and until recently, Chinese architecture, like its calligraphy were 
figurative representation.  
 
Changes in the architectural field happen at practice. Where on the uncommon 
occasion where it was driven by theory, as in the case with Postmodern 
architecture as purveyed by Jencks, that version of Postmodern architecture 
was short-lived. Whereas, culturally driven postmodernism as inferred by 
Jameson is still with us today. 
 
By cultural acceptance there continues to be a place for architectural 
innovations as history continues to accommodate the wax and wane of 
successions of architectural styles. It is nearly always the case that 
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architectural innovations are externally driven, where the environment of their 
practices influences the P-creative architects. The jump from P-creativity to H-
creativity happens at tipping points when there are enough shared narratives to 
convince the external culture of the appropriateness of the narratives to the 
spirit of the period. 
 
If H-creative innovation is culturally determined, why then innovate at all? -  As 
this infers that a new spirit of the arts will in any event emerge with the spirit of 
the time. Collins suggests that it is for emotional energy, and to become the 
emblem of the group that creativity is pursued (ref. Collins, 2004; APPENDIX: 
43). However, it could also be said that innovation in the arts and architecture 
is the natural exercise of the human imagination. Particularly, today, which is 
witnessing the intensification of architectural innovation, with the tools of 
collaboration accessible to anyone. More architects now have the power to 
create their own novel contents and globalise them. 
 
When we used to live under centralised structures, which were more vertically 
organised, innovation was more problematic and happened only occasionally. 
History had demonstrated that where the mechanisms of the establishment 
were loosened, creativity flourished, as witnessed in post-reformation Europe, 
and particularly when enchainment intensified. When hierarchy becomes 
flattened in many parts of the world today, innovation increases exponentially. 
With so much novelty going on in architecture today, the question often posed 
is whether the novel architecture is ‘ethical’ – in other words, whether the 
architecture is meaningful. 
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It could be argued that intensity of innovation is reflective of cultures that have a 
sense of well-being, rich in collaboration, and where the general populace is 
emboldened, where power works from the bottom up. China for example, 
reflected intellectual stagnation for nearly 600 hundred years, when it began to 
become insular by fiat (beginning with reign of Emperor Hongxi in 1424) and 
lost its technological lead to the other nations, and later became decrepit and 
lost its sovereignty. The same could be said of the Islamic civilisation when 
conservatism and dogma became the practice by fiat in the twelfth century, 
influenced by a movement spearheaded by al-Ghazali, which is equivalent to the 
modern day Taliban (ref. Atalay, 2006: 35).  
 
The recent example in Malaysia is the naïve planning of Putrajaya, which was 
planned by decree from an authoritative administration, based on classical and 
unimaginative precepts. After more than ten years of construction, it remains 
sterile and an undesirable place to live. In fact, the city is now poorly maintained 
and some of the sheen is beginning to crumble. In contrast, Kuala Lumpur, 
which is an accidental city, has built up many layers of meanings and life at the 
time when Putrajaya was under construction and continues to become more 
interesting and diversified. Kuala Lumpur still houses the most creative local 
entities whereas Putrajaya as yet houses none. 
 
A spirit of innovation is still essential in architecture and in the arts, although as 
Vitruvius had said, invention in architecture is merely the arrangement of the 
same fundamental principles, as the picture is larger than that of the field. 
Today, it is in part a process of flattening, to empower the bottom of the 
pyramid, and to raise the hope of change, so that lives in the bigger picture is 
progressive.   
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Those who are autocratic, and without imagination themselves are 
retrospective in their visions. This is seen in all the regressive and oppressive 
regimes – whether in governments, ideologies or units of cultural 
establishments. Pride of history is often the excuse used to suppress progress. 
One of the dark periods of Malaysian architecture saw the reversion to 
simplistic symbolism in the mid-1980s where under authoritative decree and 
ethnic pride, new public buildings were to use variations of the Malay roof to 
symbolise ‘national identity’, and in Putrajaya, ‘Islamic symbols’ in whatever 
form, was a requirement of planning approval. The past that is being mined is 
usually an adorned and imagined one, which was made to seem more ideal 
than it truly was. 
 
The minds of the ideological community are shaped by three kinds of forces. 
The first of which is cultural dogma, which are handed down by the higher 
authorities. These are the stories and myths – the collective narratives fed 
orally, visually or through literature. The other is the context in which the 
individuals grow up in, which makes a more lasting impression in the minds. The 
third is the time-determined practice, or everyday doing, which shapes the mind 
that, can supersede the early impressions.  
 
What then distinguishes the innovator from ordinary practise within the 
ideological community, as clearly, the ideological community sets a 
predetermined range of options within its culture? The external culture also 
frames how the action is described, for example, very often in Singapore and 
Malaysia; architecture is seen only in economic terms, described to ensure 
economic gain and preventing loss. Ordinary practice also has the tendency to 
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lull into complacency, content with everyday ‘toolmaking’ and cooperation. Just 
as the minds are shaped by the external world, the external world can delude 
the minds that it houses. The instinct is to fall back onto the paths of least 
resistance in dealing with fellow players in the community and make 
relationships bearable. This coaxes the novice into passive compliance, whereas 
the route to innovation contains an element of risk to the status quo. 
 
Innovations usually shock the status quo and seem at first to threaten social 
cohesion. Following Wittgenstein, where: “the limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world” (ref. Wittgenstein, 1921: S 5.6), it will be through symbols 
and metaphors that we could transcend our cognitive limitations. 
Wittgenstein’s remark suggests that language indicate the way the mind works 
and the way it is limited. The first way to transcend the limitation is through 
conceptual metaphors. As innovation in architecture has only to do with the 
rearrangement of fundamental principles, innovators co-opt oppositional forces 
to test the limits of the fundamental principles – being the rules by which the 
ideological community follow. Innovators have in their collection, more 
articulated metaphors to make more complex combinations of thoughts. The 
metaphors are not just literary tropes but can capture deep equivalences in 
causal mental networks that are used to build problems and provide novel 
solutions. 
 
The combinatory power of language is an indicator of the combinatory power of 
architectural rearrangement. The ultimate ability of this cognitive power is to 
have infinite use of infinite options with infinite means. As language is the skillful 
combination and arrangement of phrases and sentences, architecture is 
likewise the skillful arrangement of forms and spaces, the tools are the 
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materials of varying tactility and these days, also of technology. The combinatory 
apparatus of grammar apply to both language and architecture – the first of 
which is logocentric and the other visiocentric. Following Wittgenstein, the 
combinatorial apparatus of grammar mirrors the combinatorial power of 
thought; each expression can manifest a potentially complex idea. 
 
Even though the inventory of concepts and relations are finite, the combinatorial 
power could entertain an explosion of unlimited ideas through the use of 
metaphors. In the visual world as in the linguistic world, new metaphors are 
continually being discovered and these are developed into newer and more 
complex metaphors and analogies. By concentrated practice, the innovator 
develops a sense of sifting out the best match between the relations of 
concepts and metaphors. Intuition is developed by which the innovator prunes 
away the mediocre features to focus on the valuable ones. 
 
There isn’t a mechanical way to arrive at innovation – it can only be done 
through concentrated practice. A single mind alone, without enchainment is 
limited in experience and ingenuity, and even the ideological community on its 
own, without the enchainment with other domains is inadequite. The point is to 
increase the fecundity that enriches the combinatorial skills. 
 
Seeing the way that ideas do not flourish under authoritative and vertical 
regimes, the evaluation of ideas must be wrenched away from the staid 
institutions of polically vested authority. Instead, everything to do with ideas 
must be open to debate, critique, question, and to peer review. The goal of 
concentrated practice is to make up for the shortcomings of pure instincts – 
not to implant abstract imperatives on vacant minds, but by developing mental 
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models that can become standard equipment for calling upon to arrive at ways 
of assembling metaphors into more and more sophisticated combinations. 
 
A circuit map adapted from Weisberg’s adaptation of Csikszentmihalyi’s map 
demonstrates how the combinations is explicable (ref. Notes: 1: Systems View 
of Creativity/ Innovation): It provides a diagrammatic analogy to the ways in 
which the combinatory play of symbols and metaphor work themselves out 
between the external environment and the individual’s mind. To elucidate this, 
take for example the Wickham Apartments, which were conceived during the 
period of current research. The everyday process and concerns in the design of 
the apartments are already sketched out in pages 37 and 38; however 
Csikszentmihalyi’s map is useful to explain the mental constructs:  
  
 
Genes                     Field                                 Social  
              3. Produces     
           Variances  
           And Change 
                 1. Retains Selected 
                         Variances 
Individual 
        2. Transmits  
           Structured  
           Information       Symbol                    Culture  
           And Actions      System 
Experience 
 
1. Retains Selected Variances: 
Whilst the limits of language frames the mental limits, language also provides 
the structure through which thoughts and ideas travel from the external 
environment to the mental system to become the tools for creative actions. As 
expressed in language structures, this is done through the combinatory play of 
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symbols. Likewise in architecture, the mental actions of combining and 
arranging symbols are visiocentric (whereas it is logocentric in literature) using 
imagination. For example, since 2005, at the time when the seed the current 
research was first planted, it was noticed that Kuala Lumpur had transformed 
into a city of many layers, mostly by accident over time, without intentive action 
from the government authorities. This phenomenon was found to be 
fascinating: more so when compared with the staid and unappealing contrived 
environment of the new city of Putrajaya. See Notes: ‘7. Comparative Crusts’ for 
visual comparison. The narrative for Kuala Lumpur as a layered city is lodged in 
the conclusion of the APPENDIX (10.28). What had happened, following 
Csikszentmihalyi’s map is, the observer had retained selected variances from 
the field and converted the observation into symbols and metaphors as 
expressed in the narrative. The indigenous layered cake was adopted as 
overriding metaphor.  
 
2. Transmits Structured Information and Actions 
Through mental acts, the symbol system is converted into structured 
information and actions and applied to architecture. It is not a mechanical 
action; but a heuristic one, built upon one mental discovery over another in 
concert with concentrated acts of penning the knowledge capital into paper and 
then ultimately into recognisable works of architecture through the normal 
process of practice. During the period of designing the Wickham Apartments, 
post-structuralist ideas were prevalent in philosophy and in popular science, 
where absolute ideals were replaced by fluid networks, webs, matrices and 
continuous change, and where cities were regarded as dynamic complex 
adaptive systems. The mind was shaped by research and observation and the 
resulting layered, matrix-like and woven architecture of the Wickham 
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Apartments merely echoed the way the mind was shaped by external 
circumstances. This attitude in architecture is not at all unique as it is observed 
that several architects are doing similar work, no doubt mindshaped by the 
similar external circumstances.  
 
3. Produces Variances and Change 
Although mindshaped by similar external circumstances, every individual 
produces variances in his/her work and the completed work will contribute to 
enriching the architectural field. Judgment will be made on the contribution the 
work makes, and the intellectual community decides on the merit of the work to 
either reject, ignore or mythicise it. The work is enchained to the social system, 
becoming a phenomenon that reaches beyond architecture in that it has 
become part of the social psyche as well as being a contribution to habitation 
and an impact on the local economy. It locks into the matrices of mental maps 
and becomes a reference for the next purveyor of similar building type. The 
work may add to the knowledge capital of the next architect doing similar work, 
who would convert it into his own symbolic grammar and through the looping 
circuit, contribute his work back to the field, and so, the architectural field is 
enriched and Boden’s incremental P-creativity is played out to the point when 
rare H-creativity may possibly arrive at tipping point.  
 
The Wickham Apartments sits comfortably in the context of Kuala Lumpur in 
the early twenty-first century, and is an analogy of the thick crust of time that 
makes contemporary Kuala Lumpur. Unsurprisingly, nothing similar is yet found 
in Putrajaya, being an instant city, and a collection of methodical insertions of 
different well-worn building types in carefully prescribed zones and segments 
(‘precincts’) – a typically over-planned city with no surprises. It is likely that 
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something like the Wickham Apartments would appear alien in the over-
planned and pristine environment: as the Putrajaya environment suggests a 
different narrative, one that is likely to be monumental and assertive, situated 
on a thin crust, devoid of layering either of time or, of mixed use. 
 
For example, at the core of the city, which is the administrative spine planned 
along a grand axis of several miles, the crust is so thinly spread that that there 
is no means at all of walking from one building block to another, without 
exposure to the extremities of weather. Placed right in the middle of the axis, 
the overly broad boulevard exists merely to emphasise the unimaginative plan 
that speaks of nothing else but of overt display of political power. The picture 
shown in Notes: 7 was taken near to mid-day on a bright Sunday morning, and 
there was not a single pedestrian in sight throughout the whole length of 
boulevard of several miles. This crust is as flat and tasteless as a pancake 
without condiments. There isn’t anywhere along the spine that allows for 
spontaneous creativity, but instead, this is precisely the kind of place that is 
hostile to the creative mind. Moreover, how could any of the architecture along 
the spine be considered as worthy (no matter the quality of space and form-
making) if the architecture contributes nothing to the street nor enhance the 
human environment nor provide phenomenological experience?  
 
Speculating Future Practice: 
Through reasoned arguments, and the way this research has built itself, future 
practice is not something that is predictable as changing environment and 
circumstances continuously shape the practitioner’s mind. However, research 
suggests that it is possible to curate one’s external environment so that the 
propensity to innovate becomes a part of everyday thinking and doing, even 
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becoming a conscious, intense ritual, as alluded by Collins (ref. Collins, 2004: 
42). Notwithstanding the prescriptions for innovation as speculated and 
suggested in this research, the trait for future practice is traceable to the ways 
in which the propensity to form-making in the earlier years has given way to the 
creation of complex spaces, with each period of change being the result of 
changing external circumstances and external activities that had shaped the 
practitioner’s mind. The narratives for the works had also become more 
complex, from ‘singular statements’ to architecture that carried richer 
descriptions. Rich architectural description naturally extends time, and with the 
discovery that Kuala Lumpur encrusts thick time, the next phase of practice 
could possibly be about the ways time could be extended in architecture. This is 
not the same as current thinking about ‘slow architecture’ (having to do with 
tactility), but one that has to do with experiential variances through moments in 
a building. Current works already contain the beginnings of this. This 
practitioner now has to curate his external environment to enable the 
transformation to occur. Is it possible to have an architecture that speaks 
clearly just of time? – That perhaps is the speculative end to this practitioner’s 
journey. 
 
11. Epilogue: Speculation On Architecture Of Thick Time 
 
We know time only through our relationship with external phenomena, such as 
the movement of the sun over a day, the wax and wane of the moon over a 
month and the seasons that identify the year, and astronomical observations 
that give us millennia cycles. Our mental topography is built around these 
observations, in concert with the physical geography and climate, and the 
richness of the habitat.  
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Our habitat is made up layering of experiences of various thicknesses, from 
thick to thin. Cities that are built heuristically over time, dense with variety and 
variances of physical structures and continuous changes, with a history of 
tragedy as well as exuberant celebrations, economic flux and open to plural 
experiences are considered as thick crusts of many layers and are likely to be 
centres of creativity. The thinnest experiential crusts are the habitats that are 
instantaneous, inflexible, homogeneous, intolerant of change and resistant to 
new ideas. Slicing our mental topography in a frozen moment of time tells us 
whether the slice is a thick or a thin one.  
 
The psychology is made up of many complex moments, the thicker the slice; the 
greater is the propensity toward cultural intelligence. This kind of intelligence is 
suggested by the ways in which the moments are apprehended, expanded and 
managed. It is a service to the user if the practitioner is able to enrich the 
experiences of the user, broaden the everyday experiential vocabulary and 
connect the user to open systems, and to enable change, and hence prompt 
the user towards this ascendency.  
 
It is however possible for the user to curate his/her environment to achieve a 
habitat of thick slice without resorting to having to live in an encouraging 
environment: From Briggs’ perspective, much of this thick slice could be just 
imagining: as with the case of Virginia Woof’s narrative of her experiences of St. 
Ives, which was like “a bowl that one fills and fills and fills – then my bowl without 
a doubt stands upon this memory” (Appendix 7.16). This kind of imagination too 
is generated by real experiences, which is the point of creating the crust of 
experiences in architecture.  
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As time is told by light in the moment of a day, or the darkness of a night, the 
internal of the architecture has to capture the narrative of the external 
environment and that the apprehension of the moment is a managed one, not 
by accident but by design. Are there also places in the architecture that can 
become a refuge from the tyranny of time? This too is a point of consideration 
for an architecture of time.  
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Notes             
 
 
1. Systems View of Creativity/Innovation 
 
 
The map below shows the interrelations of the three systems that jointly determine the 
occurrence of a creative/innovative idea, object or action. The individual takes some 
information provided by the culture and transforms it, and if the change is deemed 
valuable by society, it will be included in the domain (Symbol System), thus providing a 
new starting point for the next generation of creators/innovators. The actions of all 
three systems are necessary for creativity/innovation to occur. The map is an 
adaptation of Weisberg’s adaptation of Csikszentmihalyi’s map (ref. Weisberg, 2006: 
62). 
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2. Notes on the Innovator: 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
– Most interactions are between minds; not between bodies. 
 
– We only know about the world through our brains. 
 
 
 Innovator 
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– Our brains can create a false mental world. 
 
– The brain actively creates pictures of the world. 
 
– Bayne’s Probability Equation: 
 
P (A/X) = BELIEF 
 
Given some phenomenon (A) that we want to know about, and an observation 
(X) that is evidence relating to A, Bayne’s Equation tells us how much we should 
update our knowledge of A, given the new evidence X. 
 
When I am absolutely certain about something (like concrete is made up of 
sand, cement aggregate), the probability is 1. This can be expressed as an 
equation thus: [P (concrete make-up) = 1]. 
 
Or the probability is zero if I am confident that something will never happen: [P 
(concrete is turning into wood) = 0]. 
 
Something lying between 0 and 1: [P (the concrete requires reinforcement) = 
0.5]. 
 
The brain behaves like Baynesian observer – Weak evidence is ignored; strong 
evidence is emphasised (ref. Frith, 2007: 120-1). 
 
 
 
   
 
 
–  
 
– The brain discovers what is out there in the world by constructing models of 
that world. These models are not arbitrary. They are adjusted to give the best 
possible predictions of our sensations as we act upon the world. But we are not 
aware of this complex mechanism.  
 
– The innovator’s mind is particularly skilled at combining and rearranging the 
symbols, including those provided by the external culture to produce new forms, 
which are fed back into the field. 
 
 
 
3. Notes on the Field 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Experience 
 
 
  
      Field 
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– By making models of the minds of others – enter into a shared mental world. 
 
– A single mind alone, without enchainment is limited in experience and ingenuity. 
 
 
– The point is to increase fecundity that enriches the combinatory skills.  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
– Prejudice is crucial for the brain to function. 
 
 
 
4. Symbol System 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
– Language and culture – sharing mental models. 
 
– In practice, the architect puts aside, and reorganise chunks of symbols, some of 
which he uses as symbols in practice and others, he stores for a long time. 
 
– In the act of design, the architect moves the symbols about, cross-referencing 
first with one, and then another and mentally shape the subject into one form 
or another. 
 
– Language is the resource by which we re-describe our thoughts in a format we 
use for all kinds of mental operations and manipulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
– People’s behaviour controlled by belief even if beliefs are false. 
 
– Beliefs are models of the world. 
 
 
 
5. Notes on the Circuit Loops 
 
 
Social System 
 
 
  Symbol System 
 
 
 
  Culture 
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– The cycle of activity that runs from brain through body and world and back 
again actually constitutes cognition. The mind, on this account, is both an 
internal mechanism as well as externally shaped. 
 
– Fundamentally, minds are shaped by our external environment, where 
information are converted into symbols through language ability and, through 
our combinatory mental power, these symbols are rearranged into 
psychological creativity. 
 
– Architectural innovation is merely the product of a sustained and iterated 
sequence of interactions between sequence of interactions between the mind 
and a variety of external symbols. Much of the activity involves loops and circuits 
that run between the brain and the local environment. 
 
– Following Wittgenstein, the combinatory apparatus of grammar mirrors the 
combinatory power of thought; each expression can manifest a potentially 
complex idea. 
 
– By concentrated practice, the innovator develops a sense of sifting out the best 
match between the relations of concepts and metaphors. 
 
 
 
6. Visuals for Biography in Mindshaping in Practice: 
 
 
      -  Mistaking Architecture: Search for Singular Statements (1992-1995)        
     
 
      -  Search for Significant Form: Merely Game Playing With Light and Shapes  
                  (1996-1999)       
    
      -  Search for Critical Meanings: Phenomenology the Only Offer  
           (2000-2004)        
 
      -  Search for the Structure of Innovation: Letting the Fly Out of the Fly Bottle 
                   (2005-Present)      
 
 
 
7.  Comparative Crusts: Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya: 
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A Thick Crust 
 
 
 
Kuala Lumpur: 
Bukit Bintang, one of several centres of Kuala Lumpur had undergone unfettered 
change prompted by changing market requirements and shifting tastes. The landscape 
morph ceaselessly and is said to transform itself every five years. The first urban 
typologies of the area were double-story Chinese shophouses, a school, and one of the 
city’s first purpose designed hotel.. 
 
 
 
A Thin Crust 
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Putrajaya: 
The new instant city of Putrajaya, anchored by a grand axis, which is its administrative 
spine, which lies forlorn and appears menacing between working hours. At the end of 
the grand axis is the Prime Minister’s department. Lining the axis are various 
ministries and statutory departments. Around the grand axis are precincts with 
distinct purposes, including areas of residences. Architecture here has to reflect some 
form of ‘Islamic’ architecture to obtain approval, which interpretation is loose, subject 
to negotiation and whims of the planning authority. 
 73 
Selected Bibliography 
 
Ackerman, J.S. (1966). Palladio, London: Penguin 
 
Atalay, B. (2006). Math and the Mona Lisa, New York: Harper Collins Publishers. 
 
Boden, M. (2004). The Creative Mind, Myths and Mechanisms, London: Routledge. 
 
Briggs, J. (2000). Fire in the Crucible, Michigan: Phanes Press. 
 
Clark, A. (1998). Being There, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Collins, R. (1998), The Sociology of Philosophies, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
Collins, R. (2004). Interaction Ritual Chains, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow, New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). Creativity, New York: Harper Collins. 
 
Cytowic, R. E. (2002). Synesthesia, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Frith, C. (2007). Making Up The Mind, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Gadamer, H.G. (2004). Truth and Method, Translated by Weinsheimer, J. and Marshall, 
D.G., London: Continuum. 
 
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gardner, H. (1993) Creating Minds, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gardner, H. (1999). Intelligence Reframed, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gardner, H. (2004). Changing Minds, Boston: HBS Press 
 
Girardet, H. (1992). The Gaia Atlas of Cities – New Directions for Sustainable Urban Living, 
London: Gaia Books Limited. 
 
Iaconobi, M. (2008). Mirroring People, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 
Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
 
Jencks, C. (1977). The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, London: Academy. 
 
Lin, Y. (1935). My Country and My People, Singapore: Cultured Lotus (2001). 
 
Lin, Y. (1937). The Importance of Living, New York: William Morrow (1996). 
 
McCarter, R. (1997). Frank Lloyd Wright, London: Phaidon Press. 
 
Nisbett, R. (2003). The Geography of Thought, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Noë A. (2004). Action in Perception, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
Pietarinen, A-T. (2006). Signs of Logic, Dordrecht: Springer. 
 
Pietarinen, A-T. (2007). Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning, Oxford: Elsevier. 
 74 
 
Pinker, S. (2007). Stuff of Thought, New York: Viking. 
 
Van Campen (2008). The Hidden Sense, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 
van Schaik, L. (2005). Mastering Architecture, Sussex: Wiley-Academy. 
 
Vitruvius (C1st  B.C.). The Ten Books of Architecture, Translated by Morris Hiely Morgan, 
New York: Dover Publication (1960). 
 
Weisberg, R.W. (2006). Creativity, New Jersey: Wiley. 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1921). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Translated by Pears, D.F. and 
McGuiness, B.F., 1961. London: Routledge Classics (2001). 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations, Translated by Anscombe, G.E.M., 
1953. 3rd Edition. London: Prentice Hall (1958). 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books, New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1969). On Certainty, Edited by Anscombe, G.E.M. and von Wright, G.H.; 
Translated by Paul, D. and Anscombe, G.E.M., New York: Harper Touchbook (1972). 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1969a). Philosophical Grammar, Edited by Rhees, R.; Translated by 
Kenny, A., Berkeley: University of California Press (1974). 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1977). Culture and Value, Edited by von Wright, G.H.; Translated by 
Winch, P., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1980). 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1979). Wittgenstein Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-1935. From the Notes 
of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald, edited by Alice Ambrose, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1980). Zettel, Edited by Anscombe, G.E.M. and von Wright, G.H.; 
Translated by Anscombe, G.E.M., Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Witgenstein, L. (1980a). Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2. Edited by G.H. 
von Wright and N. Nyman, translated by C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press (1990). 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1993). Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951, Edited by Klagge and 
Nordmann, A., Indianapolis: IN: Hackett. 
 
 
                 
A Structure for Architectural Innovation: 
Mindshaping 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 i 
CONTENTS           
 
Hypothesis            1 
 
Preface             3 
 
METHODOLOGY           5 
 
ONE: INTRODUCTION  
Literature Review A           7 
Preamble             7 
Ostensivity            7 
Language Games            8 
Context             9 
Ostensivity of Interpretation         10 
Mastering is Ostensive          11  
Cultural Dimension (Capital)         12 
Shared Practices as Form of Life         13 
Locality of Innovation          13 
Solipsism in Innovation          14 
Flow            15 
Background           16 
Weakness and Antagonistic View        17 
Corroborative Supports          18 
Pedagogical   Spin-Offs          20 
Considered Questions          20 
 
TWO: EXISTENTIAL IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review B          23 
Preamble            23 
Image as Consciousness          23 
Image as Perception          24 
Intention            25 
Custom and Habit           25 
Imaginative Knowledge          26 
Imaginative Meaning          27 
Visual Imagination          28 
Imaginative Consciousness         30 
Perception            31 
Mental Acts of Architectural Innovation        32 
First and Second Acts of Architectural Innovation      34 
Unreal and Real Exclusion         34 
In Cultural and Historical Contexts          35 
Existential Imagination in Architectural Innovation      36 
 
THREE: INTERACTION RITUAL THEORY (PROTAGONIST) 
 ii 
Literature Review C          39 
Preamble            39 
Innovation in IR Chain          40 
Collective Motivation          40 
IR Emblem           41 
IR Network           43 
Traits             44 
Flow States            46 
KLPAC – Case Study of IR in Architecture 
Background           47 
IR Architecture           48 
Further Description          49 
 
FOUR: PHENOMENOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review D          51 
Preamble            51 
Phenomenology a product of Consciousness       52 
Perception Bridges Imagination With Reality       53 
Truth in Imagination          53 
Network of Evidence is in the Context        55 
Intention Separates Imagination From Perception      55 
Creativity Lies in the Non-ostensive        56 
‘Noemata’ and ‘Noesis’          57 
Classification           59 
Singular Stratum and Possibilities        61 
Phenomenological Space          64 
Space and Context          66 
Body and Sensory Fields          68 
House X1: Light and Shadow         69 
Sound            69 
Hapticity            70 
Intention and Site Circumstance         70 
 
FIVE: COMPUTATIONAL IMAGINATION (PROTAGONIST) 
Literature Review E          73 
Preamble            73 
Conceptual Spaces          73 
AI Concepts                      74 
Hindrances Over AI Creativity         74 
Beyond Intuition            76 
P-creativity and H-creativity         76 
Computational Creativity          77 
Generative Systems          79 
Scripts, Frames and Nets          80 
Mind-body Paradox          82 
Computational Psychology         85 
 iii 
Myths            86 
Twelve-year Rule           87 
Computational creativity in Architecture        88 
House X3            91 
 
SIX: HERMENEUTICAL IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review F          93 
Preamble: From Visual to Literary Image       93 
Engagement of the Mythical         94 
Textual Over Visual Semantics         95 
Requirement of Context          95 
Ontological Necessity          97 
Culture           98 
Taste           98 
Aesthetic Differentiation         99 
Extra-aesthetic Elements        100 
Architecture as Play        100 
Temporality         101 
Historical Significance        102 
Practice and Experience         104 
Wickham Apartments        106 
 
SEVEN: CRYSTALLISATION OF THE MENTAL PROCESS  
(PROTAGONIST) 
Literature Review G        109 
Preamble          109 
Themata          110 
Feeling Tones         112 
Individual-universal Equation or Implicate Order    115 
Synesthesia         117 
Structure to Thought Crystallisation      119 
Extended Standard Theory       121 
Deep Structure, Surface Structure Symmetry     123 
Extended Standard Theory for Visual Innovation    124 
Creating Mental Contexts        125 
House X4          126 
 
EIGHT: POSTMODERN IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review H        129 
Preamble          129 
Difference and Repetition        131 
Deleuze’s Idea of Postmodern Creativity      136 
Essentiality of Process        137 
Little Narratives and Open System      137 
Character of Postmodern Urbanity      137 
Premises for Postmodern Creativity      140 
 iv 
Heterarchy System        140 
Self-organisation         142 
Ethics of Postmodernism        142 
Gallery Evason Hotel        145 
From Mohamed Sultan Road to Clarke Quay     145 
 
NINE: DISCUSSION 
Preamble          149 
Distillation – Questions and Answers      150 
Science Filter to Bacon        156 
Bacon’s Method of Induction       157 
Bacon’s Ideas Manifested Through Heterogeneous Influences   159 
Heterogeneous Linkages Between Architecture and the Arts   159 
Behren’s Significant Influences       161 
Bacon’s Utility and Power in Advertising Posters    162 
Bernhard, the Accidental Minimalist      162 
Malevich to El Lissitzky        163 
Merger Between Art and Architecture      164 
Objective Analysis Group and Scientific Modernism    165 
Bacon’s Method Realised With Constructivism     166 
Breaking the Classical Paradigm       167 
Constructivism to Deconstruction      169 
Dadaist State of Mind        170 
From Freedom to Imagination       171 
Question of Language        172 
Time Context – Cybernetics Theory      176 
Mutuality           178 
Undivided Wholeness in Flowing Movement     179 
From Flow to Socio-culture       183 
Interaction Between and Within Domains     186 
Collective Interaction Rituals       188 
Self-curation         192 
Themata as Motivation        194 
Nuances in Mental Processes       195 
Innovator’s Individual-universal Equation     197 
Nuance of Sense and Intelligence       198 
Nuances in Mental Crystallisation      199 
Beyond Chomsly, Contexts in Mental Crystallisation    202 
Emotional and Intuitive Contents in Reason     203 
Background for Second-order Narratives      205 
Synthetic Imagination        206 
Constitutive and Descriptive Orders      207 
Historical Testimonials        208 
Projective Empathy        210 
Summary of Discussion        211 
 
 v 
TEN: CONCLUSION 
Recalling Summary of Discussion      213 
Attitudes of Creativity        214 
Environment that Encourages (Third Place)     214 
Network Culture         215 
Pedagogy in Network Culture       216 
Autopoiesis         217 
City as a Complex Adaptive System      218 
Dynamics of Everyday Spaces       221 
Practice in Context        224 
Wickham Apartments        224 
Review of Hypothesis        226 
Notes          229 
References         235 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assumed Hypothesis: 
 
Architectural innovation is ostensively meaningful. It is validated through context and 
launched from the mastery of Language Games and Form of Life. 
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Preface 
 
 
The word, ‘structure’ as used in the title, ‘The Structure of Architectural Innovation’ 
is a non-exclusive term. It is intended to have a sense of critical description of 
architectural innovation. It is a way of assembling (evidence), recognising themes, 
ordering constants and correspondences (ref. Derrida, 1967: 17). 
 
This thesis has its basis on two theses: 
– ‘Critical Meanings In Architecture’ (2004/5), (my Masters thesis completed with the 
University of Malaya), 
– ‘Mastering Architecture’ (2005), a book by Leon van Schaik. 
 
The conclusions reached in ‘Critical Meanings In Architecture’ (CMA) and the platform 
for ‘Mastering Architecture’ (MA) are similar, although they were written independent of 
each other. 
 
The theses allude towards interrogating architectural innovation; but stopped short due to 
the underlying constraints of the titles. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to take the common shared premise of the two theses and 
bring them to the next natural level, which is to interrogate architectural innovation. 
 
Whilst CMA relied on philosophical arguments, around Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations (1953), to arrive at its conclusion; MA was built on pedagogical platform, 
example: sharing arguments developed by Gardner (‘Intelligence Reframed’) and Collins 
(‘The Sociology of Philosophies’). However, conclusion in CMA and platform for MA 
are the same. 
 
The hypothesis, “Architectural innovation is ostensively meaningful and validated 
through context, and launched from the mastery of Language Games and Form of 
Life”, is drawn entirely from the propositions found in the two theses. 
 
Literature review will form the basis of interrogation, supported by selected Malaysian 
and other Asian or Australian architectural and urban evidence and, common sense 
observation. 
 
The interrogation will be argued dialectically: Literatures that support the hypothesis are 
deemed as Protagonists and those that provide opposing arguments are regarded as 
Antagonists. The Antagonists will test the validity of the hypothesis.  
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ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
Literature Review A:  
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953) 
Supporting Literature: 
Wittgenstein, The Blue And Brown Books (1958) 
Wittgenstein, On Certainty (1969) 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar (1969a) 
Wittgenstein, Culture And Value (1977) 
Wittgenstein, Zettel (1980) 
Wittgenstein, Remarks On The Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2 (1980a) 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951 (1993) 
Stern, Wittgenstein On Mind and Language (1995) 
John-Steiner, Notebooks Of the Mind (1985) 
Leach, ed., Rethinking Architecture (1997) 
 
Preamble  
1.01   The contents of the introduction below is intended to build towards the 
hypothesis that: 
  
Architectural innovation is ostensively meaningful and validated through context, 
and launched from the mastery of Language Games and Form of Life.  
  
The above hypothesis is what the conclusion of  ‘Critical Meanings in Architecture’ 
(CMA) and ‘Mastering Architecture’ (MA) is supposed to have inferred, and that the 
interrogation of architectural innovation would take the synthesis of the two theses to 
their next natural level: which is the interrogation of architectural innovation. Thereafter, 
a series of literature reviews would be inducted to test the hypothesis (see Methodology). 
 
1.02   The synthesis and build-up towards the hypothesis is done by way of 
Wittgenstein’s latter philosophy, particularly, his ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (1953), 
which will cement the two theses to form the backbone for the hypothesis. The task of 
this introduction is to demonstrate that, and to establish the hypothesis. It is believed that 
the shared bedrock for the conclusion of CMA and platform for MA can be framed by 
Wittgenstein’s ‘Language Games’ and ‘Form of Life’, and that architectural innovation 
requires the mastery of issues inferred in these two terminologies. These terminologies 
are discussed extensively in  ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (1953) and Wittgenstein’s 
other post-Tractatus1 works. Above all, ‘Philosophical Investigations’ argues for 
ostensivity, which is an essential argument in the conclusion of CMA and the platform 
for MA. 
  
Ostensivity 
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1.03   The nature of  ‘Language Games’ and ‘Form of Life’ is ostensive, as 
pointed out in ‘Philosophical Investigations’: 
  
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything. – Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is 
hidden, for example, is of no interest to us (Wittgenstein, 1953: S 126). 
 
The above passage supports ‘meaning’ in architecture as propositioned in the conclusion 
of CMA, and the manner in which visual examples are used as evidence in MA. 
 
1.04   Further on ostensivity, section 135 of ‘Philosophical Investigations’ says, 
“Asked what a proposition is – whether it is another person or ourselves that we have to 
answer – we shall give examples… now in this way we have a concept of a proposition”. 
Most of the next 100 sections of ‘Philosophical Investigations’ are occupied with 
exploring and undermining the view that meaning consists in mental processes and the 
view that meanings consists in implicit rules: “One of his principal aims is to discredit the 
idea of a hidden fact that somehow underlies what our words mean and gives them a fully 
determinate sense, whether that ‘fact’ is conceived of as a subjective mental process or an 
objective rule” (Stern, 1995: 121). This is the way that MA has chosen to present the 
evidence – by offering the reader to look at visual examples. 
 
Language Games 
1.05   By doing away with systematic analysis, the concept of language games 
enables us to give up systematic analysis as a rule and use alternatives in descriptions. 
Language games broadly infers rules, but not in a systematic way. This avoids stasis 
thereby enabling the thesis to progress. Instead of systematisation, language games can 
introduce comparative method instead (as a choice of rules), just as it was done in MA, 
wherein: objects of comparison … throw light … by way not only of similarities, but also 
of dissimilarities (Wittgenstein, 1953: S130). The point of the comparison is to elicit 
analogies between the use of language and playing a game: both are activities, things we 
do, and both involve the use of rules (ref. Stern, 1995: 21). 
 
1.06   Therefore, understanding, in language games is attained by means of 
‘looking’ instead of theorising: It is ostensive: 
 
Our mistake is to look for explanation where we ought to look at the facts as a 
‘proto-phenomenon’. That is, where we ought to have said: this language game is played. 
It is not a matter of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but 
of noting a language-game. 
… –Look on the language-game as primary (Wittgenstein, 1953: SS654-656). 
 
Hence, solipsism slips outside of language games. What is sought in MA is thus to bring 
architecture back from the metaphysical to its everyday use (ref. Wittgenstein, 1953: 
S116). 
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1.07   The above will correspond with the generic understanding of architecture as 
architecture is regarded as an ostensive and real vocation: buildings are real, tangible 
edifices, and it necessitates the exercise of common sense: – That is, this happens when 
we philosophise; for as soon as we revert to the standpoint of common sense this general 
uncertainty disappears (Wittgenstein, 1958: 45). 
 
1.08   Working in architecture, just as working in philosophy, is really more of 
working on oneself. On one’s own interpretation – On one’s way of seeing things. From 
the ‘Philosophical Investigations’ perspective, the aim is to bring architecture down to 
earth; instead of trying to grasp the hidden structure underlying architectural activities.  
 
Context 
1.09   Following this, we naturally depend on a background of common behaviour 
and shared practices, and of shared physical circumstances: we could generalise this as 
‘context’.  The shared practice is ‘form of life’. In this perspective, architecture does not 
have a privileged vantage point: Wittgenstein points that: the place I really have to get to 
is a place I must already be at now. (Wittgenstein, 1977: 7). Hence, we cannot achieve an 
objective standpoint outside of ordinary lives. 
 
1.10   Indeed, architectural exemplars are used to illustrate conditions of ordinary 
lives: 
 
(And how many towns or streets does it take before a town begins to be town?) 
Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old 
and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods, and this surrounded 
by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: S 18). 
 
1.11   Context is an essential component in the conclusion of CMA and platform 
for MA. In CMA, context includes the environmental, physical, ethical, social, political 
and economic. In MA, it ties with ‘culture’ and then to ‘cultural capital’, which is related 
to practice. See Appendix 1. In explaining the way that context is found in Wittgenstein’s 
latter thinking, Stern states as follows: 
 
On Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus conception of language, even formal rules must 
be understood in terms of their practical background, a change of view that emphasises 
practice over theory: “rules leave loopholes open, and the practice has to speak for 
itself”.2 There is no sharp transition from the calculus model to the language-game 
model, from logical holism to practical holism: Wittgenstein does not give up the idea 
that our linguistic practices are rule-governed, but rather comes to see that rule-
governed behaviour depends on a practical context (Stern, 1995: 120). 
 
1.12   In the first 200 sections of ‘Philosophical Investigations’, two aspects reign 
throughout: The first of which is that no mental content is intrinsically meaningful and 
that all determination of meaning depends on interpretation. Any given mental process or 
formulation is open to deviant interpretation. In sections 143 and 185, he quotes the 
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example of the pupil who learns to add small numbers correctly but systematically 
miscalculates, all the while insisting that he is going on the same way, is one example of 
this leitmotif. Further, in sections 73-74, 85-86, 139, he gives examples of a leaf, 
following arrows or signposts, or interpreting the drawing of a cube, where no occurring 
act can give a rule the power to determine future actions, because there is always the 
question of how that act is to be interpreted.  
 
1.13   This follows that mental content and interpretation of meanings are 
misguided without context, and any assumption that rules can be applied to future 
applications without reference to context is also misguided. A change in the context of 
application therefore yields a change in meaning, and it follows that meaning cannot be 
identified with anything independent of context. Wittgenstein says,  
 
What is essential is that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear 
the words and application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think 
we shall say not (Wittgenstein, 1953: S 140). 
 
Ostensivity of Interpretation 
1.14   According to Wittgenstein, the mental process of interpreting is not an 
intuitive, or ‘inner’ process; instead it is a decision, following rules correctly in a 
language game. In ‘The Blue and Brown Books’, Wittgenstein asks the interlocutor, “– 
But what does it mean to follow the rule correctly? How and when is it to be decided 
which at a particular point is the correct step to take?” The interlocutor responds by 
appealing to the rule-giver’s intentions: “The correct step at every point is that which is 
accordance with the rule as it was meant, intended” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 142). In the 
ensuing dialogue, the interlocutor tries to specify the rule-giver intentions, and 
Wittgenstein repeatedly undermines him by asking how the application of intention, 
meaning, mental act, or whatever other candidate is offered can be guaranteed in 
advance, as the same deviant possibility can always be raised. Wittgenstein sums up as 
follows: 
 
The trouble crops up whenever we try to think about the ideas of thinking, 
wishing, expecting, believing, knowing, trying to solve a mathematical problem, 
mathematical induction, and so forth. 
 
It is no act of insight, intuition, which makes us use the rule as we do at the 
particular point of the series. It would be less confusing to call it an act of decision, 
though this too is misleading, for nothing like an act of decision must take place, but 
possible just an act of writing or speaking. And the mistake which we here and in a 
thousand similar cases are inclined to make is labelled by the word ‘to make’ as we have 
used it in the sentence ‘It is no act of insight which makes use the rule as we do’, because 
there is an idea that ‘something must make us’ do what we do. And this again joins on to 
the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to follow the rule as 
we do. The chain of reasons has an end (Wittgenstein, 1958: 143). 
 
 11 
1.15   To Wittgenstein therefore, there is no suggestion of an act of decision; only 
that if any mental process is involved, it is a decision, not an insight or an intuition. 
Wittgenstein proposes therefore, instead of interpreting, we simply grasp the rule in 
practice and this will apply to the practise of architecture as well. This does not infer 
however, that we cannot make our own rules, say for architecture. The search for self-
interpreting interpretation in architecture for instance, only arises when the rule used is 
expressed as an interpretation, a construal of the rule that still needs to be made 
completely determinate. This infers that in everyday making of architecture, we do not do 
any interpreting, but simply grasp the rule in practice. Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of 
signposts to explain this convention: 
 
A rule stands there like a sign-post. – Does the sign-post leave no doubt about the 
way I have to go? Does it show which direction I am to take when I have passed it; 
whether along the road or footpath or cross-country? But where is it said which way I am 
to follow it; whether in the direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the opposite one? And if 
there were, not a single sign-post, but a chain of adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the 
ground – is there only one way of interpreting them? – So I can say, the sign-post does 
after all leave no room for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes leave room for doubt and 
sometimes not. And now this is no longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical 
one (Wittgenstein, 1953: S85). 
 
1.16   Thus, whether or not a rule or sign-post gives rise to doubts about what it 
means will depend upon its context and our interpretation of the context. However, not 
every question about the rule or sign-post, such as that which form part the practise of 
architecture, need to answered for it to be useful. Potential ambiguity need not be 
resolved unless it actually arises. Explanation may call for further explanations only if it 
is necessary to prevent a misunderstanding. Wittgenstein reasons that: 
 
An explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none 
stands in need of another unless we need it to prevent a misunderstanding – one, that is, 
that would occur but for the explanation; not everyone that I can imagine. 
 
It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap in the 
foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything 
that can be doubted, and then remove all these doubts. 
 
The sign-post is in order – if, under normal circumstances, it fulfils its purpose 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: S87). 
 
Mastering is Ostensive 
1.17   The role of language and practice that Wittgenstein uses to build his 
response to the sceptical interlocutor who raises every imaginable doubt, can be 
summarised in sections 198 – 199 of ‘Philosophical Investigations’ and the points made 
are equally applicable to the practice of architecture. The first section recapitulates the 
dialogue with a voice that asks the sceptical question: How can I ever know how to 
follow a rule, and whether any action can follow from any rule, given a sufficient 
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ingenious interpretation? The second section contain the response which can be applied 
equally to the practice of architecture: 
 
“But how can a rule show me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on 
some interpretation, in accordance with this rule.” – That is not what we ought to say, 
but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and 
cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. 
 
“Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule?” – Let me ask 
this: what has the expression of a rule – say a sign-post – got to do with my actions? 
What sort of connexion is there here? – Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to 
react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react.* 
 
But this is only to give a causal connexion, only to explain how it has come about 
that we now go by the sign-post; not what this going-by-the-sign really consists in. On the 
contrary; I have further indicated that a person goes by the sign-post only in so far as 
there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom. 
 
Is what we call “obeying a rule” something that it would be possible for only one 
man to do, and to do only once in his life? – This is of course a note on the grammar of 
the expression “to obey a rule”. 
 
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone 
obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a 
report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. – To obey a rule, to make a 
report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). 
 
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a 
language means to be master of a technique (Wittgenstein, 1953: S198, S199). 
*(My emphasis) 
 
 
Cultural Dimension (Capital) 
1.18   In its direct inference to architectural meanings from the Wittgenstein’s 
perspective, instead on relying on interpretations which could possibly be deviant, we are 
to think about how a particular expression of  architectural rule and the actions of the 
participants (architect and users) are connected. In the above quotes in sections 198 and 
199 of ‘Philosophical Investigations’, the first point made is that interpretation is not 
enough: imagining deviant interpretations from what is ordinarily meant, shows that there 
is more to following a rule than simply formulating an interpretation of the rule. 
Wittgenstein’s initial answer is to point towards causal connections, and asks the 
interlocutor to consider that he was once trained how to make use of signposts, and that is 
what the connection depends on. However, this is not simply stating the causes that led to 
architectural meanings: Wittgenstein also insists on the importance of social and cultural 
(custom) dimensions: The training only has significance within the context of customary 
circumstances, or as MA puts it: – cultural capital3. 
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1.19   Considered in abstraction from the way Wittgenstein puts it, cultural capital 
can be that context, that rule – like an ostensive definition, which conforms with our 
strain of argument, whereby “we give one interpretation after another, as if each one 
contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it 
(Wittgenstein, 1953: S201). In this sense, cultural capital becomes the background to 
which a rule belongs, and that which takes on a determinate form. 
 
Shared Practices as Form of Life 
1.20   In addition to this, from the MA’s perspective, our explicit beliefs and 
interpretations are only meaningful against a background of shared practices, which 
include the skills and customs we have learned – that is, in ritualised social activities4 (as 
well as cultural capital). These are ways of acting that are acquired through training 
rather than through beliefs. The ways of acting are ‘Forms of Life’. It is this “way of 
grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 
‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’” that ultimately ends the regress of 
interpretations (Wittgenstein, 1953: S201). In other words, “it is our acting, which lies at 
the bottom of language games” (Wittgenstein, 1969: S204) – The bottom of language 
games is form of life. 
 
1.21   What is appealed here is not agreement over specific doctrines or views; but 
propositions on the role of training (through ritualised social activities) and custom 
(cultural capital) – this is not to establish a positive theory of concept formation, but to 
emphasise that meaningful architectural activities (form of life) depends on these ‘facts’ 
being in place. Therefore, mastery in architecture, from the Wittgenstein’s perspective, is 
about rule obeying; it is a shared practice cause by ritualised social activities within the 
context of cultural capital and that it is ostensive. According to MA, mastery is the 
platform that launches innovation. 
 
Locality of Innovation 
1.22   ‘Innovation’ as a discussion is the step above ‘mastery’. According to MA, 
innovation transcends mastery in that it has: “the capacity to change the way in which we 
think about the domain of architecture”6. Equally, Jameson locates innovation outside 
‘the system’: “From within the system you cannot hope to generate anything that negates 
the system as a whole or portends the experience of something other than the system, or 
outside the system” (Leach, ed., 1997: 260).  
 
1.23   The step from mastery to innovation hence requires the conversation to step 
out of the system and, this infers a self-curatorial process, as pointed out in the 
concluding zone of MA, particularly, the ‘second-order’ curating which, “opens up 
options for further innovation by including the subjectivity of the curator within the act of 
curating” (MA: 214, 215). MA suggests that this can be done through visualisation, 
which is a solipsistic process: “Through your visualisation of yourself as a creative 
innovator…. Through your visualisation of yourself as a strategic player…. Through your 
visualisation of yourself as a player between fields…. Through your visualisation of 
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yourself as a theorist….” (MA: 216). The second order curatorial process of innovation 
therefore invokes the subjective imagination, and that it is solipsistic.  
 
1.24   The solipsistic nature of innovation thus shift the interrogation from within 
language games to its borders. ‘Philosophical Investigations’ does not take us there. For 
further interrogation onto the validity we need to step into the earliest and the latest of 
Wittgenstein’s works, particularly those found in ‘Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951’ 
(1993), ‘On Certainty’ (1969), ‘Philosophical Grammar’ (1969a) and ‘Zettel’ (1980). 
Works in ‘On Certainty’ and ‘Zettle’ particularly opens up the barriers surrounding 
language games to the possibilities of interrogating innovation. These then will launch 
the following series of literature reviews. 
 
Solipsism in Innovation  
1.25   To Wittgenstein, solipsistic imagination is problematic because of its 
privacy: 
 
Privacy of feelings can mean: nobody can know them unless I show them, or: I 
can’t really show them. Or: if I don’t want to, I needn’t give any sign of my feeling but 
even if I want to I can only show a sign and not the feeling (Wittgenstein, 1993: 86). 
 
The problem seems to be that inner ostension plays no role in establishing the meaning of 
the terms in what we see in reality. The problem applies to architectural propositions 
which always end in some kind of physical edifices. 
 
 
1.26   Wittgenstein tries to show that practical context always lead towards 
ostension, so that ostensive definition, whether it concerns inner or outer objects always 
depends on a prior context of practices and institutions. In privacy, we are simply 
misdescribing and misunderstanding what we ordinarily do – not because there is no 
reliable test for privacy, but because the stage setting for private ostension is not in place 
– it is a logical problem. 
 
1.27   One of the principal aims of  ‘Philosophical Investigations’ is to show that 
the ordinary use of language is primarily practical, a matter of skills and abilities, and 
cannot be understood as a matter of grasping a theory or holding that certain propositions 
are true. The  ‘technique of use’ is potentially a public one: 
 
So it’s no use saying that we have a private object before the mind and give it a 
name. There is a name only where there is a technique of using it and that technique can 
be private; but this only means that nobody but I can know about it, in the sense in which 
I can have a private sewing machine. But in order to be a private sewing machine, it must 
be an object which deserves the name ‘sewing machine’, not in virtue of its privacy but in 
virtue of its similarity to sewing machines, private or otherwise (Wittgenstein, 1993: 
448). 
 
 15 
1.28   Despite 1.24-1.26 above, creative innovation requires that there is no sharp 
boundary between inner and outer ostension and that we must be able to bring aspects of 
the background into the foreground (ref. 1.23). In one of the later publications, ‘On 
Certainty’, Wittgenstein questions about the sureness of language games: 
 
Certain events would put me in a position in which I could not go on with the old 
language-game any further. In which I was torn away from the sureness of the game. 
 
Indeed, doesn’t it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is 
conditioned by certain facts? 
 
In that case it would seem as if the language-game must ‘show’ the facts that 
make it possible. (But that’s not how it is.) (Wittgenstein, 1969: SS617-618). 
 
Flow 
1.29   The last paragraph of the above is to avoid falling into dogmatism with 
regard to language game. However, to bring inner ostension forward onto an outer 
ostension, it is necessary to blur the boundary edges of the game. Wittgenstein introduces 
the idea of ‘flow’, which appeared in one of the latest collections of his works, ‘Zettel’: 
 
We only speak of ‘thinking’ in quite particular circumstances. 
 
How then can the sense and the truth (for the truth and the sense) of sentences 
collapse together? (Stand or fall together?) 
 
And isn’t it as if you wanted to say: “If such-and-such is not the case, then it 
makes no sense to say it is the case?” 
 
Like this, e.g.: “If all moves were always false, it would make no sense to speak of 
a ‘false move’”. But it is only a paradoxical way of putting it. The non-paradoxical way 
would be: “The general description…. makes no sense”. 
 
Instead of “one cannot”, say: “it doesn’t exist in the game”. Not: “one can’t 
castle in draughts” but – “there is no castling in draughts”; and instead of “I can’t 
exhibit my sensation” – “in the use of the word ‘sensation’, there is no such thing as 
exhibiting what one has got”; instead of one cannot enumerate all the cardinal numbers” 
– “there is no such thing here as enumerating all the members”. 
 
Conversation, the application and interpretation of words flow on, and only in the 
flow (Fluβ) does a word have its meaning. 
 
“He has gone away”. – “Why?” What did you mean when you uttered the word 
“why”? What did you think of? (Wittgenstein, 1980: SS130-135) 
 
1.30   At the end of the remark above, Wittgenstein infers that words have ‘flow’ 
in the train of thought during a conversation – there is something that goes on in the 
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speaker’s head to make the words significant. This time instead of looking at the practical 
context, Wittgenstein counsels that we look at stream of thought and activity, wherein he 
says that: “Words only have meaning in the river of thought and life” (Wittgenstein, 
1980: S174). The river metaphor infers that the significance of a particular utterance is 
placed within the stream of conversation – in the ordinary use of language. In the final 
sentence of the above passage, Wittgenstein infers that we need to go into the mind for 
words to be significant.  
 
Background 
1.31   With reference to the visiocentric nature of architecture, the closest to it in 
Wittgenstein’s ‘flow’ is found in ‘On Certainty’. Here he sets his river image as a visual 
illustration of the nature of boundary of every assertion and the words we use to describe 
the background, and also why the background is so hard to describe. The passages begin 
with a sketch of a world-picture, which is a graphic depiction of his understanding of the 
world and our place in it. The use of imagery is a consequence of his conception of a 
world-picture, which can be described in terms of myth, or of the rules of a game that we 
may know mentally but not articulated. This is not ostensive analysis because the rules 
are implicit and normative rather than explicit and factual: any explicit formulation of the 
world-picture will not draw out the embedded: 
 
But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied with its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false. 
 
The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a mythology. And 
their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, 
without learning any explicit rules. 
 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical 
propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions 
as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid 
propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. 
 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may 
shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift 
of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. 
 
But if someone were to say “So logic too is an empirical science” he would be 
wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to 
test by experience, at another as a rule of testing. 
 
And the bank of the river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or 
only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which is now in one place now in another 
gets washed away, or deposited (Wittgenstein, 1969: SS94-99). 
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1.32   The above image holds that change is possible against a background. It 
implies indeterminacy in the world; however some things must remain constant. 
Wittgenstein is to later point to the primacy of the background and its indeterminacy: “If 
a pattern of life is the basis for the use of a word then the word must contain some 
amount of indefiniteness. The pattern of life, above all, is not one of exact regularity” 
(Wittgenstein, 1982: S211). Once indeterminacy is introduced into the picture, the 
boundary between the subjectivity of background and objective ostensivity is blurred. He 
then says in ‘Philosophical Grammar’, “…. In our study of symbolism there is no 
foreground and background; it isn’t a matter of tangible sign with an accompanying 
intangible power or understanding” (Wittgenstein, 1969a: S43). The background that 
Wittgenstein discusses about is an indeterminable pattern of life, which is causal to our 
thoughts: “Behind our thoughts, true and false, there is always to be found a dark 
background, which we are only later able to bring into the light and expressed as thought” 
(Wittgenstein, 1979: 36). The influence that this background has on form of life is further 
described as follows: 
 
We judge an action according to its background within human life, and this 
background is not monochrome, but we might picture it as a very complicated filigree 
pattern, which, to be sure, we can’t copy, but which we can recognize from the general 
impression it makes. 
 
The background is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within 
this bustle. 
 
And it is the very concept ‘bustle’ that brings about this indefiniteness. For a 
bustle only comes about through constant repetition. And there is no definite starting 
point for ‘constant repetition.’…. 
 
How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by showing the actions of 
a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. Not what one person is doing now, 
but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see action, and it 
determines our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions (Wittgenstein, 1980a: SS624-
626, S629). 
 
Weakness and Antagonistic Review 
1.33   Wittgenstein’s later works suggests that the blurring of the boundary 
between the blur background and the ostensive foreground enables visualisation: such as 
that through self-curation as suggested in 1.23 (MA: 216). The uncertainty caused by the 
blurring of the boundary between what is sensual and what is logical (see quote in 1.31 – 
Wittgenstein, 1969: S98)) hence suggests the probable weakness of the hypothesis – that 
the structure of innovation may not be that ostensive after all. Also as suggested in 1.25, 
privacy of feeling in the curation of innovation is problematic in an ostensive world. In 
1.31, it is stated that explicit formulation of rules will not draw out the embedded, 
suggesting an induction of psychology with regard to innovation.  
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1.34   It is elsewhere in architectural conversation that psychology is more 
fervently interrogated, such as in:  
 
1) Existentialism (eg. Sartre),  
2) Phenomenology (eg. Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty),  
3) Hermeneutics (eg. Ricoeur, Gadamer),  
4) Post-modernism (eg. Lacan, Lyotard, Foucault) 
 
All of the above have their basis in inner ostensivity, particularly in imagination, 
laying claims to deeper symbolic level: they seek to go beyond external codification to 
attempt to reveal a subjective understanding of the world. They are essentially 
antagonistic to Wittgenstein’s approach to meanings in the way that are self-referential, 
opposed to Wittgenstein’s ostensivity. To test the validity of the hypothesis, these would 
be interrogated following this section on Introduction.  
 
Corroborative Supports 
1.35   Outside of  philosophy, the support for the hypothesis, that the structure for 
creative innovation is an ostensive argument, which follows language games and form of 
life is strong, particularly where arguments are corroborated from the gathering of 
empirical evidence. John-Steiner’s marshalling of her own work summarises creativity 
follows exactly the arguments of MA and Wittgenstein’s: 
 
In my analysis of thought and creativity, I have emphasised the role of lengthy 
and varied apprenticeships, the impact of participating in a community, and the role of 
friendships and collaboration as part of an individual’s ability to sustain his or own work 
and to develop an effective organisation of knowledge and purpose. There has been, as 
well, an emphasis upon the evolution of different languages of thought, the differences 
between images, movement ideas, and inner speech…. some of the common features of 
thinking and the way in which ideas are transformed from private to public forms, from 
condensed ideas to communicative expressions (John-Steiner, 1985: 210). 
 
1.36   Further in support of language games in the hypothesis, John-Steiner quotes 
Hunt’s propositions on the role of  language on creativity: 
 
 Advanced thinking depends on the mental manipulation of symbols…. Language 
in contrast, is a virtually unbounded symbol system, capable of expressing every kind of 
thought. It is the prerequisite of culture, which cannot exist without it or by means of any 
other symbol system. It is the way we human beings communicate most of our thoughts to 
each other and receive from each other the food for thought. In sum, we do not always 
think in words, but we do little thinking without them (John-Steiner, 1985: 211). 
 
1.37   On the influence of mentors, shared practices and cultural capital to 
mastery, as found in MA, John-Steiner provides the support: 
 
The young person may at first exhibit a preference for learning by movement, 
sound, vision, or language. It is a preference shaped by many circumstances: the 
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culturally available and patterned activities; the interests, experiences, and resources of 
one’s family and schooling; the role of mentors and distant teachers. All of these 
contribute to both the content and the form of knowledge in the developing individual. In 
turn these affect the growth of the dominant inner language of the mind (John-Steiner, 
1985: 213). 
 
1.38   Furtherance in support of ostensivity of mastery and creative innovation, 
John-Steiner propositions: 
 
D. E. Berlyne, a Canadian student of behaviour, argued that “creative thinking 
often receives special treatment as phenomenon apart, but this practice seems 
unjustifiable”. He suggests that we view productive and reproductive thinking as forming 
a single hierarchy of solution strategies. The former stands high in such a continuum and 
requires considerable effort for production, while reproductive thinking is easily 
accessible as it is tied to frequently occurring situations (John-Steiner, 1985: 218-219). 
 
1.39   In support of MA’s propositions on self-curation for creative innovation, 
John-Steiner says: 
 
The personality traits that have been found to be characteristic of a large number 
of creative individuals, such as perseverance, independence, nonconformity, and 
flexibility, are not traits that denote neurosis. But a certain intensity exists among 
individuals who are committed to a creative life that is central to their being… Creativity 
requires a continuity of concern, an intense awareness of one’s active inner life combined 
with sensitivity to the external world. In this developmental account of creativity, I have 
emphasised the way in which intensity at an early age may be enhanced, shaped, and 
encouraged through the multiple apprenticeships of gifted individuals (John-Steiner, 
1985: 220). 
 
1.40   Notwithstanding that generally, John-Steiner’s work support the crux of the 
hypothesis; just as in the case of Wittgenstein, creativity appear to breech the boundary 
between inner and outer ostensivity and suggests the necessity of subjective elements. In 
reflecting creative thinking, she says: 
 
To my mind, neither the behaviourist nor the Gestalt position does justice to the 
complex and interwoven process of thought. Both of these schools attempt to highlight 
only a fraction of the experience of consciousness, which includes inner monologues, 
crystallised concepts, reveries, fleeting as well as generic images, abstract pictures, 
visualised movements, and subjective feelings. Each psychological theory offers to 
examine in slow motion the rapid processes of thought, and thus untangle the many-
sided, welded, inner flow of ideas: but no single, universal hierarchy exists in the 
modalities of thought which characterises human beings (John-Steiner, 1985: 87). 
 
1.41   John-Steiner’s assertion above, which outlines the uncertainties about the 
structure of creative innovation, forms the backdrop of further interrogation on the 
subject. In her assertion, she hints at the web of relationship between objective 
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ostensivity and the necessity of subjective feelings and imagination. Her assertion echoes 
Wittgenstein’s own uncertainty about creativity, and his discomfort over what he regards 
as ‘background’, equivalent to her ‘inner flow of ideas’. Wittgenstein propositions of 
‘flow’ between inner and outer ostensivity could possibly be an extension of John-
Steiner’s inner flow. The antagonists’ positions offer a dialectic challenge that may result 
in a viable hypothesis for the structure of architectural innovation.  
 
Pedagogical Spin-Offs 
1.42   It is intended that through the process of interrogating the hypothesis, other 
pedagogical interests would emerge, such as:  
 
1) Whether architectural innovation is necessarily original or novel, or whether it is 
essentially problem solving7; 
2) Whether it is something that can be learned – whether there are constants through 
which architectural innovation can emerge8, or whether it is innate; 
3) Whether the ability to innovate is gained only through knowledge and 
experience9, or whether there is a place for mainly cognitive process10. 
 
Can architectural innovation be prescriptive? – A conversation on this would be drawn 
during the interrogation of the hypothesis. 
 
Considered Questions 
1.43   The route towards answering these would be through answers achieved 
through a series of considered questions. The literature review would be partial towards 
answering these questions. Placed in order of provisional priority, the questions are as 
follows:  
 
1a   Why do we innovate? 
1b   What is the point of it 
 
2a   Are innovators born? 
2b   Or are they made? 
 
3a   Is architectural innovation an individual quest? 
3b   Or must it be a collective pursuit? 
 
4a   Can it be born out of isolation? 
4b   Or must it be an extension of a domain? 
 
5a   Is the structure of architectural innovation ostensive? 
5b   Or must it be intrinsic? 
 
6a   Is there a structure to architectural innovation? 
6b   Or is it the result of architectural insight? 
 
7a   Is architectural innovation possible outside of context? 
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7b   Is it valid outside of   context? 
 
8a   Is it possible without mastering rules and activity? 
8b   Can it be a   result of just experience and intuition? 
 
9a   Is there a trait towards innovation? 
9b   Or is there none identifiable? 
 
The guide to priority is summarised, with provisional weightage given as follows: 
 
  
 
 
 
      1a  1b 
 
           2a  2b     3a  3b 
      
            4a  4b     5a  5b     6a  6b 
 
      7a  7b           8a  8b           9a  9b 
Figure 1.42 
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TWO: 
EXISTENTIAL IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review B: 
Sartre, The Psychology Of Imagination, 1966 
Supporting Literature: 
Barrett, Irrational Man, 1958 
Koestler, The Act Of Creation, 1964 
Debord, The Society Of The Spectacle, 1994 
Kearney, Poetics Of Imagination, 1998 
Gardner, Intelligence Reframed, 1999 
Fodor, The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, 2000 
van Schaik, Design City Melbourne, 2006 
 
Preamble 
2.01   Existential imagination is antagonistic to the hypothesis. It is converse to 
external ostensivity and because of this, it is normally viewed with suspicion as it is 
considered as an unreliable, unpredictable and irrelevant faculty (ref. Kearney, 1998: 3). 
For example, when Gardner first propositioned Multiple Intelligence in 1983, in the 
publication, ‘Frames of Mind’, existential intelligence was not among those included as a 
viable intelligence. It was only in a later publication, ‘Intelligence Reframed’ (1999) that 
it was included as one of the new candidates for intelligence. It was only then that it was 
considered not to have included “…. features that, according to (Gardner’s) definition, 
are not germane to a consideration of intelligence”, and of interest to this thesis is the 
“potential to engage in transcendental concerns, a capacity that can be aroused and 
deployed under certain circumstances” (Gardner, 1999: 60).  
 
2.02   Wittgenstein hinted at something close to existential imagination, as 
something that lay in the ‘background’, in an indeterminable pattern of life, which is 
causal to our thoughts: “Behind our thoughts, true and false, there is always to be found a 
dark background, which we are only later able to bring into the light and expressed as 
thought” (Wittgenstein, 1979: 36) (ref. 1.32). The route out of the dark background, and 
into the light is through a mental route which Wittgenstein term as ‘flow’: “and only in 
the flow (Fluβ) does a word have its meaning” (Wittgenstein, 1980, S 135) (ref. 1.29). 
Wittgenstein arrived at this towards the end of his life and had not interrogated it before 
his demise. The great proponent of this dark background is Sartre who made an attempt 
to bring this dark background into the light in ‘The Psychology Of Imagination’ (1966). 
Its relevance to us in architecture lies in Sartre’s examination of the relationship between 
the human consciousness, the image and reality – all of which are relevant to the act of 
architectural innovation. 
 
 
Image As Consciousness 
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2.03   Sartre starts with the proposition that the object and the idea of the object 
are one and the same thing: that the image is a consciousness: “To have an idea of chair is 
to have a chair in consciousness. That this is so is shown by the fact that what is true of 
the object is also true of the idea. If the object must have a determined quantity and 
quality, so must the idea” (Sartre, 1966: 5). Sartre sets out to contend that imagining is to 
be distinguished from perceiving – not by reference to the object that it intends, but by 
reference to the act of intending. The mental image is what counts – it is a unique 
orientation of consciousness towards the thing: 
 
What we find here is not a semblance of the chair which suddenly worked its way 
into consciousness and which has an ‘extrinsic’ relation to the existing chair, but a 
certain type of consciousness, a synthetic organisation, which has a direct relation to the 
existing chair and whose very essence consists precisely of being related in this or that 
manner of the existing chair (Sartre, 1966: 7). 
 
2.04   Consciousness is thus a synthetic organisation to become actual and 
concrete in nature. What defines the imaginary and the real world is an attitude of the 
mind, wherein the image and the percept are not different objects of consciousness; but 
are different ways of being conscious of the objects: 
 
The word image can therefore only indicate the relation of consciousness to the 
object; in other words, it means a certain manner in which the object makes its 
appearance to consciousness, or, if one prefers, a certain way in which consciousness 
presents an object to itself  (Sartre, 1966: 7). 
 
Image And Perception 
2.05   Architectural innovation involves image and perception. Sartre separates 
image from perception. He considers the two phenomena as radically distinct: Image is 
knowledge, which is conscious of itself, which places itself at the centre of the object; 
whereas perception is a synthetic unity of a multiplicity of appearances, which emerge 
slowly: 
 
When I say; “the object I perceive is a cube”, I make a hypothesis that I may have 
to reject at the close of my perceptions. When I say: “the object of which I have an image 
at this moment is a cube”, my judgment is final: it is absolutely certain that the object of 
my image is a cube. What does this mean? In perception, a knowledge forms itself slowly; 
in the image the knowledge is immediate. We see now that the image is a synthetic act 
which unites a concrete nonimagined knowledge to elements which are more actually 
representative…. 
 
No matter how long I look at an image, I shall never find anything in it but what I 
put there. It is in this fact that we find the distinction between an image and a perception. 
In the world of perception every ‘thing’ has an infinite number of relationships to other 
things. And what is more, it is this infinity of relationships – as well as the infinite 
number of relationships between the elements of the thing – which constitute the very 
essence of a thing…. 
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Now the image, on the other hand, suffers from a sort of essential poverty. The 
different elements of an image have no relationship with the rest of the world…. 
 
The difference is not that of vividness but rather that of the objects of the world of 
images can in no way exist in the world of perception; they do not meet the necessary 
conditions (Sartre, 1966: 10,11). 
 
Intention  
2.06   When the architectural object appears in the mind’s eye, it is naturally 
regarded as a perception rather than a concept and we assume that it is the result of a 
multiplicity of synthetic acts. Sartre however forewarns that this is incorrect, as what is 
observed is determined by intention: 
 
In the image a certain consciousness does indeed present itself with a certain 
object. The object is therefore a correlative of a certain synthetic act, which includes 
among its structures a certain knowledge and a certain ‘intention’. The intention is at the 
centre of the consciousness: it is the intention that envisages the object, that is, which 
makes it what it is. The knowledge, which is inseparable from the intention, specifies that 
the knowledge is this or that, adds some determinations synthetically (Sartre, 1966: 12). 
 
2.07   For intention to determine the image, the intention must be charged with 
knowledge. That knowledge therefore becomes an active structure of the image. Sartre 
states that: 
 
An image could not exist without a knowledge that constitutes it. This is the basic 
reason for the phenomenon of quasi-observation. But the knowledge can exist in the free 
state, that is, constitute a consciousness only to itself (Sartre, 1966: 73) 
 
2.08   Being in a free state, as Sartre purports, the image when not anchored is 
meaningless as it is convertible into anything that the mind intends: An architectural 
image becomes no more profound than say, any moveable image in a computer screen, a 
mere spectacle: 
 
This is also the reason why the world of images is a world in which nothing 
happens. I can at will develops this or that object into an image, make a cube turn, make 
a plant grow, make a horse run, without producing the least shift between the object and 
consciousness. Not a moment surprise: the object which is moving is not alive, it never 
precedes the intention (Sartre, 1966: 13). 
 
What Sartre uses to anchor the free state of the image are ‘custom’ and ‘habit’ as 
is seen below. 
 
Custom And Habit 
2.09   Architecture necessarily engages with the external world. The proposition 
that Sartre uses to resemble the image and the external object comes relatively close to 
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Wittgenstein’s language games. Sartre here describes it as ‘custom’ and ‘habit’, through 
which is found the resemblance between the image and the object: 
 
There is no relationship whatsoever between ‘Office’, black strokes on white 
paper, and the ‘office’ as a complex object which is not only physical but social. The 
source of the association is custom; and subsequently strengthened by habit. Without 
habit, which motivates a certain mental attitude as soon as the word is perceived, the 
word ‘office’ would never evoke its object. 
 
But the relationship between the material of the physical image and its object is 
altogether different; the two resemble each other (Sartre, 1966: 27). 
 
2.10   It needs to be noted how carefully Sartre avoids bridging the internal with 
the external world in his perspective of existential imagination. The closest he has come 
to it is to infer that the internal resembles the external through ‘custom’ and ‘habit’ – the 
two worlds are separate and not bridged although they may resemble one another. This 
also infers that when the external representation is destroyed; the internal image remains. 
However, when the imaginative consciousness is destroyed, nothing remains of the 
content: 
 
…. when the imaginative consciousness is destroyed the transcendental content is 
destroyed with it; no describable residue remains, we are confronted by another synthetic 
consciousness which has nothing in common with the first. We cannot therefore hope to 
get at this content by introspection. We must choose: either we form the image, and get to 
know the content only by its function as analogue (whether we form a non-reflective or 
reflective consciousness), we apprehend on it the qualities of the envisioned object; or we 
do not form the image, in which case we no longer have the content, nothing remains of it 
(Sartre, 1966: 70). 
 
Imaginative Knowledge 
2.11   To Sartre, the other aspect that enables meaning to emotional experience 
and which enable us to find our way around the world is imaginative knowledge (as 
opposed to image). This is to say that when a work of architecture is found to be 
meaningful, it is not the image that comes to mind that makes it meaningful, but our 
imaginative knowledge about the work. Equally, architectural innovation is invoked 
through imaginative knowledge and not through image, which merely provides for 
meaningless spectacle. Taking examples from the act of reading and experience in a 
theatre, Sartre says: 
 
In reading, as in the theatre, we are actually in the presence of a world and we 
attribute to that world just as much of existence as we do that of the theatre; that is, a 
complete existence in the unreal. Verbal signs are not the intermediaries between the 
pure meanings and our consciousness, as they are, for instance, in the case of 
mathematics: they represent the area of contact between us and this imaginary world. In 
order to describe correctly the phenomenon of reading it must be said that the reader is 
in the presence of a world. It is this fact that clearly demonstrates – if the matter were to 
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be proven – the existence of what Binet calls ‘latent images’…. we must admit that some 
things does enact the role of these alleged latent images: namely imaginative knowledge 
(Sartre, 1966: 81, 82). 
 
2.12   Imaginative knowledge has the tendency towards the intuition, through 
synthesis of relationships in order for us to find our way around the world. To reach at the 
intuition, the real is only envisioned. In this respect, Sartre regards the real as a kind of 
contamination. Speaking about the contents of a novel, where words play the role of 
signs, Sartre said:  
 
But imaginative knowledge has too strong a tendency towards an intuition which 
will fill it up, not to attempt to make the sign enact the role of representative of the 
object; when this happens it uses the sign as if it were a drawing. The physiognomy of the 
word becomes the representative of the physiognomy of the object. A real contamination 
takes place. When I read ‘this beautiful person’, the words no doubt mean, above all, a 
certain young woman, the heroine of the novel. But to a certain degree they represent the 
beauty of the young woman; they enact the role of this something which is a beautiful 
young woman (Sartre, 1966: 85, 86). 
 
Thus, in imaginative knowledge, beauty is idealised by the physiognomy of the 
word, which is contaminated by the object of beauty, which is the young woman. 
 
Imaginative Meaning 
2.13   In the above passage, Sartre is looking for depth beyond appearance: depth 
of meaning is somewhat spoilt by appearances. Debord has another way of describing 
this contamination: like a nonchalant observer, calls it ‘spectacle’, inferring that it is a 
ubiquitous negating social condition: “…. it is a social relationship between people that is 
mediated by images” (Debord, 1994: S 4). As a negating condition, Debord elaborates on 
the spectacle: 
 
 Understood in its own terms, the spectacle proclaims the predominance of 
appearances and asserts that all human life, which is to say all social life, is mere 
appearance. But any critique capable of apprehending the spectacle’s essential character 
must expose it as a visible negation of  life – and as a negation of life that has invented a 
visible form for itself (Debord, 1994: S 10). 
 
2.14   However the way of overcoming the hegemony of the image (or the 
spectacle) in search of depth or meaning differs somewhat between Sartre and Debord. 
Sartre descends towards inversion into human consciousness whereas Debord 
recommends a taking over of external conditions. In the inversion towards solipsism in 
search of depth and meaning, Sartre states: 
 
Reflection yields us affective consciousnesses. Joy, sorrow, melancholy are 
consciousnesses. And we must apply to them the great law of consciousness: that all 
consciousness is consciousness of something. In a word, feelings have special 
intentionalities, they represent one way – among others – of self-transcendence. Hatred is 
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hatred of someone, love is love of someone. James said: remove the physiological 
manifestation of hatred, of indignation and all you have remaining is abstract judgments 
about feeling…. These qualities are in a sense, not properties of the object, so that 
basically, the very term ‘quality’ is inappropriate. It would be better to say that the 
qualities constitute the sense of the object, that they are affective structure: they permeate 
the entire object; when they disappear – as in the cases of depersonalisation – the 
perception remains intact, things do not seem to be changed, but the world is singularly 
impoverished nevertheless (Sartre, 1966: 88, 89). 
  
2.15   To Debord however, the meaning is only engaged externally, in practical 
terms. Destroying the meaningless spectacle requires the setting off of a ‘practical force 
in motion’ – which is a collective political force (ref. Debord, 1994: S 203). 
Conversations on meaning, history and innovation, necessarily includes culture and the 
contents of conversation is ostensive. This is unlike Sartre’s existential imagination; it 
engages instead, something that approximates Sartre’s ‘custom’ and ‘habit’ (ref. 2.09). 
Speaking about innovation in the context of culture, Debord propositions the 
transcendence of culture, or in Sartre’s terminology: the transcendence of  ‘custom’ and 
‘habit’: 
 
The struggle between tradition and innovation, which is the basic principle of the 
internal development of the culture of historical societies, is predicated entirely on the 
permanent victory of innovation. Cultural innovation is impelled solely, however, by the 
total historical movement which, by becoming conscious of its totality, tends toward the 
transcendence of its own cultural presuppositions – and hence toward the suppression of 
all separations (Debord, 1994: S181). 
 
To further connect meaning to ostensivity, Debord propositions that meaning is 
linked to the presence of culture: 
 
Culture issued from a history that had dissolved the way of life of the old world, 
yet culture as a separate sphere is as yet no more than an intelligence and a sensory 
communication which, in a partially historical society, must themselves remain partial. 
Culture is the meaning of an insufficiently meaningful world (Debord, 1994: S 183). 
  
Visual Imagination 
2.16   Compared with the attitude of phenomenology, Sartre is clear about the 
priority given to the sense of sight over the other four visceral senses. Whereas in 
phenomenology, the sensations between the five senses are united synthetically11, Sartre 
suggests that the other visceral senses are subordinate to vision:  
 
These visual impressions that constitute an immobile form are joined, by strictly 
kinaesthetic sensations (skin, muscles, tendons, articulation) which accompany them 
mutely. These present more feeble elements that are completely dominated and even 
denatured  by the forms and clear perceptions of vision. They are doubtless the support of 
the intentions and protentions: but these secondary intentions are rigorously 
subordinated to the retentions and protentions that envision the impression of vision. 
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Since, otherwise, there is no kinaesthetic persistence, they are immediately effaced 
(Sartre, 1966: 97). 
 
2.17   Hence to Sartre, visceral meaning is imaginatively driven. Quoting the 
experiments of the Wurzburg psychologists, Sartre points out the observations: 
 
“Something about this symbolism”, writes Burlord, “is discovered in the motor 
representations that accompany mental work. The representations are so obscure that the 
subjects are not always certain whether these are images or sensations of movement. In 
the experimental reports we find mention of the eye and head movements; ‘a sort of 
symbolic sensation of nodding of the head in approbation’; ‘a convulsive pressure of the 
jaw concomitant and symbolic sensation (or representations) as when one turns the head 
away from something, in suppressing a thought’; ‘a motor incertitude in the hands and 
the posture of the body’ as when in doubt; all these phenomena jostle each other in 
intellectual processes as in emotional processes. Subjects are most unable to state 
whether what they experience is consciousness of an attitude or attitudes of 
consciousness”. 
 
“So in the consciousness which is clearly imaginary there is a zone of semi-
darkness where almost imperceptible states, empty imaginative cognitions which are 
almost images, and symbolic apprehensions of movement appear and disappear rapidly. 
Let one of these cognitions fit itself for a moment on one of these movements, and the 
imaginative consciousness is born’ (Sartre 1966: 106, 107). 
 
It is thus noted that visceral meanings and gestures have an imaginative structure, 
and that consciousness is accompanied by representations that are hard to differentiate. 
Hence the subject cannot tell whether they are ‘kinaesthetic’ apprehensions or images. 
 
2.18   What the above, 2.16 and 2.17 amount to is that: since all visceral meaning 
is imaginative driven (2.17) and that imagination is itself dominated by visiocentricity 
(2.16), the basis for meaning is therefore visual imagination. This contravenes the 
phenomenology attitude that meaning is the synthesis of combined visceral senses. Sartre 
is saying that phenomenology is incorrect; instead, visceral reaction is imaginatively 
driven, with dominance given to visual imagination. As examples, he points out that: 
 
It has already been mentioned that the idea of darkness involves a dilation of the 
pupils of the eye, the image of a close object involves reflexes of accommodation with 
convergence and contraction of the pupil, the thought of a disgusting object causes 
vomiting and the hope of a tasty dish produces salivation if one is hungry (Sartre, 1966: 
174). 
 
2.19   Unlike the ostensivity of Wittgenstein’s latter work, found in ‘On 
Certainty’ (1969), and ‘Zettel’ (1980), where he infers that creative innovation requires 
that there is no sharp boundary between inner and outer ostension (ref. 1.28) and that 
inner ostension can be brought forward through blurring the edges of language games 
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(ref. 1.29), Sartre’s imaginative consciousness stays as an internal ostension, even when 
imaginative consciousness tends towards words: 
 
The words are, of course, not indispensable to its structure and there are many 
images without words. Furthermore, they do not constitute a part of our consciousness as 
such, their externality throws them in the direction of the analogue. But, in the first place, 
since all the knowledge tends to express itself through words, all images have a sort of 
verbal tendency. Then, again, when the word is given to imaginary consciousness, it 
becomes integrated to the analogue, in the synthesis of the transcendent object…. It is 
enough for us to note that if we give the name of image to the whole system of 
imaginative consciousness and its objects, it is a mistake to say that the word adds itself 
to it externally; it is internal (Sartre, 1966: 110, 111). 
 
2.20   With regard to architectural innovation, what the above infers is that: if we 
were to see an image of an architectural proposition in the mind, before its translation 
into an external image, the mental act involves the possessing of ‘in’ consciousness – of 
certain mental content composed of visual sensations such as: the formal and spatial 
outline of the proposition, the colour and tactility of the shape, and so on. These 
sensations cannot be externalised: they are given by some other means other than the 
visceral organs. In other words, the first act of architectural innovation is purely mental. 
 
Imaginative Consciousness 
2.21   There must then be two layers for the above to be plausible. While Sartre 
insists that imaginative consciousness is internal, there must be another form of 
consciousness that can externalise it, otherwise architectural innovation remains always 
hidden. There must hence be a belief that can posit the image as a picture. Sartre refers to 
the belief as ‘reflective consciousness’ (ref. Sartre, 1966: 112). However, according to 
Sartre, what is externalised with imaginative consciousness is not real: it is still 
imaginary. Using the observation of the Pantheon to make his point, Sartre says: 
 
It is as if I thought: “this object before me, I know that it has columns, a façade, a 
grey colour. All this is present as a certain form: what I sense there is the Pantheon, with 
its columns, its façade, its grey colour”. But the Pantheon exists elsewhere and it 
presents itself as existing elsewhere: what is present is, in some way, its absence. 
 
Thus, for a few moments, I was as if in the presence of the Pantheon and the 
Pantheon is nevertheless not there: this is the phenomenon of possession we have already 
described…. Such is the origin of the illusion of immanence: in transferring to the 
analogue the qualities of the thing it represents, a miniature Pantheon is constructed for 
the imaginative consciousness and the reflective consciousness presents the imaginative 
conscious as a consciousness of that miniature. The result of this construction is a 
mirage: I believe that the object of my consciousness is a complex of real sensible 
qualities but which are not externalised, whereas these qualities are perfectly 
externalised but imaginary (Sartre, 1966: 113, 114). 
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2.22   The problem imaginative consciousness seemingly has with architecture is 
that it may not necessarily engage with the real world, as imaginary objects can be: 
“without any attachments, without temporal relationships to any other object or my own 
duration. They are characterised only by a subjective duration, by a pure before-after 
relation, which is limited to marking the relationship of the different states of the action” 
(Sartre, 1966: 169) – In which case it bears little relevance to architecture. However, 
Sartre clarifies the difference between imagining: 1) objects of ostensivity (real objects), 
and 2) objects of hidden ostensivity (unreal objects). On unreal objects he suggests: 
 
When we speak of the world of unreal objects, we use an inexact expression for 
the sake of greater convenience. A world is a unit in which each object has its fixed place 
and bears certain relationships to the other objects. The very idea of a world implies the 
following twofold condition for its object: they must be rigorously individualised, and 
they must be in equilibrium with a milieu. It is for this reason that there is no unreal 
world since no unreal object can meet this two-fold condition (Sartre, 1966: 171). 
 
Therefore the real object posits itself in the real world through two-fold 
conditions: individuality and context. The idea of context harks back to Sartre’s earlier 
proposition of ‘custom’ and ‘habit’ and, Wittgenstein’s language games (ref. 2.09). 
 
Perception 
2.23   One of the two-fold conditions that Sartre propositions above is 
individuality. The suggestion of individuality infers that the concerned object occupies a 
particular space12, and it is through the occupation of space that the imaginative 
consciousness is externalised. The route to externalisation involves perception, and as 
Sartre explains image and perception are different entities. The image occupies individual 
space whereas perception occupies infinite space: 
  
But neither could the object of imaginative consciousness be externalised, for the 
reason that it is already such by nature. If I form the imaginative consciousness of Peter, 
Peter brings along with him his unreal space and places himself before consciousness, he 
is external to consciousness. The problem is therefore entirely different: the object of the 
image differs from the object of perception: (1) in that it has its own space, whereas there 
is an infinite space which is common to all perceived objects; (2) in that it occurs 
immediately as unreal, whereas the object of perception originally set up, as Husserl 
says, a claim to reality (Seinsanspruch). That unreality of the imagined object is the 
correlative of an immediate intuition of spontaneity (Sartre, 1966: 102). 
 
Therefore without context, the mental object remains internal, as it is still an 
image. Without context, it has not been externalised into reality. 
 
2.24   With regard to perception in the above, Sartre suggests that: (1) all 
perceived object carries an infinite space and, (2) the object of perception has a claim to 
reality. Sartre later exemplifies the proposition by contrasting perception with dreams, 
which is: “a consciousness that is incapable of leaving the imaginative attitude” (Sartre, 
1966: 213): 
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We have now arrived at the certain conclusion that the theme of the dream cannot 
be that of perception, even if it appears to resemble it on first sight. This we can also see 
from a simple inspection of reflective consciousness directed on a perceptive 
consciousness: To affirm that I perceive is to deny that I am dreaming, or, in other 
words, it is sufficient and necessary motivation for my affirming that I am not 
dreaming…. 
 
All this is, however, not enough. If we study the dream and perception somewhat 
more deeply we shall see that the difference that separates them is, from one point of 
view, like that between belief and knowledge. When I perceive a table I do not believe in 
the existence of that table. I have no need to believe in it since it is there by itself. There is 
no supplementary act by which, in addition to perceiving that table, I can confer upon it a 
believed or believable existence. The table is discovered, unveiled, given to me, in the 
very act of perception: and the thesis of the perceiving consciousness does not need to be 
confounded with the affirmation (Sartre, 1966: 211, 212). 
 
The above infers that the probable link between imaginative consciousness and 
real object is perception. 
 
Mental Acts Of Architectural Innovation 
2.25   Sartre’s imaginative consciousness explains somewhat the first mental 
action of architectural innovation, which is the human ability to imagine. He suggests that 
the second act is perception. The first act is the creation of individual space, and the 
second act is to create infinite space, wherein perception enables the percipient to link the 
internal world with the external. To clarify this, he explains the first act as follows: 
 
For a consciousness to be able to imagine it must be able to escape from the 
world by its very nature, it must be able by its own efforts to withdraw from the world, In 
a word it must be free (Sartre, 1966: 240). 
 
2.26   In the act of individuation, through the first act, the architectural innovator 
places a distance between himself and the picture, or freeing himself from the image, 
unbounded to a system. Or, according to Jameson, “From within the system you cannot 
hope to generate anything that negates the system as a whole or portends the experience 
of something other than the system, or outside the system” (Leach, ed, 1997: 260). This 
freedom is also synthetically linked to the whole, as architectural innovation requires the 
link to the external world, which is Sartre’s second act: the link through perception, 
through infinite space. He further explains as follows: 
 
First of all we must bear in mind that the act of positing the world as a synthetic 
totality and the act of ‘taking perspective’ from the world are both one and the same. If 
we may use a comparison, it is precisely by placing oneself at a convenient distance that 
the impressionist painter disengages the whole ‘forest’ or the ‘white water lilies’ from the 
multitude of small strokes he has placed on the canvas. But, reciprocally, the possibility 
of constructing a whole is given as the primary structure of the act of taking perspective. 
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It is therefore enough to be able to posit reality as a synthetic whole in order to posit 
oneself free from it and this going-beyond is freedom itself since it could not happen if 
consciousness were not free. Thus to posit the world as a world or ‘negate’ it is one and 
the same thing (Sartre, 1966: 240). 
 
2.27   The closer the Sartre’s perspective get to concretising imagination, making 
architectural innovation probable, it closer it is drawn into the edges of phenomenology. 
Sartre begins to adopt Heidegger’s terminology, ‘being-in-the-world’ to make the 
concretisation of imagination plausible: 
 
Thus, although as a result of producing the unreal, consciousness can appear 
momentarily delivered from ‘being-in-the-world’, it is just this ‘being-in-the-world’ 
which is the necessary condition for imagination.  
 
Thus the critical analysis of the conditions that made all imagination possible has 
led us to the following discoveries: in order to imagine, consciousness must be free from 
all specific reality and this freedom must be able to define itself by a ‘being-in-the-world’ 
which is at once the constitution and the negation of the world; the concrete situation of 
the consciousness in the world must at each moment serve as the singular motivation for 
the constitution of the unreal (Sartre, 1966: 242). 
 
2.28   The above infers, from the Sartre’s perspective, that architectural 
innovation is first motivated by producing the unreal, followed by singular moments 
during which the unreal is constituted, wherein the object of perception overflows 
consciousness constantly: “In a word, the object of perception overflows consciousness 
constantly; the object of the image is never more than the consciousness one has; it is 
limited by that consciousness” (Sartre, 1966: 12). 
 
 
2.29   When architectural innovation is translated on paper, the manifestation 
defines itself as a kind of ‘being-in-the-world’ – this is because, from the Sartre’s 
perspective, “the whole of the real is surpassed in order to concretise what is imagined” 
(Sartre, 1966: 245). Further to this, the architectural innovation is defined as “the absent 
piece…. The imaginary thus represents at each moment the implicit meaning of the real” 
(ref. Sartre, 1966: 245). What is meant can be exemplified by Sartre’s commentary of an 
artist at work: 
 
We often hear it said, in fact, that the artist first has an idea in the form of an 
image which he then realises on canvas. This mistaken notion arises from the fact that the 
painter can, in fact, begin with a mental image which is, as such, incommunicable, and 
from the fact that at the end of his labours he presents the public with an object which 
everyone can observe. This leads us to believe that there occurred a transition from the 
imaginary to the real. But this is in no way true. That which is real, we must not fail to 
note, are the results of the brush strokes, the stickiness of the canvas, its grain, the polish 
spread over the colours. But all this does not constitute the object of aesthetic 
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appreciation. What is ‘beautiful’ is something which cannot be experienced as a 
perception and which, by its very nature, is out of the world (Sartre, 1966: 247). 
 
First And Second Acts Of Architectural Innovation 
2.30   This infers that: what may count in a work of architectural innovation is not 
the sudden emergence of the final form from the first mental act but: (1) the first act, 
which is the conferment of individual space to the unreal, followed by, (2) the second act, 
which is perception, unifying the mental image with the world around it (ref. 2.22) – in 
the case of architecture, it will be the way the building is first drawn, the nature of the 
technology and materials used, the texture of the materials and the process of the work. 
The world is then extended to the environment, the context and then other broad issues. 
In the realisation of the work into reality the second act becomes extensive, wherein 
perception takes over from imagination. However, what is appreciated in architectural 
innovation is the apprehension of the unreal – the first act. With reference to cubist 
paintings for example, Sartre says: 
 
The aesthetic enjoyment is real but it is not gasped for itself, as if produced by a 
real colour: it is but a manner of apprehending the unreal object and, and far from being 
directed on the real painting, it serves to constitute the imaginary object through the real 
canvas. This is the source of the celebrated disinterestedness of aesthetic experience…. 
This does not come from some mysterious way of apprehending the real, which we are to 
use occasionally. What happens is that the aesthetic object is constituted and 
apprehended by an imaginative consciousness which posits it as unreal (Sartre, 1966: 
249). 
 
2.31   Kearney explains that what Sartre is trying to put across is actually the 
change of attitude – “this shift from perceptual to imaginative consciousness that 
determines the sui generis nature of art” (Kearney, 1998: 79). Kearney goes on to explain 
that: 
 
Sartre offers an interesting suggestion here that it is this mutual exclusiveness of 
intentionalities which accounts for the peculiar discomfiture one experiences when 
leaving a theatre of a concert-hall. The unease is engendered not by the passing from one 
place to another – from hall to street – but by passing from one attitude to the opposite – 
from imagination to perception. ‘Aesthetic contemplation is an induced dream and the 
passing into the real is an actual waking up’ (Kearney, 1998: 79). 
 
Unreal And Real Exclusion 
2.32   Kearney however went on to object to Sartre’s tendency to treat 
imagination in ‘pathological light’ saying that: “This is explicit in his treatment of the 
‘abnormal’ expressions of imagination – hallucination, schizophrenia, neurasthenia, but is 
also present, if diplomatically understated, in the treatment of such ‘normal’ forms of 
imagination as dreaming, infatuation, fascination or aesthetic appreciation” (Kearney. 
1998: 85). Kearney also objects to Sartre’s separation of aesthetics from the ethics, 
saying that: “By thus defining their relation as incorrigibly antithetical, Sartre is in effect 
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denying that art can ever be practical or that the praxis can ever be artistic” (Kearney, 
1998: 86). 
 
2.33   Kearney however seems to have missed Sartre’s point of separating the 
unreal from the real, the image from the perception, or for the matter, aesthetics from the 
ethics. What Sartre has effectively done is to posit the possibility of art in imaginative 
consciousness (in the first act), and to posit clearly, the genesis of creative innovation – 
which is first posited in the unreal (also in the first act). Communication with the real 
world is posited in perception (the second act), and the real is where praxis lay. Whilst it 
is true that Sartre does not allow the first and second acts to overlap, there is however the 
possibility of alternating – a mental action that every designer is familiar with. In any 
event it is impossible to overlap the first act with the second – how can a dream be a 
reality? It is either one or the other. 
 
2.34   Sartre also posits true freedom with the imagination: “this going-beyond is 
freedom itself since it could not happen if consciousness were not free” (Sartre, 1966: 
240). The genesis of architectural innovation requires mental freedom unfettered by 
systems, praxis or even ethics. Just as Kearney has pointed out (ref. 2.30) – after all, it is 
the matter of attitude, whether the mind chooses to align itself with dreams or with 
perception, with the unreal or the real, with imagination or praxis. 
 
McAllister: 
Show me the heart unfettered by 
foolish dreams 
  
And I will show you a happy man. 
 
Keating: 
Only in dreams can men  
be truly free 
 
Twas always thus 
And always thus will be. 
 
(Film: Dead Poets Society, by Peter Weir, 1989) 
 
In Cultural And Historical Contexts 
2.35   It is necessary to put into perspective the emergence of the existential 
attitude, which became especially prominent in Europe after the Second World War, that 
the emergence had a cultural basis: “The (existential) philosophy was…. a creation of the 
Western European continent at the moment in history when all of its horizons – political 
as well as spiritual – were rapidly shrinking” (Barrett, 1958: 10). Even Sartre’s influences 
from before the war, particularly, Heidegger and Jaspers, revolved their thinking around 
pervasive European intellectualism in the early part of the twentieth century:  
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Neither Heidegger nor Jaspers created their philosophies out of whole cloth; the 
atmosphere of German philosophy during the first part of this century had been 
quickened by the search for a new ‘philosophical anthropology’ – a new interpretation of 
man – made necessary by the extraordinary additions to all of the special sciences that 
dealt with man…. But what lifted Heidegger and Jaspers above the level of their 
contemporary philosophic atmosphere and impelled them to give a new voice of the 
intellectual consciousness of the age was their decisive relation to two older nineteenth-
century thinkers: Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
(Barrett, 1958: 11, 12). 
 
2.36   Barrett further observes that the existential attitude is historical, fitting 
within a larger framework of European history after the war. Writing in 1958, Barrett 
suggests that: 
 
Over the past hundred years the development of philosophy has shown a 
remarkable enlargement of content, a progressive orientation toward the immediate and 
qualitative, the existent and the actual – toward ‘concreteness and adequacy’…. In the 
broadest sense of the term, no doubt, all modern thought has been touched by a greater 
existential emphasis than was the philosophy of the early modern period. This is simply 
the result of the stepped-up secularisation of Western civilisation, in the course of which 
man has inevitably become more attached to the promises of this earth than to the goal of 
a transcendent realm beyond nature…. It is Europe that has been in crisis, and it is 
European thinkers who have brought the existential problems to the focal expression, 
who have in fact dared to raise the ultimate questions (Barrett, 1958: 18, 20, 21). 
 
Existential Imagination In Architectural Innovation 
2.37  Sartre’s type of existential imagination could not possibly be a style that can 
be said to apply exclusively to artistic pursuits, but it is an attitude (ref. 2.30): for its brief 
prominence after the war it puts the psychology of single persons (instead of, say 
community) at the centre of psychological examination. The extension of this attitude in 
conversation with architecture could possibly apply only to lone buildings outside of the 
urban context. The conversation cannot be any other than psychological wherein the 
observer and the author are exclusive to one another. The moment architecture is 
connected to cultural circumstances, say, in an urban context; the existential meanings 
fade away to be superseded by the demands of human life and the physical conditions 
around it. 
 
2.38   Under the circumstances of ‘lone’ buildings, say one in the wilderness, like 
the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Cultural Centre by Greg Burgess in Uluru-Kata Tjuta National 
Park, there is a subjective, ineffable impact because the significance is solipsistic, as the 
building is compared with its vicinity in a psychological manner. The park is memorable 
for its monumental rock outcrops, particularly, Ayer’s Rock, which stands singularly on a 
vast arid plain, and also at 40 kilometres away, also visually prominent, is ‘The Olgas’ a 
collection of rock outcrops that together, is as large as Ayer’s Rock. Ayer’s Rock in 
particular, is often photographed in different colours, depending on the time of day and 
the atmospheric conditions – “the rock can dramatically change colour, anything from 
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blue to violet to glowing red” (www.crystalinks.com/ayersrock). Van Schaik observes 
that: “The two outcrops are so close that the one can be seen through the windscreen of a 
car whole the other fills the rearview mirror. A visitor who takes the time to observe 
these as a pair discovers that they are engaged in a perpetual dance of with the one 
turning red as the other turns navy blue, dawn and dusk. Externally, the Uluru-Kata Tjuta 
Cultural Centre seems to marry these two colour states” (van Schaik, 2006: 146). 
 
2.39   The impact of the powerful mythical presence of Ayer’s Rock and ‘The 
Olgas’ upon the site is unavoidable. The building designed by Burgess sits in ‘possibly 
the most sensitive site in Australian mythology’ (van Schaik, 2006: 146). Some of the 
mythical aspects of the site is explained as follows: 
 
Ayer’s Rock (Mount Uluru) is inhabited by dozens of ancestral ‘beings’ whose 
activities are recorded at many other sites. At each site that took place can be recounted, 
whether those events were of significance or whether the ancestral being just rested at a 
certain place before going on. 
 
Usually, there is a physical feature of some form at each ancestral site which 
represents both the activities of the ancestral being at the time of its formation and the 
living presence of Tjukurpa within the physical feature today. For the Australian 
Aboriginal people, that physical feature, whatever its form or appearance, animate or 
inanimate, is the Tjukurpa. It may be a rock, a sand hill, a grove of trees, a cave. For all 
of  these, the creative essence remains forever within the physical form or appearance. 
 
Around Mount Uluru there are many examples of ancestral sites. The Anangu 
explanations of these sites and the formation of Mount Uluru itself derive from the 
Tjukurpa. Most of these explanations are in the realm of secret information and are not 
disclosed to the Piranypa, the non-Aborigines (www.crystalinks.com/ayersrock). 
 
2.40   As part of the Aboriginal Dreamtime story for Ayer’s Rock, Tatji, a small 
Red Lizard, who lived in the mulgi flats, came to Uluru. He threw his kali, a curved 
throwing stick, and it became embedded in the surface. He used his hands to scoop it out 
in his efforts to retrieve his kali, leaving a series of bowl-shaped hollows (ref. 
www.crystalinks.com/ayersrock). A series of bowl-shaped hollow can be seen in one of 
the faces of Ayers Rock. Intentional or not, from the air, Burgess’ building resembles a 
pair of lizards (tatji), weaving their ways towards Ayer’s Rock, inscribing their patterns 
on the arid sand. Van Schaik observes that: “In both these cases Burgess’ clients 
responded strongly to his use of natural materials and sinuous lines approximating to 
drawings in sand” (van Schaik, 2006: 146). 
 
2.41   Was it also coincidental, or did the mythology played into the mind of the 
architect whose looping interior of the Uluru-Kata Tjuta Cultural Centre resembles that of 
the emptied insides of a reptile. The exposed rafters resemble ribs of the sinuous creature 
and the trunks of the pale Casuarinas are like bones of creatures. There is clearly a 
psychological component in Burgess’ building, but is it also cultural? The only culture 
that counts here is Aboriginal mythic culture, which can be manifested only symbolically. 
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This is echoed in the shape of the buildings (like lizards), their ground-scraping 
positioning (like traversing lizards), the exposed internal rafters (like ribs of lizards), the 
slates and shingles used on the roof (like scales of reptiles).  
 
2.42   Architecture of existential imagination are symbolic, weighted towards 
psychological expectations. The culture that influences the architecture is also 
psychological, and in this respect, mythical. The influencing culture is not the ostensive 
kind of culture; that is, one that expectantly embodies political, social and economic 
conventions. The Burgess’ building carries instead, a culture of inner ostensivity, a 
psychological one, where the mythic culture is only recognised imaginatively, adopting 
Sartre’s idea of imaginative knowledge: “In order to describe correctly the phenomenon 
of reading it must be said that the reader is in the presence of a world. It is this fact that 
clearly demonstrates – if the matter were to be proven – the existence of what Binet calls 
‘latent images’…. we must admit that some things does enact the role of these alleged 
latent images: namely imaginative knowledge” (Sartre, 1966: 81, 82). 
 
2.43   The ‘latent images’ is not the result of interaction with external culture but 
psychological culture – the mythical culture, which works subjectively and solipsistically. 
The observers ‘knows’ in an internal way the rightness of Burgess’ architecture, not 
through interaction with other people; but with the environment and the land upon which 
the observer stands. Equally, Burgess did not arrive at the architecture to fit with the 
metropolis but with the myth (psychological) and the land (physical). If Burgess had 
depended on the quality of sociological (therefore human) interaction instead of 
psychological (therefore mythical) interaction, the existential position of the architecture 
would not have existed.  
 
Conversely, how would architecture have fitted had it interacted firstly with 
people (therefore, with conventional culture)….? This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Preamble 
3.01   The first step from solipsism to the ostensive world is face-to-face 
interaction between two people, and then between three, and so on, leading on to 
interaction between groups of people. Interactions create situations – Collins terms these 
situations as ‘interaction rituals’ (Collins, 2004: 3). In the purview of interaction ritual 
(IR), architecture as an activity is a result of “momentary encounters among human 
bodies charged up with emotions and consciousness because they have gone through 
chains of previous encounters” (Collins, 2004: 3). This points to the case that 
architectural innovation is a cultural activity, arrived at interactively – it has social and 
cultural premise. Unlike existentialism, IR does not accept the permanence of uniqueness 
of individuals, as: “Individuals are unique to just the extent that their pathways through 
interactional chains, their mix of situations across time, differ from other persons’ 
pathways. If we reify the individual, we have an ideology…. but we cut off the possibility 
of explaining how individual uniqueness are moulded in a chain of encounters across 
time” (Collins, 2004: 4,5). Collins thus argues that human events result from an 
interaction chain of social activities and individual psychology forms only a part of IR 
chains: 
  
Yes, human individuals also sometimes act when they are alone, although they 
generally do so because their minds and bodies are charges with results of past 
situational encounters, and their solitary action is social insofar as it aims at and comes 
from communicating with other persons and thus is situated by where it falls in an IR 
chain (Collins, 2004: 6). 
 
 
The IR theory is a protagonist of the hypothesis, as the theory encompasses rules 
(language games) and activities (forms of life). 
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Innovation In IR Chain 
3.02   According to IR theory, progressive attitude, say towards architecture 
innovation is a result of a chain of events connected to human interaction. This attitude 
generally takes place along an entire front of innovators who happen upon new 
information, data or materials. The ideas with which they analyse their newly acquired 
information resemble one another because they formulate their mental tools under the 
same cultural conditions, from the works of their predecessors. The cult of innovators 
would then raise a few canonical names and treat them as sole creators – this is to 
simplify and summarise an IR event (ref. Collins, 2004: 10). Csikszentmihalyi puts it as 
follows: 
 
Therefore, to understand creativity it is not enough to study the individuals who 
seem most responsible for a novel idea or a new thing. Their contribution, while 
necessary and important, is only a chain, a phase in a process. To say that Thomas 
Edison invented electricity or that Albert Einstein discovered relativity is a convenient 
oversimplification. It satisfies our ancient predilection for stories that are easy to 
comprehend and involve superhuman heroes. But Edison’s and Einstein’s discoveries 
would be inconceivable without the prior knowledge, without the intellectual and social 
network that stimulated their thinking, and without the social mechanisms that 
recognised and spread their innovations (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: 7). 
 
Gardner shares this point when he says that: “Once again, as we saw in Einstein, 
Freud, Picasso, and Stravinsky, a creative individual on the threshold of his most 
dramatic achievement has benefited from close, almost parent- or sibling-like ties to 
respected intimates” (Gardner, 1993: 244). 
 
Collective Motivation 
3.03   IR theory propositions a collective motivation towards innovation through a 
mutual focus of attention towards a goal. What purports to happen, according to Collins 
is: 
 
A high degree of intersubjectivity, together with a high degree of emotional 
entrainment – through bodily synchronisation, mutual simulation / arousal of 
participants’ nervous systems – results in feelings of membership that are attached to 
cognitive symbols; and result also in the emotional energy of the individual participants, 
giving them feelings of confidence, enthusiasm, and desire for action…. These moments 
of high degree of ritual intensity are high points of experience (Collins, 2004: 42). 
 
3.04   What is mutually focussed upon becomes the emblems, or cognitive 
symbols of the group. In the cult of innovators, canonical names and their works are the 
emblems that represent the group. Through the emblems the group focuses on its own 
feelings of intersubjectivity and shared emotions – it reifies its experiences. Collins 
explains IR role in this as follows: 
 
One chief result of rituals is to charge up symbolic objects with significance, or to 
recharge such objects with renewed sentiments of respect. Along with this, individual 
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participants get their own reservoir of charge. The ‘sort of electricity’ that Durkheim 
metaphorically ascribes to the group in its state of heightened excitement is stored in 
batteries: one component of which is the symbol, and the other pole of which is the 
individual. Participant in the ritual gives the individual a special kind of energy, which I 
will call emotional energy (Collins, 2004: 38). 
  
IR Emblem 
3.05   What motivates the architect in the cult of innovators is to be recognised as 
an emblem of the group. The innovative architect who has become an emblem, or 
cognitive symbol of the group equates with the way a politician, a religious leader, or a 
sports figure can become emblems for other IR groups. The emblems are essential for the 
prolongation of the group, as they become subjects for third-person narrations, gossips 
and are subjects of conversation within the network: “Both individual names and 
narratives about them are symbols, which get charged up with significance through the 
amount of momentary effervescence of the conversations in which they play a part” 
(Collins, 2004: 85). The emblem then becomes mythic as: “The accuracy of these 
accounts is a minor consideration in successful conversational ritual, and the further the 
network goes from the source, the less a consideration it becomes at all” (Collins, 2004: 
85). There is also perceived profit in this for emblems whose names are canonised and 
mythicised, as they are situated at the pinnacle of an elitist group where: 
 
Entrée into and success within a particular occupational network is not only a 
matter of having the generalised cultural capital of that group – that which is known 
widely among persons who may not be acquainted with each other – but also having 
particular knowledge of who did what, who has what track record, who has connection 
with whom, “where the bodies are buried”. The latter form of knowledge or 
particularised cultural capital or symbolic repertoire may well be the most important 
kind, especially for the dynamics of fluidly moving situations, such as business 
transactions where time is of the essence, or analogously for scientists or other 
intellectuals attempting to innovate on the cutting edge before someone else does so. 
Here too, as in the world of private sociability, symbolic reputations are amplified to 
higher levels in networks that have enough redundant social ties so that symbols 
circulate in at least some closed loops, reinforcing the significance of a symbol because it 
is heard from all sides, and probably exaggerated in the retelling (Collins, 2004: 86). 
 
3.06   In sociological terms, the emblem of the group acts also like the sacred 
symbol for the group: it provides a flow of emotional energy to the group. Following 
Chambliss’ studies of competitive athletes in 198913, Collins points that:  
 
These dominated persons can cope with the situation, can maintain some 
anticipation about what will happen only by focusing on the other person as the lead, 
rather than projecting their own volitional future. In effect, such a person can recoup 
some emotional energy from the situation by becoming a follower, attaching themself to 
someone else’s lead. The more they resist such attachment, the less emotional energy 
they will have left. 
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In terms of the IR model, one could say that the dominant person makes oneself 
the focus of interaction. He or she becomes, in some sense, a Durkheimian sacred object 
(Collins, 2004: 122, 123). 
 
3.07   The metaphysical equivalent to this would be religious symbols found all 
over the world. In the anthropological sense, these religious symbols provide meaning to 
the group or culture. They also are cultural gels, which is why when religious symbols 
are threatened, the threat is perceived by the group as a threat to the group’s existence 
and often, reaction is violent: it becomes a matter of emotional survival. Geertz explains 
the importance of metaphysical symbols as follows: 
 
But meanings can only be ‘stored’ in symbols: a cross, a crescent, or a feathered 
serpent. Such religious symbols, dramatised in rituals or related in myths, are felt 
somehow to sum up, for those for whom they are resonant, what is known about the way 
the world is, the quality of emotional life it supports, and the way one ought to behave 
while in it. Sacred symbols thus relate an ontology and a cosmology to an aesthetics and 
a morality: their peculiar power comes from their presumed ability to identify fact with 
value at the most fundamental level, to give to what is otherwise merely actual, a 
comprehensive normative import (Geertz, 1973: 127). 
 
3.08   What the innovative architects, when recognised as emblem has gained 
over the group is asymmetrical power, under this circumstance, Collins explains that, 
“Power is an asymmetrical focus of attention upon such a situation, so that one side 
battens on the energy that all the participants have mutually produced. In a power ritual, 
the social battery is revved up, but the benefit goes largely to one side” (Collins, 2004: 
125). It is thus evident that the emblem gains not only social significance (ref. 3.05) but 
also power and becomes the main beneficiary of collective emotional energy. The type of 
emotional energy associated with such gain would be joy and enthusiasm (ref. Collins, 
2004: 125). 
 
3.09   According to Collins, there is asymmetrical stratification of emotional 
energy within the group, and that the emblem fits analogically, in an energised upper 
class, “Lording over a depressed lower class, with moderately energised middle-class 
persons in between” (Collins, 2004: 132). Taking this pattern, the winning innovators 
become the ‘energy stars’ – they become socially significant and would appear as such:  
 
Persons with lower amounts of EE (emotional energy) are impressed by those 
who have accumulated a lot of it; such people have an EE-halo that makes them easy to 
admire. They are persons who get things done; they have an aura of success surrounding 
them. And since having high EE allows one to focus attention, one can get a certain 
amount of rise in one’s own EE by following them… This high EE gives dominant 
persons a kind of micro-situational legitimacy (Collins, 2004: 132, 133). 
 
3.10   IR theory infers that individual behaviour is shaped by ritual participation, 
and that EE operates as the common denominator in the determinant of choices made 
between various courses of action and behaviour: “Emotional energy is the common 
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denominator of all social comparisons and choices” (Collins, 2004: 172). Under IR 
theory, the investment of emotion, energy, costs and time is intended to result in 
emotional energy benefits. In architectural innovation, the benefit to the innovator is to be 
accepted as an emblem of the group with all the benefits raised in 3.08. Hence: 
 
   IR maximise ratio = benefits (EE)     
            investments ( EE + time + material) 
 
According to Collins, “the theory of maximisation ration is more powerful when applied 
to emotional currency of social life and the structures of interaction that produce it” 
(Collins, 2004: 182). 
 
IR Network 
3.11   In IR theory, the factor that enables the all the elements in the equation is 
networking. According to the theory, an intensive network between successful innovators 
enables architectural innovation: successful innovators have more network ties to other 
successful innovators than less successful innovators do. It infers that great innovators are 
more closely connected to other great innovators than are those in the lower rungs of 
innovation, and minor innovators have fewest ties of all. To Collins, “In the case of ideas 
we are concerned with here, the ideas which have mattered historically, it is possible to 
demonstrate that the individuals who bring forward such ideas are located in typical 
social patterns: intellectual groups, networks and rivalries” (Collins, 1998: 3).  
 
3.12   Taking philosophers for example, Collins observe a chain of mentoring 
both upstream and downstream and, “across the generations both backward and forward 
in time. Great philosophers have more pupils and grandpupils who are relatively 
successful than lesser philosophers do; intellectual success propagates forward but also 
backward – having pupils who do important work is part of what gets an individual a 
long-term historical reputation as having had very important ideas” (Collins, 2004: 190). 
This observation could equally apply to architectural innovators, and the reasons given by 
Collins from the IR perspective could be said of architectural innovators: 
 
One of the reasons why there tend to be a chain from one highly creative 
intellectual to another is that the younger persons draws energy from the older just as 
such a symbolic hero. It is not merely a matter of transmitting cultural capital from one 
generation to the next, since we are dealing here with creative departures rather than 
loyal discipleship. The protégé’s consciousness is filled by the image of what it is to be an 
intellectual hero, by an ideal to emulate, even while one challenges the content of the 
master’s ideas (Collins, 1998: 36). 
 
3.13   To Collins, ideas do not emerge out of isolation, but are part of a larger 
network:  
 
There are particular locations in intellectual networks where a few individuals 
become highly focussed, highly energised, putting together streams of symbols in new 
ways; and those symbols do indeed come from outside, not from a creative realm of 
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creative spirit, but from the dynamics of the intellectual community internalised in that 
person’s mind and now on their way to being externalised again (Collins, 2004: 192). 
 
The internalisation is not an existential one, but is a recombination of the 
development of ideas and techniques (ref. Collins, 2004: 193). 
 
3.14   Other than vertical network between mentors and pupils as outlined in 3.12 
above, Collins also propositions horizontal networking between peers, where redundancy 
networking produces a strong sense of collective identity (ref. Collins, 2004: 193). In 
architecture, innovators often acquaint themselves in the same forum where they meet to 
propound their latest works, and the same innovators appear in often the same 
publications where they tend to compare works. In Asia, interaction groups for 
architectural innovators periodically feature in the same forums such the Asian Design 
Forum and AA Asia (ref. also van Schaik, 2005: 118-120). 
 
3.15   In ‘Creative Minds’ (1993), Gardner says that even the giants of innovation 
in the twentieth century often knew one another, and they take into account innovative 
conceptualisations done in domains other than their own:  
 
It is important that individuals like Picasso and Stravinsky were friends in late 
life. Freud and Einstein had a casual acquaintance and engaged in a memorably pointed 
correspondence about war. Certain ideas associated with these creators become such 
common coin that anyone working during the era would have encountered them…. It 
would be odd if highly creative individuals did not somehow take others’ novel 
conceptualisations into account in their own work (Gardner, 1993: 15). 
 
He is to reassert this again in ‘Multiple Intelligences’ in 1999, when speaking 
about individuals, Gardner infers that innovators do not appear from nowhere but are part 
of societal, or cultural network: “Individuals do not exhibit their intelligences ‘in the 
raw’; they do so by occupying certain relevant niches in their society, for which they 
must prepare by passing through an often lengthy development process. In a sense, 
intelligences have their own developmental history” (Gardner, 1999: 38). 
 
Traits 
3.16   However, to be an important innovator, it is not simply a matter of mere 
enchainment with mentor and peers but of possessing distinguishable difference – there 
must be emergence of strong originality, that is, new ideas has to emerge. There are 
usually only a few of these important innovators and they change the course of prevailing 
paradigm. Every student and architect is familiar with the usual architectural icons whose 
mention is inevitable in architectural history14 – Collins explains the leads towards 
identifying the traits of important innovators. The first of which is the break from the 
mentor: 
 
  To be an important thinker in one’s own right means to create new ideas. Often 
that means breaking with one’s teacher…. They are far from universal, since minor 
figures do not break with their teachers, but occur only when structural conditions are 
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present that open up space for new positions to be formulated…. One pattern that is 
transmitted, even across breaks in ideas, is high EE. Eminent thinkers are energy stars 
(Collins, 2004: 192). 
 
3.17   The second trait is high productive output from the innovator, where only a 
few of the works will become famous. Collins propositions that the inspiration for these 
famous works are not internal but external, part of cultural dynamics: 
 
They work extremely long hours, seemingly obsessed with their work; their 
thinking is itself energising for them, as if they are magnetically drawn along their chains 
of thought. At the peak of momentum in these spells of thinking ideas come into their 
heads…. This pattern, found among those most magnetised by their work, gives some 
credence to the notion of ‘inspiration’, as if the creative thinker is a genius, uniquely in 
touch with creative flow from some higher region. The metaphor is misplaced, but it 
translates into a sociological truth; there are particular locations in intellectual networks 
where a few individuals become highly focused, highly energised, putting together 
streams of symbols in new ways; and those symbols do come from outside, not from a 
mysterious realm of creative spirit, but from the dynamics of the intellectual community 
internalised in that person’s mind and now on their way to being externalised again 
(Collins, 2004: 192). 
 
3.18   Thus according to Collins, the innovator works extremely long hours for the 
few works which will become famous. However, using Pareto’s 80/20 principle15, 
Gardner infers in 2004 that 80 percent of an innovator’s recognition will come from 20 
percent of his output. Therefore it would make sense to devote attention and resources to 
the profitable products while dropping the losers (ref. Gardner, 2004: 8). However, this 
remains merely a concept, as a devotion to the small number of works will result in 
diminishing returns if the principle were to remain consistent. Until demonstrated 
otherwise, Collins’ assertion that the innovator works extremely long hours for the few 
works to achieve the intended dynamics still applies. 
 
3.19   In 1993, Gardner infers a probable third trait, which has to do with the 
personalities of innovators. He refers to a study on the personality traits of ‘creative 
architects’, but they were general and he qualified the study: 
 
In a representative study conducted by the Berkeley Institute of Personality 
Assessment, ‘creative architects’, as distinguished from their less creative peers, 
exhibited a greater incidence of such personality traits as independence, self-confidence, 
unconventionality, alertness, ready access to unconscious process, ambition, and 
commitment to work. However, it is not clear whether people who already exhibited such 
characteristics become creative or whether, as a result of acknowledge creativity, people 
come to exhibit such positively tinged traits. Also, individuals who work closely with 
those deemed creative seem to exhibit a similar profile of traits (Gardner, 1993: 23,24). 
 
3.20   Collins is however, unconvinced with the generalised flamboyance of 
personalities as suggested in the study above, which Gardner quotes. He infers that the 
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high regard for flamboyance is misplaced; what is more essential is the possession of 
high emotional energy: “Not all creative individuals have the same flamboyance – and 
the same publicity focused upon their private behaviour – but they all have relatively high 
degrees of emotional energy concentrated in their work” (Collins, 2004: 192). Therefore, 
to Collins, the traits that count are only those of 3.16, 3.17 above. 
 
Flow States 
3.21   However, Gardner suggests an inferred state of mind of an innovator in the 
process of work, first propositioned by Csikszentmihalyi in 1990 as ‘flow’, a mental state 
of heightened attention: 
 
The attainment of heightened attention, as in ‘flow states’, is also within at least 
partial control of the experiencer. Under such highly desirable circumstances, people 
become so immersed in the execution of an activity that they lose all sense of time and 
space. Certain brain centres and neural transmitters are mobilised in these states, 
whether they are induced by the ingestion of substances, involvement in a hobby, or sheer 
control of will (Gardner, 1999: 63). 
 
3.22   When Csikszentmihalyi first suggested ‘flow’ in 1990, he describes it as: 
 
The optimal state of inner experience is one in which there is order in 
consciousness. This happens when psychic energy – or attention – is invested in realistic 
goals, and when skills match the opportunities for action. The pursuit of a goal brings 
order to awareness because a person must concentrate attention on the task at hand and 
momentarily forget everything else. The periods of struggling to overcome challenges are 
what people find to be the most enjoyable times of their lives…. By stretching skills, by 
reaching toward higher challenges, such a person becomes an increasingly 
extraordinary person (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990: 6). 
 
3.23   It is evident that Gardner’s ‘flow states’, Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘flow’ and 
Collins’ ‘emotional energy’ share exactly the same meaning.  
 
Gardner’s ‘heightened attention’ where, Certain brain centres and neural 
transmitters are mobilised in these states, whether they are induced by the ingestion of 
substances, involvement in a hobby, or sheer control of will (ref. 3.20) infers the same 
meaning as: 
 
  Csikszentmihalyi’s The optimal state of inner experience is one in which there is 
order in consciousness. This happens when psychic energy – or attention – is invested in 
realistic goals, and when skills match the opportunities for action. The pursuit of a goal 
brings order to awareness because a person must concentrate attention on the task at 
hand and momentarily forget everything else (ref. 3.21).  
 
This again is the same as Collins’ A high degree of intersubjectivity, together with 
a high degree of emotional entrainment – through bodily synchronisation, mutual 
simulation / arousal of participants’ nervous systems – results in feelings of membership 
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that are attached to cognitive symbols; and result also in the emotional energy of the 
individual participants, giving them feelings of confidence, enthusiasm, and desire for 
action…. These moments of high degree of ritual intensity are high points of experience 
(ref. 3.03). 
 
Therefore: 
 
‘Flow States’(Gardner) = ‘Flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi )= ‘Emotional Energy’(Collins) 
 
–The psychological circumstances when innovation occurs. 
 
3.24   Although Csikszentmihalyi describes psychic energy in ‘flow’, it is not an 
existential or mystical hidden energy, but one that is overt as he later qualifies: 
 
After all, mystical experiences are not necessary to account for the performance 
of a great violinist, or a great athlete, even though most of us could not even begin to 
approach their powers…. Like all virtuosi, he must spend many years learning, and he 
must keep constantly in training. Being a specialist he cannot afford the time or the 
mental energy to do anything other than fine-tune his skill at manipulating inner 
experiences…. 
 
Because no branch of science deals with consciousness directly, there is no single 
accepted description of how it works. Many disciplines touch on it and thus provide 
peripheral accounts. Neuroscience, neuroanatomy, cognitive science, artificial 
intelligence, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology are some of the most directly relevant 
fields to choose from; however, trying to summarise their findings would result in an 
account similar to the descriptions the blind men gave of the elephant: each different, 
and each unrelated to the others. No doubt we shall continue to learn important things 
about consciousness from these disciplines, but in the meantime we are left with the task 
of providing a model that is grounded in fact, yet expressed simply enough so that anyone 
can make use of it (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990: 25). 
 
KLPAC – Case Study of IR In Architecture 
Background 
3.25   Since its opening in 2005, the KLPAC (Kuala Lumpur Performing Arts 
Centre) is becoming an emblem for those in need of constant emotional recharging. It 
fills a void in the performance arts in KL and gives meaning to those who wishes for the 
arts to occupy our time besides the everyday pursuit of ordinary existence. From the IR 
perspective, the KLPAC is a significant distribution centre of emotional energy – the kind 
of energy that gives joy and enthusiasm, a place of innocence and the sustenance of it. It 
is an ideal of an art group manifested in real form, one that has intense emotional energy 
for the group. 
 
3.26   From the IR perspective all interaction groups need its emblem, and this 
emblem has a legendary beginning, one that is forged, in the beginning, by misfortune, 
and later by seemingly supernatural intervention. It began when the Actors’ Studio at 
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Dataran Merdeka (Independence Square) was flooded out of existence in a massive flood 
in Kuala Lumpur in June 2003, with significant material as well as cultural loss, as even 
then, there was no other place like the Actors’ Studio, a theatre, wholly funded by private 
means, nurtured by love for the performing arts and energised by a sense of mission. All 
the resources for the Actors’ Studio emanates from a husband and wife team of Joe 
Hasham and Faridah Merican. The couple is symbolic to the performing arts of the city. 
 
3.27   It had taken a telephone call of conscience from the landscape architect (Ng 
Sek San) of the Sentul West development (a development at a dilapidated part of KL), an 
otherwise unlikely meeting between a corporate icon (Francis Yeoh) and his men with 
the Actors’ Studio and the prompting of the then Deputy Prime Minister’s wife (Endon) 
to see an uncanny realisation of what was nothing more than mere hope. All the rest of 
the activities, from inception to the realisation of the building: from the setting of a 
budget, the magnanimity of a corporate giant, the presence of a magical setting, the 
singular sense of mission of all those subsequently involved, converged together in a 
combined collective will to realise the dream. Under this context, Csikszentmihalyi’s 
‘flow’ seems an appropriate terminology to portray Collins’ collective motivation (ref. 
3.03, 3.04). EE was the common denominator that brought together the various human 
emblems, representing different domains together. From the IR perspective what has 
happened was a mutual attention towards a goal and could be represented by Collins 
description (ref. 3.03): 
 
A high degree of intersubjectivity, together with a high degree of emotional entrainment – 
through bodily synchronisation, mutual simulation / arousal of participants’ nervous 
systems – results in feelings of membership that are attached to cognitive symbols; and 
result also in the emotional energy of the individual participants, giving them feelings of 
confidence, enthusiasm, and desire for action… (Collins, 2004: 42). 
 
IR Architecture 
3.28   Unlike the staid, commercial architecture usually associated with large 
property development corporations like YTL, which has its own architectural division, 
the KLPAC appeared like a breath of fresh air in the corporation’s portfolio. The team of 
architects in YTL, lead by Baldip Singh produced a work of architecture which has 
emotional content, which does not ‘smell of money’, that can be an enjoyable place to be. 
In his description of the building, the architect is keen to emphasise that the building is an 
honest one, which is arrived at from the premise of functionality – with materials and 
services that are expressed as part of the architecture. With this basic premise, the 
resulting architecture is one of considerable merit.  
 
3.29   Seen in the IR perspective, the building is mutually focussed upon, 
becoming the emblem, or cognitive symbol of the group(ref. 3.04). Collins put this as 
follows: 
 
One chief result of rituals is to charge up symbolic objects with significance, or to 
recharge such objects with renewed sentiments of respect. Along with this, individual 
participants get their own reservoir of charge. The ‘sort of electricity’ that Durkheim 
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metaphorically ascribes to the group in its state of heightened excitement is stored in 
batteries: one component of which is the symbol, and the other pole of which is the 
individual Collins, 2004: 38). 
 
Further Description 
3.30   However, the IR description of the architecture, leaves it yet incomplete as 
the completed building merit a phenomenological description. Particularly in the way that 
the building sits engagingly in a minimalist landscape, providing the sense of presentness, 
having a phenomenological sense as the building is approached or viewed from the 
grounds. The presentness is enhanced as the distinction between landscape and building 
is blurred, particularly where the water feature permeates in and out of the entrance 
lobby. A permeable, signature landscape wall defines the grounds of the architecture 
from the landscape areas but the definition is merely gestural – like a brush-stroke – 
something to look at, like a work of art. The lightness and permeability of space 
continues into the main stairs made out of just steel sections. 
 
3.31   The building is also one of adaptive reuse, the architecture appears 
successful because the new and the old parts of the building are distinctive and 
recognisable. The new exists side by side with the old without damaging what is 
precious. Both the old and the new exist together in presentness. At the central areas, the 
new roof rises above the old one in order to make the theatre functional. In any case there 
appear to be a genuine attempt to respect the old. The eventual architecture is a tactile 
one, with the preserved bricks and metal trusses kept as a reminder of what the old world 
once was. 
 
3.32   The requirements for a phenomenological description necessitate an 
examination of phenomenology in architecture in the next chapter…. 
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Preamble 
4.01   Like existential imagination, phenomenological imagination celebrates the 
imagination’s creative power by doing away with traditional theories that tied the 
imagination to conceptual prejudices such as: ‘dualism’, ‘representationalism’ and 
‘reification’16. Before Sartre’s existential imagination, it was Husserl’s phenomenological 
imagination that freed the imagination from its inherited conceptual constraints. Sartre 
describes the constraints as ‘illusion of immanence’, which is to be overcome: 
 
By revealing the image to be an intentional structure, Husserl frees it from the 
condition of an inert content of consciousness. At one stroke vanish, along with the 
immanent metaphysics of images, all the difficulties concerning the relationship of the 
simulacrum to its real object, and of pure thought to the simulacrum…. Husserl freed the 
psychic world of a weighty burden and eliminated almost all the difficulties that clouded 
the classical problem of the relations of images to thoughts (quote, Kearney 1998: 13). 
 
4.02   Hence in phenomenological imagination, the ultimate grounding act to free 
the imagination is not something to do with experience, but that to do with intention or, 
‘the seeing of essences’. He uses the example of the ‘geometer’, or the creative 
draughtsman (or architect) to elucidates what can be achieved eidetically rather than 
experientially: 
 
The geometer who draws his figures on the board produces thereby factually 
existing lines on the factually existing board. But this experiencing of the product, qua 
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experiencing, no more grounds his geometrical seeing of essences and eidetic thinking 
than does his physical producing. This is why it does not matter whether his experiencing 
is hallucination or whether, instead of actually drawing his lines and construction, he 
imagines them in a world of phantasy. It is quite otherwise in the case of the scientific 
investigator of Nature. He observes and experiments; that is, he ascertains factual 
existence according to experience; for him experience is the grounding act which can 
never be substituted by a mere imagining. And this is precisely why science of matters of 
fact and experiential science are equivalent concepts. But for the geometer who explores 
not actualities but ‘ideal possibilities’, not predicatively formed eidetic affair-complexes, 
the ultimate grounding act is not experience but rather the seeing of essences (Husserl, 
1998: 16). 
 
4.03   Although the phenomenological method is freed from logical 
presuppositions, such as the empiricist and rationalist premises, Husserl requires it to be 
based on rigour, as certain as that of the sciences, by ‘understanding the fundamental 
essence of existence’ (Kearney, 1998: 15). It is different from the other sciences on 
eidetic grounds: 
 
Within the circle of our intuitions of the individuals, to determine the ‘summa 
genera of concretions’ and, in this manner, to effect ‘a distribution of all intuited 
individual being according to regions of being, each of which marks off an eidetic or 
empirical science’ (or group of sciences) that is ‘necessarily distinct’ from other sciences 
because it is distinguished from them in the most radical eidetic grounds (Husserl, 1998: 
32). 
 
 
Phenomenology A Product Of Consciousness 
4.04   Just as Sartre was to later separate imagination from perception, Husserl 
separates the imagination from the object of observation, thus enabling the rigorous 
interrogation of creative imagination. Taking the mythical centaur as example, the 
centaur is imagined as a product of the mind, that is, of consciousness:  
 
The flute-playing centaur we freely imagine is precisely our objectivational 
formation. – Certainly ‘concept formation’ and likewise free fiction are carried out 
spontaneously, and what is spontaneously generated is obviously a product of the 
mind…. the centaur is indeed ‘nothing’, it is wholly ‘imagination’, stated more precisely: 
the mental process of imagining is the imagining of the centaur (Husserl, 1998: 43). 
 
4.05    Phenomenological imagination thus redefines the image as a relation, an 
act of consciousness directed at an object beyond consciousness. By doing this the world 
remains at all times transcendent of the consciousness which intends it:  
 
Our considerations have established that the physical thing is transcendent to the 
perception of it and consequently to any consciousness whatever related to it; it is 
transcendent not merely in the sense that the physical thing cannot be found in fact as a 
really inherent component of consciousness; rather the whole situation is an object of 
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eidetic insight: With the absolute unconditional universality and necessity it is the case 
that a physical thing cannot be given in any possible perception, in any possible 
consciousness, as something really inherently immanent. Thus there emerges a 
fundamental essential difference between being as a mental process and being as a 
physical thing (Husserl, 1998: 89). 
 
Perception Bridges Imagination With Reality 
4.06   Like Sartre who was to follow him, Husserl separates the imagination, the 
perception and physical reality (object), but the perception is seen as the bridge between 
imagination and the physical reality and that only perception engages with physical 
reality.  
 
The perception of a physical thing does not presentiate something non-present, as 
though it were a memory or a phantasy; perception makes present, seizes upon an it-itself 
in its presence ‘in person’. Perception does this according to its own peculiar sense; and 
to attribute something other than that to perception is precisely to contradict its sense. If 
we are dealing, as here, with the perception of a physical thing then it is inherent in its 
essence to be an adumbrative perception; and correlatively, it is inherent in the sense of 
its intentional object, the physical thing as given in it, to be essentially perceivable only 
by perceptions of that kind, thus by adumbrative perception…. Every perception of 
something immanent guarantees the existence of the object (Husserl, 1998: 93, 94, 100). 
 
4.07   Husserl advocates that there is an inexactness about perception. By 
describing perception as ‘adumbrative’ he infers a degree of inherent vagueness about 
perception. This is illustrated by the change of the tonal quality of sound heard in 
different positions and of objects seen in different light and orientation: 
 
A violin tone, in contrast, with its objective identity, is given by adumbration, has 
its changing modes of appearance. These differ in accordance with whether I approach 
the violin or go farther away from it, in accordance with whether I am the concert hall 
itself or am listening through the closed doors, etc. No one mode of appearance can 
claim to be the one that presents the tone absolutely although, in accordance with my 
practical interests, a certain appearance has a certain primacy as the normal 
appearance: in the concert hall and at the ‘right’ spot. I hear the tone ‘itself’ as it 
‘actually’ sounds. In the same way we say that any physical thing in relation to vision has 
a normal appearance; we say of the colour, the shape, the whole physical thing which we 
see in normal daylight and in normal orientation relative to us, that this is how the thing 
actually looks; this is the actual colour, and the like (Husserl, 1998: 96). 
 
 
Truth In Imagination 
 4.08   Through perception, the physical reality is experienced, however, in 
phenomenological imagination, when the experienced is dissolved into the eidetic, it (the 
eidetic) manifests a deeper truth than the physical reality. Husserl explains as follows: 
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 The existence of a world is the correlate of certain multiplicities of experience 
distinguished by certain essential formations. But it cannot be seen that actual 
experiences can flow only in such concatenated forms; nothing like that can be seen 
purely on the basis of the essence of perception taken universally, and of the essences of 
other collaborating kinds of experiential intuition. It is instead quite conceivable that 
experience, because of conflict, might dissolve into illusion not only in detail, and that it 
might not be the case, as it is de facto, that every illusion manifests a deeper truth and 
that every conflict…. in short, that there might no longer be any world  (Husserl, 1998: 
109).  
 
 4.09   Husserl then reduces the whole spatiotemporal world as part of human Ego, 
which is known only in human consciousness. In other words, the spatiotemporal world 
is only known intentionally, beyond which, it is ‘nothing’: 
 
 The whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego 
as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus 
one has the merely secondary sense of being for a consciousness. It is a being posited by 
consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, can be determined and 
intuited only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appearances: 
beyond that it is nothing (Husserl, 1998: 112). 
 
 4.10   To further emphasize on the subservience of reality to phenomenological 
imagination, Husserl propositions that: 
 
 Reality is not in itself something absolute which becomes tied secondarily to 
something else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is nothing at all; it has no ‘absolute 
essence’ whatever; it has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is only 
intentional, only an object of consciousness, something presented in the manner peculiar 
to consciousness, something apparent <as apparent> (Husserl, 1998: 113). 
 
 4.11   The truth is thus entrusted only in one’s ‘own absolute being’ as all else that 
is physical is considered as ‘nothing’: The fundamental field of phenomenology is a 
mental process, that is, a psychological process: 
 
 In other words, instead of naively effecting the acts pertaining to our Nature – 
constituting consciousness with their positings of something transcendent, and letting 
ourselves be induced, by motives implicit in them, to effect ever new positings of 
something transcendent – instead of that, we put all positings ‘out of action’, we do not 
‘participate in them’; we direct our seizing and theoretical enquiring regard to pure 
consciousness in its own absolute being. That, then, is what is left as the sought-for 
‘phenomenological residuum’ though we have ‘excluded’ the whole world and all 
physical things, living beings and humans, ourselves included. Strictly speaking, we have 
not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly 
understood, contains within itself, ‘constitutes’ within itself, all worldly transcendencies 
(Husserl. 1998: 113). 
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Network Of Evidence Is In The Context 
 4.12   Being eidetic, the mental process is not a concrete process in the sense that 
it is not a self-sufficient one in the full sense – there always is a need for supplementation 
with respect to prescribed concatenation. It is the interaction chain – the network of 
evidence that necessarily takes away the arbitrariness of the eidetic mental process. In 
architecture, the network of evidence is actually the context as propositioned by Husserl, 
and that the medium is perception: 
 
 We observe any perception of something external, let us say of this determined 
perception of a house taken in concrete fullness; there then belongs to this perception the 
surroundings of mental processes as a necessary determinational part; however, it is, to 
be sure, a specifically peculiar, necessary and yet ‘extra-essential’ determinational part. 
Namely that determinational part the change of which alters nothing in the essential 
contents proper to the mental process. Thus perception itself changes according to 
change in determinedness of the surroundings, while the ultimate specific differences of 
the genus Perception, its inner ownness, can be conceived as identical (Husserl, 1998: 
198). 
 
Intention Separates Imagination From Perception 
 4.13   Being non-concrete, the creative mental image is not an internalised ‘quasi-
thing’; instead, the essence of the creative image is an intentional act. Husserl 
propositions that it is the intentional nature of phenomenological imagination that 
separates it from perception: 
 
 Under intentionality we understand the own peculiarity of mental processes ‘to be 
conscious of something’. We first of all encounter this marvellous ownness, back to which 
all rational-theoretical and metaphysical enigmas lead, in the explicit cogito: a 
perceiving is a perceiving of something, perhaps a physical thing; a judging is a judging 
of a predicatively formed value complex; and so forth (Husserl, 1998: 200). 
 
 4.14   Imagination is a part of this intentive mental process, and it is imagination 
that releases things from the contingent status of facts and grants them an idealised status 
as possibilities, wherein each fact is only a single instance among many possible 
instances (ref. Kearney, 1998: 20). The value of multiple instances to creative 
imagination is elaborated by Kearney as follows: 
 
 Imagination allows universals to present themselves through multiple rather than 
merely single instances. To be sure, the ‘a priory’ essence is present in every single 
instance of its actual experience. But it is present in a partial and implicit way, as but one 
moment of its total horizon. Free variation supposedly allows this essence to present 
itself in a full and explicit way, by filling out the total horizon with fictional instances. 
This filling out is what Husserl calls ‘constitution’. The essence does not actually exist 
prior to our constitution to it. Rather, it comes to be through the process of free variation 
(Kearney, 1998: 25). 
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 4.15   Although Husserl’s intentionality applies to both imagination and 
perception, the two aspects of consciousness are separated by: 1) Intention of irreality in 
the case of imagination and, 2) Intention of reality in the case of perception. With the 
example of the flute-playing centaur (ref. 4.04), Husserl suggests that the fact that the 
centaur does not actually exist does not eliminate it as a psychological entity. His image 
intention of the centaur is clearly an irreality. Kearney further illuminates what Husserl 
meant as follows: 
 
 To perceive my brother and to imagine my brother are two different ways of 
intending the same transcendent object. The intentional percept refers to the same object 
– my brother – as the intentional image; but the crucial difference is that the first intends 
him as real, the latter is unreal. In this way, phenomenology rescues imagination from its 
‘naturalistic’ confusion with perception, and restores it to its essential role as a power 
capable of intending the unreal as if it were real, the absent as if it were present, the 
possible as if it were actual (Kearney, 1998: 16). 
 
 4.16   Among the advocates of architectural phenomenology, Holl propositions 
that it is intention that sets architecture apart from the other sensational and physical 
engagement with phenomenology. What Holl propositions could equally apply to other 
forms of art: 
 
 While sensations and impressions quietly engage us in the physical phenomena of 
architecture, the generative force lies in the intentions behind it…. Questions of 
architectural perception underlie questions of intention. This ‘intentionality’ sets 
architecture apart from pure phenomenology that is manifest for the natural sciences. 
Whatever the perception of a built work – whether it is troubling, intriguing, or banal – 
the mental energy which produced it is ultimately deficient unless intent is articulated. 
The relationship between the experiential qualities of architecture and the generative 
concepts is analogous to the tension between the empirical and the rational. Here the 
logic of pre-existing concepts mess the contingency and the particularity of experience 
(Holl, et. al., 1994: 41) 
 
Creativity Lies In The Non-Ostensive 
 4.17   In phenomenological imagination therefore, the surest way of grasping 
essences and therefore free the imagination to enable creativity lies in the non-ostensive, 
which is human consciousness in the solipsistic sense. Husserl propositions that 
eschewing the physically ostensive, with reference to naturalism or empirical science is 
conditional to this: 
 
 Thus I exclude all sciences relating to this natural world no matter how firmly 
they stand there for me, no matter how much I admire them, no matter how little I think of 
making even the least objection to them; I make absolutely no use of the things posited in 
them. Nor do I make my own single one of the propositions belonging to <those 
sciences>, even though it be perfectly evident; none is accepted by me; none gives me a 
foundation – let this be well noted; as long as it is understood as it is presented in one of 
those sciences as a truth about actualities of this world. I must accept such a proposition 
 57 
until after I have put parenthesis around it. That signifies that I may accept such a 
proposition only in the modified consciousness, the consciousness of judgment-excluding, 
and therefore not as it is in science, a proposition which claims validity and the validity 
of which I accept and use (Husserl, 1998: 61, 62). 
 
 4.18   In contrasting the empirical science with possibilities, where creativity 
could be possible, Husserl uses the terminology, ‘intentive mental process’ (ref. Huserl, 
1998: 73), also nominally referred to as ‘noesis’ and ‘noema’17 in pp. 211-325, which in 
the broadest sense is ‘consciousness of something’ which is free from empirical science. 
Memory, for example is one of the intentive stratum, regarded as a ‘remembering noesis’ 
that can wonder into a world of fantasy in a creative mental process: 
 
‘Noemata’ And ‘Noesis’  
 Suddenly we turn our regard to an object of memory which ‘comes to mind’: 
Instead of going through the perpetual noesis, which, in a continuous unitary though 
highly articulated manner, constitutes for us the continually appearing world of physical 
things, the regard goes through a remembering noesis in a world of memory; it wonders 
about in this world, passes over into memories of other degrees or into world of 
phantasy, and so forth (Husserl, 1998: 223). 
 
 4.19   Aesthetic judgment or ‘valuing’, and perceiving are other strata of intentive 
mental process, invoking different ‘noemata’ or senses. According to Husserl, judgment 
or ‘valuing’ is analogous to removing layers of strata in an intentive mental process: 
 
 In that connection, the stratifications, generally speaking, are such that the 
uppermost strata of the total phenomenon can be removed without the remainder ceasing 
to be a concretely complete intentive mental process, and, conversely, a concrete mental 
process can also take on a new noetic total stratum: as when a non-selfsufficient moment 
of ‘valuing’ is stratified on a concrete process of simply objectivating or, on the other 
hand, is removed again. 
 
 If, in this manner, a perceiving, a phantasying, judging, or the like, founds a 
stratum of valuing which overlays it completely, we have different noemata or senses in 
the stratified whole which is called a concrete mental process of valuing by being 
designated according to the highest level within it (Husserl, 1998: 231). 
 
 4.20   Whilst the ‘noemata’ is in effect, the intentive mental process that provides 
unity to consciousness, it is the ‘noesis’ that provides the mental multiplicities that feeds 
creativity (it also feeds other mental processes such as perception): “The noematic is the 
field of unities, the noetic is the field of ‘constituting’ multiplicities” (Husserl, 1998: 
242). In simplified terms, ‘noemata’ can be considered as the mental framework, and 
‘noesis’ as the multiplicities of data. Husserl tries to explain as follows, in describing 
perception through memories of the Dresden Gallery in the early twentieth century: 
 
 Dresden Gallery – ‘rememberingly’ we walk through the Gallery in Dresden. 
Then we can, again within memory, live in the observation of pictures and find ourselves 
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in the world of pictures. After this, adverted to the gallery of paintings in picture 
consciousness of the second level, we look at the paintings themselves; or we reflect 
hierarchically upon the noeses, etc. The multiplicity of possible directions of the regard 
essentially to the multiplicities of intentionalities related to and founded in one another; 
and wherever we find analogous founding relationships – and in what follows we will 
become acquainted with many different kinds – analogous possibilities of changing 
reflection are brought out (Husserl, 1998: 248). 
 
 To Husserl, such a description is regarded as a scientific exploration: “It need not 
be said that these relations require scientifically detailed explorations with respect to their 
essence” (Husserl, 1998: 248). 
 
 4.21   When Husserl suggests the analogy to: When the “analogous possibilities of 
changing reflection” is applied to specific objects, he infers both certainty and doubt, and, 
the mental shifts between imagination and perception – there is the mental play between 
what is consciousness and what is real. These are the realms from which creativity is 
invoked: 
 
 For this characteristic can become modified; it can become transformed, perhaps, 
in the same phenomenon by actual modifications. The mode of ‘certain’ belief can 
change into the mode of mere deeming possible or deeming likely, or questioning and 
doubting; and, as the case may be, that which appears (and which, with regard to the 
first dimension of characterisations is characterised as ‘originary’, ‘reproductive’, and 
the like has taken on now the being-modalities of ‘possible’, of ‘probable’, of 
‘questionable’, of ‘doubtful’ (Husserl, 1998: 250). 
 
 4.22   Husserl’s “analogous possibilities of changing reflection” gives rise also to 
fantasy, which is essential for creativity to emerge. Indeed he calls fantasy a ‘neutrality 
modification’18 and it is of ‘universal significance’, inferring that it is an intrinsic 
ingredient in consciousness, and that it is deceptive: 
 
 The deceptive and not really easily untangled circumstance here consists of the 
facts that phantasy itself is in fact a neutrality modification, that it is of universal 
significance in spite of the peculiarity of its type, applicable to all mental processes, that 
it also plays its role in most of the formations pertaining to thinking-of and must, 
nonetheless, be distinguished in that connection from the universal neutrality 
modifications with its manifold formations corresponding to all kinds of position 
(Husserl, 1998: 260). 
 
 4.23   Following this, creation then to Husserl is the matter of taking the 
‘analogous possibilities of changing reflection’ to a higher plane, above that of 
‘phantasy’, to the same plane as hallucination: 
 
One will then see too what is inherent in the essential sort of this hierarchical formation: 
namely that every phantasy of a higher level can be freely converted into a direct 
phantasy of what was indirectly phantasied in it, whereas this free possibility does not 
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take place in going over from phantasy to the corresponding perception. For spontaneity 
there is the abyss here which the pure Ego can transcend only in the essentially new form 
of actualising action and creation (where account must also be taken of hallucinating) 
(Husserl, 1998: 263). 
 
 4.24   According to Husserl, all mental acts, including that of creativity, are 
‘synthesis of consciousness’, which come with packets of time: phenomenology is time 
related. It is one of Husserl’s ways of making the process scientific, a way of objectifying 
what are in effect subjective psychological and emotive processes. He packages the 
psychological and emotive process under ‘noesis’ – the content, the multiplicities of data. 
He propositions that it is intention that link the various aspects of mental processes, or 
noemas  (groups of noeses), or synthetic consciousness: 
 
 If we now turn our attention…. to the form of synthetic consciousness, then a 
multiplicity of modes of formations belonging to mental processes by means of intentive 
connections make their appearance in our horizon which, as eidetic possibilities, pertain 
in part to all intentive mental processes…. A consciousness and a consciousness are not 
only bound together universally, but are combined into one consciousness the correlate 
of which is one noema which, on its side, is founded on the noemas of combined noeses. 
 
 …. What holds for a particular mental process also holds for the whole stream of 
mental processes. No matter how alien in essence mental processes can be with respect 
to one another, they are nonetheless constituted altogether as one temporal stream, as 
members in the one phenomenological time (Husserl, 1998: 283). 
 
Classification 
 4.25   Husserl’s classification of mental processes into ‘noemas’ is a precursor of 
Levi-Stauss’ later totemic classification of myths, which are the combination of object 
and events (object + event) – a non-linear way toward scientific definition. Levi-Strauss 
way of objectifying aesthetic works follows the same way toward classification, the same 
way as Husserl’s attempts to classify mental acts through ‘noemas’. The relations of 
Husserl’s ‘noemas’ to the aesthetics is alluded in Levi-Strauss’ explanation of the way 
the ‘bricoleur’ create structures by means and events – Husserl’s structure will be mental 
rather than material, all apprehended in a single moment in time, as is required in 
Husserl’s phenomenology. What Levi-Strauss said about scientific classification with 
regard to the aesthetics was this: 
 
 The problem of art has been touched on several times in the foregoing discussion, 
and it is worth showing briefly how, from this point of view, art lies half-way between 
scientific knowledge and mythical and magical thought. It is common knowledge that the 
artist is both something of a scientist and of a ‘brocoleur’. By his craftsmanship he 
constructs a material object which is also an object of knowledge. We have already 
distinguished the scientist and the ‘brocoleur’ by the inverse functions which they assign 
to events and structures as ends and means, the scientist creating events (changing the 
world) by means of structures and the ‘bricoleur’ creating structures by means and 
events. 
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 …. The paintings of the Sistine Chapel are a small-scale model in spite of their 
imposing dimensions, since the theme which they depict is the End of Time. The same is 
true of the cosmic symbolism of religious monuments. Further, we may ask whether the 
aesthetic effect, say, of an equestrian statue which is larger than life derives from its 
enlargement of a man to the size of a rock or whether it is not rather due to the fact that it 
restores what is at first from a distance seen as a rock to the proportions of a man. 
Finally even ‘natural size’ implies a reduction of scale since graphic or plastic 
transposition always involves giving up certain dimensions of the object: volume in 
painting, colour, smell, tactile impressions in sculpture and the temporal dimension in 
both cases since the whole work represented is apprehended at a single moment in time. 
 
 What is the virtue of reduction either of scale or in the number of properties? It 
seems to result from a sort of reversal in the process of understanding. To understand a 
real object in its totality we always tend to work from its parts (Levi-Strauss, 1966: 22, 
23). 
 
 4.26   In an attempt to grapple with and understand the essence of the creative, 
musical world in the bohemian setting in Greenwich Village in New York in the early 
1960’s, Bob Dylan wrote something similar: 
 
 If anything, I wanted to understand things and then be free of them. I needed to 
learn how to telescope things, ideas. Things were too big to understand all at once, like 
all the books in the library – everything laying around on all the tables. You might put it 
all in one paragraph or into one verse of a song if you could get it right (Dylan, 2004: 
61). 
 
 4.27   Levi-Strauss further infers Husserl’s noema when he explains the structure 
behind the mode of creativity in the aesthetic world, exemplifying with the lace collar in 
the portrait of Elizabeth of Austria by Francois Clouet. The description could apply to 
any significant detail of a painting and that the description is dependent upon spatial and 
temporal context: 
 
 For it is true that the relation of priority between the structure and event is 
exactly the opposite in science and ‘bricolage’, then it is clear that art has an 
intermediate position from this point of view as well. Even if, as we have shown, the 
depiction of a lace collar in miniature demands an intimate knowledge of its morphology 
and technique of manufacture (and had it been a question of people or animals we should 
have said: of anatomy and physical attitudes), it is not just a diagram or blueprint. It 
manages to synthesise those intrinsic properties with properties which depend on a 
spatial and temporal context. The final product is the lace collar exactly as it is but so 
that at the same time its appearance is affected by the particular perspective. This 
accentuates some parts and conceals others, whose existence however still influences the 
rest through the contrast between its whiteness and the colour of the other clothes, the 
reflection of the pearly neck it encircles and that of the sky on a particular day and at a 
particular time of day…. The painter is always mid-way between design and anecdote, 
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and his genius consists in uniting internal and external knowledge, a ‘being’ and a 
‘becoming’, in producing with his brush an object which does not exist as such and which 
he is able to create with his canvas. This is a nicely balanced synthesis of one or more 
artificial and natural structures and one or more natural and social events. The aesthetic 
emotion is the result of this union between the structural order and the order of events, 
which is brought about within a thing created by man and so also in effect by the 
observer who discovers the possibility of such a union through the work of art (Levi-
Strauss, 1966: 25). 
 
Singular Stratum And Possibilities 
 4.28   Unlike Levi-Strauss’ structures which are pinned to tangible objects – to the 
observable; Husserl’s is purely mental, lined with intentions. Apprehended in a single 
temporal moment, phenomenological imagination has only one mental position, or one 
overall stratum which does not depend on mere appearance. Being mental, Husserl’s seek 
to go deeper than just ‘a coat of varnish, or a piece of clothing covering it over’:  
 
 The expressive stratum can have no other qualified posited or neutral position 
than the stratum subject to the expression, and in the coincidence we find not two 
positions which are to be separated but only one position. 
 
 …. For not too much should be expected of the metaphor stratification; 
expression is not something like a coat of varnish, or like a piece of clothing covering it 
over; it is mental formation exercising new intentive functions on the intentive sub-
stratum and which, correlatively, is subjected to the intentive functions of the <sub-
stratum>. What this new metaphor signifies for its part must be studied in the phenomena 
themselves and in all their essential modifications. Of particular importance is the 
understanding of the different sorts of ‘universality’ which make their appearance there; 
on the one side, those which belong to each expression and moment of expression, also to 
the non-selfsufficient ‘is’, ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘if’, and so forth…. (Husserl, 1998: 297). 
 
 4.29   Husserl’s requirement that the expressive stratum is found in one position 
can be explained by Sacks’ explanation of the problem with a Dr. P (‘The Man Who 
Mistook His Wife For A Hat’) who was unable to recognise his wife from a hat. Through 
cerebral ailment, Dr. P’s problem is he sees the expressive stratum in several disparate 
positions instead of one holistic one, thereby losing the ability of recognition:  
 
 Dr. P, on the other hand, functioned precisely as a machine functions. It wasn’t 
merely that he displayed the same indifference to the visual world as a computer but – 
even more strikingly – he construed the world as a computer construes it, by means of 
key features and schematic relationships. The scheme might be identified  – in an 
‘identiti-kit’ way – without reality being grasped at all (Sacks, 1985: 13,14). 
 
 4.30   In plumbing the mental depths beyond metaphorical stratification (which he 
describes as ‘a coat of varnish’), Husserl seeks ‘pure possibility’. The indication of 
imagination and possibility is implicit throughout ‘Ideas’ (1913), but it was not until the 
‘Cartesian Meditations’ (1929) that he explicitly propositioned its importance. In it he 
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describes phenomenology as an a priory science which concerns itself with the ‘realms of 
pure possibility, pure imaginableness’. He goes on to say that: “Instead of judging about 
actualities, phenomenology uses imagination to judge about its a priory possibilities and 
thus at the same time prescribes rules a priory” (Husserl, 1960: 28). Husserl speaks of 
imagination as intuiting the essence of perception by reducing it to a world of as-if, as 
pre-empted in ‘Ideas’ (see quote in item 4.26 above): 
 
 We shift the actual perception into the realm of non-actualities, the realm of the 
as-if, which supplies us with ‘pure’ possibilities, pure of everything that restricts to this 
or that fact whatever. We keep these aforesaid possibilities…. just as completely free 
‘imaginableness’ of phantasy. Thus removed from all factualness, we reach the pure 
eidos of perception whose ideal extension is made up of all ideally possible perceptions, 
for every fact can be thought of merely as exemplifying a possibility (Husserl, 1960: 70-
1). 
 
 4.31   Although Husserl’s pursuit of ‘pure possibility’ is eidetic, to Kearney, it is 
not a solipsistic act, but one that is linked to the external world. Kearney suggests that the 
possibilities are not fabrications of the consciousness, instead, they are revealed from 
external sources. Kearney elucidates what Husserl had meant in ‘Cartesian Meditations’ 
(1960) as follows:  
 
 Husserl tended to speak increasingly of transcendent horizons of possibility which 
stretch out beyond the given reality and mobilise consciousness as ‘an intending-beyond-
itself’. 
 
 But there is obvious ambiguity here as to whether this reaching out beyond the 
immediate presentness of our experience is a mere projection of the self, or an encounter 
with something other than the self. If imagination is merely conscious of possibilities 
fashioned within its own consciousness, we can no longer speak of the object of 
imagination as a transcendence. And, if this be the case, we find ourselves once again 
prey to the illusion of immanence. It would seem clear, however, that the originality of 
Husserl’s theory of imagination lies in his interpretation of images as pure possibilities 
revealed to consciousness rather than fabricated within it. Husserl thus finds himself 
back with the old question: If possibility is ‘pure’ – that is, emancipated with all ties with 
reality – then how does its freedom avoid degenerating into arbitrariness? If, on the 
other hand, possibility is ‘real’, it is no longer arbitrary, but surely at the expense of 
being pre-determined by an already given world (Kearney, 1998: 30). 
 
 4.32   As Husserl’s interest in phenomenological imagination remain Cartesian, at 
a purely mental level, the external sources that Kearney infers above is incomplete – 
could the external sources infer the external environment, or is it corporeal, with 
reference to ‘being’. Modern neurological research however argues that consciousness is 
inextricably integrated with the human body, and to the state of the brain. Damasio firstly 
explains the physiological integration between the brain and the body: 
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 The brain and the body are indissociably integrated by mutually targeted 
biochemical and neural circuits. There are two principal routes of interconnection. The 
route usually thought of first is made of sensory and motor peripheral nerves which carry 
signals from every part of the body to the brain, and from the brain to every part of the 
body. The other route, which comes less easily to mind although it is far older in 
evolution, is the bloodstream: it carries chemical signals such as hormones, 
neurotransmitters, and modulators. Even a simplified summary reveals the intricacy of 
the relationships… (Damasio, 1994: 87). 
 
 4.33   Damasio later explains that the mind, or consciousness has a neurological 
basis, which is integral with the rest of the human body: 
 
 My view then is that having a mind means that an organism forms neural 
representations which can become images, be manipulated in a process called thought, 
and eventually influence behaviour by helping predict the future, plan accordingly, and 
choose the next action. Herein lies the centre of neurobiology as I see it: the process 
whereby neural representations, which consist of biological modifications created by 
learning in a neuron circuit, become images in our minds; the process that allows for 
invisible microstructural changes in neuron circuits (in cell bodies, dendrites and axons, 
and synapses) to become neural representation, which in turn becomes an image we each 
experience as belonging to us (Damasio, 1994: 90). 
 
 4.34   Damasio also argues that the external environment influences the brain, 
through the body: 
 
 If body and brain interact with each other intensely, the organism they form 
interact with its surrounding no less so. Their relations are mediated by the organism’s 
movement and its sensory devices. 
 
 The environment makes its mark on the organism in a variety of ways. One is by 
stimulating neural activity in the eye (inside which is the retina), the ear (inside which is 
the cochlea, a sound-sensing device, and the vestibule, a balance-sensing device), and the 
myriad of nerve terminals in the skin, taste buds and nasal mucosa. Nerve terminals send 
signals to circumscribed entry points in the brain, the so-called early sensory cortices of 
vision, hearing, somatic sensations, taste and olfaction. Picture them as a sort of safe 
harbour were signals can arrive. Each sensory region (early visual cortices, early 
auditory cortices, and so forth) is a collection of several areas, and there is heavy cross-
signalling among the aggregate of areas in each sensory collection (Damasio, 1994: 90, 
91). 
 
 4.35   Although the mind and the body is inseparable in function as Damasio 
advocates, this still does not complete the medical explanation for consciousness. There 
is still an aspect of the phenomenon, which Sacks attempts to explain, albeit not 
completely: 
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 As soon as we attend to phenomena as such, to the actual quality of experience or 
thought or action, we have to use the terms more reminiscent of a poem or painting. 
How, say, is a dream intelligible in terms of function?  
 
 We have always two universes of discourse – call them ‘physical’ and 
‘phenomenal’, or what you will – one dealing with the questions of quantitative and 
formal structure, the other with those qualities that constitute a ‘world’. All of us have 
our own, distinctive mental worlds, our own mental journeyings and landscapes and 
these, for most of us, require no clear neurological ‘correlate’. We can usually tell a 
man’s story, relate passages and scenes from his life, without bringing in any 
physiological or neurological considerations: such considerations would seem, at the 
least, supererogatory, if not frankly absurd or insulting. For we consider ourselves, and 
rightly, ‘free’ – at least, determined by the most complex human and ethical 
considerations, rather than by our neural functions or nervous systems (Sacks, 1985: 
121). 
 
 4.36   The phenomenological ‘world’ that Sacks seeks, which is not a mental one, 
nor one that is purely physical to explain the encounters with his patients, is one that is 
offered by Merleau-Ponty in the description of perception. Merleau-Ponty also bridges 
Damasio description of knowing the world through the human senses with Husserl’s 
quest for eidetic possibilities. Husserl’s possibilities, to Merleau-Ponty is based on the 
real: 
 
 The self-evidence of perception is not adequate thought or apodeictic self-
evidence. The world is not what I think, but what I live through. I am open to the world, I 
have no doubt that I am in communication with it, but I do not possess it; it is 
inexhaustible. ‘There is a world’, or rather: ‘There is the world’; I can never completely 
account for this ever-reiterated assertion in my life. This facticity of the world is what 
constitutes the ‘Weltlichkeit der Welt’, what causes the world to be the world; just as the 
facticity of the cogito is not an imperfection in itself, but rather what assures me of my 
existence. The eidetic method is the method of a phenomenological positivism which 
bases the possible on the real (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: xvii). 
 
 4.37   Meanwhile, reality is the external world, the nature of which that affect our 
senses ‘remains unchanged’, whatever the consequences of our thought or perception: 
 
 We started of from a world in itself which acted upon our eyes so as to cause us to 
see it, and we now have consciousness of or thought about the world, but the nature of 
the world remains unchanged: it is still defined by the absolute mutual exteriority of its 
parts, and is merely duplicated throughout its extent by a thought which sustains it 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 39). 
 
Phenomenological Space 
 4.38   The nature of the external world can be made by human hands to become 
something that is spatially designed that affect our senses. To Merleau-Ponty, it is the 
sensory realms that enable us to perceive the world that is there before us. The concert 
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hall, when filled with people is naturally seen to be cramped, however music is still felt to 
flow unrestricted but the perception of this may differ between the percipients as what is 
perceived between individual percipients is not known: 
 
 When, in the concert hall, I open my eyes, visible space seems to me cramped 
compared to that other space through which, a moment ago, the music was being 
unfolded, and even if I keep my eyes open while the piece is being played, I have the 
impression that the music is not really contained within this circumscribed and 
unimpressive space. It brings a new dimension stealing through visible space, and in this 
it surges forward, just as, in victims of hallucinations, the clear space of things perceived 
is mysteriously duplicated by a ‘dark space’ in which other presences are possible, Like 
the perspective of other people making its impact on the world for me, the spatial realm 
of each sense is an unknowable absolute for the others, and to that extent limits their 
spatiality…. the unity of space can be discovered only in the interplay of the sensory 
realms (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 222). 
 
 4.39   With reference to Husserl’s suggestion that phenomenological imagination 
has only one position, found in one singular stratum, that it does not depend on mere 
appearance or upon ‘a coat of varnish, or a piece of clothing covering it over’ (see item, 
4.26). Merleau-Ponty further suggests an element of memory for the synthesis to work, 
wherein it infiltrates the world in its entirety, and calls this synthesis ‘transition-
synthesis’: 
 
 We can no more construct perception of the thing and of the world from discreet 
aspects, than we can make up the binocular vision of an object from two monocular 
images. My experiences of the world are integrated into a single world as the double 
image merges into one thing, when my finger stops pressing upon my eyeball. I do not 
have one perspective, then another, and between them a link brought about by the 
understanding, but each perspective merges into the other and, in so far it is still possible 
to speak of a synthesis, we are concerned with a ‘transition-synthesis’. It is particularly 
true that my present vision is not restricted to what my visual field actually presents to 
me, for the next room, the landscape behind that hill and the inside or the back of that 
object are not recalled or represented. My point of view is not for me so much a 
limitation of my experience as a way I have of infiltrating the world in its entirety 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 329). 
 
 4.40   The manner in which Hicks speaks about the way the mind organises and 
synthesises the information flow through and around the percipient echoes Merleau-
Ponty’s ‘transition-synthesis’. Hicks is equally dependent on sensation, and is more 
forthright in the suggestion that perception is memory-dependent in the way that 
awareness is “…. guided by the memory deposits of our previous experience of moving 
about in a three-dimensional world: 
 
 The senses having thus registered their minute selection of the mass of 
information flowing through and around us all the time, the mind then processes it, 
organising it into our familiar environment. For example, we see three-dimensionally, 
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although the light waves falling upon the eye only directly affect the (almost) flat surface 
of the retina. But the mind/brain immediately converts this information into one familiar 
three-dimensional experience by a complex set of calculations based on a variety of 
clues, including the images they receive based on a variety of clues, including the 
disparity between the images they receive, the angle of convergence of he two eyes, which 
are converted to an awareness of depth, and at greater distances by the position of 
images in the visual field (the higher the more distant). Although this is normally done 
habitually and unconsciously, our ability to see depth and judge distances is an acquired 
skill made possible b the correlating touch with movement in space…. Again, in 
recognising a building, we see it as three-dimensional, with depth and a back as well as 
the flat side actually visible to us. We are extrapolating in this way all the time, guided by 
the memory-deposits of our previous experience of moving about in a three-dimensional 
world (Hick, 2004: 40). 
 
 4.41   Husserl’s ‘one position, found in a singular stratum’, beyond ‘a coat of 
varnish’ is manifested in architectural phenomenology. Holl suggests that in the design 
process, all the apparent layers are merged together: 
 
 This overlap of foreground, middle ground, and distant view is a critical issue in 
the creation of architectural space. We must consider space, light, colour, geometry, 
detail, and material as an experiential continuum. Though we can disassemble these 
elements and study them individually during the design process, they merge in the final 
condition, and ultimately we cannot readily break perception into simple collection of 
geometries, activities, and sensations (Holl, et. al., 1994: 45). 
 
Space And Context 
 4.42   To Merleau-Ponty, man’s position in an integrated natural world applies 
also to his contextual position in the social world and his existence as ‘structures of 
history’. He regards his relationship with the social world as deeper than to that of the 
natural world, and that this relationship is a permanent one: 
 
 We must therefore discover, after the natural world, the social world, not as an 
object or sum of objects, but as a permanent field or dimension of existence: I may well 
turn away from it, but not cease to be situated relative to it. Our relationship to the social 
is, like our relationship to the world, deeper than any express perception or any 
judgment. It is as false to place ourselves in society as an object among other objects, as 
it is to place society within ourselves as an object of thought, and in both cases the 
mistake lies in treating the social as an object. We must return to the social with which 
we are in contact with the mere fact of existing, and which we carry about inseparably 
with us before any objectification. Objective and scientific consciousness of the past and 
of civilisations would be impossible had I not, through the intermediary of my society, my 
cultural world and their horizons, at least a possible communication with them, and if the 
place of the Athenian Republic or the Roman Empire were not somewhere marked out on 
the borders of my own history, and if they were not there as so many individuals be 
known, indeterminate but pre-existing, and if I did not find my own life the basic 
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structures of history. The social is already there when we come to know and judge it 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 362). 
 
 4.43   In the above sense, Merleau-Ponty is similar to the later Wittgenstein (as 
elucidated in Philosophical Investigations, 1953). Meanings, to Merleau-Ponty, including 
that of language, is understood within a social context: 
 
 I begin to understand the meaning of words through their place in a context of 
action, and by taking part in a communal life (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 179). 
 
 4.44   On the description of space, Merleau-Ponty introduces space as an entity 
which has two properties: 
 –   It has a physical presence, which he calls ‘spatialised…. space’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962: 244); 
 –    It can be geometrical (geometrical space), which he calls ‘spatialising space’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 244). 
 
 On physical space, Merleau-Ponty characterises spatial things and the spatial 
relationships between them as they are presented to percipient during the ordinary course 
of experience: it is not the unity or uniqueness of space that is perceptually presented; but 
the multiplicity (p. 282) of the spatial items: 
 
 My body and things, their concrete relationships expressed as such terms as top 
and bottom, right and left, near and far, may appear to me as an irreducibly manifold 
variety (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 103). 
 
 4.45   ‘Geometrical space’ to Merleau-Ponty, is space of thought, compared with 
physical space, which is space as directly experienced. He suggests that geometrical 
space has, “interchangeable dimensions: homogeneous and isotropic” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962: 244), which are not properties possessed by physical space. The following is 
possible in geometric space: 
 
 A pure change of place which could leave the moving body unchanged, and 
consequently a pure position distinct from the situation of the object in its concrete 
context (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 244). 
 
 4.46   In other words, geometrical space is malleable in thought while the 
percipient and the context remains unchanged. Priest interpret Merleau-Ponty’s ‘pure 
position’ above as follows: 
 
 Pure positions are pure in the sense that their being, and their being in the 
positions that they are, do not depend upon their being occupied, nor upon there being 
occupants. A situation, on the other hand, is necessarily actually or possibly occupied. 
Situations are individuated only via actual or possible occupants. Positions are 
individuated via each other. Physical space contains situations but no positions but 
geometrical space contains positions but no situations (Priest, 1998: 104). 
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Body And Sensory Fields 
 4.47   From the Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, the perception of space is subject 
dependent, in the way that perception will differ between individual percipients: “It is 
easy to show that there can be direction only for a subject who takes it” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962: 107),  and that the subject is influenced by a ‘mass of sensory fields’: “We are not 
among things” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 246-7) and, “We have as yet only sensory fields” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 247). This suggests that we are not directly presented with spatial 
relations as they actually are, but rather with a ‘mass of sensations’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962: 245), which we spatially order according to pragmatic or subjective criteria: 
 
 One cannot take the world and orientated space as given along with the contents 
of mere experience or with the body in itself, since experience in fact shows that the same 
contents can be successively orientated in one direction or another (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962: 105). 
 
 4.48   What the above amounts to is the proposition that the body plays an 
essential role in the constitution of space as it appears to the percipient, and the 
proposition that there is more than one space in perception.  This is even more so in 
aesthetic perception. Merleau-Ponty uses painting and dance to illustrate this; but it could 
equally apply to architecture: 
 
 One might show…. that aesthetic perception too opens up a new spatiality, that 
the picture as a work of art is not in the space which it inhabits as a physical thing and as 
a coloured canvas. That the dance evolves in an aimless and unorientated space 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 114). 
 
 Hence, from the Merleau-Ponty’s perspective, architecture is produced by the 
architect qua body-subject, not qua physical objects. In the body-subject there is a mutual 
dependence between vision and presence which architecture reveals and depends upon. 
 
 4.49   In the constitution of architectural space, the sensations of the body is allied 
with intention: the process is both physical as well as mental. Following Bretano, Holl 
calls it ‘outer perception’ and, ‘inner perception’: 
 
 According to Bretano, physical phenomena engage our ‘outer perception’, while 
mental phenomena involve our ‘inner perception’. Mental phenomena have real, as well 
as intentional, existence. Empirically we might be satisfied with a structure as purely 
physical-spatial entity but, intellectually and spiritually, we need to understand the 
motivations behind it. The duality of intention and phenomena is like the interplay 
between objective and subjective, or, more simply, thought and feeling. The challenge of 
architecture is to stimulate both inner and outer perception; to heighten phenomenal 
experience while simultaneously expressing meaning; and to develop this duality in 
response to the particularities of site and circumstance (Holl, et. al., 1994: 42). 
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 Thus from the viewpoint of phenomenological imagination, architecture 
synthesises all the layers into a singular stratum. Physically, it synthesises the foreground, 
middle ground and distant view (ref. Holl, et. al., 1994: 45), and the complete perception 
includes the subjective qualities of material and light to form the basis of complete 
perception (ref. Holl, et. al. 1994: 45). It is the fusion of the subjective and the objective. 
Intention provides the conceptual logic which drives the design and that the phenomenon 
is expressed in inter-subjective link. 
 
House X1 
Light And Shadow 
 4.50   Since Le Corbusier’s statement, “Architecture being the masterly, correct 
and magnificent play of masses brought together in light…”,19 architects have 
occasionally propounded the entire hypotheses of their work around the properties of 
light, in the similar way that painters occasional build their works around the properties 
of colours. However, solids and voids in architectural composition, coupled with 
materials that lend themselves to various degrees of opacity, transparency and 
translucency do enable light to provide architectural experience with various degrees of 
intensities.  At the fundamental level, architecture cannot be appreciated without light, 
and at the ethereal level, movement of light to a building provide various intensities of 
emotive feelings to the percipient.  
 
 4.51   In the absence of a clock, time is measured by the intensity of sunlight and 
the length of the shadows, both of which gives time duration and the perception of it. In 
this sense, time is measured in the memory instead of mechanically. For a moment that 
the percipient looks up as the beam of clustered light pours through a large window, the 
perception modifies the consciousness as the awareness of time is intensified by the 
memory of the length of shadows in relation with the time of day. An architectural form 
is also appreciated by the way light and shadow brings out the shape of three-dimensional 
forms. The following statement on House X1 to appear in ‘Home’ published by 
Millennium House Pty Ltd in 2006: 
 
 The architect believes that architecture should be a work of art. The canvas 
consists of the materials used, the backdrop is the surrounding landscape. The quality of 
light is a major criterion upon which art is judged—and so it is with architecture. Light 
can also accentuate the natural qualities of solids, voids, and other textural spaces. 
Where light is soft and gentle, then space takes over; where light is weak, space takes on 
a dream-like ambience (Millennium House, 2006). 
 
Sound 
 4.52   The resonance of live sound upon the walls and floor in a space creates an 
awareness of the presence of the space – the depth of the space, the geometry and the 
materials of the space. The resonant, backdrop sound of traffic for example, make us 
aware of the urbanity our habitat, or, conversely in silence, the emergence of water drops 
in darkness can sound extremely loud with the ear carving a large volume into the void of 
darkness.  
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 4.53   If the surface is dampened with soft materials, the experiential dimension 
would be lost – say, if the walls had been covered with plants and the floor, carpeted. A 
sequence of sound of moving water can have a mesmerising effect upon the psyche – 
when the sound of water is heard in a continuous flow it soothes the human psyche. One 
of the endearing components of House X1 is the small water fountain in the entrance 
courtyard. 
 
Hapticity 
 4.54   The haptic realm in architecture is presented as the sense of touch, 
particularly with materiality. This become evident as part of the detail make-up of a 
space, and when the detail unfolds when light washes its surface. House X1 is conscious 
of the way that details would emerge as rays of sunlight hits the surfaces of the house. 
Generally, the internal walls of the house is unplastered – the internal spaces are 
enlivened when rays of light hit the surfaces.  
 
 4.55   Appreciation of architecture is essentially visual: hapticity in architecture is 
presented to the eye. Through memory of other sensations, the eye can sense touch and 
even scent. Merleau-Ponty describes this as follows: 
 
 Cézanne declared that a picture contains within itself even the smell of the 
landscape. He means that the arrangement of colour on the thing (and in the work of art, 
if it catches the thing in its entirety) signifies by itself all the responses which could be 
elicited through an examination of the remaining senses; that a thing would not have this 
colour had it not also shape, these tactile properties, this resonance, this odour, and that 
the thing is the absolute fullness, which my undivided existence projects before itself 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 318-9). 
 
Intention And Site Circumstance 
 4.56   From the phenomenological viewpoint, architecture differs with every site 
and circumstance. As no context is the same, neither can a work of architecture be 
repeated without modification in another context. The architect’s intention for House X1 
is published by Millennium House as follows: 
 
The architect wanted to keep the house as close to the slope as possible. To 
achieve this, a central courtyard breaks the house into two distinct parts. The courtyard 
space, conceived as a cubic void, is the link with all parts of the house. There is a visual 
link between the top and bottom of the slope, and there is a spatial link which allows the 
passage of air from the bottom to the top of the house. This breezeway is emphasized by 
the formation of a wind shaft, terminating at the rooftop. 
 
Lyricism in architecture is achieved when space, form, and materials react 
favourably with the light. The architect considered this configuration in the design of 
House X1. He feels that successful architecture is when the climatic conditions are also 
taken into account.  
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In addition, the natural landscape has an important part to play in the lyricism of 
architecture—in fact, it should be considered as an integral part of the whole project. In 
House X1, the interior and the landscape blend with one another, the walls becoming a 
transparent skin, which diminishes the visual barrier between outside and inside spaces. 
 
 The architect believes that architecture should be a work of art. The canvas 
consists of the materials used; the backdrop is the surrounding landscape. The quality of 
light is a major criterion upon which art is judged—and so it is with architecture. Light 
can also accentuate the natural qualities of solids, voids, and other textural spaces. 
Where light is soft and gentle, then space takes over; where light is weak, space takes on 
a dream-like ambience (Millennium House, 2006).  
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Preamble 
 5.01   In phenomenological imagination above, it is inferred that consciousness is 
possible only in a single stratum position (4.28), in that creativity cannot be achieved 
through the combination of various parts put together: Medical evidence suggests that 
forms cannot be perceived by stringing analysis of various sensations together (4.29). 
Merleau-Ponty propositions that perception is possible through ‘transition-synthesis’, the 
synthesis of mind, sensation, memory and external conditions that infiltrate the entire 
phenomenological world (4.39). Medical evidence also seems to suggest that, as the brain 
and body is neurologically linked (4.32-3), the state of consciousness is hence dependent 
on the condition of the body (4.35, and by extension, linked to external contexts (4.36-7). 
However, the structure of consciousness seems to defy scientific explanation. Although 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty intended their works as scientific explanations of 
phenomenology, their findings however seems instead to underpin consciousness as a 
non-ostensive and subjective human attribute.  
 
 5.02   Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological imagination leaves no 
room for incremental creativity in the way that creativity could be managed, as creativity 
in phenomenological imagination is a mystical process: Creativity is enmeshed in 
‘transition-synthesis’ which infiltrates the entire phenomenological world all at once. In 
contemporary times, Boden sets out to demystify this world, and to find one that could 
make creativity assessable to ‘everyman’ (ref. Boden, 2004: 256-76). She first 
propositions that thought can be structured into conceptual spaces and these spaces can 
be transformed, say into realms of creativity. The idea is that every person has at least a 
germ of conceptual spaces that could be expanded (ref. Boden, 2004: 4): In other words, 
creativity can be managed. 
 
Conceptual Spaces 
 5.03   Boden’s conceptual spaces are structured styles of thought which are 
already imprinted in individuals’ minds, the style being shaped by culture or peer group, 
or occasionally borrowed from other cultures (ref. Boden, 2004: 4).  According to Boden: 
 74 
 
 They include ways of writing prose or poetry; styles of sculpture, painting or 
music; theories in chemistry or biology; fashions in couture or choreography, nouvelle 
cuisine and good old meat and two veg – in short, any discipline way of thinking that is 
familiar to (and valued by) a certain social group (Boden, 2004:4). 
 
 5.04   Boden’s proposition is that the conceptual mental spaces are transformed 
into creative thinking in everyday events: 
 
 In exploratory creativity, the ‘countryside’ is a style of thinking. Instead of 
exploring a structured geographic space, you explore a structured conceptual space, 
mapped by a particular style of painting, perhaps, or a specific area of theoretical 
chemistry.  
 
 All professional artists and scientists do this sort of thing. Even the most mundane 
street artists in Leicester Square produce new portraits, or new caricatures every day. 
They are exploring their space, though not necessarily in an adventurous way…. They 
add a new trick to their repertoire, but in a real sense it’s something that ‘fits’ their 
established style: the potential has always been there (Boden, 2004: 5). 
 
AI Concepts 
 5.05   Boden then uses artificial intelligence (AI) concepts to find the structure for 
conceptual spaces. It is thought that a computational approach gives a way of coming up 
with scientific hypotheses about the rich subtleties of the human mind. For instance, 
regarding Frank Lloyd Wright’s Prairie Houses, Boden thought that: 
 
 The structure of harmony, or the ‘grammar’ of Prairie Houses, can be clearly 
expressed, and specific ways of exploring the space can be tried out. Methods for 
navigating, and changing, highly structured spaces can be compared (Boden 2004: 7). 
 
 5.06   The assumption about the usefulness of AI in the pursuit of structure of 
conceptual spaces, specifically in creativity is due to the assumption that creativity is an 
intelligence: 
 
 The combining of ideas creatively is not like shaking marbles in a bag.  The 
marbles have come together because there is some intelligible, though previously 
unnoticed, link between them which we value because it is interesting – illuminating, 
thought-provoking, humorous – in some way. We saw also that combinational creativity 
typically requires a very rich store of knowledge, of many different kinds, and the ability 
to form links of many different types (Boden, 2004: 8). 
 
Hindrances Over AI Creativity 
 5.07   The hindrance over AI creativity according to Boden, is ‘value’, which is 
highly variable: 
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 Because creativity by definition involves not only novelty but value, and because 
values are highly variable, it follows that many arguments about creativity are rooted in 
disagreements about value. This applies to human activities no less than to computer 
performance. So even if we could identify and program our aesthetic values so as to 
enable the computer to inform and monitor its own activities accordingly there would 
still be disagreement about whether the computer even appeared to be creative (Boden, 
2004: 10). 
 
 5.08   Budd elaborates on the variable values of art as follows: 
 
 So a work of art can have many different kinds of value – a cognitive value, a 
social value, an educational value, a historical value, a sentimental value, a religious 
value, an economic value, a therapeutic value; it can possess as many kinds of value as 
there are points of view from which it can be evaluated…. My claim is that the value of a 
work of art as a work of art is intrinsic to the work in the sense that it is (determined by) 
the intrinsic value of the experience the work offers (so that if it offers more than one 
experience, it has more than one artistic value composed of these different artistic values) 
(Budd, 1995: 1, 4). 
 
 5.09   The other problems Boden sees about creativity are:  
 1) The social recognition of things that are novel. Particularly when novelty is 
outside of prevailing paradigm (p. 13); 
2) The inspirational view of creativity in that it is a mysterious, ‘even superhuman 
or divine’. She regards this as misunderstood and quotes Bernard Levin’s 
column in The Times, who, “explicitly drew the conclusion that Mozart (like  
other great artists) was, literally, divine inspired” (p.14); 
3) The romantic view of creativity, less extreme than the inspirational view, 
nevertheless claims that creativity is at least an exceptional gift: “Creative 
artists (and scientists) are said to be people gifted with a specific talent which 
others lack: insight or intuition (p. 14). 
 
 5.10   The romantic view is probably the most prevailing attitude toward the 
assumed structure of creativity. Koestler, for example sees creativity as a reflex, like a 
sudden insight, just as laughter is a sudden response to a joke (ref. Koestler, 1964: 28). 
With one foot on the mysterious connection of ‘previously unrelated dimensions of 
experience’ and another on rational description, Koestler propositions that: 
 
 The creative act, by connecting previously unrelated dimensions of experience, 
enables him to attain to a higher level of mental evolution. It is an act of liberation – the 
defeat of habit by originality…. 
 
 The moment of truth, the sudden emergence of new insight, is an act of intuition. 
Such intuitions give the appearance of miraculous flashes, or short-circuits of reasoning. 
In fact they may be likened to an immersed chain, of which only the beginning and the 
end are visible above the surface of consciousness. The diver vanishes at one end of the 
chain and comes up at the other end, guided by invisible links (Koestler, 1964: 96, 211). 
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 5.11   Koestler’s reflex creativity has its basis in the ‘bisociation’ of two disparate 
conceptual matrices, wherein it is the “basic bisociative pattern of the creative synthesis: 
the sudden interlocking of two previously unrelated skills, or matrices of thought” 
(Koestler, 1964: 121). Hence, the more unusual the bisociation, the more scope there is 
for innovative ideas to emerge. He will not agree with Boden’s computational 
explanation of creativity, which he would regard as ‘mechanistic’. However, Koestler 
does not explain how creativity is possible, and how the bisociation of matrices actually 
work, which is the quest of Boden. 
 
Beyond Intuition 
 5.12   Boden seeks to explain creativity beyond the idea of ‘insight’ and 
‘intuition’ as typified by Koestler’s description. For example, she is interested in ‘how 
intuition works’ and, ‘how is it possible for people to think new thoughts’ (ref. Bden, 
2004: 15). This is opposite to the arguments offered by the antagonists in Section 4 above 
(Phenomenological imagination). Boden’ starting premise is that: “We are all creative to 
some degree – and what we can do, Mozart could do better” (Boden 2004: 24). What 
makes the difference between an outstandingly creative person and a less creative one is: 
 
  …. not any special power, but greater knowledge (in the form of practised 
expertise) and the motivation to acquire and use it. This motivation endures for long 
periods, perhaps shaping and inspiring a whole lifetime (Boden, 2004: 35). 
 
 5.13   Further to this Boden follows Poincare and Hadamard’s suggestion that 
creativity requires the hidden combination of unconscious ideas, with four phases of 
creativity: “Preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification” (Boden, 2004: 29). 
She points out that: 
 
 ‘Complete’ illumination…. is comparatively rare. Composers usually make 
corrections to their manuscripts scores, and art historians (using increasingly 
sophisticated scientific techniques) constantly discover the rejected first thoughts of the 
artist, hidden under the visible layers of paint. Sometimes corrections must be minimised 
(if a mural has to be painted before the plaster dries), and sometimes they are impossible 
(when a jazz-musician improvises a melody to fit a given cord sequence). Even so, the 
artist evaluates the production, so as to do better next time. 
 
 In short, Poincare’s four-phase theory allows that the arts and the sciences 
achieve their innovations in broadly comparable ways (Boden, 2004: 31). 
 
P-creativity And H-creativity 
 5.14   Boden suggests that context supports either psychological creativity or, 
historical creativity. If the sense of creativity is psychological, she calls it P-creative; if it 
is historical, she calls it H-creative. Both are intended to define creative ideas created by 
people: 
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 The psychological sense concerns ideas  (whether in science, needle work, music, 
painting, literature…. ) that are surprising, or perhaps even fundamentally novel, with 
respect to the individual mind which had the idea…. The historical sense applies to ideas 
that are novel with respect to the whole of human history…. But whichever type of 
creativity is involved, it’s historically creative only if no one has had that thought before. 
 
 Similarly, people can be credited with creativity in two senses. Someone who is P-
creative has a (more or less sustained) capacity to produce P-creative ideas. An H-
creative person is someone who has come up with one or more H-creative ideas (Boden, 
2004: 43). 
 
 5.15   Although H-creativity is usually associated with historical significant 
innovations, P-creativity is the aspect that is more important as it is more frequent. The 
initial creative idea is usually P-creative and is often filed away in the brain, and it need 
not be unusual. It could be a novelty for the person generating it, but not necessarily for 
anyone else. Boden further suggests that every human infant is creative, “For children’s 
minds develop not just by learning new facts, and not just by playfully combining them in 
novel ways, but also by coming to have ideas which they simply could not have had 
before” (Boden, 2004: 48). Taking musical innovation for example, Boden observes that 
someone like Schoenberg, despite being recognised as a ‘destroyer’ of tonality, took 
tonality more seriously than did any of his avant-garde contemporaries. 
 
 That is, he saw that the conventions were about modulations, approved cadences, 
repetitive themes, and concluding consonance were not arbitrary aspects of tonality. 
Given the fundamental tonal concept of a home key, they were intelligible, mutually 
coherent, constraints. Being defined at less fundamental levels than the home key, they 
could more easily transformed, or even dropped. Nevertheless, they were all part of one 
coherent generative system (Boden, 2004: 73). 
 
 5.16   Boden suggests that Schoenberg’s musical innovation is not arrived at from 
nothing; it is instead built upon a steady steam of minor innovations and knowledge: 
 
 There must have been previous composers, determined to push modulation to its 
limits (although these need not have been Brahms, Chopin, Debussey and Scriabin). 
Before them, there must have been trail-blazers mapping the structural skeleton of tonal 
music (as Bach was doing in his ‘Forty-Eight’). And before them, someone must have 
taken the first exploratory steps in using what is recognisably a scale (or proto-scale), 
even if it is not yet clearly defined in contrast with the preceding style (the ‘modes’ of 
mediaeval music) (Boden, 2004: 73). 
 
Computational Creativity 
 5.17   The kind of creativity that Boden suggests is regarded by her as 
‘computational’ in the sense that it is arrived at within a generative system; otherwise the 
creativity is not recognised: 
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 If, by some miracle, a composer has written atonal music in the sixteenth century, 
it would not have been recognised as creative. To be appreciated as creative, a work of 
art or a scientific theory has to be understood in a specific relation to what preceded it…. 
An impossibilist creative idea is one which surprises us because it could not have 
happened before. This is a computational ‘could’, to be interpreted in relation to a 
particular way of thinking, or generative system. 
 
 Only someone who understood tonality could realise just what Schoenberg was 
doing in rejecting it, and why (Boden, 2004: 74). 
 
 5.18   Despite the generative nature in which Schoenberg’s music had evolved, it 
was still a shift from existing paradigm, and his music was hard to accept during his time: 
 
 Like many creative artists, Schoenberg was not universally appreciated even by 
his peers, many of whom reviled his music as a cacophony. 
 
 To some extent, such reluctance to accept new artistic ideas springs from a 
temperamental and/or socially comfortable unadventurousness. But is due also to the 
difficulty (at least for the adult minds) of making truly fundamental conceptual shifts 
(Boden, 2004: 74). 
 
 5.19   To Schoenberg then, his musical innovation was equivalent to P-creativity, 
being arrived at through knowledge in depth on tonality and the innovation he made was 
natural to him, but it did not find universal acceptance – as it was considered to be 
cacophonic. When his music was eventually accepted as innovative, it fell into H-
creativity. Boden suggests the change of mental geography that result in its acceptance: 
 
 An H-creative idea sometimes involve such radical change in mental geography, 
requiring such a different sort of map to represent the new range of computational 
possibilities, that many people minds cannot immediately accommodate it. And artists, of 
course, cannot bludgeon their critics with independently verifiable facts. They can only 
seek to persuade them that the mental exploration is intelligible, and therefore – like 
climbing of Everest – justified for its own sake (Boden, 2004: 74-5). 
 
 5.20   Boden then attempts to chart the mental geography or mental map, in a way 
that a landscape can be described. By considering the mental map as ‘structured space of 
computational possibilities’, Boden could then correlate it with the Heuristics. She 
considers the Heuristics as: 
 
 …. ways of selectively – insightfully – moving through the space and/or of 
transforming it, sometimes by changing other heuristics. ‘Protecting your queen’ directs 
you into some chess-paths and away from others. And ‘consider the negative’, if applied 
at a relatively deep level of the generative system, can transform the space so 
fundamentally that very different sorts of location are created and many previous 
locations, indeed whole regions, simply cease to exist (Boden, 2004: 89). 
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 5.21   The analogy of the chess game infers rules, which makes mental mapping 
possible, where each move involves a specific action  defined by the rules of chess. 
Within the rules, intuition provides possibilities. Chess masters for example, move 
intuitively by perceiving familiar board patterns, with the potential of each piece 
embedded in memory. While playing within the rules, Boden suggests that the human 
thought-processes, and the mental spaces they inhabit are largely hidden from the 
thinkers themselves (ref. Boden, 2004: 90).  
 
 5.22   Boden further suggests that the sort of thinking that involves well-
structured constraints, such as that of the chess game, can be better understood by 
comparing it with problem-solving computer programs whose conceptual spaces can be 
precisely mapped, and the same could apply to imprecise thinking, such as poetic 
imagery, or the intuition recognition of chess-patterns. Boden propositions that artificial 
intelligence (AI) can help us think more clearly about the conceptual spaces of various 
kinds (ref. Boden, 2004: 90). When abnormal P-creative thinking is required; the frozen 
heuristic becomes an obstruction, which has to be removed: this would put previously 
inaccessible parts of the search-space back into the mental map. A problem-solving 
system, whether it is an AI program or person, may possess higher order heuristics with 
which lower-level heuristics can be transformed, for example when the queen is 
sacrificed in the chess game to be replaced with higher order heuristics (ref. Boden, 2004: 
93). 
 
Generative Systems 
 5.23   What is inferred in computational imagination is thus the presence of rules, 
which is required for mental mapping. Boden observes that many generative systems 
possesses a hierarchical structure, with some rules being more basic than others, and uses 
the analogy of a tree to illustrate what is meant: 
 
 Represented as a search-tree, the basic choice-points occur at the origins of the 
thickest branches, while the more superficial choices give rise to the twigs. To chop off 
one branch (to drop a fundamental constraint) is to lose all the twigs sprouting from it – 
which may be a significant proportion of the whole tree (Boden, 2004: 94). 
 
 5.24   Innovation requires a deeper change in the generative system, however, the 
deeper the change, the more different – and less immediately intelligible – is the 
corresponding conceptual space: Hence the initial difficulty in accepting Schoenberg’s 
music. What Schoenberg had done was to abandon the prevailing constraints of tonality 
and successively introduced others – using every note of the chromatic scale, for 
instance. Boden elaborates on the implications: 
 
 Whether his added constraints are aesthetically pleasing, as opposed to being 
merely ingeniously productive is another question. Some people would argue that they 
are not, because they are arbitrary with respect to the natural properties of auditory 
perception. (Impressionism, for instance, exploits deep properties of vision, despite the 
Impressionists’ concern with the science of optics, their work is therefore less 
‘intellectual’ than Schoenberg’s music). In short, to drop all current constraints and 
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refrain from providing new ones is to invite not creativity, but confusion (Boden, 2004: 
95).  
 
 5.25   Boden infers that it is the partial continuity of constraints that enables an 
innovative idea to be both recognised by both author and audience: The new conceptual 
space provides a novel way of viewing the domain and signpost new ideas not apparently 
visible nor seem possible before. Taking Schoenberg’s case again, Bowden states: 
 
 But until the final break into a fully chromatic search-space, the persistent 
musical conventions – about the return to a home-key, or preferred modulations or 
cadences – provide the listener with familiar bearings with which to navigate the 
unfamiliar territory. Even the flight into atonality can be understood as the final step in a 
progressive structural modification of tonal space, as we have seen (Boden, 2004: 96). 
 
 5.26   In putting it this way, the innovative idea thus seem neither random nor 
perverse, but arose during the process of consciously exploring the relevant conceptual 
space in an intelligible way. In other words, creativity is evaluative and exploratory. The 
appreciation of the innovative idea is based on shared constraints and recognising them, 
and seen as a new solution, probably to a new problem, connected to a previous one. This 
is also why new ideas are normally resisted and usually appreciated only by a few: in the 
case of architecture, it normally is the critics who first appreciate the innovation. 
 
 5.27   From here, Boden propositions that anyone seeking to understand the above 
process needs to be able to describe the structures and processes clearly and assess their 
generative potential rigorously, and she suggests that AI terms can do this. For, according 
to Boden: 
 
 AI-concepts must be unambiguously defined, if they are to be embodied in a 
computer program. Moreover, any result obtained when actually running a program 
must lie within the potential of the program concerned (Boden, 2004: 97). 
 
 That is, just like the essential continuation of constraints, a computer can only do 
what its program and data enable it to do. 
 
Scripts, Frames And Nets 
 5.28   According to Boden, what a computer is able to do, is to provide  
systematic theory explaining: “how, and why, different sorts of representation are 
appropriate to different classes of problem” (Boden, 2004: 107), although no such theory 
exists yet. Proponents of AI have studied representation leading to problem solving, and 
on these representations, Boden theorises: 
 
 Various methods of representing knowledge have been used in computer 
programs, including ‘scripts’, ‘frames’, and ‘semantic nets’ – sometimes called 
‘associative nets’. In addition, some theoretical AI-research has tried to distinguish 
general types of representation; an example is ‘analogical’ representation (Boden, 2004: 
1-07). 
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 5.29   In AI, semantic nets are: “computational structures representing (in a highly 
simplified way) the field of meaning within a certain part of conceptual space… It’s those 
association which are the basis for combinational creativity. A semantic consists of nodes 
and links. The nodes stand for specific ideas, while the links – whereby one idea can be 
accessed from another – represent various types of mental connections” (Boden, 2004: 
107). Semantic nets depict human memory as an associative system wherein each idea 
can lead to many other relevant (and irrelevant) ideas linked to the first by phonetic 
similarity or even by mere coincidence. For example, the colour red in architecture is 
linked to fire escape signs and danger.  
 
 5.30   In AI processes, scripts and frames are thought of as special cases of 
semantic nets. They represent the conceptual skeleton of a familiar idea, such as in 
architecture, the familiar ways of doing initial sketches, or the familiar steps taken in 
running projects. However, like in semantic nets in general, they can be modified: The 
initial sketches could instead be done in pencil instead of in pen and new programs could 
be used in running a project. 
 
 Scripts is particularly concerned about recognised ways of behaving, such as 
expected in a computer program. In architecture, it could for example, also be the 
familiar design methodology commonly used by the architect. Frames on the other hand 
represent single concept or idea. To invoke innovation, both can be modified. 
 
 5.31   For an innovative idea to be accepted, the architect relies heavily on the 
scripts in the minds of the audience. To accept even a basic innovative idea, there are 
many mental gaps that need to be filled as the project is presented explicitly. 
Reciprocally, without script-based expectations, the audience would not be able to grasp 
the creative twists. The audiences’ creativity is to map the conceptual space 
propositioned by the architect onto a novel, although fundamentally similar mental spaces 
that are previously defined. 
 
 5.32   Frames, as propositioned in AI hierarchical in the sense that there are ‘big-
picture’ frames as well as ‘small-picture’ frames. For example, ‘commercial buildings’ 
are big-picture frames, whereas, ‘offices’, ‘restaurants’, ‘sops’ are small-picture frames. 
Boden states that: “Various slots are defined within the frame, and specific instances of 
the general class in question are represented by having different details in the (low-level) 
slots in the frame” (Boden, 2004: 111). 
 
 5.33   In the AI sense, a programmed frame (such as in a computer program) will  
include suggestions for moving around within the framework of a conceptual space. That 
is, the programmed frame provides computational pointers, suggesting which unfilled slot 
should be considered at various stage of thinking. In the computer, some slots come 
provided with ‘default values’, where the program assumes a particular description in 
absence of contrary instruction (ref. Boden, 2004: 112). 
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 For example, if an architect were to work on a courtyard space, or if he were to 
recognise it in drawing or illustration, he would normally expect it to be opened to the 
sky; not roofed over. The courtyard would normally be surrounded by three or four walls; 
not completely opened without walls. There is ingress and egress in and out of the space. 
Working on the physical aspects of architecture alone, most likely limits creativity to P-
creativity, which is incremental type of creativity.  
 
 5.34   To arrive at H-creativity, Boden suggests looking beyond the physical to 
the program, for example, she suggests a focus on function, which creative architects 
already normally do: 
 
 An architect can focus on functional instead of physical issues. If what one needs 
to fulfil the various domestic functions carried on in a house is a number of clearly-
defined and interconnected spaces, then physical walls are not always necessary. Indeed, 
‘focus on the function’ is a heuristic that is very often used by architects, designers, and 
creative engineers to escape from stereotyped thinking (Boden, 2004: 113). 
 
 5.35   Boden acknowledges that whatever mechanism that could be arrived at 
through AI, such as the analogy of scripts and frames, they could only possibly echo 
conscious thoughts – those that are ostensive – not the unconscious influences: “in short 
(so the objection goes), it is folly to expect scientific and poetic creativity to be explained 
in computational terms. ‘Computation’ means ‘following a program’, and whatever the 
brain is doing it is surely not that” (Boden, 2004: 126). She however does not give up. 
She suggests a reply to this: 
 
 The key point in the reply is that the brains are, to some extent, like a certain type 
of computer-model; namely connectionists systems or neural networks. ‘Computation’ in 
connectionist systems does not mean following a program in the traditional sense. We 
shall see that the ideas used to describe connectionist computation are helpful in 
understanding how the brain works – and how some aspects of human creativity, 
especially combinational creativity, are possible (Boden, 2004: 127). 
 
 5.36   This correlates with current neurological theory on how the brain works, 
particular as propagated by Damasio, who explains that that the mind, or consciousness 
has a neurological basis, which is integral with the rest of the human body through 
biochemical and neural circuits and that learning in a neuron circuit creates modifications 
and become images in the minds: 
 
 The process that allows for invisible microstructural changes in neuron circuits 
(in cell bodies, dendrites and axons, and synapses) to become neural representation, 
which in turn becomes an image we each experience as belonging to us (Damasio, 1994: 
30). 
 
 Refer also to items 4.32, 4.33 above. 
 
Mind-Body Paradox 
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 5.37   Pinker propositions that the computational theory of the mind provides a 
scientific resolution to the mind-body paradox based on the logic that: data and symbols 
trigger our sense organs, which in turn give rise to new sense data – it allows meaning to 
cause and be caused: 
 
 The computational theory of the mind resolves the paradox. It says that beliefs 
and desires are information, incarnated as configurations of symbols. The symbols are 
the physical states of bits and matter, like chips in a computer or neurons in the brain. 
They symbolise things in the world because they are triggered by those things via our 
sense organs, and because of what they do once they are triggered. If the bits of matter 
that constitute a symbol are arranged to bump into the bits of matter constituting another 
symbol in just the right way, the symbols corresponding to one belief can give rise to new 
symbols corresponding to another belief logically related to it, which can give rise to 
symbols corresponding to other beliefs and so on. Eventually the bits of matter 
constituting a symbol bump into bits of matter connected to the muscles, and behaviour 
happens. The computational theory of the mind thus allows us to keep beliefs and desires 
in our explanations of behaviour while planting them squarely in the physical universe. It 
allows meaning to cause and be caused (Pinker, 1998: 25). 
 
 5.38   Pinker however cautions that non-ostensive human behaviour falls in the 
realm of different discussion. To Pinker, a human being is simultaneously a machine and 
a sentient free agent, depending on the purpose of the discussion: “The mechanistic 
stance allows us to understand what makes us tick and how we fit into the physical 
universe. When those discussion wind down for the day, we go back to talking about 
each other as free and dignified human beings” (Pinker, 1998: 56). He further says that: 
 
 I am certain that I am sentient as I am certain of anything. Though I concede that 
my curiosity about sentience may never be satisfied, I refuse to believe that I am just 
confused when I think that I am sentient at all. And we cannot banish sentience from our 
discourse or reduce it to information access, because moral reasoning depends on it 
(Pinker, 1998: 148). 
 
 5.39   Pinker suggests that in the computational theory, the whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts, and that sentience is not merely the computation of the parts together 
and in the end, he regards consciousness as still an enigma: 
 
 Sentience is not a combination of brain events or computational states: how a 
red-sensitive neuron gives rise to the subjective feel of redness is not a whit less 
mysterious than how the whole brain gives rise to the entire stream of consciousness. The 
‘I’ is not a combination of body parts or brain sates or bits of information, but a unity of 
selfless over time, a single locus that is nowhere in particular. Free will is not a causal 
chain of events and states, by definition…. Our bafflement at the mysteries of the ages 
may have been the price we paid for a combinatorial mind that opened up a world of 
words and sentences, of theories and equations, of poems and melodies, of jokes and 
stories, the very things that make a mind worth having (Pinker, 1998: 564-5). 
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 5.40   Boden, however does not give the computational theory up to ‘the 
mysteries’ as Pinker had done. In quoting Livingston Lowes, Boden infers that: 
 
 Creativity is universal and non-magical, that it is a natural feature of the human 
mind that can be understood in psychological terms…. In short; just what are the hooks 
and eyes of memory; how do they find each other, and how can they fit together to 
produce a novel form? (Boden, 2004: 131).  
 
 5.41   Boden suggests that connectionist computer models could help us 
understand how, say, poetry is possible (ref. Boden, 2004: 131) through the following 
frames: 
 
 1)  Connectionist systems, for example, can do ‘analogical pattern-matching’. 
Which is explained as: 
 
An output pattern (that) can call up a range of stored different-yet-similar 
patterns, whose activation strength varies according to their similarity (as 
apples are strongly reminiscent of oranges and pears, and to a lesser degree 
to bananas (Boden, 2004: 132). 
 
 2)   These systems have ‘contextual memory’, wherein: 
 
An input pattern can activate not only a similar pattern, but also some 
aspects of its previous context. This is especially true if those aspects have 
already been partially aroused by the current context. (Similarly, an apple in 
a religious painting may remind you of eve, whereas an apple in a still-life 
does not.) (Boden, 2004: 132). 
 
 3)  They do not need perfect information, but can make do with probabilities, 
even messy probabilities. In other words: 
 
They can compute by using ‘weak constraints’. They will find the best match 
to a pattern by weighing up many different factors, none of which is 
individually essential and some of which are mutually inconsistent. (A person 
does the same sort of thing in judging the aptness of a poetic image) (Boden, 
2004: 132). 
 
4)    Connectionist systems have ‘associative memory’, grounded in both meaning 
and context: 
 
With repeated experience of the patterns concerned, many can learn to do 
better (much as someone brought up in an orchard is more likely to 
remember apples than someone who has seen apples only once). They learn, 
and can reactivate, many semantic and contextual associations between 
different representations (Boden, 2004: 132). 
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5)   Over time, these things are done ‘naturally’, without specifically programmed 
to do them: 
 
(Likewise, you need not be told about apples, nor do you need explicit rules 
stating the relation of apples pears, or even to Eve – although an art-
historian may help by telling you that an apple sometimes symbolises Eve.) 
Rather their associative memory and tantalising, human-like, capacities are 
inevitable results of their basic design (Boden, 2004: 133).  
 
5.42   In defence against suggestions that computational idea is irrelevant to 
creativity because the brain is not programmed, Boden iterates that: 
 
Connectionist computation is not the manipulation of formal symbols by 
programmed rules. It is a self-organising process of equilibrium, governed by differential 
equation (which deal with statistical probabilities) and comparable to energy-exchange 
in physics…. We must consider the ability of neural networks to learn to associate 
(combine) patterns without being explicitly programmed in respect to those patterns…. A 
computational system that could pick up a regularity, perhaps a very subtle one, without 
such pre-knowledge…. Likewise a mechanism that could spontaneously link – or even 
merge – concepts from different sources (Boden, 2004: 137). 
 
5.43   What Boden arrives at eventually, through the computational idea, is that 
creativity draws crucially from ordinary human abilities: 
 
Noticing, remembering, seeing, speaking, hearing, understanding language, and 
recognising analogies: all these talents of Everyman are important. So is our ability to 
redescribe our existing procedural skills on successive representational levels, so that we 
can transform them in various ways. It is this which enables young children to draw 
increasingly imaginative ‘funny houses’ and ‘funny men’…. and one could hardly get 
more ordinary than that (Boden, 2004: 261). 
 
Computational Psychology 
5.44   Boden claims that computational psychology helps ordinary people to 
understand things that are intuitively grasped by creative people. Take Picasso, for 
example, whose painting styles to Boden are “grounded in the deep structure of natural 
vision” (Boden, 2004: 264). She claims that through computational psychology, ordinary 
people can come to appreciate Picasso’s 1930’s portraits of Dora Maar, showing her with 
two eyes on the same side of the nose, which would otherwise appear to be unnatural, 
unreasonable, and therefore, ugly (ref. Boden, 2004: 264): 
 
But whoever said that the artist must accept all the constraints of the real world? 
Enough is we can use them, challenge them, transform them, in ways that are somehow 
intelligible to us. The pictures of Dora are intelligible (they are even recognisable, if one 
has seen the a photograph of Dora). She does have two eyes, after all; and she does have 
a nose with a Roman profile. Simply, we cannot in real life see her as having these things 
together. If the painter chooses nevertheless to depict all these in one canvas, why should 
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we complain? Is he really doing something utterly unnatural, with no intelligible 
grounding in our knowledge and visual experience? Or is he, rather, exploring the 
conceptual space within which things may be seen either frontally or in profile? (Boden, 
2004: 264). 
 
 5.45   Similarly, with Impressionist paintings, Boden suggests that it is our ability 
to compute interpretations at the ‘higher levels’ that helps us to see beyond the patches of 
colours: 
 
 A painter like Monet can help us to realise that distinguishing colour-patches is 
one thing, and seeing them as water-lilies is another. Indeed computational theories (and 
computer models) of vision suggest that our visual perceptions are constructed on several 
successive representational levels. Colour-patches and line-segments are identified at a 
relatively early stage. The construction of physical surfaces, located relative to the 
current position of the viewer, comes later. The construction of solid objects, 
independently located in three-dimensional space, comes later still. And the identification 
of named things, such as water, is constructed last of all (Boden 2004: 265). 
 
Similarly, in ordinary lives, Boden suggests that we use computational method to 
notice things, to combine familiar ideas in novel ways, to understand sentences and 
appreciate analogies. 
 
Myths 
5.46   Based on arguments developed in computational psychology, Boden 
suggests that ‘creative geniuses’ like Mozart does not have ‘special powers granted only 
to the artistic elite’; only a highly developed version of the power we all share (ref. 
Boden, 2004: 267). She suggests that myths were invented around these individuals, for 
example, letters which Mozart purported to have written, claiming sudden inspirations 
were later found to be spurious20: 
 
Musicologists have rejected this spurious ‘letter’ since the mid-1960s. Yet, a 
quarter of a century later, it is still being cited without qualifications by some writers on 
creativity. It is, of course, seductively plausible – for it fits in with the romantic and even 
inspirational views, and endorses our hero-worship of Mozart to boot (Boden, 2004: 
266). 
 
5.47   In order for us to manage our everyday lives, we are required to do all the 
things Boden describes in 5.43, as well as the ability to recognise things all at once – (the 
ability to recognise the wife from a hat) (ref. 4.29). Boden suggests that the difference 
between Mozart and the rest of us was he could do it better: 
 
The reason he could do it better, at least where music was concerned, is that he 
had more extensive knowledge of the relevant structures. Memory, as noted earlier, 
stores items in the conceptual spaces within the mind. The more richly-structured (and 
well-signposted) the spaces, the more possibility of storing items in a discriminating 
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fashion, and recognising their particularities in the first place…. Mozart’s exceptionally 
well-developed musical memory was a crucial aspect of his genius (Boden, 2004: 268). 
 
 5.48   Boden considers Mozart a ‘genius’ because he was one of the very few 
people who have a constant, long-lasting, ability to produce H-creative ideas. Comparing 
Mozart with Haydn, who was more daring than Mozart in challenging musical rules, 
Boden deduces that Mozart’s H-creativity was primarily a matter of exploring prevailing 
rules to the limits, including bending and tweaking them at many unexpected points, 
rather than breaking them at the fundamental level as Haydn had done (ref. Boden, 2004: 
269). In exploring existing musical rules: 
 
 We hear it with delighted amazement, for we had never realised that the relevant 
structural constraints had such potential. Someone who agreed with this relevant 
judgment might nevertheless regard Mozart as the greater genius – perhaps because his 
music is more diverse than Haydn’s, or because it shows us the full potential of a given 
genre even though he did not invent it in the first place. 
 
 Whether or not an instance of style-based H-creativity involves exceptionally 
radical transformation, it must involve the exploration of conceptual spaces. Accordingly 
expertise is essential. If one does not know the rules (not even tacitly), one can neither 
break nor bend them. Or rather, one cannot do so in a systematic way (Boden, 2004: 
269). 
 
 5.49   Boden shares the same perspective with Gardner and Collins (ref. Section 3 
above) by suggesting that H-creative people have a better sense of domain-relevance than 
P-creative people. Within the domain, she deduces that their mental structures are more 
“wide-ranging, more many-levelled, and more richly detailed than ours. And their 
exploratory strategies are probably more subtle, and more powerful” (Boden, 2004: 270). 
Elaborating this, she suggests: 
 
 These rare individuals, then, can search – transform – high-level spaces much 
larger and more complex than those explored by other people. They are in a sense more 
free than us, for they can generate possibilities that we cannot imagine. Yet they respect 
constraints more than we do, not less. Where we can do nothing, or at best mentally toss 
a coin, they are guided by powerful domain-relevant principles onto promising pathways 
which we cannot even see (Boden, 2004: 270). 
 
Twelve-Year Rule 
 5.50   Computational view of intelligence hence leaves room for ordinary people 
to achieve a fair degree of P-creativity, with hope that leads to H-creativity, or at the very 
least, improve imaginative powers. Boden dismisses the myth of Mozart’s ‘divine-given’ 
powers and outlined that:  
 
 Mozart needed twelve years of concentrated practice before he could compose a 
major work, and much the same seems to be true of other composers. In short, a person 
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needs time, and enormous effort to amass mental structures and to explore their potential 
(Boden, 2004: 270).21 
 
 5.51   How then does computational theory explains the emergence of H-creative 
person from the rest of the P-creative pack – what makes Mozart different from, say, 
Salieri who also devoted his life to music. Boden suggests that there may be something 
about Mozart’s brain that makes it exceptionally efficient at picking up musical 
regularities and exploring them and that, there is some evidence that that musical ability 
is to some extent innate: 
 
 Nevertheless, inborn factors may help certain individuals to develop the 
conceptual structures required. Some structures may even be inaccessible in the absence 
of such factors. If so, then no amount of education or commitment could suffice to form a 
Mozart….  
 
 Just what these factors are, assuming they exist at all, is not known. But whatever 
they are, they are not supernatural. And almost certainly, they are more efficient versions 
of mechanisms we all share – not something profoundly different (Boden, 2004: 275). 
 
Computational Creativity In Architecture 
5.52   In architecture, taking an iconic architect as an example: Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s series of prairie houses exemplify Mozart’s exploration of rules – in Wright’s 
case, rules of aesthetic grammar. Boden observes that: “Mozart needed twelve years of 
concentrated practice before he could compose a major work, and much the same seems 
to be true of other composers” (Item 5.50) seems to apply also to Wright. Wright’s first 
breakaway from classicism was with his own house in Oak Park, Illinois in 1889. His 
first prototypes for the Prairie Houses, the Warren Hickox House and the Harley Bradley 
House were built in Kankakee, Illinois in 1900. His first ‘true’ prairie house, the Ward 
Willits House, in Highland Park, Illinois was built in 1901 (ref. McCarter, 1997: 44, 48), 
exactly twelve years since his first break from classicism. 
 
5.53   It is also worth noting that Frank Lloyd Wright’s Prairie Houses was not the 
sudden arrival of a divine-given idea but one that was evolved over a twelve year period. 
His own house built in 1889 was his first break from classicism. With the William 
Winslow House, built in 1893, “Wright first developed the exterior forms and elevational 
concepts that would allow him to begin to give shape on the outside to the dynamic 
qualities of interior space and plan he had already built inside his earlier houses” 
(McCarter, 1997: 35). 
 
Other houses which followed: The Isedore Heller House, 1896; the Joseph Husser 
House, 1899; the undistinguished houses for J. Baldwin; N. Moore; O. Goan; G. Furbeck 
and K. Furbeck were described by McCarter as: 
 
The cause for the slow but certain unravelling of Wright’s design method during 
this period was his belief that he should provide a totally unique form for each of his 
client, even as their numbers rapidly increased; this belief of Wright’s was an 
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interpretation of individuality in architecture which he now found increasingly difficult to 
accomplish in his actual designs  (McCarter, 1997: 39). 
 
 5.54   Boden’s description of the happenings in Mozart’s mental spaces could 
well apply to Wright: “The reason he could do it better…. is that he had more extensive 
knowledge of the relevant structures. Memory, as noted earlier, stores items in the 
conceptual spaces within the mind. The more richly-structured (and well-signposted) the 
spaces, the more possibility of storing items in a discriminating fashion, and recognising 
their particularities in the first place….” (Item 5.47).  
 
 And also: “These rare individuals, then, can search – transform – high-level 
spaces much larger and more complex than those explored by other people. They are in a 
sense more free than us, for they can generate possibilities that we cannot imagine. Yet 
they respect constraints more than we do, not less. Where we can do nothing, or at best 
mentally toss a coin, they are guided by powerful domain-relevant principles onto 
promising pathways which we cannot even see” (Item 5.49). 
 
 Wright also shows us: “the full potential of a given genre even though he did not 
invent it in the first place” (Item 5.48). In describing Wright’s ideas on the Susan 
Lawrence Dana House, 1900, a renovation, Secrest puts it this way: 
 
Wright was hardly the first to reject the idea of a house and rooms as a series of 
boxes, but he took its possibilities in new directions. By positioning his rooms on the 
diagonal he avoided the error of creating, by the simple removal of walls, a larger box in 
place of two smaller boxes, and went much further than his predecessors in replacing 
those divisions, which had formerly dictated the use of individual spaces, with screens or 
freestanding slabs that merely suggested them. ‘Destroying the box’ in this way still did 
not go far enough to suit him; he wanted to achieve the same with exterior walls as well. 
His solution was, first, to expand vastly the size and number of windows and, then, by 
inventing a method of turning the corner with windows, placing the panes of glass edge 
to edge with no intervening supports, he created the trompe l’oeil effect of appearing to 
make the corner disappear…. (Secrest, 1992: 169). 
 
 5.55   To Boden, McCarter and Secrest, Wright’s innovation is explicit and can be 
described. Boden dismisses the notion that Wright’s innovation is purely intuitive. She 
argues instead that Wright’s Prairie Houses follow grammatical constraints and is 
contained within a generic framework. In denigrating Koning’s and Eizenberg’s 
suggestion that Wright’s achievement of balance of the Prairie Houses is ‘occult’22 – 
“inferring that the stylistic unity is a mystery, accessible only to the intuitive genius of 
Wright”; she argues instead: “the shape grammar apparently captures the crucial aspects 
of the Prairie Houses” (Boden, 2004: 310). She explains that Wright’s organisation of the 
Prairie Houses is explicit: 
 
 Most of Lloyd Wright’s Prairie Houses have only one fireplace. Occasionally, 
however, he replaced the single hearth with several fireplaces. Because of the pivotal 
role of the fireplace in this particular style, to add a fireplace is to make a fundamental 
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alteration to the overall structure. But it will still be recognised as an (unusual) form of 
the Prairie House. As the ‘grammarians’ responsible put it, varying the number of 
fireplaces generates ‘a veritable prairie village of distinct but interacting prairie-style 
designs’, all within a single building. 
 
Since the grammar allows a range of choices at each point, one can move into 
various regions of the conceptual space differing from neighbouring regions in more or 
less fundamental ways. Distinct ‘families’ of houses inhabit different regions of the space, 
and our intuitive of architectural similarity and dissimilarity can be specified 
accordingly. The principle of unity is no longer occult, but has been made explicit 
(Boden, 2004: 310). 
 
5.56   Taking another example of an iconic architect: Andrea Palladio. Records 
reveal that Palladio likewise had taken approximately twelve formative years to arrive at 
what we now recognise as the original Palladian architecture. Ackerman states as 
follows: 
 
These great figures (Bramante, Romano, Michelangelo) of the first decades of the 
century drew Palladio first in one direction, and then in another, in the formative years, 
1538-49, and his work was more erratic in style and quality than that of any apprentice 
to the profession in the Renaissance. But he matured with unpredictable suddenness; the 
designs of around 1549 – Palazzo Chiericati and the villas Thiene and Rotonda – were 
wholly his and wholly new. He had learned to find himself by knowing others (Ackerman, 
1966: 31). 
 
5.57   Like Mozart and Wright, Palladio also shows us: “the full potential of a 
given genre even though he did not invent it in the first place” (Items 5.48, 5.54). Boden 
describes as follows: 
 
The Palladian villa, as a general class (conceptual space), has a rectangular 
outline and preferred numerical proportions and dimensions. Its internal walls divide the 
plan into smaller rectangles, and the rooms are positioned and proportioned only in 
certain ways. The sixteenth-century Italian architect Andrea Palladeo designed many 
variations on his basic theme, which survive as actual buildings or as drawings. He also 
left some remarks describing his design technique, such as his habit of ‘splitting’ 
rectangles vertically or horizontally. But art historians have long disagreed about just 
what are the underlying rules. The Palladian program is an attempt to clarify them…. 
 
What one would like to have is a program which simply cannot generate 
unacceptable designs. In other words, one wants a ‘shape grammar’ that will generate 
only allowable (‘grammatical’) structures (Boden, 2004: 308-9). 
 
5.58   Boden speaks about ‘shape grammar’ and ‘grammatical structures’ as 
constraints that allows sustainable innovation, and an approximate twelve years formative 
period, working within the grammatical constraints for the ideas to mature. Similarly, 
Gardner estimates that it takes ten years to become an expert in a domain and he gives 
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another ten years to make a truly original contribution to the domain (ref. Gardner, 2004: 
139). Depending on interpretation, the formative years is twelve according to Boden and, 
ten according to Gardner (from expertise to originality). Both estimates are close and this 
is evidently exemplified in the cases of Mozart, Wright and Palladio. 
 
5.59   In Boden’s texts, ‘shape grammar’ and ‘grammatical structures’ are 
operational through conceptual spaces (Item 5.04), mental maps (Item 5.20), frames and 
semantic nets (Item 5.28). All of these are visually interpreted, just as the examples used 
by Boden are visually orientated. Her interpretations are also categorical, structural and 
ostensive in the sense that the discussions do not bleed into matters that are subjective, 
such as discussions on consciousness. Her goal is to provide a material and ostensive 
description of creativity so that it can be accessible and attainable to ‘everyman’. 
 
5.60   Ricoeur’s discourse into the equivalence of conceptual spaces and mental 
maps are equally psychological. However, he offers that the imagination is less that of 
‘vision’ and more in terms of ‘language’. Not dissimilar to Boden proposition, semantic 
plays an essential role in innovation: instead of using the phrase, ‘semantic nets’; he 
instead calls it ‘semantic innovation’ (ref. Kearney, 1998: 142). The next section will 
interrogate Ricoeur’s hermeneutic imagination. 
 
House X3 
 5.61   House X3 follows rules set by a genre of houses in the practice that began 
with Pat’s House (1999) and House X2 (2004). The common traits of these houses are as 
follows: 
  
–  A main flexible space on a single floor that is nearly transparent, that reduces 
the boundary between internal and external spaces. 
–  The main space floats over the terrain, providing clarity of formal expression. 
 –  The walls of the main space are inflected horizontally and vertically with the   
intention of creating emotive responses as the light changes with the inflection 
of the walls. 
–  Industrial materials are normally used to achieve consistent recognisable 
lineage between the genres of houses. 
–  They are tropical in attitude with large overhangs and freely ventilated walls. 
Louvres are normally used to cut excessive penetration of sunlight, particularly 
where walls face low angular sun. 
 
5.62   The house is considered as an evolution within a series, which started with 
Pat’s House (1999), with maturity and refinements as the series evolve over the years. 
There is a ‘shape grammar’ about it. The shape grammar is also a kind of ‘sign-posting’ 
of the particular genre of houses.  
 
For now, the houses are located at P-creativity – it would be in later years that the 
houses may arrive at H-creativity, which would be for others to judge. 
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5.63   Through following rules of formal grammar in these series of houses, it is 
suggested that these series of houses can be applied to many sites. Changes are 
necessarily made to accommodate contextual circumstances, for example, site terrain, site 
profile, sun orientation, prevailing winds, and client profile. Development evolution takes 
place over time. House X4 in Section 7 demonstrates how adaptation can take place to fit 
with different circumstances.  
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SIX: 
HERMENEUTICAL IMAGINATION (ANTAGONIST) 
Literature Review F: 
Ricoeur, The Conflict Of Interpretations, 2004 
Gadamer, Truth And Method, 2004 
Supporting Literature: 
Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, 1966 
Bachelard, On Poetic Imagination And Reverie, 1971 
Danto, The Transfiguration Of The Common Place, 1981 
Vattimo, The End Of Modernity, 1988 
Kearney, Poetics Of Imagining, 1998 
Bohm and Peat, Science, Order And Creativity, 2000 
 
 
Preamble: From Visual To Literary Image 
6.01   In Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 above, imagination is visually orientated. To Sartre 
in Section 2, it is an ‘unrealised mode of quasi-seeing’; in Section 4, it is a ‘neutralised’ 
mode of seeing to Husserl, and a dialectical counterpart of the visible to Merleau-Ponty. 
In the existential and phenomenological methods of description, privilege is granted to 
the visual model; however as we move from description to interpretation, privilege is 
revised from ‘visual’ to ‘language’. The common vein that runs throughout the 
existential, phenomenological, and now the hermeneutical methods, is psychological. 
Ricoeur justifies the privilege given to language in interpretation as follows: 
 
The dream symbolism revealed by psychoanalysis – with all its equivalents in 
folklore, legends, proverbs, and myths; the verbal creations of the poet, following the 
guideline of the sensory, visual, acoustic, or other images or following the symbolism of 
space and time. In spite of their being grounded in different ways – in the physiognomical 
qualities of the cosmos, is sexual symbolism, in sensory imagery – all these symbolisms 
find their expression in the element of language. There is no symbolism before man 
speaks, even if the symbol is grounded much deeper. It is in language that the cosmos, 
desire, and the imaginary reach expression; speech is always necessary if the world is to 
be recovered and made hierophany. Likewise, dreams remain closed to us until they have 
been carried to the level of language through narration (Ricoeur, 2004: 13). 
 
6.02   Ricoeur’s thoughts echoes Bachelard who preceded him in providing the 
link between language and imagination and, between ‘correspondence’ and ‘metaphor’ 
(ref. Bachelard, 1971: xxxvi). Bachelard propositions that the imagination is captivated 
by the literary image, which eventually leads to the desire for reverie: 
 
There is no poetry preceding the literary image. The literary image does not 
clothe a naked image, does not give speech to a mute image. Imagination speaks in us; so 
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do our reveries, our thoughts. All human activities desire to speak. When this speech 
becomes conscious of itself, then human activity desires to write, to give order to reverie 
and thought. The imagination is captivated by the literary image. Literature is thus not a 
pure substitute for any other activity. It accomplishes a human desire. It represents an 
emergence of the imagination (Bachelard, 1971: 26). 
 
6.03   Bohm and Peat suggests that language is an essential media that enables an 
enfolding order from consciousness all the way to the structure of society. It is the media 
that transcends the covert (consciousness) and the overt (society, culture, etc.) and 
enables external structure to be formed, such as the structure of society: 
 
Language is an enfolding order. Meaning is enfolded in the structure of the 
language, and meaning unfolds into thought, feeling and all the activities that have 
already been discussed. In communication, meaning unfolds into the whole community 
and unfolds from the community into each person. Thus, there is an internal relationship 
of human beings to each other, and to society as a whole. The explicate form of all this is 
the structure of society, and the implicate form is the content of the culture, which 
extends into the consciousness of each person (Bohm and Peat, 2000: 185). 
 
Engagement Of The Mythical 
6.04   Unlike the purely scientific method of description as exemplified by Boden, 
which normally dismisses the mythical (ref. 5.46); hermeneutical imagination engages 
the mythical as it is deemed to precede rationalisation, and has a deeper signifying power  
(ref. Ricoeur, 2004: 29). In rationalising myths, Ricoeur refers to structuralism, 
particularly to structural anthropology, which method follows the lead of linguists: “But 
the mind contrives to introduce a principle of order and regularity in certain parts of mass 
of signs, and this is the role of the relative motivator. In this sense we might say that 
some languages are more lexicological and others more grammatical” (Levi-Strauss, 
1966: 156).  In comparing the creative acts in myths and art, Levi-Strauss states: 
 
The creative act which gives rise to myths is in fact exactly the reverse of that 
which gives rise to the works of art. In the case of the works of art, the starting point is a 
set of one or more objects and one or more events which aesthetic creation unifies by 
revealing a common structure. Myths travel the same road but start from the other end. 
They use a structure to produce what is itself an object consisting of a set of events (for 
all myths tell a story). Art thus proceeds from a set (object + event) to the discovery of its 
structure. Myths start with a structure by means of which it constructs a set (object + 
event) (Levi-Strauss, 1966: 26). 
 
 6.05   Ricoeur however departs from structural anthropology because of its 
insufficient attention to the unity of mythical thought and complain about its 
overemphasis on canonical forms, where the structure is more important than the content 
(ref. Ricoeur, 2004: 39, 47). He is also not convinced that linguistic concepts are 
insufficient for the entire range of mythical thought, and expressed that: 
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There perhaps exists another pole of mythical thought where syntactical 
organisation is weaker, the connection to ritual less marked, the relation to social 
classifications more tenuous, and where, on the contrary, the semantic richness allows an 
indefinite number of historical discoveries in more varied social contexts. At this other 
pole of mythical thought…. structural comprehension is perhaps less important, in any 
case less exclusive, and more explicitly requires being joined to a hermeneutical 
comprehension, which endeavours to interpret the contents themselves, so as to prolong 
their existence and thereby to incorporate what in these contents is efficacious for 
philosophical reflection (Ricoeur, 2004: 40)). 
 
Textual Over Visual Semantics 
6.06   An issue about textual semantics, as opposed to visual semantics (as 
propounded by Boden) is the presence of multiple meaning, which makes language an 
instrument of knowledge compared with the image: 
 
A sign can indicate one thing without ceasing to indicate another thing and thus 
that, in order to have an expressive value in regard to the second, it must be constituted 
as a sign of the first…. The ‘accumulated intention’ of words is the fruitful source of 
ambiguity, but it is also the source of that analogous predication through which the 
symbolic power of language comes into being (Ricoeur, 2004: 68). 
 
Leading on to creativity, multiple meaning can take on an expressive function 
with regard to realities signified in an indirect manner (ref. Ricoeur, 2004: 68).  
 
Requirement Of Context  
6.07   The terminology used for multiple meaning is ‘polysemy’ (ref. Ricoeur, 
2004: 68). Context is required to order polysemy, without which, polysemy merely floats 
about without any mechanism. Ricoeur explains as follows: 
 
Here we grasp its mechanism in what we can now call an effect of context. Let us 
look once more at the functioning of ordered polysemy, which…. is properly a meaning 
effect produced in a discourse. When I speak, I realise only a part of the potential 
signified; the rest is erased by the total signification of the sentence, which operates as 
the unit of speaking. But the rest of the semantic possibilities are not cancelled; they float 
around the words as possibilities not completely eliminated. The context thus play the 
role of filter; when a single dimension of meaning passes through by means of the play of 
affinities and reinforcements of all analogous dimensions of other lexical terms, a 
meaning effect is created which can attain perfect univocity, as in technical languages. It 
is in this way that we can make univocal statements with univocal words by means of this 
sorting or screening action of the context (Ricoeur, 2004: 69). 
 
6.08   According to Ricoeur, the problem with the above description is that: the 
achievement developed in the above description is exclusive to linguistics: 
 
In this way, semantics and its problem of multiple meaning remain inside the 
closed system of language…. We now know that the science of this multivocity  - the 
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science of linguistics – requires that we remain within the enclosure of the universe of 
signs (Ricoeur, 2004: 70-1). 
 
For multivocity to apply to other domain requires a strategic change of analysis: 
from that of words (lexemes) to that of underlying structure, “constituted wholly for the 
needs of analysis” (Ricoeur, 2004: 72). 
 
6.09   Operating within a semantic framework, innovative ideas necessitates 
greater complexities in structural semantics. Ricoeur requires all semantic variants to be 
anchored in context:  
 
The entire effort of structural semantics will be to reconstruct, bit by bit, the 
relations that allow us to account for these meaning effects, following an increasing 
complexity…. Structural semantics attempts to account for the semantic richness of 
words by means of a highly original method which consists in matching the variants of 
meaning to classes of contexts. The variants in meaning can then be analysed in a fixed 
nucleus, which is common to all the contexts, and in contextual variables (Ricoeur, 2004: 
73). 
 
6.10   In the process of formulating innovative ideas, the many semantic variables 
are rationalised in correspondence with contextual semes (meanings). Ricoeur puts the 
equivalent analysis in linguistic argument as follows: 
 
If we place this analysis inside the framework of operational language, by 
including lexemes to a collection of semes, we can then define the variable meaning 
effects of a word as derivative of semes – or of semes – arising from the conjunction of a 
semic nucleus and of one of several contextual semes, which are themselves semic classes 
corresponding to contextual classes (Ricoeur, 2004: 73). 
 
6.11   In taste and humour for example, contextual semes is culturally 
conditioned. As an analogous example, this is evident in the political difficulties that had 
arisen from the satirical cartoons that had appeared in the Jyllands-Posten newspaper, 
Denmark in September 2005. Critics of the cartoons describe them as Islamophobic and 
argue that they are blasphemous to people of the Islamic faith, “intending to humiliate 
and marginalize a Danish minority, and that they are manifestation of ignorance about 
history of western imperialism, from colonialism to the current conflicts in the Middle-
East”; whereas, supporters of the cartoons claim that in the context of a period of 
extremist Islamic terrorism, their publication is a legitimate exercise of the right of free 
speech. (ref. en.wikepedia.org/wiki/Jyllands-Posten_Muhammad_cartoons)23. 
 
6.12   As part of an argument for cultural context in taste and humour in the 
aesthetics, Danto argues that: 
 
It may be argued that the senses of taste and humour are culturally conditioned, 
so that people of a given tribe find hysterically funny things that appal us, such as the 
death throes of a of a wounded antelope; and it is notorious tat there are people who find 
 97 
aesthetically valuable things that repel us; exaggerated earlobes, tiny feet, immense lips, 
huge scars, ponderous bellies. But it may be countered that even colour predicates vary 
from tribe to tribe and culture to culture, so that differences erected upon this basis 
amount to very little (Danto, 1981: 96). 
 
Ontological Necessity 
6.13   However, from the same perspective, the effect of cultural conditioning 
differs between art (including architecture) and non-art. To Danto, art is necessarily 
ontological whereas non-art is institutional: 
 
No sensory examination of an object will tell me that it is an artwork, since 
quality for quality it may be matched by an object that is not one, so far at least the 
qualities to which the normal senses are responsive are concerned…. Our aesthetic 
responses will differ because the qualities to which we respond are different…. We may, 
upon learning that an artwork is before us, adopt an attitude of respect and awe…. 
Learning something to be an artwork, we may attend to its gleaming surfaces. But if what 
we attend to could have been attended to before the transfiguration, the only change will 
have been adoption of an aesthetic stance, which we could in principle have struck 
before. It is a matter merely of attending to what was there to be perceived – like the taste 
of raspberries in a glass of gigondas…. Learning it is a work of art means that it has 
qualities to attend to which its untransfigured counterpart lacks, and that our aesthetic 
responses will be different. And that it is not institutional, it is ontological (Danto, 1981: 
99). 
 
6.14   By means of context, Ricoeur sees that the mysteries in language is 
overcome; however as in art (as interpreted by Danto above) the outcome of language is 
also regarded as ontological: 
 
I think we too can say that there is no mystery in language; the most poetic, the 
most ‘sacred’, symbolism works with the same semic variables as the most banal word in 
the dictionary. But there is a mystery of language, namely, that language speaks, says 
something, says something about being. If there is an enigma of symbolism, it resides 
wholly on the level of manifestations, where the equivocalness of being is spoken in the 
equivocalness of discourse (Ricoeur, 2004: 75). 
 
6.15   Compared with Ricoeur’s semes (or semic), which has a linguistic and 
semantic basis, units of meanings in ontology are usually intentional relation. Gadamer 
refers to Husserl’s phenomenology to equate units of meanings as such: 
 
The epistemological function of the concept of experience in Husserl’s phenomenology is 
equally universal…. The unit of experience is not understood as a piece of the actual flow 
of experience of an ‘I’, but as an intentional relation…. Experiences exist only insofar as 
something is experienced and intended in them. It is true that Husserl also recognises 
non-intentional experiences, but these are merely materials for units of meaning, 
intentional experiences. Thus for Husserl experience becomes the comprehensive name 
for all acts of consciousness whose essence is intentionality (Gadamer, 2004: 57). 
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Culture 
6.16   Gadamer develops the ontological aspect of hermeneutics even more 
strongly than Ricoeur with the introduction of ‘Bildung’, which to Gadamer, “is 
intimately associated with the idea of culture and designates primarily the properly 
human way of developing one’s natural talents and capacities…. describes more the 
result of becoming than the process itself. The transition is especially clear here because 
the result of Bildung is not achieved in the manner of a technical construction, but grows 
out of an inner process of formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly in a state of 
continual Bildung… The cultivation of a talent is the development of something that is 
given, so that practising and cultivating it is a mere means to an end” (Gadamer, 2004: 
10). 
 
 6.17   In the area of the aesthetics, ontological value is tampered by common 
sense and community value, taking taste as example, Gadamer observes that: 
 
Here one may speak of a true sense of community. Doubtful though it may be 
whether one may speak of knowledge in connection with aesthetic taste, and certain 
though it is that aesthetic judgments are not made according to concepts, it is still the 
case that aesthetic taste necessarily implies universal agreement, even if it is sensory and 
not conceptual. Thus the true sense of community, says Kant, is taste (Gadamer, 2004: 
30). 
 
Taste 
6.18   In the event of artistic innovation Gadamer suggests that innovation is 
accepted within a universal framework, which is the prevailing taste: 
 
Genius is ultimately a manifestation of the vivifying spirit for, as opposed to the 
pedant’s rigid adherence to rules, genius exhibits a free sweep of intervention and thus 
the originality that creates new models. 
 
In this situation the question arises of how Kant sees the mutual relation between 
taste and genius. Kant preserves the privileged position of taste, inasmuch as works of art 
(that is, the art of genius) must be viewed from the guiding viewpoint of beauty. One may 
regret the improvements that taste imposes on the invention of genius, but taste is a 
necessary discipline of genius. Thus, in cases of conflict, Kant considers that taste should 
prevail…. Taste is a faculty of judgment, and hence reflective, but what it reflects about is 
only that state of mind – the vitalisation of cognitive powers that results as much from 
natural as from artistic beauty. Thus the systematic significance of the concept of genius 
is limited by its being as special case of the artistically beautiful, whereas the concept of 
taste by contrast is universal (Gadamer, 2004: 46-7). 
 
 6.19   To Gadamer, taste provides the aesthetic context in the way that it eschews 
arbitrariness as “a society chooses and knows what belongs to it and what does not”: 
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However, the unity of an ideal of taste that distinguishes a society and bonds its 
members together differ from that which constitutes the figure of aesthetic culture. Taste 
still obeys a criterion of content. What is considered valid n a society, its ruling taste, 
receives its stamp from the commonalities of social life. Such a society chooses and 
knows what belongs to it and what does not. Even its artistic interests are not arbitrary 
or in principle universal, but what artists create and what the society values belong 
altogether in the unity of a style of life and an ideal of taste (Gadamer, 2004: 73). 
 
6.20   Gadamer however provides the possibility of innovation surpassing that of 
taste as Gadamer regards taste to be subservient to genius when art ‘steps into the 
foreground’: 
 
It is in fact clear that the concept of taste loses its significance if the phenomenon 
of art steps into the foreground. The standpoint of taste is secondary to the work of art. 
The sensitivity in selecting that constitutes taste often has a levelling effect in contrast to 
the originality of the artistic work of genius. Taste avoids the unusual and the monstrous. 
It is concerned with the surface of things; it does not concern itself with what is original 
about an artistic production (Gadamer, 2004: 49-50). 
 
Aesthetic Differentiation 
6.21   To Gadamer, what is considered a work of art has ‘aesthetic differentiation’ 
and with it, it can exist in its own right. The extra-aesthetic elements are things like, 
‘purpose, function, the significance of its content’, and these elements situates the work 
in context with the world and therefore provides meaning to the work: 
 
 It shows what a pure work of art is, and allows it to exist in its own right. I call 
this ‘aesthetic differentiation’. 
 
Whereas a definite taste differentiates – i.e., selects and rejects – on the basis of 
some content, aesthetic differentiation is an abstraction that selects only on the basis of 
aesthetic quality as such. It is performed in the self-consciousness of ‘aesthetic 
experiences (Erlebnis) is directed towards what is supposed to be the work proper – what 
it ignores are the extra-aesthetic elements that cling to it, such as purpose, function, the 
significance of its content. These elements may be significant enough inasmuch as they 
situate the work in its world and thus determine the whole meaningfulness that it 
originally possessed (Gadamer, 2004: 74). 
 
 6.22   Among the members of the artistic fraternity, the architect is considered 
‘sui generis’ because according to Gadamer, unlike the poet, painter, or composer, he is 
not independent of commission or occasion. Whereas, the free artist creates without a 
commission, and he (the free artist) seems distinguished by “the complete independence 
of his creativity and thus acquires the characteristic social features of an outsider whose 
style of life cannot be measured by the standard of public morality” (ref. Gadamer, 2004: 
76). To Gadamer, the condition of the free artist is not necessarily a good thing: 
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 But at the same time the artist, who is as ‘free as a bird or a fish’, bears the 
burden of a vocation that makes him an ambiguous figure. For a cultured society that has 
fallen away from its religious traditions expects more from art than aesthetic 
consciousness and the ‘standpoint of art’ can deliver. The romantic demand for a new 
mythology…. gives the artist and his task in the world the consciousness of a new 
consecration.  He is something like a ‘secular saviour’ (Immermann), for his creations 
are expected to achieve on a small scale the propitiation of disaster for which an unsaved 
world hopes. This claim has since defined the tragedy of the artist in the world, for any 
fulfilment of it is always a local one, and in fact that means that it is refuted. The 
experimental search for new symbols or a new myth that will unite everyone may 
certainly gather a public and create a community, but since every artist finds his own 
community, the particular of such communities merely testifies to the disintegration that 
is taking place. What unites everyone is merely the universal form of aesthetic culture…. 
Immermann calls this free-overflowing of spirit within itself ‘extravagantly self-
indulgent’ (Gadamer, 2004: 76-7). 
 
Extra-Aesthetic Elements 
6.23   Gadamer thus infers that without the extra-aesthetic elements like ‘purpose, 
function, the significance of its content’ (Item 6.20), and context (Item 6.18), the work of 
art is without meaning and is refutable. On the other hand, the work of the architect, 
which is not independent of commission or occasion, (Item 6.21) is regarded as more 
meaningful. Gadamer hence suggests that for art (and architecture) to be meaningful; it 
cannot be pure abstraction – it is tied to the extra-aesthetic elements. This would likewise 
apply to innovative art (or architecture): 
 
 In Kant the concept of genius had a transcendental function, and the concept of 
art was grounded through it. We saw how this concept of genius was extended by its 
successors to become the universal basis of aesthetics. But is the concept of genius really 
suited to this?  
 
Modern artistic consciousness seems to suggest it is not…. 
 
The work of art is not some alien universe into which we are magically 
transported for a time. Rather, learn to understand ourselves in and through it, and this 
means that we sublate the discontinuity o our own existence. For this reason, we must 
adopt a standpoint in relation to art and the beautiful that does not pretend to immediacy 
but corresponds to the historical nature of the human condition. The appeal to 
immediacy, to the instantaneous flash of genius, to the significance of ‘experiences’ 
(Erlebnisse), cannot withstand the claim of human existence to continuity and unity of 
self-understanding. The binding quality of the experience (Erfahrung) of art must not be 
disintegrated by aesthetic consciousness (Gadamer, 2004: 80, 83-4). 
 
Architecture As Play 
 6.24   Gadamer’s premise that the work of art or architecture should necessarily 
be connected to the extra-aesthetic elements (purpose, function, content and context), 
which is “not independent of commission or occasion” to be meaningful, suggests a third 
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party involvement – i.e., a spectator or audience, with the author. The medium of the 
work of art is like drama between the author and the spectator, and Gadamer infers that it 
is more than rules. To Gadamer, the work of art or architecture is a ‘transformation’, or a 
‘play’, which can subsequently exist without the author and the spectator. By means of 
play, the work of art overcomes mere abstraction:  
 
The work of art understood as a drama is not a mere schema of rules or 
prescribed approaches within which play can freely realise itself. The play of the drama 
does not ask to be understood as satisfying a need to play, but as the coming-into-
existence of the work itself. And so there arises the question of what such a work properly 
is, given that it exists only in being played and in its representation as a play, though is 
nevertheless its own being that is thereby presented. 
 
 …. Play is structure – this means that despite its dependence of being played it is 
a meaningful whole which can be repeatedly presented as such and the significance of 
which can be understood. But structure is also play because…. it achieves its full being 
only each time it is played. That both sides of the question belong together is what we 
have to emphasize against the abstraction of aesthetic differentiation (Gadamer, 2004: 
116). 
 
Temporality  
6.25   When the work of art or architecture is seen as a play, it is not confined to 
one interpretation. By fulfilling its function, it becomes contemporaneous, having 
temporality (a past), and as drama, it has ‘total mediation’ and has an existence of its 
own: 
 
 The mediation that communicates the work is, in principle, total. 
 
Total mediation means that the medium as such is superseded (aufhebt). In other 
words, the performance does not become, as such, thematic, but the work presents itself 
through it and in it. We will see that the same is true of the way buildings and statues 
present themselves to be approached and encountered. Here too the approach as such is 
not thematic, but neither is it true that one would have to abstract from the work’s 
relations to the life world in order to grasp the work itself. Rather, it exists within them. 
The fact that the works stretch out of a past into the present as enduring monuments still 
does not mean that their being is an object of aesthetic or historical consciousness. As 
long as they still fulfil their function, they are contemporaneous with every age…. Thus 
we have the task of interpreting the work in terms of time (zeit) (Gadamer, 2004: 118-9). 
 
 6.26   Compared with a work of art, Gadamer suggests that a work of architecture 
just cannot stand anywhere and be a blot in the landscape – it is a solution to ‘an 
architectural problem’ (ref. Gadamer, 2004: 149). Hence, a work of architecture is not 
merely an abstract consciousness, but something that is worth thinking about: It would 
have context of life and intention (points back to original). Gadamer suggests that:  
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If a building is a work of art, then it is not only the artistic solution to a building 
problem posed by the contexts of purpose and life to which it originally belongs, but 
somehow preserves them, so that they are visibly present even though the building’s 
present appearance is completely alienated from the original purpose. Something in it 
points back to the original. Where the original intention becomes completely 
unrecognisable, or its unity is destroyed by too many subsequent alterations, then the 
building becomes incomprehensible. Thus architecture, this most statuary of all art 
forms, shows how secondary ‘aesthetic differentiation’ is. A building is never a work of 
art. Its purpose, through which it belongs in the context of life, cannot be separated from 
it without it losing some of its reality. If it has become merely an object of aesthetic 
consciousness, then it has merely a shadowy reality and lives a distorted life only in the 
degenerate form of a tourist attraction of a subject for photography. The ‘work of art in 
itself’ proves to be a pure abstraction (Gadamer, 2004: 149-150). 
 
Historical Significance 
 6.27   On the necessity of architecture being contemporaneous, Gadamer suggests 
specifically that the architect is an artist of his time: 
 
Works of architecture do not stand motionless on the shore of the stream of 
history, but are borne along by it. Even if historically-minded ages try to reconstruct the 
architecture of an earlier age, they cannot turn back the wheel of history, but must 
mediate in a new and better way between the past and the present. Even the restorer or 
the preserver of ancient monuments remains an artist of his time (Gadamer, 2004: 150). 
 
 Further to this, Gadamer rationalises that: 
 
It remains irrefutable that art is never simply past but is able to overcome 
temporal distance by virtue of its own meaningful presence…. Even though it is no mere 
object of historical consciousness, understanding art always includes historical 
mediation (Gadamer, 2004: 158). 
 
 6.28   Gadamer explains this further by considering the relevance of historical 
context in the interpretation of the text, but again the explanation could equally apply to 
architecture in the generic sense, as he has suggested that the architect is an artist of his 
time: 
 
Every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way, for the text belongs 
to the whole tradition whose content interests the age and in which seeks to understand 
itself. The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not depend on the 
contingencies of the author and its original audience. It certainly is not identical with 
them, for it is always co-determined also by the historical situation of the interpreter and 
hence by the totality of the objective course of history (Gadamer, 2004: 296). 
 
 6.29   Temporality is tied to its production in the original environment, or world, 
which is its context, without which, it loses its significance. Referring to art, Gadamer 
suggests that: “It loses its meaning when it is wrenched from this environment and enters 
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into general circulation” (Gadamer, 2004: 159). Likewise a work of architecture enjoys 
its true significance only where it originally belongs.  
 
6.30   Further to this, the hermeneutics perspective requires agreement between 
the spectator and the author, wherein the spectator transpose himself not into the author’s 
mind; but into the work. The work is described as a perspective (or mediation: ref. Item 
6.24). Gadamer explains about text, but could equally apply to works of art or 
architecture: 
 
 When we try to understand a text, we do not try to transpose ourselves into the 
author’s mind but, if one wants to use this terminology, we try to transpose ourselves into 
the perspective within which he has formed his views…. we are moving in a dimension of 
meaning that is intelligible in itself as such offers no reason for going back to the 
subjectivity of the author. The task of hermeneutics is to clarify this miracle of 
understanding, which is not a mysterious communion of souls, but sharing a common 
meaning…. 
 
We have seen that the goal of all attempts to reach an understanding is agreement 
concerning the subject matter. Hence the task of hermeneutics has always been to 
establish agreement where there is none or where it has been disturbed in some way 
(Gadamer, 2004: 292). 
 
 6.31   Gadamer acknowledges that the requirement of temporality poses an 
obstacle to the appreciation of new or innovative works of art (or architecture) and 
suggests that they are appreciated historically, that is, after the age of their production. 
Gadamer calls this ‘historical distance’ (Gadamer, 2004: 297), that is: “Only when their 
relations to the present time has faded away can their real nature appear”: 
 
 Everyone is familiar with the curious impotence of our judgment where temporal 
distance has not given us sure criteria. Thus the judgment of contemporary works of art 
is desperately uncertain for the scholarly consciousness. Obviously we approach such 
creations with unverifiable prejudices, presuppositions that have too great an influence 
over us for us to know about them; these can give contemporary creations an extra 
resonance that does not correspond to their true content and significance. Only when 
their relations to the present time has faded away can their real nature appear, so that 
the understanding of what is said in them could be authoritative and universal (Gadamer, 
2004: 297). 
 
6.32   According to the Gadamer’s perspective, the conditions for the appreciation 
of an innovative work includes the closure of a historical event, which, “allows us to 
view it as a whole, and its distance from contemporary opinions concerning its import” 
(Gadamer, 2004: 297). The further the historical distance, the less subjective the 
judgment of the works become: 
 
 The implicit presupposition of historical method, then, is that the permanent 
significance of something can first be known objectively only when it belongs to a closed 
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context – in other words, when it is dead enough to have only historical interest. Only 
then does it seem possible to exclude the subjective involvement of the observer 
(Gadamer, 2004: 297). 
 
6.33   Other than clearing away subjectivity and prejudices, Gadamer suggests 
that temporal distance allows the true meanings of the work to appear. So essential is 
temporal distance in the judgement of creative works that Gadamer suggests that, “the 
hermeneutically trained mind will also include historical consciousness”. With the 
historical consciousness, the true meaning of the creative work continues to reveal itself 
infinitely: 
 
 But the discovery of the true meaning of the text or the work of art is never 
finished; it is in fact an infinite process. Not only are fresh sources or error constantly 
excluded, so that al kinds of things are filtered out that obscure the true meaning; but the 
new sources of understanding are continually emerging that reveal unsuspected elements 
of meaning. The temporal distance that performs the filtering process is not fixed, but is 
itself undergoing constant movement and extension. And along with the negative side of 
the filtering process brought about by the temporal distance there is also the positive 
side, namely the value it has for understanding. It not only lets local and limited 
prejudices die away, but allows those that bring about genuine understanding to emerge 
clearly as such. 
 
Often temporal distance can solve question of critique in hermeneutics, namely 
how to distinguish the true prejudices, by which we understand, from the false ones, by 
which we misunderstand. Hence the hermeneutically trained mind will also include 
historical consciousness (Gadamer, 2004: 298). 
 
 6.34   The real experience of art, or architecture must thus have historical 
consciousness, and to Gadamer’s mind, art cannot be ‘contemporary to all times’ and 
that, art or architecture outside history is false. He distinguishes real art from ‘aesthetic 
consciousness’: 
 
If Hegel considers all art as something past, it is as it were absorbed by 
historical, rememorative consciousness; and as something past, it achieves aesthetic 
simultaneity. Insight into this context set me the hermeneutic task of employing the 
concept of aesthetic non-differentiation to distinguish the real experience of art – from 
aesthetic consciousness. This seems to me a legitimate problem, one that does not result 
in idolising history but is unmistakable in our experience of art. To regard ‘art’ either as 
contemporary with all times and outside history or as a way of attaining culture through 
the experience of history is to impose a false dichotomy (Gadamer, 2004: 575). 
 
Practice And Experience 
 6.35   In the production of innovative works, it seems conceivable that knowledge 
and insight could be accumulated through experience prior to an innovative 
breakthrough. Gadamer suggests that: “The truth of experience always implies an 
orientation toward a new experience. That is why a person who is called experienced has 
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become so not only through experiences but is also open to new experience” (Gadamer, 
2004: 350). Here, Gadamer infers that a person can be radically undogmatic because of 
the many experiences and knowledge he has drawn from them, he is particularly well 
equipped to have new experiences and learn from them. From this perspective the 
dialectic of experiences enable openness and invention. 
 
6.36   The reliance on experience infers an inversion towards psychology instead 
of say, methodology, in the production of innovative works. A psychological agreement 
between the spectator and the author is also prerequisite to the appreciation of the works. 
Gadamer however admits the difficulty of reconciling the psychological inversion with 
historical significance, and it remains unresolved: 
 
 A philosophical theory of hermeneutics is not a methodology – right or wrong 
(‘dangerous’) as the case may be. It may be misleading when Bollnow calls 
understanding an ‘essential creative act’ – although Betti does not hesitate to describe 
the elaborative interpretation of law. But it is quite certain that to follow the aesthetics of 
genius, as Betti himself does, is not sufficient. The theory of inversion cannot really 
overcome what Beti recognises as a psychologising constriction…. If, in order to explain 
the possibility of understanding…. he has to presuppose that only a mind on the same 
level can understand another mind, the inadequacy of this psychological-hermeneutical 
ambiguity becomes apparent.  
 
Even if we are basically clear about the difference between psychic particularity 
and historical significance, it obviously remains difficult to find the transition between 
the narrowness of psychology to a historical hermeneutics (Gadamer, 2004: 513). 
 
 6.37   From the Gadamer’s world-view, historical distance validates innovation, 
but it is psychological experience that produces innovation. With this comes the 
importance of ‘practice’, which he regards as a necessity over ‘method’. Compared to 
practice, method merely creates confusion. Practice could negotiate with things that are 
considered as subjective to arrive at the ‘concreteness of the case’ with ‘highest 
universality’, to guard against ‘technological self-understanding’, which he associates 
with method. He uses scientific enquiry, legal judgment and ‘play’ as analogies to 
proposition this point: 
 
The final confusion that dominates methodology of the sciences is, I think, the 
degeneration of the concept of practice. This concept lost its legitimacy in the age of 
science with its ideal of certainty. For since science views its purpose as isolating the 
causes of events – natural and historical – it is acquainted with practice only as the 
application of science. But that is a practice that requires no special account. Thus the 
concept of technology displaces that of practice; in other words, the competence of 
experts has marginalized political reason…. 
 
 We are acquainted with this problem in the form Kant gave it in the ‘Critique of 
Judgment’. There he differentiates between determinative judgment, which subsumes the 
particular under a universal, and reflective judgment, which seeks a universal concept 
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for a given particular…. The universal under which the particular is subsumed continues 
to determine itself through the particular. Thus the legal meaning of a law is determined 
through adjudication, and fundamentally the universality of the law is determined 
through the concreteness of the case. Aristotle has even gone as far as to claim that the 
atomic idea of the good is vacuous, and rightly so, if we really have to think of the good 
as a being of the highest universality. 
 
 Relying on the tradition of practical philosophy helps guard us against the 
technological self-understanding of the modern concept of science…. The concept of 
play…. which I employed to critique ‘aesthetic differentiation’, involves an ontological 
problem. For this concept unites event and understanding in their interplay, and also the 
language games of our world experience in general, as Wittgenstein has thematised them 
in order to criticise metaphysics (Gadamer, 2004: 560-1). 
 
6.38   It is also Danto’s viewpoint that art cannot be isolated from its history, 
which gives the art its identity and structure – he in fact regards that there is no 
philosophical defence for an ahistorical theory of art: 
 
 There is a further point. I have inveighed against the isolation of artworks from 
the historical and generally causal matrices from which they derive their identities and 
structures. The ‘work itself’ thus presupposes so many causal connections with its artistic 
environment that an ahistorical history of art can have no philosophical defence (Danto, 
1981: 175). 
 
6.39   However, according Vattimo, history is something that is made by 
innovators, rather than something that is needed to validate innovation, and because of 
this, he sees a non-historicity about innovators. Instead he sees that the innovator is more 
dependent on taste and technical ability to “produce truly exemplary works which are 
epoch-making”. Vattimo also advocates practice to arrive at innovation; but appearing to 
by-pass history, he takes his cues from Kuhn’s idea of breaking existing paradigms to 
arrive at true innovation: 
 
 The apparent non-historicity of genius stands opposed to the historicity 
established by mechanical ‘heads’, and by great scientists as well. The genius cannot 
teach others his ways of inventing and producing, since he himself dos not know how to 
understand them fully. Works of genius nevertheless serve as exemplary models, and 
when nature gives rise to other geniuses the latter becomes the impulse, for any existing 
genius, towards new analogous works. This, perhaps more than anything else, can be 
called historicity: for is the kind of progress established by mechanical ‘heads’ appears 
primarily as a model of continuity and cumulation, it is still lacking in an authentically 
processual nature. Everything that scientists discover is presupposed as already 
available: in other words, scientific discoveries give articulation to already existing 
paradigms (Vattimo, 1988: 93). 
 
Wickham Apartments 
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6.40   The project for luxury apartments at Jalan Wickham in Kuala Lumpur was 
designed in concurrence with the interrogation of  hermeneutic imagination for this 
thesis. Hermeneutic imagination states that privilege is given to language over visual. It is 
closely related to phenomenological imagination in its engagement with psychology: “the 
verbal creations of the poet, following the guideline of the sensory, visual, acoustic, or 
other images or following the symbolism of space and time” (Item 6.01; Ricoeur, 2004: 
13). 
 
 6.41   Hermeneutical imagination engages the mythical as it is deemed to precede 
rationalisation, and has a deeper signifying power  (Item 6.03; ref. Ricoeur, 2004: 29). 
Following this, the narrative of the project revolves itself around the mythical 
preconditions that surround climate, wherein the engagement of climate becomes the 
main premise of the design:  
 
1) The creation of breezeways: That the natural warm climate is good thing and 
the apartments should engage directly with the prevailing climate. The result is the 
creation of breezeways, where breeze is allowed to traverse from one end of the building 
to another, thereby cooling the whole abode. This follows that air-conditioning is 
dispensed with for the living areas of the house as the house is naturally cooled. 
 
2) The creation of courtyards: Historically, the courtyard is inextricably linked 
with urban living, which is traced to the earliest townhouses in Malacca and Penang. 
Historically, the urban courtyards were all located close to the centre of deep land-plots, 
where the buildings were no more than two stories. Indeed the very earliest townhouses 
were single stories with courtyards in the middle. The buildings were normally 60’ to 
100’ deep.  
 
 By economic necessity, the Wickham Apartments has arisen up to seven stories, 
and 70’ deep. Locating the courtyard in the middle will not work with a high building as 
little light is received at the lower levels. Hence the courtyards are placed at the edge of 
the buildings to become large voids that connect directly with the external environment 
and with the sky. 
 
3) Being in the line of prevailing sea winds, the natural terrain is perpetually wet 
and green. Water and foliage are abundant in the natural landscape. This is introduced 
into the courtyards and at the podium. They flow naturally into the apartments, taking 
away the boundary between the internal and external spaces. 
 
 6.42   Hermeneutical imagination requires that the design is anchored in 
appropriate context (ref. Item 6.08): “It loses its meaning when it is wrenched from this 
environment and enters into general circulation” (Gadamer, 2004: 159). The present 
physical vicinity is made of scattered bungalows surrounded by bungalows. The 
bungalows come from different era, including the present era. Due to economic pressure, 
luxury apartments in similar scale to Wickham Apartments are gradually replacing the 
individual bungalows. Hence the prevailing physical context is one of low density 
residential, of varying scales and the Wickham Apartments is just one of these. 
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6.43   In the engagement of historicism, Gadamer requires that the ‘architect is an 
artist of his time’, for the work to be authentic (ref. Item 6.26), and taking a step further, 
Vattimo infers that the designer is entitled to break from existing paradigm to arrive at a 
new precedence. Wickham Apartments does not profess to do either. It is more a play of 
rules (or language games) – ‘the breezeway’, ‘the courtyard’, dealing with water elements 
and foliage: Gadamer’s hermeneutic imagination allows for the play of semantics – a 
play as part of practice that enables the work to rise above mere method (ref. Item 6.36). 
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Literature Review G: 
Briggs, Fire In The Crucible, 2000 
Chomsky, Language And Responsibility, 1979 
Dewey, Art As Experience, 1934 
Bachelard, The Poetic Of Space, 1964  
Bachelard, On Poetic Imagination And Reverie, 1971 
Chomsky, Reflections On Language, 1975 
John-Steiner, Notebooks Of The Mind, 1985 
Csikszentmihalyi, Flow, 1990 
Secrest, Frank Lloyd Wright – A Biography, 1992 
Bohm and Peat, Science, Order, And Creativity, 2000 
 
 
Preamble 
 7.01   This section explores the mental processes that creates innovation. In the 
exploration of this process, Briggs asks several questions: 1) How innovators work; 2) 
Why they work as they do; 3) The way creative techniques and talents appear; 4) The 
flowering of particular creation (ref. Briggs, 2000: 5). The premise of Briggs thesis is to 
use the idea of ‘alchemy’ as a metaphor to interrogate the creative mental process: 
 
 One particularly delightful instance of the reminder lies in the felicitous phase 
‘magnum opus’. So often applied to superior creative productions, the term originally 
was alchemic, referring both to the final product of the hierophant’s activity that created 
the stone (Briggs, 2000: 5). 
 
 Briggs qualifies that the metaphor ‘alchemy’ is not intended to carry any weight 
to determine claims: 
 
 By using this metaphor I am neither affirming nor denying any of the claims of 
alchemy as such. Also, in an actual (as opposed to a metaphorical) sense it should be 
kept in mind that geniuses are quite unlike alchemists (Briggs, 2004: 5). 
 
 7.02   Briggs opposes the reductionistic approach to the interrogation of mental 
processes that lead to innovation. He eschews the attempts to squeeze the mental 
processes to a simple cluster of traits or attributes, and differing from say, Boden’s 
computational imagination, Briggs complains that: 
 
 A reductionist approach treats the human mind as if it were a computer whose 
complexity may be explained by the logic of the computer language and the on-and-off 
status of the electromagnetic switches. But the mind is not a computer and during the 
 110
past few years a growing number of scientists and philosophers of science have pointed 
out the serious problems inherent in this view that the universe is fundamentally 
mechanical and reducible (Briggs, 2000: 8). 
 
 7.03   As propounded in Section 6, aligning with Gadamer’s hermeneutical 
imagination, Briggs appear to agree that innovators are motivated by non-objective 
aspects such as ‘truth’ and ‘vision’: 
 
 Curiously, the notion that a great genius possesses ‘vision’ is usually slipped into 
even the most reductionist discussions of creativity – an element assumed but not defined, 
vital but almost totally ignored. ‘Truth’ however, is a word seldom used by creativity 
theorists – though it is not uncommonly found in statements by creators…. Indeed, it is a 
little hard to imagine that you could say much scientifically about a person’s intimate 
sensations of truth. 
 
 Nevertheless, the obvious fact is that the lives of great creators are importantly 
motivated or guided by some quest for truth, some vision, some inner spirit…. “the 
inward voice that decides” (Briggs, 2000: 9). 
 
Themata 
 7.04   Following the work of Holton, Briggs suggests that there are hidden 
elements in the minds of innovators, which is termed as ‘thematic ideas’, which are 
clusters of presuppositions and ‘gut’ assumptions, which are called ‘themata’: themes. 
Using scientific discoveries as examples, Briggs explains as follows: 
 
 For the most part themata are aesthetic qualities like the assumption that the 
universe is basically symmetrical, or the opposite assumption that it’s symmetrical…. 
‘normal’ science share basically the same set of underlying assumptions. Scientists who 
end up revolutionising their fields appear to have a collection of themata at variance in 
some significant ways with the theme clusters held by most of their colleagues (Briggs, 
2000: 26). 
 
 7.05   These themata are not abstraction, but are concrete feel for the surrounding 
world. Holton analogises the themata as ideas, but Briggs call them thematic perceptions. 
For example, one of Einstein’s themata includes the belief that scientific explanations 
should be formalistic mathematical set of ideas rather than involving observable natural 
phenomena; a belief that whatever laws that are found should be applicable to anywhere 
in the universe: “a conviction that the universe is in its deepest sense unified, 
symmetrical, simple, and causal; and a need to have descriptions and explanations be 
‘complete’” (Briggs, 2000: 29). 
 
 7.06   Themata are seen as guiding visionary elements connected to the 
innovator’s emotional life. Briggs speculates that when Einstein theorises on light, like 
the way he elevates the speed of light to the status as the only constant, or invariance, it 
might have something to do with unconscious biblical significance as part of his 
childhood influence; “linking him to the themes that were part of his childhood sense of a 
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religious paradise. In relativity theory, light becomes the cornerstone of universal order” 
(Briggs, 2000: 30). 
 
 7.07   From Briggs’ perspective, the mind is not tabula rasa, but is made up of 
themata (he also calls these thought-forms), which for some minds can produce real 
insights and not for others. He speculates that innovators have a higher commitment to 
the pursuit of their idiosyncratic ensembles of themes than their less creative colleagues:  
 
Colleagues may ignore, even suppress some of their own subliminal thematic 
perceptions because they are not perceptions that people around them acknowledge….  
 
 Great creators are different in the sense that they feel compelled to show the 
world that their themata in fact point to a hidden reality that people pursuing the 
consensual themata of the moment have failed to notice. 
 
 The strength of this commitment is so powerful that rather than bend or suppress 
personal themata in order to carry on a successful career…. some (innovators) have 
switched fields looking for a place where their themata could attain full expression 
(Briggs, 2000: 32). 
 
 7.08   Working in tandem with themata are ‘screen memories’, which provide 
nuances to the themata. Briggs describes as follows: 
 
 Think of nuance in terms of colour. The three primary colours may be missed to 
produce a virtually endless number of shades, tones and hues – that is, nuances. Or, 
more dramatically, think of perfume. The same perfume on one woman smells differently 
on another. The perfume itself is composed of a huge number of odours, some of them not 
typically associated with pleasant aromas. Roots, mosses, beaver castoreum, even skunk 
oil are common ingredients of perfume. Together, the different scents fuse to produce a 
single subtly vivid odour…. the thematic qualities are in fact fused in the nuance (Briggs, 
2000: 39). 
 
 7.09   Further to this, Briggs propounded examples of works of writers, poets, 
musicians and artists. He suggests that: “an emotional and aesthetically images can’t be 
verbalised. It is a matter of nuance”. For example he quotes nature photographer Ansel 
Adams: 
 
 “Why is an Edward Weston photograph of a rock vastly more exciting than a very 
competent informational or technical picture of the same rock? The chances are that the 
latter might be physically ‘sharper’, and may reveal to a geologist certain physical facts 
in all aspect that the Weston picture cannot do. The difference is one of purpose, 
sensitivity and the ability to visualise an emotionally and aesthetically exciting image. To 
further verbalise this is futile” (Briggs, 2000: 40). 
 
 7.10   Dewey finds it equally difficult to ‘verbalise’ artistic nuances and he puts it 
in another way: 
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 We are hardly conscious of anything metaphorical when we say of one picture or 
of another story that it is dead, and of another that it has life. To explain just what we 
mean when we say this, is not easy. Yet the consciousness that one thing is limp, that 
another has the heavy inertness of inanimate things, while another seems to move from 
within, arises spontaneously. There must be something in the object that instigates it 
(Dewey, 1934: 183). 
 
 7.11   Out of the exemplars of the many innovators from various domains: 
wherein Briggs quotes Virginia Woolf, John Keats, Beethoven, Georgia O’Keeffe, 
Louise Nevelson, Albert Einstein, Isaac Newton, Copernicus, Kepler, Charles Darwin, 
Nikola Tesla and Marie Curie (ref. Briggs, 2000: 36-47) – he concludes as follows: 
 
 What do all these cases show? It appears that for many (innovators), an obsession 
with some particular nuance or complex of nuances burns at the core of vision. For other 
(innovators), a general sensitivity to certain classes of nuances may be significantly at 
play. Such sensitivity would help a scientific creator, for example, sort out the relevant 
details from what is called the ‘noise’ in the experimental situation and go straight to the 
heart of the matter. Nuance and themata are clearly related. Nuance is the aura or 
nimbus that surrounds a thema or several themata, the energy that infuses thematic 
convictions (Briggs, 2004: 47). 
 
Feeling Tones 
 7.12   The idea of ‘feeling tones’ was first developed in the research of William 
Gray and reformulated by Paul LaViolette24 as a psychodynamic and neuroanatomical 
picture of how the brain is organised (ref. Briggs, 2000: 48).  Feeling tones are emotional 
nuances that are logged in the brain through thoughts and memories. Gray suggests that 
even in the ordinary course of thought, emotional nuances are evoked even if no attention 
is paid to them. To elucidate this, Briggs borrows Gray’s example of a simple cognition: 
take the cognition, 2+2=4: 
 
 Try to remember what it must have felt like to learn that concept. Something 
called 2 has a feeling to it. The process of adding, the process of equalling and something 
called 4 also have feeling to them. There must have been a small amazement, a shock to 
the brain, at being shown or told that all these nuances form an order. The order, 
2+2=4, now has its own nuance that includes a sense of finality or closure, a sense that 
‘this is the way it is’. Eventually that nuance-with-closure overshadows the others until 
2+2=4 seems to be pure cognition, a rational thought with no emotion at all. That isn’t 
true of course. Thoughts always have emotion connected to them and, in humans, 
emotions are mostly set in motion by thoughts. 
 
 According to Gray, thought-emotions become associated together into structures 
vastly larger and more complex than 2+2=4. The structures include, for example, our 
knowledge of mathematics as a whole (Briggs, 2000: 49). 
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 7.13   According to LaViolette, a closed-loop network of neurons connects the 
limbic organs of the human brain, in what is called the Papez circuit. They trigger feeling 
tone responses and generate what Gray and LaViolette call an emotional ‘theme’, which 
is similar to a musical theme – an organised pattern of feeling tones or musical notes (ref. 
Briggs, 2000: 52-3). Although researched separately, Gray-LaViolette’s ‘theme’ is 
common with Holton’s themata, wherein both terms refer to the qualitative and emotional 
elements underlying thought. LaViolette proposes that the waveforms that circulate 
through the Papez circuit evoke long-term memories, where these memories in turn 
become part of the evolving ‘theme’.  
 
 7.14   In similar vein, Bachelard speaks metaphorically about the poet’s dynamic 
imagination, which has integrative powers that enable us to incorporate images. He takes 
the metaphor of an upside down tree, and describes it emotively: 
  
 …. whose roots, like a delicate foliage, tremble in the subterranean winds while it 
branch take root firmly in the blue sky. 
 
 I believe that there are objects which have integrative powers, things which 
enable us to incorporate images. For me, the tree is an integrative object. It is normally a 
work of art…. The imagination then took possession of all the powers of plant life…. 
Immediately, within us, we feel the roots working, we feel that the past is not dead…. The 
tree is everywhere at once. The old root – in the imagination there are no young roots – 
will produce a new flower. The imagination is a tree. It has the integrative virtues of a 
tree. It has roots and boughs. It lives between earth and sky. It lives in the earth and in 
the wind. The imagined tree becomes imperceptibly the cosmological tree, the tree which 
epitomises a universe, which makes a universe (Bachelard, 1971: 84-5). 
 
 7.15   Probing deeper into memories that are carried in “the waveforms that 
circulate through the Papez circuit” (ref. Item 7.13), Bachelard describes about childhood 
reveries that are carried into adult life: 
 
 The dream-being passes through all the ages of man, from childhood to old age, 
without growing old. And that is why, later in life, one experiences a sort of double 
reverie when one attempts to revive childhood dreams…. 
 
 Dreaming of childhood, we go back to the den of reveries, to the reveries which 
opened up the world for us. It is reverie which makes us the first inhabitants of the world 
of solitude. And we live all the better in the world, living as the solitary child lives in 
images. In the child’s reverie, the image comes first. Experiences only come afterward; 
they go against the current of all reveries of flight. The child’s vision is grand and 
beautiful. Reverie orientated toward childhood takes us back to the beauty of first 
images…. that reverie which unites us with the world (Bachalard, 1971: 96). 
 
 7.16   In a more ostensive and less metaphorical manner, Briggs elucidates the 
point the nuance tones (equivalent to Bachelard’s reverie) by quoting Virginia Woolf’s 
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own narrative about her first memories at St. Ives that influenced her adult writing, 
particularly her books, ‘To the Lighthouse’ and ‘The Waves’: 
 
 “…. in fact is the most important of all my memories. If life has a base that it 
stands upon, if it is a bowl that one fills and fills and fills – then my bowl without a doubt 
stands upon this memory. It is of lying half asleep, half awake, in bed in the nursery of St. 
Ives. It is of hearing the waves breaking, one, two, one, two, and sending a splash of 
water on the beach; and then breaking, one, two, one, two, behind the yellow blind. It is 
of hearing the blind draw its little acorn across the floor as the wind blew the blind out. It 
is of lying and hearing this splash and seeing this light, and feeling, it is almost 
impossible that I should be here; of feeling the purest ecstasy I can conceive” (Briggs, 
2000: 36). 
 
 7.17   Briggs observes that not only the title but the entire structure of Woolf’s 
‘The Waves’ is based on the metaphor of waves tumbling one after another on the beach. 
Briggs speaks of the rhythm of the book as follows: 
 
 Having eliminated plot and the traditional time-space structure of the novel, 
Woolf replaced it with sections in which the consciousness of each character speaks. 
These sections fall after one another in repeated sets, like waves. The early pages, 
representing the early childhoods of the characters, are filled with what Woolf called 
elsewhere ‘moments of being’, moments of exquisite, vibratory perception like the one 
she described having had as a baby in the nursery at St. Ives…. Thus in Virginia’s cortex, 
the angle of the blind, the rhythmic patterns of the waves are being abstracted out and 
transmitted through the brain as sensory information (Briggs, 2000: 37, 52). 
 
 7.18   From Briggs’ perspective, the nursery room nuance had activated in 
Virginia Woolf, a set of nuances that were part of the large ‘theme’ of nuances that have 
to do with her memories of the St. Ives’ summer. Briggs proposes that: 
 
 The ‘theme’ circulating mostly below the level of awareness, would contain 
hundreds of sensory fragments, each impregnated with emotional nuances. Over time 
these nuances would constantly be modified by other nuances, so that the ‘theme’ would 
vary in a complex way (Briggs, 2000: 54). 
 
 7.19   Briggs describes the mental condition, not as a cognition, but a ‘brain state’, 
which was not mainly thought but also not mainly feeling, and not mainly perception. 
Briggs describes it as a kind of ‘pulsation in a field of nuance’: 
 
 …. a state in which feelings, thoughts, memories and perceptions flowed vividly 
into each other and were inseparable. The words ‘emotion’, ‘nuance’ and ‘feeling-tone 
theme’ do not imply that the state is emotional in the ordinary sense of the word emotion, 
nor should we conclude that nuances do not importantly contain thoughts. 
 
 Thoughts are obviously an immense and indispensable feature of a creator’s 
mental activity in all phases of creative process. It’s only when a child begins to 
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formulate cognitions that creativity as we recognise it becomes possible. However, 
creators seem inclined to keep their thoughts pulsating in a field of nuance rather than 
having them dominate the field (Briggs, 2000: 55-6). 
 
 7.20   In parallel with Virginia Woolf’s description of childhood memories in St. 
Ives, Bachelard’s proposition of childhood memories of spaces in a dwelling resonates 
something similar, which is familiar to architects: 
 
 The house we were born in has engraved within us the hierarchy of the various 
functions of inhabiting. We are the diagram of the functions of inhabiting that particular 
house, and all the other houses are but variations on a fundamental theme. The word 
habit is too worn a word to express this passionate liaison of our bodies, which do not 
forget, with an unforgettable house. 
 
 But this area of detailed recollections that are easily retained because of the 
names of things and people we knew in the first house, can be studied by means of 
general psychology. Memories of dreams, however, which only poetic meditations can 
help us to recapture, are more confused, less clearly drawn. The great function of poetry 
is to give back the situations of our dreams. The house that we were born in is more than 
an embodiment of a home, it is also a embodiment of dreams. Each one of its nooks and 
corners was a resting-place for daydreaming. Our habits of a particular daydream were 
acquired there. The house, the bedroom, the garret in which we were alone, furnished the 
framework for an interminable dream…. In point of fact, we are in the unity of image and 
memory, in the functional composite of imagination and memory…. What special depth 
there is in a child’s daydream! And how happy the child who really possesses his 
moments of solitude! (Bachelard, 1964: 15-6). 
 
Individual-Universal Equation Or Implicate Order 
 7.21   Briggs suggests that innovators see their works as manifestation of 
universal truths – in holistic and cosmic terms. Mozart, for example said that a piece 
would grow on him until “the whole, though it be long, stands almost complete and 
finished in my mind so that I can survey it, like a fine picture or a beautiful statue, at a 
glance. Nor do I hear in my imagination the parts successively, but I hear them, as it 
were, all at once” (Briggs, 2000: 82). In bringing this kind of discussion to the surface, 
Bohm calls it ‘implicate order’, wherein lone images are transformed into an organic 
whole rather than a succession of images, which is common to all works of art: 
 
 This perception of implicate order is generally common to all works of art. For 
example, the montage, or editing together of successive images, in the film of a great 
director has something in common with music, for the internal structure, quality, and 
feeling of each image infuses with all others. In this way the value and meaning of a 
particular image, seen alone, is totally transformed and the resulting scene is viewed as 
an organic whole rather than as a succession of explicit images. In poetry the various 
resonances of words and images act together in highly complex orders so that 
associations of memory and meaning in an individual word or image, together with the 
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particular sounds in vocalisation evokes, are all enfolded together (Bohm and Peat, 
2000: 189). 
 
 7.22   John-Steiner explains that the innovator is driven by the largeness of his 
goal compared to the ordinary person, who is ordinarily content with repetitions: 
 
 These characteristics of creativity – its developmental nature, linking of overt and 
covert processes, and the construction of an open-ended and regenerative system – may 
also be seen in the lives lacking the distinction of creative achievements. What is the 
difference? 
 
 The difference lies in the intensity and continuity of the creative individual’s 
mental life. Work in the market place is discontinuous; one is given a task, which once 
completed leads to another, a discreet assignment. Daily thought, which accompanies 
these daily challenges, also has a certain discontinuity. Once we close the door behind 
our paid work, we also tend to close our mind to it. Indeed, ordinary, repetitive work 
needs to be extrinsically rewarded because it lacks the intrinsic rewards of sustained, 
continuous labour (John-Steiner, 1985: 221). 
 
 7.23   The innovator is hence driven to recreate whole systems. In Item 7.16, 
when Woolf reminisce the moment of life like, “a bowl that one fills and fills and fills – 
then my bowl without a doubt stands upon this memory”, the moment of life is also seen 
as a whole of her life. A biographer, Jean Love were to say that, Woolf “tried much of 
her adult life, by means of her writing, to compose the perfect whole of her past 
experiences (Briggs, 2000: 68). The innovator therefore uses the products of creative 
activity to identify the self with the whole in the desire to become the centre of a 
universe. 
 
 7.24   With deference to the creative side of art, particularly, in the domain of 
painting, Bohm and Peat attempt to make comparisons with of creative art with their 
experiences with creative science. Their objective description, using terms ‘matrix of 
ideas’ and ‘inward perception’ correlates with Woolf’s poetic description of literary 
insights. Their description reinforces Woolf’s perception from another perspective: 
 
 Yet all sensory data are deeply influenced by a person’s background and 
disposition. In the case of the artist, this includes everything that has gone before…. as 
well as with the artist’s relationship to the subject. 
 
 Psychological experiments have established that visual perception is clearly 
conditioned by the circumstances in which that perception takes place, for example, the 
‘meaning’ of the scene and which questions are put to the viewer at the time. Clearly the 
artist is not immune to this process and the ‘artistic vision’ arises out of an outward 
communication with a vast matrix of ideas, social predisposition and so on. In addition, 
the artist is also very much concerned with the ‘inward perception’, a vision through the 
mind that is not dissimilar to that experienced by the (creative) scientist…. Indeed the 
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final painting must take its place within an artistic matrix that stretches over space and 
time (Bohm and Peat, 2000: 105). 
 
Synesthesia 
 7.25   The term ‘Synesthesia,’ as interpreted by Briggs, is a concept developed 
from the mixing of senses and intelligences. Some of Gardner’s intelligences like spatial 
and bodily-kinesthetic intelligences have a degree of sensory content; while others like 
logical-mathematical and linguistic intelligences are high in conceptual content. All 
seven intelligences25, in turn, are mixture of core intelligences, having various levels of 
sensory and conceptual contents. Synesthesia goes beyond the ordinary mixing of senses 
that takes place in the consciousness. Briggs describes it as “sense and intelligence 
mixing in unusual patterns of perception and thought” (Briggs, 2000: 167). In the idea of 
synesthesia, innovators supposedly possesses the ability to: 
 
 …. mix senses or types of intelligence in unusual ways from early childhood 
(when the differences between the senses and intelligences were not yet discriminated), 
or they learn, later, through feedback, to map one intelligence onto another. 
 
 Synesthesia probably keeps the creator in touch with the nuance level of 
perception. Nuance may even be the actual source of synesthesia thought, or vice versa 
(Briggs, 2000: 167). 
 
 7.26   Briggs uses Jean Love’s quote on Woolf ‘s experience as an example of 
synesthetic experience: 
 
 “…. highly pleasant emotions came with synesthetic sensation. That is, she was 
enormously and pleasurably excited when sights, sounds, and other sensations seemed 
unified with each other. She was elated when her inner sensations seemed to be fused 
with sensations coming from the world around her. She remembered being intensely 
aware of the diffusion and unity of all her sensations and emphasised that a sense of unity 
and wholeness was essential to her feeling of pleasure…. She associated the sense of 
wholeness with her writing” (Briggs, 2000: 167). 
 
 7.27   It is evident that the idea of ‘synesthesia’ shares similarities with Gardner’s 
‘heightened attention’, Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘flow’ and Collins’ ‘emotional energy’:  
 
Gardner’s ‘heightened attention’ says, Certain brain centres and neural 
transmitters are mobilised in these states, whether they are induced by the ingestion of 
substances, involvement in a hobby, or sheer control of will (ref. 3.20) infers the same 
meaning as: 
 
  Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘flow’: The optimal state of inner experience is one in which 
there is order in consciousness. This happens when psychic energy – or attention – is 
invested in realistic goals, and when skills match the opportunities for action. The pursuit 
of a goal brings order to awareness because a person must concentrate attention on the 
task at hand and momentarily forget everything else (ref. 3.21).  
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This again is the same as Collins’ emotional energy: A high degree of 
intersubjectivity, together with a high degree of emotional entrainment – through bodily 
synchronisation, mutual simulation / arousal of participants’ nervous systems – results in 
feelings of membership that are attached to cognitive symbols; and result also in the 
emotional energy of the individual participants, giving them feelings of confidence, 
enthusiasm, and desire for action…. These moments of high degree of ritual intensity are 
high points of experience (ref. 3.03). 
 
Therefore: 
 
‘Flow States’(Gardner) = ‘Flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi )= ‘Emotional Energy’(Collins) 
= ‘Synesthesia’ (Briggs) 
 
–The psychological circumstances when innovation occurs. 
 
7.28   Following Csikszentmihalyi description of ‘flow’, ‘synesthesia’ is likewise 
not an existential or mystical hidden energy, but one that is overt as he is to qualify: 
 
After all, mystical experiences are not necessary to account for the performance 
of a great violinist, or a great athlete, even though most of us could not even begin to 
approach their powers…. Like all virtuosi, he must spend many years learning, and he 
must keep constantly in training. Being a specialist he cannot afford the time or the 
mental energy to do anything other than fine-tune his skill at manipulating inner 
experiences…. 
 
 Because no branch of science deals with consciousness directly, there is no single 
accepted description of how it works. Many disciplines touch on it and thus provide 
peripheral accounts. Neuroscience, neuroanatomy, cognitive science, artificial 
intelligence, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology are some of the most directly relevant 
fields to choose from; however, trying to summarise their findings would result in an 
account similar to the descriptions the blind men gave of the elephant: each different, 
and each unrelated to the others. No doubt we shall continue to learn important things 
about consciousness from these disciplines, but in the meantime we are left with the task 
of providing a model that is grounded in fact, yet expressed simply enough so that anyone 
can make use of it (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990: 25). 
 
 7.29   Although ‘synesthesia’ is a mental condition, same or similar with 
Gardner’s ‘heightened attention’, Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘flow’ and Collin’s ‘emotional 
energy’, it however has an extension towards specialisation. It follows Gardner’s theory 
of ‘multiple intelligence’, and suggests that the innovator “experiences a synesthetic mix 
of intelligences that chemically alters the intelligence or talent that governs their creative 
field. To elucidate this, Briggs proposes as follows: 
 
 For example, in the creative field of literature, the talents required for writing 
lyrical poetry or short stories are not the same as those required for writing novels. In 
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novel writing dramatising characters demand a high degree of what Gardner calls the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences. That doesn’t mean the creator needs to be 
good at getting along with people or at living a well-balanced intrapsychic life – but a 
novelist does need a capacity for insights in these areas…. Woolf in fact possessed the 
kind of eidetic sense memory….  
 
 This illustrates another facet of the uniqueness of talents: Each creator embodies 
a unique constellation of ancillary intelligences which (s)he brings to bear on the field in 
which the principal creative talent is exercised (Briggs, 2000: 172). 
 
 7.30   Architectural innovations could often be traced to synesthetic influences. 
Biographers have speculatively traced Frank Lloyd Wright’s geometrical innovations to 
the synesthetic interest in music, the various fields of arts, Japanese prints, love of nature 
and the Froebel blocks he played with as a child: 
 
 His sister, Maginal recalls: He couldn’t leave the (the piano) alone, and he would 
experiment, moderating tempo and tone and bring out the expression called for…. He 
loved to show off his mastery of certain passages so that they sounded as if they were 
really being played by a virtuoso (Secrest, 1992: 135). 
 
 His sons Lloyd and John recall: Soon there were Japanese prints as well, which 
Lloyd helped unwrap, unbook, clean and mount…. He introduced them to music, poetry, 
art; he had a love of nature and a Welsh belief in spirits (Secrest, 1992: 136). 
 
 Since (Wright) always organised his floor plans using the intricate patterns he 
learned from the Froebel blocks – he once said that he saw the method’s possibilities 
anew when his own children began playing with them…. this gave his designs, however 
modest or ambitious, uniform dimensions and properly orchestrated axes and directions 
to his houses (Secrest, 1992: 168). 
 
Structure To Thought Crystallisation 
 7.31   In providing a structure to the way language crystallises through the mind, 
Chomsky has also given an outline to the process of creative crystallisation. In his thesis, 
‘Aspects Of The Theory Of Syntax’, 1965, Chomsky formulated the first model towards 
the mental crystallisation of language, which makes explicit mental structures: 
 
  rewriting  
       rules 
                  surface  
      BASE                              --------    transformations   -------    structure 
 
       LEXICON 
                  Semantic     phonological 
                interpretation     interpretation 
 
 
 
  deep 
structure surface str ct re 
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 Figure 7.31 (ref. Chomsky, 1979: 137) 
 
 
 The base component consists of two elements: the rewriting rules which, as 
before, indicate the structure of sequences of words; and the lexicon, to which are 
assigned all the syntactic, semantic, and phonological properties of the lexical items. The 
base grammar generates the initial phrase marker, or the ‘deep structure’. 
 
 The transformational component transforms this initial structure into other 
structures, the last of which is termed the ‘surface structure’. The base component and the 
transformational component constitute the generative part of the model. 
 
 Relevant to mental crystallisation towards innovation is the introduction of two 
interpretive components, the phonological component and the semantic component. They 
provide the possibilities of changing prevalent morphology. The semantic component 
however extends the concept of generative grammar into the domain of meaning. 
 
 7.32   Semantic interpretation, according to Chomsky is intentional, leading to 
‘meaning’. It is sometimes termed as ‘semantic representation’ and considered as 
thematic (ref. Chomsky, 1979: 145). In the crystallisation of mental process, it is 
equivalent to ‘themata’. Item 7.07 states: 
 
 “From Briggs’ perspective, the mind is not tabula rasa, but is made up of themata 
(he also calls these thought-forms), which for some minds can produce real insights and 
not for others. He speculates that innovators have a higher commitment to the pursuit of 
their idiosyncratic ensembles of themes than their less creative colleagues”. 
 
 Semantic representation is required to account for legitimate reference, truth 
condition, speech acts, and so on (Chomsky, 1979: 148) 
 
 7.33   In Chomsky’s phonological interpretation, there are vowels and there are 
consonants (Chomsky, 1979: 155). It is about phonetic nuances in the linguistic sense. In 
the crystallisation of mental process, it is equivalent to ‘feeling tones’. Item 7.12 
describes ‘feeling tones’ as: “emotional nuances that are logged in the brain through 
thoughts and memories. Gray suggests that even in the ordinary course of thought, 
emotional nuances are evoked even if no attention is paid to them”. Hence the equivalent 
mental structure for the crystallisation of mental process is something like the following: 
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  rewriting  
       rules 
                  surface  
     Program                              --------    transformations   -------    structure 
 
         architectural 
  lexicon                ‘Themata’            ‘Feeling Tones’ 
               (Thought-forms)              (nuances) 
 
 
 Figure 7.33 
 
Extended Standard Theory 
 7.34   The above picture is based on Chomsky’s 1965 thesis. It is obviously 
incomplete, as the picture has not arrived at any kind of form to be useful schemata for 
creative innovation. Chomsky calls the above model (Figure 7.31) as ‘Standard Theory’ 
of  ‘Aspects of the Theory of Syntax’ (1965). In the 1970s Chomsky arrived at the 
‘Extended Standard Theory’ wherein, surface structure plays a primary role in semantic 
interpretation whereas previously, semantic interpretation was arrived only from deep 
structure (see Figure 7.31).  
 
 7.35   What is essentially new in the ‘Extended Standard Theory’ is the concept of 
‘trace’, t, which marks the position of an element that has been displaced by a 
transformation. Chomsky propositions that: 
 
 Within the framework of trace theory, one can even go further and say that all of 
the semantic representation, including thematic relations, can in a sense be derived from 
surface structure: to be sure, with a considerably enriched notion of ‘surface structure’, 
because the new surface structures contain traces, in terms of which thematic relations as 
specified by the base rules can be reconstructed (Chomsky, 1979: 164).  
 
 7.36   The above proposes a non-linear process of thought where traces, t, from 
surface structure, “in terms of which thematic relations as specified by the base rules can 
be reconstructed” (Chomsky, 1979: 164). Surface structure is close to the location of 
‘logical form’ which can be expressed ostensively. Conversely, the trace is returned to 
surface structure as, “a sort of memory of deep structure recorded in the surface 
structure” (Chomsky, 1979: 165). Yet, from another point of view, inferring the 
flexibility of ‘trace’, Chomsky describes it as follows: 
 
 From another point of view the trace in this case can be considered as indicating 
the position of a variable bound by the kind of quantifier which is introduced into the 
logical form by rules applying to the surface structure. In this later version, the theory 
has roughly the following form: Deep structures are generated by the base component, 
 
surface 
structure 
  deep 
structure 
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with their specific properties. Transformations form surface structures enriched by 
traces. The surface structures are associated by further rules to representations by sound 
(phonetic representation) and meaning (logical form) (Chomsky, 1979: 165). The 
resulting schema proposed by Chomsky is as follows: 
 
 
         logical  
         form  
    Base           Deep      transformations  Surface 
         Component      Structure    Structure 
         phonetic 
         representation 
 
 
 Figure 7.36 (ref. Chomsky, 1979: 165) 
 
 
 7.37   Based on Chomsky assertions in Items 7.35-6 above, the more correct is a 
two-way traffic of influences, the process is not a linear one: 
 
 
         logical  
       (t)     (t)   form  
    Base           Deep      transformations  Surface 
       Component       Structure   Structure 
            (t) ‘Trace’ 
                (t) 
 
 
 Figure 7.37   
 
 
 7.38   On ‘logical form’ above, Chomsky does not have a specific notion for it 
and infers that it is variable: 
 
 This is an alternative model of language as a cognitive system. Remember that by 
the phrase ‘logical form’ I mean the partial representation of meaning that is determined 
by grammatical structure. Beyond that, we can study the interaction of this cognitive 
system with others, just as in physiology, once the heart has been identified, we can study 
its interaction with the other organs…. Choice of the term ‘logical form’ may or may not 
have been a wise terminological decision – the term is used in other ways. But 
terminology aside, there are interesting directions for research here…. Consequently, it 
becomes possible to obtain empirical evidence to answer the question: Which is the 
correct system of logic, the notation actually used in the mental representation? 
(Chomsky, 1979: 165-6). 
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 7.39   The terminology, ‘deep structure’ above does not mean that it is something 
invariant: “…. people have apparently been misled by the word deep and confuse it with 
invariant. Once again, the only thing I claim to be ‘invariant’ is universal grammar” 
(Chomsky, 1979: 172). By making surface structure and deep structure variable, 
Chomsky encourages creativity within grammatical rules. Using creative work in science 
as analogy, Chomsky describes as follows:  
 
 What you expect of a scientist is to discover new principles, new theories, even 
new modes of verification…. That won’t happen by learning a fixed procedure. The same 
is true of linguistics today. It is impossible to explain to someone the procedure he must 
apply in order to find the generative grammar of some language. What one looks forward 
to is the discovery of new phenomena that will show that the theories that have been 
proposed are false, that they must be changed – new questions that no one has thought of 
posing before, at least in a clear manner, new contributions to understanding, achieved 
perhaps with new ‘methods’. And finally, new ideas and new principles, which will reveal 
how limited, false, and superficial are the assumptions that we hold to be valid today 
(Chomsky, 1979: 179). 
 
Deep Structure, Surface Structure Symmetry 
 7.40   Chomsky’s ‘deep structure’ is not something that is mysterious. It merely is 
phonetic interpretation, which is captured by trace theory, and it “designate a precise 
stage in the derivation of a sentence” (ref. Chomsky, 1979: 173, 183). It is symmetrical to 
‘surface structure’, which is semantic interpretation  (ref. Chomsky, 1979: 173). To aid 
understanding, he offers the following diagram: 
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 Figure 7.40 (ref. Chomsky, 1979: 173) 
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Extended Standard Theory For Visual Innovation 
 7.41   Chomsky’s models for the structures that determine the mental process for 
the competency of language possibly could apply to other domains. He assumes that the 
mental requirements for visual competency, for example, would be similar to that for 
language: 
 
 It is possible that the theory for face perception resembles a generative grammar. 
Just as in language, if you suppose that there are base structures and transformed 
structures, then one might imagine a model which might generate the possible human 
faces, and the transformations which would tell you what each face would look like from 
all angles…. the human perceptual system is not learned, but is rather an innate 
capacity, perhaps specifically related to language, though this is debated (Chomsky, 
1979: 52). 
 
 7.42   Using the Chomsky’s premise that the mental processes for language 
competency and visual competency are similar, Chomsky’s model for the Extended 
Standard Theory is adopted to structure the thought process for visual competency. The 
variability of the ‘Extended Standard Theory’ provides a further extension towards a 
structure for visual innovation.  
 
 The proviso for the structure is an assumption of rules, for without which 
according to Chomsky, “we have arbitrary and random behaviour, not creative acts” 
(Chomsky, 1975: 133).  
 
 The basis for Chomky’s structure is, “a system of intellectual organisation, call it 
the ‘initial state’ of the mind (Chomsky, 1975: 137) – The base for both the linguistic and 
visual abilities are innate, according to Chomsky: “Thus the theory of faces (like 
language) might be innate, though fully functional only at a particular stage of 
development” (Chomsky, 1975: 145). The modified diagram for visual innovation 
adopted from Chomsky’s model would become something like this: 
 
 
 
     System of Rules 
 
 
         logical form 
         (Innovation) 
    Innate           Deep      transformations  Surface 
        Knowledge       Structure   Structure 
                              ‘FeelingTones’ 
   ‘Themata’       (nuances) 
   Thought-Forms 
 
 Figure 7.42    
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Creating Mental Contexts 
 7.43   Chomsky’s type of mental structure is purely cognitive, however in 
architecture, external factors needs to be addressed. Quoting Gruber, Briggs suggests that 
contextual conditions can be created mentally: “Gruber calls this pearl-making 
‘constructing a point of view – the slow process by which the thinker constructs the 
mental circumstances of his own insights” (Briggs, 2000: 261). Briggs further suggests 
that: “Building a point of view means creating a context that unites the creator’s 
amorphous vision with the outward requirements of the creative field and its audience” 
(Briggs, 2000: 262). For example, Briggs suggests that Van Gogh created his own 
context which energises his career as a painter: 
 
 (Van Gogh explains to his brother Theo) that at the moment he remains idle, but 
that was only because he lacked a way to convey to others what was in him. He lacked a 
context. His first step in creating such a context so that others would see what was in him 
(and so that he himself could truly see it) was to crystallise his energies toward a career 
as a painter (Briggs, 2000: 263). 
 
 7.44   Briggs suggests that generally ‘a long time’ is required before the creator’s 
context shifts enough for the magnum opus to emerge. Cultivating the ability to think 
oppositionally allows the innovator to transform contexts, break prevailing operating 
mindset to plumb the materials from new angles. According to Briggs this is what 
purportedly happens: 
 
 During the apprenticeship period, the different nuance themes (themata) link up 
and creators recognise the nuances of other works in the creative field as having both 
relevance and irrelevance to the personal creative purpose. Most importantly, throughout 
apprenticeship, creators develop what Einstein called the capacity for ‘self-criticism’ 
(Briggs, 2000: 264). 
 
 7.45   The ‘long time’ that Briggs suggests is equivalent to Gardner’s ten-year 
rule – a requirement of concentrated work before the magnum opus emerges (ref. 
Gardner, 2004: 139). Boden’s estimate is 12 years, using Mozart as example: 
 
 Mozart needed twelve years of concentrated practice before he could compose a 
major work, and much the same seems to be true of other composers. In short, a person 
needs time, and enormous effort to amass mental structures and to explore their potential 
(Boden, 2004: 270). 
 
 In the architectural field, Palladio had taken twelve formative years (ref. 
Ackerman, 1966: 31) and Wright had taken twelve years from his first break from 
classicism to the first Prairie House (ref. McCarter, 1977: 35). (See also Items 5.50, 5.52, 
5.56) 
 
 7.46   What is achieved through the shift of mental context, according to Briggs’ 
study of Conrad’s work, is the ‘inward voice that decides’, wherein: 
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 The whole movement to evolve that inward voice entails linking feedback loops 
which join talent and vision, with the problem or material the creator is focussing on, 
with insight strategies, and with the tradition of the creative field. These interlocking 
loops, at a certain point (indicated in some creators by a ‘crystallising’ moment) interact 
to form what system theorists call a ‘self-organising structure’ (Briggs, 2000: 265).  
 
 7.47   The shift of mental context is continuous, evolving from one magnum opus 
to the next. Towards the end, anything can happen – the vision may be as different in the 
early stages from its later stages: 
 
 Vision evolves, the creator evolves, the magnum opus leads to a new magnum 
opus – otherwise the creative life dies. The completion of a work, the acceptance of a 
work by its intended audience, changes in the creator’s personal life, historical changes 
– all have an effect on   the further development of the creative enterprise…. Anything 
may happen. The vision may be as different in the early stages from the later stages 
(Briggs, 2000: 268). 
 
 7.48   The prevailing mental context is thus precursor to the degree of the 
innovator’s creativity. This is thus situated early in the mental crystallisation toward 
creativity.  
 
 The only other area that needs to be included in a final model for the mental 
process leading to innovation is ‘synesthesia’, which is the “sense and intelligence 
mixing in unusual patterns of perception and thought” (Briggs, 2000: 167). ‘Synesthesia’ 
is thus located later in the process. ‘Synesthesia’ necessarily interacts with nuances.  
 
 
 
     System of Rules 
 
 
         logical form 
         (Innovation) 
    Innate           Mental           transformations           ‘Synesthesia’ 
        Knowledge       Context    
                             ‘FeelingTones’ 
   ‘Themata’       (nuances) 
            Thought-Forms 
 
 
 Figure 7.48 
 
 
 
House X4 
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 7.49   House X4 in Damansara, Kuala Lumpur carries several aspects that could 
be taken as analogies to the issues propounded in the crystallisation of the mental 
process.  
 
 ‘Themata’ – The first of which is ‘themata’. It contains cognitive ideas about 
geometry, lines and construction, where in an abstract manner, these are seen as “guiding 
visionary elements” (ref. Item 7.06). They are taken as analogies of ‘thought-forms’ – 
which are “idiosyncratic ensembles of themes” (ref. Item 7.07). 
 
 ‘Nuances’ - Artistic nuances (ref. Item 7.09) comes with the way in which the 
lines are constructed in tandem with the plan geometry of the site. The walls of the upper 
floors of the house are also inflected both vertically and horizontally to achieve geometric 
nuances. 
 
 ‘Feeling tones’ – these are emotional nuances logged in the brain (ref. Item 7.12). 
The masses of the house are constructed to evoke emotive responses as they flare in 
varying directions. The way in which the walls are inflected creates variances in tonality 
as light hits the walls, also creating emotive responses to the observer. Through the 
complexity of the geometries, the house appears to contain multiple “sensory fragments, 
each impregnated with emotional nuances” (ref. Briggs, 2000: 54). 
 
 ‘Implicate order’ – where, “lone images are transferred into an organic whole 
rather than a succession of images” (ref. Item 7.21). The house is seen as a whole system 
created from parts. 
 
 ‘Synesthesia’ – this is the mixing of senses and intelligence, where creativity is 
described as “sense and intelligence mixing in unusual patterns of perception and 
thought” (ref. 7.25). In attitude, the house is at least this. 
 
 7.50   House X4 is a continuum of House X3 (see Section 5), carrying similar 
themes and visual grammar. In particular, they share the theme of formal inflection, 
particular in the main blocks, where the walls are inflected horizontally and vertically 
with the intention of creative emotive responses as light changes with each inflection. 
However, compared to House X3, House X4 has a more extensive programme, requiring 
a process of crystallisation rather than say, a simpler evolving computational process, 
which is more applicable to House X3. 
 
 As a result, House X4 is more generative, an endless process which is expected to 
continue until the house is completed. 
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Preamble 
8.01   Contemporary urban culture is regarded by cultural critics  as ‘postmodern’, 
in a phrase coined by Barthes: it is ‘civilisation of the image’. Baudrillard’s fascination 
with the modern American expansive landscape sums up the postmodern narrative of the 
contemporary metropolis: 
 
Why is LA, why are the desert so fascinating? It is because you are delivered from 
all depth there – a brilliant, mobile, superficial neutrality, a challenge to meaning and 
profundity, a challenge to nature and culture, an outer hyperspace. With no origin, no 
reference-points….  
 
What is arresting here is the absence of all these things – both the absence of 
architecture in the cities, which are nothing but long tracking shots of signals, and the 
dizzying absence of emotion and the character in the faces and bodies (Leach, ed: 223). 
 
8.02   Baudrillard’s postmodernist culture is devoid of any fixed point to an 
origin, where the image appears to refer to other images, where the postmodern image 
circulates in a seemingly endless performances of imitation. Kearney describes this as 
‘parody’:  
 
The post-modern image circulates in a seemingly endless play of imitation. Each 
image becomes a parody of another which precedes it…. and so on. The idea of an 
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‘authentic’ image is subverted – as is evident in the practice of pastiche which informs 
contemporary forms of representation (Kearney, 1998: 178). 
 
8.03   Although the term ‘post-modern’ was first used in 1938, current 
understanding of postmodernism is however traced to its reference to architecture in the 
nineteen seventies, particularly when Charles Jencks argued in favour of radical 
eclecticism with pseudo-historical overtones over the utopianism of international 
modernism.26 In literary criticisms in the nineteen seventies and the nineteen eighties, the 
word ‘post-modern’ began to used for a body of text that did not necessitate particular 
plots or characters but were instead reflection of writing itself. Many of the literature 
were works of earlier decades. Speaking about a literary movement, nouveau roman, 
Cuddon were to say that: 
 
Plot, action, narrative, ideas, the delineation and analysis of character…. such 
things had little or no place in a novel. On the contrary, a novel should be a form of ‘re-
istentialism’ – to use Paul Jenning’s word. It should be about things; an individual 
version and vision of things; a systematised and analytical record of objects…. 
 
Such a view of the function of the novel is not entirely new. Long before. 
Huysmans had suggested what might be done about objects and how the novel might be 
depersonalised; Kafka had shown that the conventional methods of depicting character 
were not essential; James Joyce had demonstrated that plot was dispensable; and Louis-
Ferdinand Celine, in several novels, but especially ‘Vovage au bout de la nuit’ (1932), 
had written of themes which later preoccupied the existentialists and the hodjas 
(mentors) of the cult of the absurd, and especially those of the Theatre of the Absurd 
(www.calvertonschool.org/waldspurger/pages/nouveau.html). 
 
8.04   In some instances, writing became a reflection of the very process of 
writing, where text can disintegrate into an endless self-mirroring of: “the impossibility 
of  authorial creation. Fiction swallows its own tail” (Kearney, 1998: 179). Samuel 
Beckett’s ‘Imagination Dead Imagining’ exemplifies this. Taking an excerpt from the 
writing for example: 
 
No trace anywhere of life, you say, pah, no difficulty there, imagination not dead 
yet, yes, dead, good, imagination dead imagining. Islands, waters, azure, verdure, one 
glimpse and vanished, endlessly, vomit. Till all white in the whiteness the rotunda. No 
way in, go in, measure. Diameter three feet, three feet from ground to summit of the 
vault. Two diameters at right angles AB CD divide the white ground into two semicircles 
ACB BDA. Lying on the ground two white bodies, each in its semicircle…. 
(www.olimu.com/Readings/ImaginationDeadImagine.htm). 
 
8.05   In the visual arts, the postmodern movement is manifested by the erosion of 
the modernist belief in the artist as an elite avant-garde ‘committed to the salvation of 
mankind’; instead the distinction between high art and popular culture disappears. 
Warhol’s spoof seriographs of Marilyn Monroe, Jackie Kennedy, Coca-Cola bottles and 
‘Brillo Box’ exemplify this. Danto describes the postmodern attitude art as follows: 
 131 
 
It is part the sense of no longer belonging to a great narrative, registering itself in 
our consciousness somewhere between uneasiness and exhilaration, that marks the 
historical sensibility of the present…. helps to define the acute difference, of which I think 
that awareness only began to emerge in the mid-1970’s, between modern and 
contemporary art. It is characteristic of contemporaneity – but not of modernity – that it 
should have begun insidiously, without slogan or logo, without anyone being greatly 
aware that it had happened (Danto, 1997: 5). 
 
8.06   Hence, by appearance, there is nothing that separates the difference 
between art and non-art. Andy Warhol’s ‘Brillo Box’ is frequently used to elucidate this 
parody. Danto says this for example: 
 
To use my favourite example, nothing need mark the difference, outwardly, 
between Andy Warhol’s ‘Brillo Box’ and the Brillo boxes in the supermarket. And 
conceptual art demonstrated that there need not even be a palpable visual object for 
something to be a work of visual art. That meant that you could no longer teach the 
meaning of art by example. It meant that as far as appearances are concerned, anything 
could be a work of art, and it meant that if you were going to find out what art was, you 
had to turn from sense experience to thought (Danto, 1997: 13). 
 
8.07   Danto’s proposition ‘to turn from sense experience to thought’ meant that 
appreciation of art (and architecture) in the postmodern context has to be an intellectual 
one with philosophical overtones. With its philosophical overtones, it then follows that 
postmodern imagination necessarily engages the following and asks the following 
questions: 
 
1) ‘The endless performances of imitation as parody’ (ref. Item 8.02).  
How does innovation come in?  
 
2) It no longer belongs to the ‘great narrative’ (ref. Item 8.05).  
How can innovation overcome this?  
 
3) The idea of ‘authentic’ image is subverted (ref. Item 8.02, 8.03, 8.04, 8.06).  
What kind of innovation results with this? 
 
4) The subversion of plot and character (ref. Item 8.03).  
What kind of innovation results with this? 
 
5) ‘Endless self-mirroring’. The elevation of process (ref. Item 8.04).  
What is the order of innovation? 
 
Difference And Repetition 
8.08   Deleuze’s ‘Difference and Repetition’, first published in French in 1968, 
predicted Baudrillard’s engagement of the “seemingly endless play of imitation, where 
each image becomes a parody of another which precedes it”27 (ref. Item 8.02). Deleuze 
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regards repetition in art as paradoxical and extend the paradox even to the generalities of 
natural law, which in the end is subject to change: 
 
The repetition of a work of art is like a singularity without a concept, and it is not 
by chance that a poem must be learned by heart. The head is the organ of exchange, but 
the heart is the amorous organ of repetition. (It is true that repetition also concerns the 
head, but precisely because it is its terror or paradox.) Pius Servien rightly distinguished 
two languages: the language of science, dominated by the symbol of equality, in which 
every term is irreplaceable and can be and can only be repeated. Repetition can always 
be ‘represented’ as extreme resemblance or perfect equivalence, but the fact that one can 
pass by degrees from one thing to another does not prevent their being different in kind. 
 
On the other hand, generality belongs to the order of laws. However, law 
determines only the resemblance of the subjects ruled by it, along with their equivalence 
to terms which it designates. Far from grounding repetition, law shows, rather, how 
repetition would remain impossible for pure subjects of law-particulars. It condemns 
them to change. As an empty form of difference, an invariable form of variation, a law 
compels its subjects to illustrate it only at the cost of their own change. No doubt there 
are as many constants as variables among the terms designated by laws, and as many 
permanences and perseverations as there are fluxes and variations in nature. However, a 
perseveration is still not a repetition. The constants of one law are in turn variables of a 
more general law, just as the hardest rock becomes soft and fluid matter on the 
geological scale of millions of years (Deleuze, 2004: 2). 
 
8.09   To Deleuze, in art as in natural order of things, repetition is unusual: he 
regard it as abnormal and calls it a ‘transgression’ of the norm: 
 
If repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than to law. It is against the 
law: against the similar form and the equivalent content of law. If repetition can be 
found, even in nature, it is in the name of a power which affirms itself against the law, 
which works underneath laws, perhaps superior to laws. If repetition exists, it expresses 
at once a singularity opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular, a 
distinction opposed to the ordinary, an instantaneity opposed to the to variation and an 
eternity opposed to the permanence. In every respect, repetition is a transgression. It puts 
law into question, it denounces its nominal or general character in favour of a more 
profound and artistic reality (Deleuze, 2004: 3). 
 
8.10   Deleuze then went on to speak about relationship between generalities, and 
that experimentation (or the act of creativity) is “a matter of substituting one order of 
generality for another”: 
 
In these conditions, phenomena necessarily appear as equal to a certain 
quantitative relation between chosen factors. Experimentation is thus a matter of 
substituting one order of generality for another; an order of equality for an order of 
resemblance  (Deleuze, 2004: 3). 
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8.11   To Deleuze, it is also the case that the theory of difference refers to a 
conceptual difference, in other words, difference between generalities: 
 
According to the reciprocal principle of sufficient reason, there is always one 
concept per particular thing. According to the reciprocal principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles, there is one and only one thing per concept. Together, these principles 
expound a theory of difference as conceptual difference, or develop the account of 
representation as mediation (Deleuze, 2004: 13). 
 
8.12   Deleuze regards ‘contradiction’ as a superior form of difference compared 
to ‘contrariety’ and also, generic difference is greater than specific. Specific difference 
itself is greatest only in a relative sense: 
 
Return to the expression ‘the greatest difference’. It is now evident that the 
specific difference is the greatest only in an entirely relative sense. Absolutely speaking, 
contradiction is greater than contrariety – and above all generic difference is greater 
than specific (Deleuze, 2004: 40). 
 
If we were to regard contradiction to prevailing norm as an attitude of innovation, 
then it is a greater form of difference than just being contrary, seen by Deleuze as merely 
a mild form of opposition. 
 
 
8.13   Innovation infers contradiction, and it also infers change. Following Hume, 
Deleuze infers that change first occurs in the mind – that is, change is firstly a mental act, 
an act of the imagination. Change as a mental act is possible because of the presence of 
memory that is contained in a ‘temporal space’ in the mind. He first places the argument 
with reference to repetition: 
 
In considering repetition in the object, we remain within the conditions which 
make possible the idea of repetition. But in considering the change in the subject, we are 
already beyond these conditions, confronting the general form of difference. The ideal 
constitution of repetition thus implies a kind of retroactive movement between these two 
limits. It is woven between the two. This is the movement which Hume so profoundly 
analyses when he shows that the cases contracted or grounded in the imagination remain 
no less distinct in the memory or in the understanding. Not that we return to the state of 
matter which produces one case only when the other has disappeared. Rather, on the 
basis of the qualitative impression in the imagination, memory reconstitutes the 
particular cases as distinct, conserving them in its own ‘temporal space’…. In other 
words, the active syntheses of memory and understanding are superimposed upon and 
supported by the passive synthesis of the imagination (Deleuze, 2004: 91-2). 
 
8.14   Deriving its force from repetition and memory, Deleuze regards that the 
new is ‘not new’ at all – it is instead, a ‘difference’, doing away with recognition and 
evoking the powers of a completely ‘other model’. In other words, to arrive at the ‘new’, 
the ‘other model’ must eventually supersede repetition and memory: 
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The new, with its power of beginning and beginning again, remains forever new, 
just as the established was always established from the outset, even if a certain amount of 
empirical time was necessary for this to be recognised. What becomes established with 
the new is precisely not the new. For the new – in other words, difference – calls forth 
forces in thought which are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the 
powers of a completely other model, from an unrecognised and unrecognisable ‘terra 
incognita’ (Deleuze, 2004: 172).  
 
8.15   Anything that is new is attained through the interrogative, rather than say, 
through ‘participating form’, and to Deleuze, this always takes place within the 
framework of a community, that is, within a context. Deleuze framed the arguments 
around sense, or common sense: 
 
Sense so defined is only a vapour which plays at the limits of things and words. 
Sense appears here as the outcome of the most logical effort, but as Ineffectual, a sterile 
incorporeal deprived of its generative power…. 
 
Is anything gained by expressing sense in the interrogative rather than the 
infinitive or participating form…. That is why – in accordance with etymology – 
interrogation always takes place within the framework of a community: to interrogate 
implies not only a common sense but a good sense, a distribution of knowledge and of the 
given with respect t empirical consciousness in accordance with their situations, their 
points of views, their positions and their skills, in such a way that a given consciousness 
is supposed to know already what the other does not…. (Deleuze, 2004: 195). 
 
8.16   Deleuze suggests that there is psychological tension or ‘exchange’ between 
intensity and aesthetic ideas and suggests that there is a confrontational relationship 
between the two, and that the relationship between the two is asymmetrical, wherein “the 
power of intensity (depth) is grounded in the potentiality of the Idea”: 
 
A whole flow of exchange occurs between intensity and Ideas, as though between 
two corresponding figures of difference. Ideas are problematic or ‘perplexed’ virtual 
multiplicities, made up of relations between differential elements‘. Intensities are 
implicated multiplicities, ‘implexes’, made up of relations between asymmetrical 
elements which direct the course of the actualisation of Ideas and determine the cases of 
solutions for the problems. The aesthetic of intensities thus develops each of its moments 
in correspondence with the dialectic of  Ideas: the power of intensity (depth) is grounded 
in the potentiality of the Idea (Deleuze, 2004: 305). 
 
8.17   Architecture is an actualisation of ideas. Deleuze propositions that 
“intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation”. If we were to regard 
architecture as ‘extensive series’, it would be something that is actualised by 
differentiation through intensity. Intensity would also dramatise the architecture. The 
proposition culminates by saying that, “intensity creates the qualities and extensities in 
which it explicates itself, because these qualities and extensities do not in any way 
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resemble the ideal relations which are actualised within them: differenciation implies the 
creation of the lines along which it operates”: 
 
How is the idea determined to incarnate itself in differenciated qualities and 
differenciated extensities? What determines the relations coexisting within the Idea to 
differenciate themselves in qualities and extensities? The answer lies precisely in the 
intensive qualities. Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is 
intensity which dramatises. It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic 
spatio-temporal dynamisms and determines an ‘indistinct’ differential relation in the idea 
to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity. In this way, after a 
fashion (but, as we shall see, only after a fashion), the movement and the categories of 
differenciation reproduce those of explication. We speak of differenciation in relation to 
the Idea which is actualised. We speak of explication in relation to the intensity which 
‘develops’ and which, precisely, determines the movement of actualisation. However, it 
remains literally true that intensity creates the qualities and extensities do not in any way 
resemble the ideal relations which are actualised within them: differenciation implies the 
creation of the lines along which it operates (Deleuze, 2004: 306-7). 
 
8.18   In the postmodern world, Deleuze regards the sites of simulacra to be the 
centres of creativity, hence of innovation – they are the locations for the actualisation of 
ideas. The potential of the simulacra lies in their propensity toward divergence, 
decentring, differences, and chaos, with plenty of communication, making them the 
fecund ground for the actualisation of ideas and the distribution of them. In the spirit of 
little narratives in postmodernity, Deleuze also suggests that while each of the series is, 
constituted by differences, and communicates with the others through differences, no 
series enjoy a privilege over others: 
 
Systems of simulacra affirm divergence and decentring: the only unity, the only 
convergence of all the series, is an informal chaos in which they are all included. No 
series enjoys a privilege over others, none possesses the identity of a model, none the 
resemblance of a copy. None is either opposed or analogous to another. Each is 
constituted by differences, and communicates with the others through differences of 
differences (Deleuze, 2004: 348). 
 
8.19   With deference to the postmodern propensity toward little narratives, 
Deleuze puts forward this attitude as essential for the actualisation of ideas. Deleuze’s 
equivalent of the little narratives is, “a multiplicity constituted of different elements” and 
that there is a three-dimensional quality about it, consisting of “elements, relations and 
singularities”: 
 
We saw how these systems were sites for the actualisation of Ideas. An Idea, in 
this sense, is neither one nor multiple, but a multiplicity constituted of different elements, 
differential relations between those elements, and singularities corresponding to those 
relations. These three dimensions, elements, relations and singularities, constitute the 
three aspects of multiple reason: determinability or the principle of quantitability, and 
complete determination or the principle of potentiality (Deleuze, 2004: 348). 
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8.20   Under the postmodern condition, Ideas can be ‘distinct’ and ‘clear’; but the 
two aspects are disproportionate. To Deleuze, being ‘distinct’ allows for differentiation 
between Ideas and non-ideas, however due to the chaotic, multifaceted condition of 
postmodernism, ‘clarity’ is disproportionate less than ‘distinct’. He describes ‘distinct’ as 
a differentiation, and ‘clear’ as a differenciation: 
 
If we call the state of a completely differentiated Idea ‘distinct’, and the forms of 
quantitative and qualitative differenciation ‘clear’, then we must reject the rule of 
proportionality between the clear and the distinct: Ideas as they exist in themselves are 
distinct-obscure. Opposed to the clear-and-distinct of Apollonian representation, Ideas 
are Dionysian, existing in an obscure zone which they themselves preserve and maintain, 
in an indifferenciation which is nevertheless perfectly differentiated, in a pre-
individuality which is nevertheless singula r: the obscure zone of an intoxication which 
will never be calmed: the distinct-obscure as the double colour with which philosophy 
paints the world, with all the forces of a differential consciousness (Deleuze, 2004: 350). 
 
Deleuze’s Idea Of Postmodern Creativity 
8.21   Although Ideas always have to do with ‘variations of relations’, Deleuze 
proposes that the ultimate origin of Ideas is traced back to a ‘solitary and divine game’, in 
other words, to Deleuze’s mind, creativity has a solipsistic beginning, and touching on a 
precept of the later Wittgenstein, it has also to do with opposing prevailing human games: 
 
For where do ideas come from, with their variations of relations and their 
distributions of singularities? Here, too, we follow the path to the bend at which ‘reason’ 
plunges into the beyond. The ultimate origin was always assimilated to a solitary and 
divine game. There are several ways to play, however, and collective and human games 
do not resemble this solitary divine game. Several characteristics allow us to oppose the 
human and the ideal as two aspects of game (Deleuze, 2004: 352-3). 
 
8.22   Deleuze’s world of “a multiplicity constituted of different elements…. 
consisting of  elements, relations and singularities” (ref. Item 8.19), which is also chaotic 
and multifaceted, where ‘clarity’ is disproportionately less than ‘distinct’ (ref. Item 8.20) 
is considered in the postmodernist context as ‘deterministic chaos’ (Kwinter, 2002: 12). 
The characteristics of ‘deterministic chaos’ are nonlinearity and indeterminacy. 
According to Kwinter, the cultural and political implications of this are: 
 
It is as if today one were forced into a new type of intellectual and cultural 
warfare, forced to accept the mobile and shifting nature of the phenomena that make up 
our social and political world, and by this same token, forced to discover within this 
slippery ‘glacis’ of largely indistinct swells and flows, all the ledges, footholds, friction 
points – in short, all the subtle asperities that would permit us to navigate, and negotiate 
life, within it (Kwinter, 2002: 12). 
 
8.23   There is a dynamic morphogenesis about Deleuze’s three dimensionality of 
“elements, relations and singularities”, where geometries and patterns are not static, but 
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appear over time. The study of phenomena would not be carried out in analytical 
isolation, but would instead be embedded within what Kwinter describes as, “a rich and 
unstable milieu of multiple communicating forces and influences” (Kwinter, 2002: 13) – 
the postmodern manifestation of Deleuze’s ‘singularities’. Deleuze’s singularity needs to 
be read with time. 
 
Essentiality Of  Process 
8.24   With this attitude, architecture is not defined by how it appears, but by 
process, or by the practices. Hence, the “unitariness of the object vanishes, replaced by 
relations that are smaller than the objects” (ref. Kwinter, 2002: 14) – that is, micro-
architecture or ‘weak architecture’. Kwinter describes the nature of the process as 
follows: 
 
Just as the meaning of a sentence differs depending on who is speaking, to whom 
it is addressed, the time and place in which it is uttered, the infinitely complex interplay 
of will, desire, and systems of legitimisation, as well as on these same conditions applied 
to the referents of each and every element of the sentence, so any proper understanding 
of architecture must also confront its character as an illocutionary event, or at the very 
least as an element inseparable from and in constant interface with the world of force, 
will, action, and history (Kwinter, 2002: 14). 
 
Little Narratives And Open System 
8.25   Although Kwinter propagates a modernist alternative in architecture, the 
world in which he locates himself is one of little narratives, a postmodern one. The little 
narrative world is one of indeterminacy, where nothing is considered as absolute and 
every element is capable of reorganisation, redistribution and revaluation. From this 
perspective, pedagogical systems become open and receptive: 
 
For here, all systems are open systems; they are labile and suffused with 
temporality; they are sensitive and chaotic in the sense that they are creative and 
adaptive – they ceaselessly undergo change, produce novelty; they transform or transmit 
unactualised potentials to a new milieu, in turn giving rise to a whole new series of 
potentials to be actualised or not. Open systems are not only open to ‘outside’, but to 
wild becoming itself – the outside of all outsides (Kwinter, 2002: 48). 
 
Character Of Postmodern Urbanity 
8.26   In concrete urban terms, the character of the spaces of indeterminacy are 
chance-driven, unpredictable and chaotic. William Lim sees this as positive and 
desirable. It is a character he continues to promote for overly controlled cities like 
Singapore. He sees it as essential for innovation to happen and for art to flourish. He 
describes the character of these spaces as follows: 
 
Spaces of indeterminacy are anchored in the postmodern. They are pluralistic and 
exhibit tolerance of differences and complexities. They may exist as substantial areas, 
such as in the western districts of Taipei and the Geylang district in Singapore or as in-
between spaces – cracks and gaps create by the new urban projects and major 
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infrastructure development, an example being disused land under highway. These life 
theatres offer potential environments from which to promote contemporary and cutting-
edge intellectual, artistic, cultural and sociological discourses. 
 
The spatial configurations of these spaces often teem with open displays of sexual 
sensuality and often become favourite hangouts of the avant-garde and the art 
community. Desire becomes a facilitator for inspirations and the narratives. The 
dialectics of art and desire are at once articulate, irrational and mystical. Together, they 
break the mould of expected normalcy, heighten the sense of desire within the city and 
provide greater texture to everyday life (Lim, 2005: 24-5). 
 
8.27   Having concretised the character of the postmodern city in his 2005 thesis, 
Lim offers a prescription to achieve creative urban environment in a postmodern Asian 
city in a later thesis in 2006. He propositions that a creative postmodern Asian city is to 
have the following ingredients: 
 
1) “Celebrating chaos”, wherein: “Vibrant urban activities continue 
unabated, notwithstanding dramatic physical changes and disruption to the 
immediate environment” (Lim, 2006: 35-6); and quoting Hou Hanru, Lim 
agrees with Hou that, “all these complex systems have acquired the ability 
to bring order and chaos into a special kind of balance…. the edge of 
chaos is where life has enough stability to sustain itself and enough 
creativity to deserve the name of life” (Lim, 2006: 36). 
 
2) “Efficiency not enough”. Lim regards efficiency with disdain, particularly 
with reference to the prevailing Singaporean work ethos, which is based 
on the Eurocentric modernist model that leaves creativity behind. He 
offers another perspective, where:  
 
In Asian architecture and urbanism, there is much to learn from non-
western culturally-rooted urbanism. The exciting chaos, the incredible 
flexibility and complex spatial order have yet to be understood and 
creatively applied. An expertise such as the design and construction of 
generic high-rise buildings that is simply replicating and improving what 
has already been done before is not enough. To put in place exciting 
design concepts and urban spaces that can redirect priority from just 
efficiency to innovation is a challenging agenda (Lim, 2006: 36-7). 
 
3) “Glocality”. It is a terminology that combines the terms ‘global’ and 
‘local’, and when applied to architecture and urbanism, it embraces: “the 
external nature of the global and the internal tendencies of the local” (Lim, 
2006: 37. With reference to the Singapore context, Lim reasons that: 
 
In the successful straddling of these two polarities, the fluid frontier of 
architecture and urbanism will continued to be applied, tested and 
modified. Their complexity can be pushed even further into a realm where 
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even subconscious applications can be identified where the architect’s 
deep understanding of Chinese spatial characteristics28 can be 
incorporated, and deliberate interaction over a time dimension between 
history and contemporariness29 can be explored (Lim, 2006: 38). 
 
4) “Overcoming risk aversion”. Again, with reference to the Singaporean 
ethos which has an aversion to risk and a propensity towards tried and 
tested regulatory practises, Lim contests that Shanghai offers a better 
model instead. By abandoning any aversion to risk, Shanghai has become 
an energetic, vibrant and exciting city, where innovation can take place:  
 
If no risks are taken, there can be no real progress and no real change, 
merely a mindless repetition and revival of tried and tested methods that 
may have worked in the past but are increasingly growing obsolete…. 
 
By abandoning any aversion to risk, urban development of Shanghai has 
in the past two decades soars beyond all limitations. It is now a very 
exciting city, so full of energy and vibrancy that it has taken the world by 
storm (Lim, 2006: 38-9). 
 
5) “Beyond Florida’s Vision”. By making the statement, Lim asks to go 
beyond Richard Florida’s argument for tolerance for the development of a 
creative culture and asks that other concerns be addressed such as: “the 
contesting concerns of race, religion and increasing income gap as well as 
the contemporary challenges of ecological sustainability, progressive 
activism and citizen participation” (Lim, 2006: 40). 
 
He also asks for the active support of artistic rebellion and for those at the 
artistic fringe. His rationale being that: 
 
A creative culture is all embracing. It is a state of mind and an attitude to 
living. Its vibrant life-force is continuously being reflected particularly in 
all aspects of art creation from art, media, literature, creative writing, 
architecture and urbanism as well as critical discourses and cultural 
studies (Lim, 2006: 40). 
 
6) “Culture of architecture and urbanism”. Lim uses van Schaik’s arguments 
in ‘Mastering Architecture’ (2004) to express his concern that practise 
must not end in competency, which eventually fades into irrelevance (ref. 
Lim, 2006: 41-2). His prescription is a crossing of boundaries between 
architecture and urbanism and other arts, and to discard ‘mainstream 
norm’ (with reference to Singapore): 
 
Over the past two decades, it has become apparent to me when discussing 
architecture and urbanism that we cannot refrain from crossing 
disciplines. Scope and complexity of the discourse widen under the 
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overarching category known as cultural studies, which encompasses the 
critical analysis of not only the social sciences, architecture and 
urbanism, but also art, literature, and various other cultural media. In 
adopting this approach, we must discard or modify much of the present 
theories and practices of mainstream norm of yesteryears (Lim, 2006: 42). 
 
7) “Embracing the contemporary”. In the acceptance of fringe groups, 
contemporary culture “embraces multiple identities and deep 
commitments to universal humanism, generosity and concern for others”, 
and by recasting Eurocentric modernity, “Identity has undergone similar 
re-conceptualisation whereby the multi-layering of fuzzy hybridised 
identity needs to reflect complex fusions of nation-state, ethnicity, 
language and religion including secularism” (Lim, 2006: 43). The embrace 
of these aspects is regarded as essential for Singapore to ‘move ahead’ 
(ref. Lim, 2006: 44). 
 
Premises For Postmodern Creativity 
8.28   Above all, William Lim sets the premises for postmodern creativity to 
happen. He outlines the need for interaction between interested groups, and a rebellious 
spirit, a high degree of tolerance and the acceptance of controversy and criticism: 
 
Creativity is not always an individual act. It can be manifested through intense 
interaction between small groups of individuals. The creative impulse can be destructive 
and painful, or exciting and joyful such as in the inspiration of artistic creation and 
architectural imagining. 
 
To be rebelliously creative is a high-risk undertaking. The process is very 
stressful and often irrational…. For creative environment to exist, there must be a high 
degree of tolerance and acceptance of controversy and criticism. Every effort must be 
made to provide a complexity of intellectual space and opportunities for our creative 
individuals to actively contribute and participate in the process (Lim, 2006: 34). 
 
Heterarchy System 
8.29   The horizontal process advocated by William Lim does away with the 
traditional top-down process in the management of happenings, and it empowers fringe 
players in a the pursuit of innovation. Elsewhere in epistemological research, von 
Foerster, in taking cues from earlier work by McCulloch, discusses about a loop-back 
process, based on a ‘heterarchy’ of values. Instead of spreading an organisation along a 
plane, as in a horizontal process, von Foerster’s topological organisation is like a ring, 
just like the sensory motor circuit. Von Foerster describes the character of heterarchical 
organisation as follows: 
 
The appropriate geometry is that of a ring (torus), in which the sensory motor 
circuit runs across the surface around the outer circuit of the ring, while the inhibitory 
circuits run alongside the periphery of the cross section. I’d like to point out that the 
word heterarchy stems from the Greek words ‘heteros’ (the other, neighbour) and 
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‘archein’ (to rule). Thus heterarchy means to rule of the other. It is no longer the holy 
one who rules from on high. There is no longer any point in talking about absolute 
values. Everyone is involved in ruling. Ruling becomes circular (von Foerster, 2002: 85-
6). 
 
8.30   McCulloch’s builds a ‘sensomotory’ circuit via a ‘reflex arc’. Von Foerster 
describes the neurological operation, which becomes a metaphor for appropriate 
management structure, and also for mental organisation: 
 
  A stimulus produces a response that leads to a motor activity, which in turn leads 
to another stimulus. What we have here is a sensory motor circuit, a loop consisting of 
seeing and acting, acting and seeing, which leads to a stability of action. But this is not 
all. As McCulloch mentioned, a theory of valuation must contain the possibility of choice. 
Yet the word ‘choice’ implies that two or more potential acts are incompatible. That 
means that the act that takes place has to change all of the incompatible acts. In other 
words, in the case of two complete sensorimotor circuits, which each determine one 
behaviour, the possibility must exist that one will block the other incompatible one. This 
scheme can be expanded as you choose and it shows that the organisation of a hierarchy 
can be drawn on a plane. The circularity of the value normally does not emerge until the 
inhibitors form a closed circle. The topology of this organisation can no longer be drawn 
on a plane (von Foerster, 2002: 85). 
 
8.31   McCulloch propositions that a theory of valuation must contain the 
possibility for choice, and that the word ‘choice’ implies that ‘two or more potential acts 
are incompatible’. The diagram below shows the presence of inhibitors where, “the 
possibility must exist that one will block the other incompatible one”. In the diagram, the 
inhibiting link of the inner circuit to the outer circuit shows a closure which McCulloch 
calls ‘diallels’ (ref. von Foerster, 2002: 85). 
 
8.32   Von Foerster recommends the heterarchy system for management where 
each employee in a company is a manager in his or her own area of expertise. He 
considers this to be psychological release as “it is always the other person who makes the 
decisions”. Every person hence has a turn at making decisions, which appears to be a 
democratic process, where, “everyone rules together for each other”. It is a circular 
structure with inhibiting links that enable decisions to be made (ref. von Foerster, 2002: 
86-8).  
 
8.33   Equally, the horizontal and chaotic process advocated by William Lim need 
eventually become a heterarchical, loop-back system whenever decisions are to be made. 
Particularly in Items 8.27.5-6 and Item 8.28 where a condition for a postmodern creative 
environment are: 
 
–  An all embracing culture (8.27.5) 
– Life-force continually reflected in all aspects of art creation (art, media, 
literature, creative writing, architecture and urbanism, along with creative 
discourses and cultural studies) (8.27.5) 
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–  Creativity is manifested through intense interaction between interested groups 
(8.28) 
–  Rebellious spirit a high degree of tolerance and the acceptance of controversy 
and criticism (8.28). 
 
The above are conditions for controlled chaos, which can run a course without 
concrete decisions being arrived at. A loop-back with inhibiting links is hence necessary 
to mitigate the dissipation of creative energies.  
 
Self-Organisation 
8.34   Referring to the work of engineers W. A. Clark and B. G. Farley in the 
1950’s, von Foerster proposes that the loop-back heterarchical system organises itself 
(‘self-organisation’). Von Foerster explains that Clark and Farley constructed models of 
binary networks in which the lights go on and off. Von Foerster explains the result of the 
experiment: “After a phase of randomly going on and off in no detectable order, the lights 
began to blink in a strange dance-like rhythm. If you inserted a little perturbation a 
different blinking pattern developed” (von Foerster, 2002: 90-1). Von Foerster however 
cautions that the principle of ‘self-organisation’ cannot be a completely closed system 
and that the context has to be considered: 
 
I also felt it was important to show that the idea of self-organisation, which 
assume a system that is thermodynamically completely closed is unacceptable. I warned 
that the word ‘self’ should not be taken too seriously. Nor should we only look at what we 
presume to be an isolated system that is no longer perceived in its environmental context. 
I pointed out that this environment functions as a supplier of energy. The system needs it 
in order to keep on organising itself (von Foerster, 2002: 91). 
 
8.35   Wilson offers the psychological equivalent ‘self-organisation’, where he 
describes consciousness a virtual world composed of scenarios consisting of multiple 
streams of activities that self-organises and change: 
 
Consciousness is the virtual world composed by the scenarios. There is not even a 
Cartesian theatre…. no single locus of the brain where the scenarios are played out in 
coherent form. Instead there are interlacing patterns of neural activity within and among 
particular sites throughout the forebrain…. There is no single stream of consciousness in 
which all information is brought together by an executive ego. There are instead multiple 
stream of activity, some of which contribute momentarily to conscious thought and then 
phase out. Consciousness is the massive coupled aggregates of such participating 
circuits. The mind is a self-organising republic of scenarios that individually germinate, 
grow, evolve, disappear, and occasionally linger to spawn additional thought and 
physical activity (Wilson, 1998: 120). 
 
Ethics Of Postmodernism 
8.36   In an unrelated but parallel observation, Wilson traces the mental 
beginnings of the postmodernist attitude leading onto an observation of postmodern 
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culture that echoes Lim’s observation. Wilson questions the ethics of postmodenism, for 
its relativism: 
 
Reality, (the postmodernists) propose, is a state constructed by the mind, not 
perceived by it. In the most extravagant version of this constructivism, there is no ‘real’ 
reality, no objective truths external to mental activity, only prevailing versions 
disseminated by ruling social groups. Nor can ethics be firmly grounded, given that each 
society creates its own codes for the benefit of the same oppressive forces. 
 
If these premises are correct, it follows that one culture is as good as any other in 
the expression of truth and morality, each in its own special way. Political 
multiculturalism is justified; each ethnic group and sexual preference in the community 
has equal validity. And, more than mere tolerance, it deserves communal support and 
mandated representation in educational agendas, not because it has general importance 
to society but because it exists. That is – again – if the premises are correct. And they 
must be correct, say the promoters, because to suggest otherwise is bigotry (Wilson, 
1998: 44). 
 
8.37   As a scientist, Wilson is perturbed by the theoretical extremities of 
postmodernism, particularly those that promote irreality such as found in the 
deconstruction technique of literary criticism, where each author’s meaning is unique to 
himself. When devoid of outside context, Wilson considers Derrida’s form of 
postmodernism as a promoter of ‘lies’: 
 
That is what Jacques Derrida, the creator of deconstruction, meant when he 
stated the formula Il ‘n’y a pas de hors-texte’ (There is nothing outside the text). At least, 
that is what I think he meant, after reading him, his defenders, and his critics with some 
care. If the radical postmodernist premise is correct, we can never be sure that is what he 
meant. Conversely, if that is what he meant, it is not certain we are obliged to consider 
his arguments further. This puzzle, which I am inclined to set aside as the ‘Derrida 
paradox’, is similar to the Cretan paradox (a Cretan says ‘All Cretans are liars)…. 
(Wilson, 1998: 45). 
 
8.38   As an illustration to what Wilson had meant, Daniel Libeskind deliberately 
writes in a manner which is not intended to communicate. His essay, ‘Fishing From the 
Pavement’ (1990) is a jumbled collection of words is intended to exemplify a 
Deconstruction essay on architecture. A random extract of the essay for example reads:  
 
Erstwhile theophany: discharge from a roving beast's eye, beauty criticizing the 
colossus. Audacious faeries made of nuclear chromosomes form into threads, split 
lengthwise, associate with Don Juan's ovoid..… Enamoured with the medically depilated 
reflection races - are occidentals tired of animal mortar? Is a pneumatic NT. Built for 
sliding down Reason's annulated cadaver? (Benjamin, ed., 1990: 51). 
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In his architecture, Libeskind’s avoidance of formal systems devises tangled, 
anguish shapes that are intended to defy formal logic. But they are merely formal games 
as his buildings follow standard architectural preconditions such as economics, rational 
structural systems, internal environmental comfort, materiality, security, urban logic and 
circulation. Even in the way that light is skilfully manipulated shows compliance to 
atmospheric delight, the approach is no different from the work of a traditionally 
recognised architectural master like Louis Kahn. 
 
8.39   When Libeskind was asked to describe his real works of architecture, like 
all architects dealing with systems of reality, he likewise places his descriptions into 
categories. In describing his architecture in his essay, ‘Between the Lines’ (1990a), for 
the Jewish Extension to the German Museum in Berlin, he categorized his descriptions as 
follows: ‘Urban Design Concept’; ‘Organization of the Building and the Required 
Functions’; ‘Link to the Existing Building’; ‘Structure, Materials and Facade Design’; 
‘Concept for Open Spaces Parking’. Under ‘Structure, Materials and Facade Design’, his 
description is as follows: 
 
  Structure: Pre-cast and cast-in-place concrete elements, constituting a type 
with variable inclination. 
  Cladding: Various cladding materials, including metal, mosaics, and glass. 
Special emphasis on light quality and lumination control. 
  Facade Design: Richly textured, visually de-naturalized, luminous surface, 
creating tension between the hand and the eye (Papadakis, ed., 1990: 66). 
 
The description is precise and clear with the intention to communicate, 
completely opposed to his essay: ‘Fishing from the Pavement’, both of which were 
written in the same year, 1990. 
 
8.40   Wilson tries to rationalise the postmodern alternative by suggesting that it is 
another way of thinking, whereupon disorder is viewed in order to create order, and those 
who upon encountering order try to protect it by creating disorder. He reasons that, “The 
tension between the two is what drives learning forward. It lifts us upward through a 
zigzagging trajectory of progress…. order always wins, because – simply – that is the 
way the real world works” (Wilson, 1998: 47). 
 
8.41   Wilsons however concedes a place for postmodernism in intelligentsia for 
the following reasons: 
 
Their ideas are like sparks from firework explosions that travel away in all 
directions, devoid of following energy, soon to wink out in the dimensionless dark. Yet a 
few will endure long enough and cast light on unexpected subjects. That is  one reason to 
think well of postmodernism, even if it menaces rational thought. Another is the relief it 
affords those who have chosen not to encumber themselves with a scientific education. 
Another is the small industry it has created within philosophy and literary studies. Still 
another, the    one that counts the most, is the underlying critique of scholarship it 
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provides. We will always need postmodernists or their rebellious equivalents (Wilson, 
1998: 47). 
 
Gallery Evason Hotel 
8.42   The design of the Gallery Evason Hotel (2000), by William Lim Associates 
and TANGGUANBEE Architects was developed over a ten-year period in the 1990’s. 
From the 1980’s the two offices were experimenting with their own views of 
postmodernism, whereby Tang Guan Bee demonstrated his ideas through practise alone, 
while William Lim was expressing his thoughts through projects, lectures and in 
publications. Other than the resulting spatial and physical form, which is recognisably 
postmodern in style, the collaboration between the two practices incorporates a pluralistic 
and open process, described by Leong Teng Wui and Andrew Lee Siew Ming as follows: 
 
Thus, while it is tempting to differentiate the individual firm and personalities’ 
contributions to the projects, it cannot be so easily reduced or attributed because the 
project defies such easy reduction. Both practices and their cast of characters brought 
with them their strengths, bias, idiosyncrasies and differences. Indeed, the 
conceptualisation and execution of the building would arguably be ‘impoverished’ 
without this strategic collaboration. This strategic alliance represents a transgressive, 
pluralistic practice which are inherently more strategic and able to exploit better the 
opportunities for innovation in an increasing complex urban environment (Tan, ed., 
2001) 
 
8.43   The ‘pluralistic’ way of collaboration is reflected in an architecture which is 
hybrid in formal expression, and appropriate for its time and in a part of Singapore which 
carries an air of pluralism and openness in both the mix of architecture and Bohemian 
lifestyle that now emerges in the Robertson Quay area. All along the riverfront are places 
of Bohemian gathering, many of which in converted colonial period buildings together 
with new exuberant architecture. Many of the converted buildings were earlier neglected. 
 
From Mohamed Sultan Road To Clarke Quay 
8.44   Nearby is the Mohamed Sultan Road, which was described by William  
Lim in 2001 as a ‘postmodern phenomenon’ (ref. Lim, 2001: 154). It was once a row of 
dilapidated double-storey shops and houses, which for no specific reason, spontaneously 
became favoured by young socialites as a place to meet and party. Lim describes the 
phenomenon as follows: 
 
Mohamed Sultan Road used to comprise of a row of dilapidated, low-rise terrace 
shops and houses. Almost overnight, it seems to have morphed into the most exciting 
nightlife district in the city. Buildings have been restored and transformed. Bars, dance 
clubs and restaurants have swamped the area, which booms with the sound of ringing 
cash registers (Lim, 2001: 155). 
 
8.45   In 2001, the ‘phenomenon’ at Sultan Mohamed Road offers a view of the 
character of a postmodern city. Lim views it as particularly exciting in Singapore as the 
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‘phenomenon’ went against the grain of normal development, which was nearly always 
planned: 
 
Uncharacteristically, this urban regeneration had  been spontaneous and was 
unplanned for by the authorities.  The invasion of the district by savvy businessmen and 
trendy clubbers had been independent of official guidelines, campaigns and incentives 
that are so much a part of Singapore’s culture. At the same time, the State has responded 
carefully to this spectacle of energy and initiative. The police have moved in  to monitor 
the situation while planners seem content to allow the place to develop, for now, along 
this trajectory (Lim, 2001: 155). 
 
It became a ‘celebration of chaos’ as Lim was to later describe as a characteristic 
of a postmodern city (ref. Item 8.27.1). 
 
8.46   However, with the completion of the chain of pods and umbrella structures 
at the nearby Clarke Quay by Will Alsop in 2006, nightlife shifted from Mohamed Sultan 
Road to nearby Clarke Quay – after-hours activity seems to have found a new 
equilibrium. Alsop’s large chain of umbrella structures which hovers over the 
rehabilitated old shophouses seems like an alien entity that has descended to engulf the 
part of the city, giving it a transient meaning, as the structures seems as removable as 
easily as they have been transplanted into position. This appears to be a manifestation of 
the postmodern world as described by Barthes, Baudrillard and Kearney. Kearney 
suggests that in the postmodern world, “Each image becomes a parody of another which 
precedes it…. and so on. The idea of the ‘authentic’ image is subverted – as is evident in 
the practice of the pastiche which informs contemporary forms of representation” 
(Kearney, 1998: 178). 
 
8.47   The bohemian life in both Mohamed Sultan Road and Clarke Quay echoes 
a world of indeterminacy, where nothing is considered as absolute and where every 
element is capable of reorganisation, redistribution and revaluation – the system becomes 
open and receptive: 
 
For here, all systems are open systems; they are labile and suffused with 
temporality; they are sensitive and chaotic in the sense that they are creative and 
adaptive – they ceaselessly undergo change, produce novelty; they transform or transmit 
unactualised potentials to a new milieu, in turn giving rise to a whole new series of 
potentials to be actualised or not. Open systems are not only open to ‘outside’, but to 
wild becoming itself – the outside of all outsides (Kwinter, 2002: 48). 
 
8.48   William Lim describes such an urban situation as something desirable to 
have for facilitating inspiration, for the arts to flourish or simply, a locus of life. This kind 
of environment opposes control and encourages chance and unpredictability, a mystical 
realm of innovation: 
 
The spatial configurations of these spaces often teem with open displays of sexual 
sensuality and often become favourite hangouts of the avant-garde and the art 
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community. Desire becomes a facilitator for inspirations and the narratives. The 
dialectics of art and desire are at once articulate, irrational and mystical. Together, they 
break the mould of expected normalcy, heighten the sense of desire within the city and 
provide greater texture to everyday life (Lim, 2005: 24-5). 
 
8.49   These are also places of intense consumption, intermingled with a myriad 
of conversations and hedonism. In Singapore, the intense consumption of goods, 
beverages, desires and ideas in Clarke Quay seems like a rebellion against the staid 
routine of normality. With reference to similar conditions in parts of Paris, Baudrillard 
calls this ‘a condition of critical mass’: 
 
It is here that a condition of critical mass develops, surpassing that of 
merchandise become hypermerchandise, or culture become hyperculture – a critical 
mass that is no longer tied to specific exchanges or to determinate needs but to a kind of 
total universe of signals; through this integrated circuits impulses travel everywhere in a 
ceaseless transit of selections, readings, references, marks, decodings. Like consumer 
objects elsewhere, the cultural objects here have no other purpose than that of 
maintaining one in a state of integrated mass, of transistorised flux, of magnitised 
molecularity (Leach, ed.: 1997: 214). 
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Preamble 
9.01   Having interrogated the various literatures that support and oppose the 
hypothesis, “Architectural innovation is ostensively meaningful and validated through 
context, and launched from the mastery of Language Games and Form of Life”, and 
having both sides of the arguments on record, this section on Discussion begins with 
sieving the points of arguments through a series of questions and answers. The purpose of 
the sieve is to distil the points of arguments. 
 
9.02   The arguments for both sides at first seem equally powerful and formidable, 
and it seems also that the dialectic arguments can continue perpetually without drawing a 
conclusion. A conclusion is however desirous, but it is also important to the integrity of 
the thesis that the discussion is not steered by preconception but arrived at heuristically. 
This meant that the discussion is required to have a framework. For the sake of relevance, 
the framework of the discussion will be its relationship to the practise of architecture. 
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Distillation – Questions And Answers 
9.03   The questions below are arranged in the order of provisional priority in 
order to create a flow. 
 
Questions     Answers 
 
1a  Why do we innovate?   Existential Imagination 
1b  What is the point of it? Imaginative knowledge (2.11, 2.12). 
Concretise the imagination (2.28) 
      IR Theory 
      For emotional energy (3.03, 3.04, 3.09, 
      3.10).  
To become group emblem (3.05, 3.06, 3.07). 
Power (3.08).  
      Phenomenological Imagination 
Mental energy – intention (4.16, 4.18). 
Synthesis of imagination (4.39, 4.41) 
Computational Imagination 
Practised expertise (5.12) 
Hermeneutical Imagination 
Create myths (6.04) 
Crystallisation of Mental Process 
Quest for truth and vision (7.03) 
Postmodern Imagination 
For change and contradiction (8.13) 
 
2a  Are innovators born?   Existential Imagination 
2b  Or are they made?    Innovators are born (2.24) 
      IR Theory 
      Innovators are made (3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13,  
      3.14, 3.16, 3.17, 3.24) 
      Phenomenological Imagination 
Innovators are born – dependent on mass of 
sensory fields (4.47, 4.48) 
Computational Imagination 
Innovators are made (5.02, 5.13, 5.20, 5.28, 
5.29, 5.30, 5.31, 5.32, 5.33, 5.34, 5.35, 5.44, 
5.45, 5.46, 5.50, 5.51, 5.52, 5.53) 
Hermeneutical Imagination 
(Not discussed) 
Crystallisation of Mental Process 
Innovators are made – takes ‘long time to 
develop’ (7.54, 7.56) 
Postmodern Imagination 
(Not discussed) 
 151 
 
3a  Is architectural innovation  Existential Imagination 
      an individual quest?   Individual quest (2.18, 2.19, 2.20, 2.21) 
3b  Or must it be a collective    IR Theory 
      pursuit?     Collective pursuit (3.03, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13) 
      Phenomenological Imagination 
      Individual quest (4.04, 4.05) 
      Computational Imagination 
      Both (5.26) 
      Hermeneutical Imagination 
      Collective pursuit (6.24, 6.38) 
      Crystallisation of Mental Process 
      Individual quest (7.19, 7.21) 
      Postmodern Imagination 
      Both (8.15, 8.21, 8.28) 
 
4a  Can it be born out of isolation?  Existential Imagination 
4b  Or must it be an extension of  Not born out of isolation (2.09, 2.12) 
      a domain?     IR Theory 
Extension of a domain (3.02, 3.05, 3.06, 
3.08, 3.09) 
Phenomenological Imagination 
Born out of isolation – eidetic, ego (4.08, 
4.09) 
Computational Imagination 
Extension of a domain (5.49, 5.54, 5.57) 
Hermeneutical Imagination 
Extension of domain (6.18, 6.19) 
Crystallisation of Mental Process 
Born out of isolation (7.18, 7.20) 
Postmodern Imagination 
Both (8.15, 8.21, 8.28) 
 
5a  Is the structure of architectural   Existential Imagination 
      innovation ostensive?   Intrinsic (2.03, 2.06, 2.27, 2.29, 2.30) 
5b  Or is it necessarily intrinsic?  IR Theory 
      Ostensive (3.04, 3.13) 
      Phenomenological Imagination 
Intrinsic – reality subservient to imagination 
(4.04, 4.10).  
A psychological process (4.11, 4.17). 
Beyond appearance (4.28) 
Computational Imagination 
Ostensive (5.05, 5.37, 5.38, 5.41, 5.55) 
Hermeneutical Imagination 
Ostensive (6.03). 
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Intrinsic (overcome by context) (6.13, 6.14, 
6.16) 
Crystallisation of Mental Process 
Intrinsic (7.10, 7.11, 7.12, 7.14) 
Postmodern Imagination 
Ostensive (8.26, 8.27) 
 
6a  Is there a structure to    Existential Imagination  
      architectural innovation?   Insight (2.05, 2.28, 2.33) 
6b  Or is it the result of    IR Theory  
      architectural insight?   Structure through network (3.02, 3.03) 
      Phenomenological Imagination 
Adumbrative insight – changing reflection 
(4.02, 4.07, 4.20, 4.22, 4.23) 
Computational Imagination 
Structure – conceptual spaces (5.03).  
P-creativity, H-creativity (5.14, 5.15) 
Structure (5.54) 
Hermeneutical Imagination 
Structure (6.04) 
Crystallisation of Mental Process 
Insight (7.15, 7.16, 7.17, 7.24) 
Also has structure (7.51, 7.57) 
Postmodern Imagination 
Horizontal structure, loop-back process 
(8.29, 8.30, 8.32, 8.33) 
 
7a   Is architectural innovation   Existential Imagination 
       possible outside of context?  Need context (2.09, 2.15, 2.22, 2.34, 2.35) 
7b   Is it valid outside of context?  IR Theory  
      Need context (3.01, 3.02, 3.15) 
      Phenomenological Imagination 
Need context – as medium of perception 
(4.12, 4.34, 4.36, 4.37, 4.38, 4.42, 4.43) 
      Computational Imagination 
      Having context (5.14, 5.41) 
      Hermeneutical Imagination 
Need context (6.07, 6.09, 6.10, 6.11, 6.26, 
6.27, 6.28, 6.29, 6.33, 6.34) 
Crystallisation of Mental Process 
Need context (7.52) 
Postmodern Imagination 
Need context (8.15) 
 
8a  Is it possible without mastering  Existential Imagination 
      rules and activity? Experience (2.09, 2.10, 2.11, 2.20, 2.28) 
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8b  Can it be a result of just   IR Theory 
experience and intuition? Rules and activities – ritual participation 
(3.10). Mentoring (3.12). Part of larger 
network, enchainment (3.13, 3.14, 3.16) 
      Phenomenological Imagination 
Intention over experience (4.02, 4.05, 4.13, 
4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.18) 
      Computational Imagination 
      Mastering rules (5.16, 5.17, 5.23) 
      Hermeneutical Imagination 
      Experience (6.15, 6.35, 6.37) 
      Crystallisation of Mental Process 
Experience and intuition (7.08, 7.09, 7.10, 
7.25, 7.26) 
      Postmodern Imagination 
Deterministic chaos, indeterminacy (8.22, 
8.25, 8.26) 
 
9a   Is there a trait towards    Existential Imagination 
       innovation?    Ability to imagine (2.24). Unbound to a  
9b   Or is there none identifiable?  system (2.25). Apprehension of the unreal 
(2.29). Alternating between real and unreal  
(2.32) 
IR Theory 
      Break from mentor (3.16).  
High productive output (3.17).  
Personality (3.19).  
Flow state (3.21, 3.22, 3.23) 
      Phenomenological Imagination 
Mental shifts between imagination and 
perception (4.21, 4.42) 
      Computational Imagination 
      Mental mapping (5.22). 
      Change generative system (5.24). 
      Explore rules better (5.48, 5.51) 
      Extensive knowledge (5.53) 
Hermeneutical Imagination 
Differentiation (6.21) 
Crystallisation of Mental Process 
Having thematic ideas (7.04) 
Mental intensity and continuation (7.22) 
      Synesthesia (7.25, 7.26, 7.30) 
Transform context mentally (7.53) 
Postmodern Imagination 
Rebellious spirit (8.28) 
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9.04   The summary of results for the questions and answers is condensed to only 
salient issues and are arranged in the same order as above but simplified. ‘Context’ is the 
most consensual where full weightage is given, and ‘traits’ is the least consensual, where 
no weightage is given, but is useful for general discussion.  
 
Purpose: 
The answers to the purposes of innovation are varied from section to section. 
However, there appear to be a general shared accent, which is the desire to break barriers. 
All the section discusses the desire to break mental barriers, except that IR Theory 
discusses the desire to break social and cultural barriers. IR Theory provided the most 
powerful arguments for the purpose of innovation (9.03 – 1). Also in the framework of 
practice, IR Theory is most pertinent. 
 
Weightage that the purposes of innovation are explained in IR Theory: 8/10.  
 
Born Or Made: 
On the question as to whether innovators are born or made, the force of arguments 
lean towards the answer that innovators are made. However, although the weight of 
argument favours this, it is not without doubt (9.03 – 2).  
 
The evidence is not compelling, but evidence for practice leans towards the notion 
that innovators are made: 7/10. 
 
Individual Quest Or Collective Pursuit: 
On the question as to whether architectural innovation is an individual quest or a 
collective pursuit, the force of arguments from the protagonists and the antagonists are 
evenly balanced. It could either be one or the other (9.03 – 3). 
 
Both sides of the arguments could apply to practice, however, IR Theory 
influences sways the weightage towards collective pursuit: 6/10 
 
Isolation Or Extension Of A Domain: 
On the question as to whether architectural innovation is born out of isolation or 
an extension of a domain, there appears to be a slight weight advantage toward an 
extension of a domain, particularly when framed in the context of practice (9.03 –4). 
 
Weightage toward innovation being an extension of a domain: 7/10. 
 
Ostensive Or Intrinsic: 
On the question as to whether the structure of architectural innovation is ostensive 
or intrinsic, both are equal in the literature review (9.03 – 5). However, everyday practice 
requires that the process of innovation is not hidden. 
 
Hence, there is a slight edge towards ostensivity: 6/10. 
 
Structure: 
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The next question was to ask whether there was a structure to architectural 
innovation after all, or was it the result of insight. Based on the literature review, the 
answers are quite even between having some kind of structure and having an insight. The 
answers imply that there is both (9.03 – 6). 
 
This requires further investigation: meanwhile, the presence of structure in 
innovation is 5/10. 
 
Context: 
Based on the literature review above, one particular consensus was arrived at: 
Architectural innovation is not possible outside of context and it is validated within a 
context (ref. 9.03 – 7). 
 
There is consensus all round that context is essential to enable and to validate 
architectural innovation. Weightage toward the presence of context: 10/10. 
 
The Mastering Of Rules, Intuition, Or Experience: 
Except for the emphasis in favour of deterministic chaos under Postmodern 
Imagination, all the other sections shares the general premise that innovation is arrived at 
either through experience, or through the mastering of rules, with nuances toward 
intention. With a view toward practice, this suggests that innovation must be developed 
and worked upon over time (ref. 9.03 – 8). 
 
Hence, weightage toward the presence of rules and experience in innovation: 
9/10. 
 
Traits: 
The most varied answers came with question on the traits leading toward 
innovation. Each section appears to have different answers. While in general most of the 
sections provided answers to do with mental abilities, IR Theory and Postmodern 
Imagination provided answers to do with social and cultural reasons (9.03 – 9).  
 
All the sections of literature review have a trait with regard to innovation, but the 
traits are not shared. Hence it would not be relevant to give weightage to this. 
 
9.05   The discovery could be further summarised as follows: 
 
Items       Weightage 
 
Purpose of innovation – based on IR Theory   8/10 
 
Innovators are made      7/10 
 
IR Theory influences: it is a   
collective pursuit 6/10 
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Innovation is an extension of domain    7/10 
 
Process of innovation is ostensive    6/10 
 
Presence of structure in innovation    5/10 
 
Requirement of context              10/10 
 
Mastery of rules and experience     9/10 
 
Whilst the structure for innovation is not particularly conclusive based on the 
literature review, all the other evidence leanings toward the following: That architectural 
innovation is purpose led; innovators are made; it is a collective pursuit; it is an extension 
of domain, it is ostensive; there is a definite requirement for context and mastery of rules 
and experience. The following investigations probe further the structure of innovation.  
 
Science Filter To Bacon 
9.06   The latest studies on creativity, say, by Shermer (2001) and Weisberg 
(2006) have swayed from the illusory toward the pedagogical viewpoints – the studies 
have purpose of utility. The equivalence in architecture is a viewpoint that has usefulness 
in practice. Using a commonsensical approach, Shermer applies a knowledge filter 
toward creativity and argues that: “Most of the time the knowledge filter works quite 
well. We can tell the difference between truth and illusion, and when we can’t there is 
usually a good reason for it – a magician is trying to fool us, or we choose to be fooled. 
Think of the knowledge filter as a mental module that screens incoming ideas for their 
veracity. It works by comparing new facts and ideas with what we already know from 
previous experience” (Shermer, 2001: 39). 
 
9.07   For the sake of credence, society too builds its own knowledge filter. The 
television audience has come to realise that there is always another perspective to most 
issues, and it has become a standard practise in television discourse to have point-
counterpoint to most assertions. Science have a built-in peer review system, where in 
order to get a paper published it must be refereed by colleagues where errors and 
unsubstantiated assumptions are weeded out. 
 
9.08   To Shermer, the best knowledge filter is science as every assertion made 
can be tested. He went on to provide an example of how he went on to test the claims of a 
psychic healer, Dr. Kam Yuen. By simple method of statistics, it was concluded that Dr. 
Yuen did no better than random chance (Shermer, 2001: 41-46). 
 
9.09   In architecture, the prevailing viewpoint is that assertions are tested in 
practice, where ultimately, buildings become real, tangible edifices, which can be used, 
experienced and critiqued. The process of designing and document a work of architecture 
and, to have it constructed is tested all the way by the requirements of reality. Indeed, 
traditionally, an architect is taken for granted as someone who puts an idea into use. For 
example, Kepler who supported the new and radical Copernican heliocentric model of the 
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universe, observed after a time spent with Brahe: “He lacks only the architect who would 
put it all to use” (Shermer, 2001: 129). 
 
9.10   Also new ideas do not emerge from the imagination alone, but is an 
assemblage of previous ideas. Darwin, for example, acknowledges Francis Bacon’s 
(1561-1626) development of inductive reasoning: “I worked on true Baconian principles, 
and without any theory collected facts on the wholesale scale” (Shermer, 2001: 210). He 
also credits Thomas Malthus for contributing a significant step toward the development 
of the theory of natural selection: “I happened to read for amusement ‘Malthus on 
Population’, and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which 
everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, 
it at once struck me that under the circumstances favourable variations would tend to be 
destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of a new species” (Shermer, 2001: 
210). 
 
Bacon’s Method Of Induction 
9.11   The Baconian principles that Darwin speaks about are in essence a method 
of science, generically known as induction, wherein he repudiates the syllogistic method 
and defines his alternative procedures as one “which by slow and faithful toil gathers 
information from things and brings it into understanding” (ref. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/). 
 
9.12   When Li provided the narrative to explain architectural and intellectual 
change in England between the years 1660-1730 (ref: Li, 2007), he used a number of key 
scholars as markers that strung the narrative together. At the forefront was Francis Bacon. 
Li suggested that Bacon was perhaps the single most influential individual in the Royal 
Society and through it; the Baconian framework became fundamentally important to 
seventeenth-century English thought (ref. Li, 2007: 23). With regard to architectural 
change, Li regarded the Baconian framework as one that leaned toward utility, or 
practice: 
 
Within the province off human reason, Bacon’s view was that the credibility of 
knowledge is inextricably linked to its use. Once the structure and content of human 
knowledge is crucially aligned with utility, humanity would be immeasurably 
empowered…. The ‘truth’ of knowledge comes precisely from this empowerment (Li, 
2007: 24-5). 
 
9.13   Li then outlines Bacon’s five aims of knowledge that leads to change   or 
innovation, all of which are normal in terms of architectural practice: 
 
The object of knowledge should be, first, the understanding of physical reality, not 
fantasies of the mind, nor the ‘instruments’ of thought such as words. Second, the nature 
of knowledge is progressive and cumulative, not eternal and unchanging…. Third, the 
method of gaining access to the new knowledge lies in observation and documentation…. 
Fourth, knowledge is not a mater of single individual working in isolation, but a form of 
social cooperation…. 
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Last, the final aim of knowledge must lie in utility, and not in the satisfaction of 
curiosity, nor in the entertainment of the mind, nor in the pursuit of ornament and 
reputation (Li, 2007: 26-7). 
 
9.14   According to Li, the main characteristic of the Baconian approach toward 
innovation has to do with the utilisation of sensory perception. In the seventeenth 
century, this approach was regarded as ‘modern’ – an attitude that is opposed to the 
application of canons of earlier periods, particularly so with regard to art and architecture, 
a result that appeals to utility and power: 
 
What Francis Bacon had begun, with his elaborate strategy to embrace both faith 
and reason, was the possibility of a profound intellectual change. While avoiding issues 
of faith, Bacon took on the authorities of the ancients, and developed a way of 
constructing knowledge based on sensory perception that appealed to utility and power. 
Bacon’s ideas indeed inspired a popular imagination: the seventeenth century had 
become ‘modern’ (Li, 2007: 45). 
 
9.15   In predicting a characteristic of modernity, Bacon did away with the notion 
of beauty as a priory to art and architecture. He instead articulated an intellectual context 
for the problem of beauty in the early seventeenth century. Li further narrates:  
 
In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon considered the ancient techniques of 
representations of reality – poesy – as ‘feigned history’ in various ‘styles’ in that it 
consisted of imitations of life which were adapted to satisfy the imagination of the mind 
and to reinforce morality…. In his essay on beauty, Bacon claimed that ‘Beauty is as 
summer fruits, which are easy to corrupt, and cannot last (Li, 2007: 57-8). 
 
9.16   Li postulated that: “(Christopher) Wren’s crucial interpretation of this 
intellectual conviction in usefulness in terms of positive and customary beauties set an 
important framework for English architecture through his virtual monopoly of important 
public projects for over forty years (1670s-1710s). The royal society through its frequent 
discussions on issues such as architectural antiquity and principles of masonry 
construction, provided a crucial intellectual and institutional setting for new development 
in English architecture” (Li, 2007: 54). Li also mentioned Robert Hooke, Nicholas 
Hawksmoor and John Vanbrugh and according to Li: 
 
Seen together, their works brought substances to the political agendas of 
propagating courtly magnificence and divine mysteries, and explored architectural 
designs inspired by the settings and forms of early Christian worship, military metaphors 
and the irreverent delight of the Restoration theatre (Li, 2007: 59). 
 
9.17   However, through the observation of their architecture, Wren, Hawksmoor 
and Vanbrugh did not extricate themselves from the styles of the past, and Li’s thesis 
seems contradictory to Bacon’ requirement of utility as a priory as utility was secondary 
to formal beauty in their architecture. Although their architecture had formal innovation, 
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past doctrines, particular classical doctrines were still continued. The ‘feigned history’ in 
various ‘styles’ in architecture was to not to be broken until the late nineteenth century.  
 
Bacon’s Ideas Manifested Through Heterogeneous Influences 
9.18   Bacon’s new way of looking at art and architecture places utility above the 
doctrine of beauty, and by inference, also of harmony and proportion, which were pre-
eminent in architecture before the seventeenth century (ref. Wittkower, 1949; March, 
1998). However, the dominance of classical representation was not overcome until the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century when modern communications, 
particularly in print and communication graphics impacted architecture, the arts and other 
design fields such as product and furniture design. The print media also impacted the way 
paintings were abstracted, which in turn influenced the aesthetics of architecture in the 
twentieth century. For example, Art Nouveau graphics influenced Charles Rennie 
Mackintosh (1868-1928) and Frank Lloyd Wright (1867-1959) in the late nineteenth 
century (ref. Meggs, 1998: 210-1). Art Nouveau graphics was also an early influence on 
Peter Behrens (1868-1940); but he subsequently developed a more objective graphic style 
at the turn of the century. Through Peter Behrens, the print media indirectly influenced 
Walter Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, Le Corbusier and Adolf Meyer who were all 
apprenticed to Behrens at different times during the first decade of the twentieth century 
(ref. Meggs, 1998: 225, 229).  
 
9.19   Besset was also to postulate that early twentieth century (second and third 
decades) painting and sculpture had influenced architecture and, it was during that time 
that art became intellectual: when for the first time intellectual content replaced ‘beauty’ 
that Bacon had advocated. Speaking about Le Corbusier, Besset stated: 
 
With Neo-Plasticism and Suprematism on the other side on the other side and 
Constructivism on the other, the position of Le Corbusier in this debate was an original 
and, for all his peremptory manner of diction, a highly differentiated one. In common 
with Mondrian and Malevich, as well as Gleizes and Juan Gris, he shared the demand 
for severity in the organisation of space – the need to retain, beyond the accidental, only 
the mathematical element – and went on to postulate the purely spiritual vocation of art 
in the following words: “Modern painting has abandoned the wall, the tapestry, the 
decorative urn, and has withdrawn into a frame. Nurtured, replete with facts, far 
removed from the distracting influence of figuration, it lends itself to meditation. Art no 
longer tells a tale, it makes one think” (Besset, 1987: 50). 
 
Heterogeneous Linkages Between Architecture And The Arts 
9.20   Throughout history, architecture, the building crafts and the arts were seen 
in close proximity with one another for the obvious reason that architecture, until lately 
was regarded as just one of both the arts and building craft. Gadamer, for instance 
describes architecture as the ‘greatest and most distinguished’ form of art (ref. Leach, ed. 
1997: 134). Equally, during the Renaissance, artists regarded architecture as a privileged 
extension of their normal artistic vocations. For example, famously, the dome of St. 
Peter’s in Rome, built in 1564, was designed by the sculptor and painter Michelangelo 
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Buonarotti, and in 1667, Gian Lorenzo Bernini, also a sculptor and painter, designed the 
piazza in front of the cathedral. 
 
9.21   The link between architecture and music is also common. Frank Lloyd 
Wright is known to have regularly played the piano to take his mind off the vicissitudes 
of life (ref. Secrest, 1992: 135-6), and the musicality of his architectural spaces is 
apparent. Comparably, Nick Mason, Roger Waters and Rick Wright were studying 
architecture at the Regent Street Polytechnic in London at the time they formed the band 
Pink Floyd in the 1960’s. The influence of their architectural background became most 
evident in ‘The Wall’ but was also evident in the construction of their elaborate 
structures, which they often worked with Mark Fisher. Their music also seems carefully 
constructed, like works of architecture. Even the visuals of their album covers are as 
carefully constructed as works of architecture. 
 
9.22   Wright was at first influenced by Art Nouveau, but sometime at around the 
turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century, he evolved the curvilinear Art Nouveau into 
a rectilinear spatial depiction, together with the introduction of horizontal planes. It is 
thought that Wright became influenced by Japanese prints: he was an avid collector of 
Japanese prints, which were popular at the time, but he also saw Japanese architecture as 
a model of harmonious proportion and visual poetry. Indeed in the Japanese measurement 
of spaces based on the tatami mat, there seemed to be a mathematical repetition in the 
creation of spaces. Equally, Wright used repetition to create symmetry in spatial 
organisation. Moreover, he extended and expanded his vision into other artistic realms 
that included furniture, graphics, fabrics, wallpapers, and stained-glass windows (ref. 
Meggs, 1998: 211). 
 
9.23   Throughout his career as an architect Wright was to periodically turn his 
hand to graphic design. He built his first house for his friend, William H. Winslow; but 
before that, he had collaborated with Winslow to produce a handcrafted book, The House 
Beautiful. In the end only 90 copies were printed, using a handpress method on handmade 
paper. Wright’s border designs were executed in a delicate freehand line drawing, which 
inscribed a lacy pattern of stylised plant form. The lines had a clear English Art Nouveau 
influence, particularly that of Aubrey Beardsley graphic work (ref. Meggs, 1998: 211). 
 
9.24   Another architect who was influenced by Beardsley and the English Art 
Nouveau was Charles Rennie Mackintosh (1868-1928). Mackintosh was part of a group 
of Scottish collaborators known in artistic circles as ‘The Four’. Which also comprised of 
J. Herbert McNair, and sisters Margaret and Frances Macdonald. The four were first 
known for their print illustrations, which were distinguished by their stylised and 
symbolic imagery derived from bold, simple lines on planes of flat colours. The spiritual 
nuances of their works were probably influenced by the Macdonald sisters who held 
strong religious beliefs with mystical ideas. The effeminate, melancholic and disquiet 
visual nuance is fairly overt. The influence of their style on Wright and the Vienna 
Secession in Austria is apparent although they seemed to have little influence in Britain 
itself (ref. Meggs, 1998: 211). 
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9.25   Mackintosh was to bring the style into his architectural designs and extend 
them into other associated areas like decorative objects, chairs and interiors. Just like 
Wright, Mackintosh applied the style to the total environment. In contrast to the usually 
busy interiors at the time, Mackintosh had the interior walls white and bathed in light 
and, uncluttered except for a few carefully placed ornaments. He used rising vertical lines 
as the unifying theme, the rising lines often had subtle curves at the end, tempered with 
horizontal lines at the junction. He also often included tall slivers of rectangles coupled 
with ovals, circles and arcs as counterpoint. These seemed to be the visual signature of 
his work. Like Wright, his furniture and interior are detailed to be compatible with the 
whole. The rising lines of the ‘Mackintosh chair’ exemplify this (ref. Meggs, 1998: 213). 
 
Behrens’ Significant Influences 
9.26   The movement that most scholars know about today, which exemplifies the 
unity of the arts is the ‘Bauhaus’. It is an art school in Germany that was started in 1919 
through the merger of two previous art schools. The full name for the ‘Bauhaus’ is Das 
Staatliches Bauhaus (The State Home for Building). The first director of the Bauhaus 
was Walter Gropius (1883-1969), already a renowned pioneer of modern architecture 
when he was appointed as director. Significantly, his mentor was Peter Behrens a 
German contemporary of Wright and Mackintosh, all of whom were born at around the 
same time, 1867, 1868. Like Wright and Mackintosh, Behrens was an architect who was 
also proficient in the printed arts. Behrens started his career as an artist who painted poor 
people and industrial landscape. He was to later embrace the Jugenstil movement – the 
German equivalent to the art nouveau movement. Indeed, one of Jugenstil iconic images 
is Behren’s The Kiss, which is a six-color woodcut, and controversial for its androgynous 
imagery (ref. Meggs, 1998: 205). 
 
9.27   Behrens was to switch back and forth between graphic arts, product design 
and architecture. He pioneered new typographic forms for the new industrial era and 
thinking like an architect, was among the first to use a grid system to structure space in 
his graphic designs. He also designed products like streetlamps and teapots for mass 
consumption using an industrial-like aesthetics, considered as innovative at the time. His 
work for the German company, AEG, is considered the first comprehensive visual 
identification program, commonly known today as branding (ref. Meggs, 1998: 223). 
Behrens rigour was continued to architecture, where he pioneered non-load-bearing glass 
curtain walls spanning the spaces between structural supports. The association of this 
method of construction with modern architecture still continues today – not a lot has 
changed since the first decade of the twentieth century. 
 
9.28   Well before the emergence of the Bauhaus in 1919 in Weimer, Behrens was 
to pioneer an art course in Dusseldorf in 1903, which combined architecture, graphic and 
interior design together as a preparatory course of study to precede specific studies. His 
intention was to raise perceptive skills through artistic and spontaneous form making 
rather than through mechanical studies. Significantly, the preparatory courses were 
precursors for the Bauhaus own preparatory course, and even more significantly, two of 
Behren’s apprentices, Walter Gropius and Mies van der Rohe served as directors of the 
Bauhaus and were themselves icons of the modern movement (ref. Meggs, 1998: 229).  
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9.29   However, Behrens later became involved with the German version of the 
arts and craft movement known as the Werkbund, which unlike the English version of the 
arts and craft movement, tried to reconcile with the machine. With the involvement, his 
work became less spontaneous and more objective, later descending into a form of neo-
classicism, moving away from the both the art nouveau and the arts and craft to draw 
inspiration from the aesthetics of ancient Greece and Rome. It was thought that the 
muscular, objective Greek and Roman geometry could make ornament universal and 
impersonal, satisfying the nature of mass production (ref. Meggs, 1998: 227). In 
pioneering the attitude of modern product design, he sought neutrality and standardisation 
for the machine to manufacture. His forms were simple, devoid of decoration with all the 
connotations of social class association stripped away. His work pointed to a new 
aesthetic sensibility, which was to mature in the 1920s into the Modern Movement. 
Behrens pointed to a rational approach to the arts deemed appropriate for the new 
industrial age, where form was to follow function. 
 
Bacon’s Utility And Power In Advertising Posters 
9.30   Bacon’s advocacy of utility and power over beauty emerged most fully in 
advertising graphics, where communications of products take precedence over the 
classical requirements of visual beauty and harmony. In putting effective message across 
from the manufacturers to the consumers, communication had to be persuasive rather 
than pretty. Bacon’s ideal of utility is manifested in the minimalist aesthetics, where 
minimal graphics communicates exactly the author’s intention without any need for 
embellishment. The medium of advertising posters took on expressive, symbolic images 
and were organised in a manner that was effective rather than beautiful for its own sake. 
The result was a distillation of energy, capturing the attention and imagination of the 
observer. 
 
Bernhard, The Accidental Minimalist 
9.31   Early in the twentieth century, a flat-color, reductive design school emerged 
in Germany in the early twentieth century known as Plakatstil or, ‘poster style’. At 
around the turn of the twentieth century, Lucien Bernhard (1883-1972) was 
unsuccessfully supporting himself as a poet in Berlin when, in 1905, he saw an 
advertisement for a poster contest sponsored by Priester matches. Bernhard who had 
excelled in art in school decided to enter the contest. His first design showed a round 
table with a checked tablecloth, with an ashtray holding a lighted cigar, and a box of 
matches. He thought at first that the image was too bare, so he painted scantily clad 
dancing girls in the background (ref. Meggs, 1998: 249).  
 
9.32   Later, during the course of the day, he decided that the image had become 
too complex and painted out the dancing girls. And when a friend dropped by and asked 
whether it was a poster for a cigar, Bernhard decided to paint out the cigar. Without the 
dancing girls and the cigar, the tablecloth and the ashtray stood out too prominently, so 
Bernhard painted them out as well. What was left was a pair of matches on the bare table. 
All that was left to do then was to paint the word Priester onto the poster, which he 
hastily did in blue above the pair of matches with nothing else to show except a dark 
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background. He quickly wrapped the poster and sent it off just in time to have it 
postmarked before midnight to beat the deadline (ref. Meggs, 1998: 249). 
 
9.33   Bernhard’s submission was at first rejected by the jury, but was rescued 
from the trashcan by a tardy juror, Ernst Growald, who convinced the other jurors of the 
merit of Bernhard’s image. The poster became the now famous Priester poster, which 
reduced communication to two matches and a word. The message was effective and 
powerful, minus all the peripheral frills and decoration. Bernhard was to repeat the 
formula over and over again over the next two decades. In total, he is estimated to have 
designed over three hundred packages for thirty-six products, becoming a highly 
successful illustrator based on a minimalist formula. The poster for Stiller shoes (1912), 
which uses flat, austere graphics was to exemplify the better of Bernhard’s many works 
of poster illustrations (ref. Meggs, 1998: 249-10).  
 
9.34   Like the significant architects of his generation (Wright, Mackintosh, 
Behrens), Bernhard became heterogeneous in his design vocation. As time went on, he 
tackled interior design, then studied carpentry to learn furniture design and construction, 
which led to a study of architecture. From the 1910s Bernhard designed furniture, rugs, 
wallpapers, and lighting fixtures as well as office buildings, factories, and houses (ref. 
Meggs, 1998: 250).  
 
9.35   The effectiveness of Bernhard’s reductive, minimalist and simple visuals 
were to anticipate the constructivist movement (ref. Meggs, 1998: 250), and with it, the 
aesthetics of the modern movement through the Bauhaus. With Bernhard, classical 
aesthetics was finally overcome since Bacon’s thesis for utility and power over beauty in 
the seventeenth century. Hence it was not architecture that first broke from classical 
aesthetics, but the print media and the advent of new communication. New painting style 
also broke from classicism ideal toward a minimalist expression that evoked utility, with 
perceptual purposes, rather than for beauty, narrative or decorative.  
 
Malevich To El Lissitzky 
9.36   Several years after Bernhard’s Priester poster (1905) and soon after his 
Stiller shoes poster (1912), Kasimir Malevich (1878-1935) emerged with a minimalist 
type of painting that dealt only with slaps of plain colours to evoke perception. In 1913 
he made a composition with a black square on a white background, asserting that the 
feeling this contrast evoked was the essence of art. In works such as the 1915 Suprematist 
Composition, “Malevich saw the work of art as a construction of concrete elements of 
colour and shape. The visual form becomes the content, and expressive qualities develop 
from the intuitive organisation of the forms and colour” (Meggs, 1998: 262). In 
suprematism, Malevich hence founded a painting style of basic forms of pure colours. It 
is a style that is purely abstract, seeking the supreme “expression of feeling, seeking no 
practical values, no ideas, no promised land” (Meggs, 1998: 262). 
 
9.37   Meggs suggests that the background for Malevich’s suprematism is 
futurism and cubism (Meggs, 1998: 262). Futurism and cubism also forms the 
background for the constructivist movement in Russia, which was accelerated by the 
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1918 revolution. However, whilst Malevich (and also Kandinsky) argued that art must 
remain an essentially spiritual activity apart from the utilitarian needs of society, 
believing that the sole aim of art was to realise perceptions, the Russian movement was to 
attempt to give art a social role, in keeping with the spirit of its 1918 revolution. The 
constructivist ideal was best realised by the architect El (Lazar Markovich) Lissitzky 
(1890-1940), who was also a painter, graphic designer and photographer. Being an 
architect, Lissitzky used mathematical and structural properties as bases for his art. In 
1919, Lissitzky joined the faculty of the art school at Vitebsk, where Malevich was 
already teaching. Meggs suggests that Malevich became a major influence on Lissitzky, 
who developed a painting style, which he called PROUNS (an acronym for “projects for 
the establishment of a new art”) (ref.  Meggs, 1998: 264). 
 
9.38   Compared with Malevich’s flat compositions in his suprematist works, 
Lissitzsky’s PROUNS have a three-dimensional illusion about them. Lissitzky called 
PROUNS “an interchange station between painting and architecture”. Meggs describes 
how Lissitzky in one of the works transformed Malevich’s suprematism:  
 
This indicates his synthesis of architectural concepts with painting; it also 
describes how PROUNS pointed the way to the application of modern painting concepts 
of form and space to applied design. This seen in his 1919 poster, Beat The Whites With 
The Red Wedge. The space is dynamically divided into white and black areas. 
Suprematist design elements are transformed into political symbolism that even a 
semiliterate peasant can understand (Meggs, 1998: 264). 
 
9.39   Meggs sees Lissitzky as the most significant among the Russian 
constructivists for his range of work, particularly in the print media. For example, one of 
the most influential graphic designs in the 1920s was the book The Isms of Art 1914-
1924, which Lissitzky edited with the dadaist Hans Arp, wherein Lissitzky’s format for 
the book was seen as an important step toward the creation of a visual programme for 
organising information. The book has an architectonic quality about it: Lissitzky used a 
three-column horizontal grid structure for the title page; a three-column vertical grid 
structure was used for the text page, and a two-column structure for the contents page. 
The structure of the book was like an architectural framework which organises a forty-
eight page pictorially illustrated portfolio (ref. Meggs, 1998: 267). 
 
Merger Between Art And Architecture 
9.40   Whilst architects have influenced the direction of art in the 1920s as in the 
case of Lissitzky as described above; it was however art that first influenced the direction 
of architectural aesthetics prior to the 1920s, also outlined above. In writing about the 
influences on Russian constructivism during the time, Catherine Cooke states that: “As in 
Europe during the time, the most obvious and direct influence in shaping the architectural 
theories and aesthetics of the avant-garde was the new art” (Papadakis, ed., 1991: 9). She 
goes on to say: 
 
If we consider the origins of architecture’s new language, as opposed to the 
spatial and social dimensions, then we are looking at quite another area of pre-
 165 
Revolutionary activity: to art…. It was Malevich’s ‘supreme abstraction’ of form in a 
four-dimensional space-time that provided the formal innovators of many different post-
Revolutionary trends with their ‘clean slate’ for building up a new formal language from 
first principles (Papadakis, ed., 1991: 11). 
 
9.41   The basis of constructivist ideals was not architecture itself, but the merger 
between different media of art, where architecture was considered as just one of these. 
According to Cooke, the statement that Vladimir Tatlin (1885-1953) issued in 1919 in 
The Work Ahead of Us was of seminal importance for the future relationship between the 
plastic arts. She goes on to state: 
 
The ‘functionless’ counter-reliefs’ he did as ‘art’ in the pre-Revolutionary years, 
he said, were the ‘laboratory scale’ preparation of a new formal language through which 
to respond now to the new society’s requirements for material objects. What were 
formerly ‘painting’, ‘sculpture’ and ‘architecture’ would now become part of a 
continuum of work with real materials whose end product was functional. From these 
studies of materials must come a whole new set of ‘disciplines’ as the designer’s tool, 
which in their different way must be ‘as rigorous as the disciplines of Classicism 
(Papadakis, ed., 1991: 13). 
 
9.42   Earlier in 1911, Wassily Kandinsky (1866-1944) wrote the influential On 
the Spiritual in Art, where he advocated the analysis of the different artistic medium, 
which challenge was taken up by various working ten years later. Kandinsky wrote that: 
 
The first part of the programme consists of an analysis of the specific properties 
of each different artistic medium. The point of departure is the psychological response of 
the artist to the property – for example, red is known to excite activity (Papadakis, ed., 
1991: 13). 
 
9.43   The writings of Tatlin and Kandinsky prompted further investigation and 
Working Groups were established to investigate ‘the specific properties’ of painting, 
sculpture and architecture. Nikolai Ladovsky (1881-1941) led the groups with specific 
focus on architecture. His ‘work-plan’ for the group was: 
 
1: The collection of theoretical studies and the existing theories of architecture of 
all theoreticians, 2: The extraction and assembly of relevant material from the theoretical 
treatises and from research in other arts that has a bearing in architecture, and 3: The 
exposition of our own theoretical attitudes to architecture (Papadakis, ed., 1991: 13). 
 
Objective Analysis Group And Scientific Modernism 
9.44   In parallel to Ladovsky’s group, were the painting and sculpture groups. 
Another group was the Objective Analysis Group, of which Ladovsky was also a 
member. The priority discussion of this group was on the principles of construction and 
composition. Cooke describes the character of the Objective Analysis Group as follows: 
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  (The Objective Analysis Group) consisted of the most radically innovative 
abstractionists, who were aware of the emergence of a new creative principle in their 
work, which differed significantly from the principles in which they had been trained. It 
was not their abstraction itself which was new, but a more self-consciously programmatic 
way of creating a form that involved ‘building it up’, literally ‘constructing’ it, rather 
than composing the work as a single perceived image (Papadakis, ed., 1991: 13). 
 
9.45   The debate of the Objective Analysis Group marked a turning point for 
architecture. Two main groups, which believed in scientific modernism were formed. 
Those who still believed in the primacy of the established notion ‘composition’, and still 
sought to develop the psychological and perceptual direction established by Kandinsky’s 
initial programme, were to become the architectural Rationalists, led by Ladovsky and his 
colleague Vladimir Krinsky. In 1923, they created ASNOVA (the Association of New 
Architects) to propagate the new Rationalist approach. On the other side, another sub-
group was convinced about about the special importance of the new principle of 
‘construction’, and went on to become the First Working Group of Constructivists. In 
1925 this group became the OSA (the Union of Contemporary Architects). The key 
architects in this group were Alexander Vesnin (1883-1959) and Moisei Ginzberg (1892-
1946). 
 
9.46   The two significant artists who played a key role in the First Working 
Group of Constructivists (which later became the OSA) were Alexander Rodchenko 
(1891-1956) and Alexei Gan (1893-1942). In a 1922 brochure Konstructivism Gan 
criticised the abstract painters for their inability to break the compositional ties to 
traditional art, and he boasted that constructivism had moved on from ‘laboratory work to 
practical application’. Gan wrote that tectonics, texture, and construction were the three 
principles of constructivism: wherein tectonics represented the unification of communist 
ideology with visual form; texture meant the nature of materials and how they were used 
in industrial production; and construction symbolised the creative process and the search 
of laws for visual organisation (ref. Meggs, 1991: 264). In the print media these were 
exemplified in Lissitzky’s The Isms of Art 1914-1924 (Ref. Item 9.39). 
 
Bacon’s Method Realised With Constructivism 
9.47   Cooke describes ASNOVA and OSA as two main groups of scientific 
modernism (ref. Papadakis, ed., 1991: 13). However, ASNOVA continued to regard the 
traditional requirement for composition as a factor in architecture. On the other hand, 
OSA had theoretically done away with the requirements for composition and embraced a 
laboratory method instead (ref. Item 9.46).  In 1927, Ginzberg described that using the 
laboratory method, any particular design problem was first ‘dismembered’ for closer 
examination and then ‘reassembled’. It also needs to be noted that OSA is a product of 
the 1918 revolution. Ginzberg hence advocated that every particular design problem was 
subject to the ‘general characteristic of the epoch as a whole’. These were purportedly the 
fact of a collective client and a new way of life; the fact that architecture was part of a 
larger state plan; the economic need to operate through norms and types; the ideological 
requirements to operate through ‘one single monistic method’ (ref. Papadakis, ed., 1991: 
15). 
 167 
 
9.48   Guinzberg’s laboratory method has four stages:  
Stage one involves generating ‘the basic spatial diagram of the building’, which 
was that ‘social condenser’, which is achieved through the analysis of the ‘flows’ and 
‘needs’ of social processes inside it, the environmental requirements, and the 
‘revolutionary thinking’ of how the technical means available might be used. 
Stage two demands that ‘the material forms crystallise as the social condenser be 
examined in terms of the problem of perception’ so that the perception enhances the 
useful activity of the condenser. 
Stage three examines ‘the elements of architecture which are the objects of 
perception: surface, volume and the volumetric co-existence of bodies in space’. It 
stresses the importance of those ‘types of transformation’, like cutting holes in surfaces, 
changes in the relationships of parts or ii their material, that offer means of making 
formal response to a change of the brief. 
Stage four involves detailed examination of ‘the particular processes of industrial 
production which leave their stamp…. on individual components and organisms within 
the building…. freed from handed-down models of the past’ (ref. Papadakis, ed., 1991: 
15). 
 
9.49   Guizberg further wrote that: “Form is a function, x, which has always to be 
evaluated anew by the architect in response to changes in the form-making situation”. 
Cooke suggests that: 
 
The mathematical language reflects one of their lessons from engineering: that 
mathematical precision is necessary in understanding properties of both materials and 
spatial organisations, and that when mathematical develops further a genuinely 
multivariate optimisation of form would become possible in architecture (Papadakis, ed., 
1991: 15). 
 
9.50   In effect, constructivism is anti-style. Architecture, like every other aspect 
of cultural life, was subjected to an examination as the Soviet Union sought a popular 
proletarian art. Architecture became part of the new socialist realism, a conscious style 
with avowed social and didactic aims. It also carried with it the conditions of culture. For 
example, Ilya Alexandrovich Golosov (1883-1945) wrote in 1921 that: “Style is not the 
essence of architecture, and what really matters is to distinguish true artistic spirit from 
style and material values” (ref. Papadakis, ed., 1991: 7). The constructivist philosophy 
also resolutely refused to evoke past and present values – constructivism eventually 
became a language of pure form, where the architect becomes a super technician. Any 
symbolism is contained within the construction. Constructivist ideal in effect carries the 
Baconian ideal for a laboratory (or scientific) approach, devoid of stylistic doctrines and 
pre-determined rules. 
 
Breaking The Classical Paradigm 
9.51   In architecture, the requirement for historicism and the classical Vitruvian 
paradigm for ‘commodity, firmness and delight’, where composition and proportion were 
always a demand were finally broken with constructivist theories and application. In his 
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article, New Methods of Architectural Thought, 1926, Ginzberg outlined   the nature of 
the break as follows: 
 
But the Revolution, in sweeping away the stagnant prejudices and outlived 
canons, has turned the fissure into abyss. On the far side of the abyss remain the last 
withering of the already decrepit system of European thinking, of that unprincipled 
eclecticism which always has a thousand aesthetic recipes at the ready, all of them 
approved by our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. Such thinking ready to ladle out 
truth from wherever suited – provided only it was from a source in the past. 
 
On this side of the abyss is opening up a new path which still has to be paved, and 
a great new expanses of space which still have to be developed and populated. The 
outlook and worldview of the contemporary architect is being forged in the 
circumstances of today, and new methods of architectural thinking are being created 
(Benjamin, ed., 1990: 43) 
 
 
9.52   To Ginzberg, the old system of designing would normally be a process 
wherein the task is hammered out logically and which represents a consciously creative 
process from the beginning to the end. He suggests that this process be replaced by one 
where the architecture “could only be solved through a precise elucidation of the 
unknowns….” (Benjamin, ed., 1990: 43). The recommended method echoes a process in 
a science laboratory, which is the Baconian inductive method. Ginzberg puts it 
rhetorically as follows: 
 
The architect sees around him the fearless creativity of inventors in various fields 
of contemporary technology, as with gigantic steps it conquers the earth, the ocean 
depths and the air, winning new bridgeheads by the hour. It is not difficult to see that 
these astonishing successes of the human genius are explained, in general, by the fact 
that the right method was pursued in tackling the task. The inventor knows full well that 
however energetic the upsurge of this creative enthusiasm may be, it will be useless 
without a sober consideration of all minutiae in the circumstances surrounding his 
activity. He is fully armed with contemporary knowledge, he takes account of all the 
conditions of today, he looks forward, he conquers the future (Benjamin, ed., 1990: 43). 
 
9.53   The purpose of adopting the inductive method is to eventually invent, or to 
discover something which is previously unknown. In architecture, the sole purpose is to 
innovate. Ginzberg states that: 
 
In this field it is only the inventor’s creative method that the contemporary 
architect must master. Any mould or model from the past must be categorically 
repudiated, however beautiful it may be, for the pursuits of the architect are in their 
essence precisely such invention, just like all other invention. His is a work of invention 
which has set itself the aim of organising and constructing a concrete practical task not 
just in response to the dictates of today, but as something that will serve the needs of 
tomorrow (Benjamin, ed., 1990: 43-4). 
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Constructivism To Deconstruction 
9.54   Sixty years later Peter Eisenman is to elucidate views similar to Ginzberg. 
Eisenman regards the ‘modern’ architecture as merely the continuum of established 
classical architecture and that it did not rupture the classical paradigm as commonly 
assumed: 
 
Thus it is now possible to see that, although stylistically different from previous 
architectures, ‘modern’ architecture exhibits a system of relations similar to the 
classical. Prior to this time, the ‘classical’ was taken to be either synonymous with 
‘architecture’ conceived of as a continuous tradition from antiquity or, by the mid-
nineteenth century, a historical style. Today the period of time dominated by the classical 
can be seen as an‘episteme’, to employ Foucault’s term – a continuous period of 
knowledge that includes the early twentieth century. Despite the proclaimed rupture in 
both ideology and style associated with the Modern Movement, the three fictions 
(representation, reason and history) have never been questioned and so remain intact. 
This is to say that architecture since the mid-fifteenth century aspired to be a paradigm of 
the classic, of that which is timeless, meaningful, and true. In the sense that architecture 
attempts to recover that which is classic, it can be called ‘classical’ (Eisenman, 2004: 
153). 
 
9.55   Like the constructivists, Eisenman suggests the doing away with 
composition as a priory to the architectural process to enable form to become a place for 
invention, that there should be an internal process that can generate a non-
representational architecture. To Eisenman, the way toward achieving formal invention is 
to undermine classical aesthetic and replace it with the poetic of architectural text: 
 
In this context architectural form is revealed as a ‘place of invention’ rather than 
as a subservient representation of another architecture or as a strictly practical device. 
To invent an architecture is to allow architecture to be a cause; in order to be a cause, it 
must arise from something outside a directed strategy of composition. 
 
The end off the end also concerns the end of the object representation as the only 
metaphoric subject in architecture. In the past the metaphor in architecture was used to 
convey such forces as tension, compression, extension, and elongation; these were 
qualities that could be seen, if not literally in the objects themselves, then in the 
relationship between objects. The idea of the metaphor here has nothing to do with the 
qualities generated between buildings and spaces; rather, it has to do with the idea that 
the internal process itself can generate a kind of non-representational figuration in the 
object. This is an appeal, not to the classical aesthetic of the object, but to the potential of 
architectural text. The problem, then, is to distinguish texts from representations, to 
convey the idea that what one is seeing, the material object, is a text rather than a series 
of image references to other objects or values (Eisenman, 2004: 163). 
 
9.56   What Eisenman advocates is similar to the Objective Analysis Group of the 
constructivists who asked for a more self-consciously programmatic way of creating a 
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form that involved ‘building it up’, literally ‘constructing it’, rather than composing the 
work as a single perceived image (ref. Item 9.44). In Eisenman, the ‘building it up’ and 
‘constructing it’ have evolved into the idea of architecture as ‘writing’, which like the 
constructivists is also opposed to architecture as image (ref. Eisenman, 2004: 163). To 
Eisenman, the reader of the writing is not regarded as a user or observer, who is therefore 
distanced from any from any external value system  (especially an architectural-historical 
system). Therefore, to Eisenman, such a reader has no preconceived knowledge of what 
architecture should be in terms of its proportions, textures, scale, and the like; nor does 
this kind of architecture aspire to make itself understandable through these perceptions 
(ref. Eisenman, 2004: 163). Eisenman describes what happens to the reader and to the 
architectural process as follows: 
 
The new reader is no longer presumed to know the nature of truth in the object, 
either as a representation of a rational origin or as a manifestation of a universal set of 
rules, governing proportion, harmony and ordering…. The activity of reading is first and 
foremost in the recognition of something as a language (that it is). Reading, in this sense, 
makes available a level of indication rather than a level of meaning or expression…. 
Architecture in the present is seen as a process of inventing an artificial past and 
futureless present (Eisenmen, 2004: 164). 
 
Dadaist ‘State Of Mind’ 
9.57   In the above statement, Eisenman asks for freedom for architecture from 
having to have a truth in the object, and freedom from having to be tied to a past or tied 
to an assumed future. The opposition to architecture having a tradition, a future or an 
image is no less than politicising architecture. Especially when Eisenman were to state, 
with regard to innovation that: “In this context architectural form is revealed as a ‘place 
of invention’ rather than as a subservient representation of another architecture or as a 
strictly practical device. To invent an architecture is to allow architecture to be a cause; in 
order to be a cause, it must arise from something outside a directed strategy of 
composition” (ref. Item 9.55). What then forms the basis of the spirit of the ‘new’ 
architecture if it is without history, assumed future, image or composition? The only 
thing that Eisenman agrees it must have is a language. Architecture to Eisenman is 
therefore some kind of political statement. According to E. M. Farrelly, writing about 
‘The New Spirit’ in 1986, when deconstruction ideas were still new, her Dadaist ‘state of 
mind’ echoed to what Eisenman had envisaged: 
 
In a few short years (Dada) was to re-evaluate the role of art and artists in 
society so profoundly that none of the arts – poetry, music, painting, sculpture, 
photography – would, or could, ever be the same again. It was, in the words of Werner 
Haftmann, a movement in which “all the values of human existence…. were brought into 
play, and every object, every thought, turned on its head, mocked and misplaced, as an 
experiment, in order to see what that was behind it, beneath it, against it, mixed up in 
it…. a state of mind feverishly exalted by the freedom virus, a unique mixture of 
insatiable curiosity, playfulness, and pure contradiction”. 
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…. Dada was not a new style or technique but in the words of Tristan Tzara, a 
‘state of mind’. It could not, therefore, be copied so far as absorbed – and, consciously or 
unconsciously, and with varying degrees of success and superficiality. Dada’s ‘freedom-
virus’ has been absorbed, direct into the blood stream of twentieth-century art (Davey, 
ed., 1986: 10). 
 
9.58   The result of the Dadaist ‘state of mind’ to architecture, according to 
Farrelly, in 1986, was a new spirit: 
 
The New Spirit, like Dada, is fired in part by the need to break-down and break 
through existing patterns of deceit and smug self-interest. It is not only anti-stasis, anti-
concealment, but also profoundly anti the increasing smoothness, glibness and facile 
predictability of the established (and by and large unexamined) canons of the prevailing 
architectural order (Davey, ed., 1986: 11). 
 
9.58   Farrelly was of course overselling her idea of ‘New Spirit’ as it did not turn 
out to be generic. Farrelly’s ‘New Spirit’ were exemplified on the main by: the works and 
manifesto of Co-op Himmelblau for architecture; Elias Moser and William Goodwin for 
interior architecture; Neville Brody for graphic design (ref. Davey, ed., 1986: 18-33). Co-
op Himmelblau would become part of the deconstruction movement and interior 
designers like the Japanese Super Potato, would continue Elias Moser and William 
Goodwin kinetic, tactile interior architecture. Neville Brody was associated with punk 
graphics due to his album covers for the Sex Pistols in the 1970s. Clearly, Farrelly was on 
to something then, but her ‘New Spirit’ never caught on; but something else did, which 
was Derrida’s ‘Deconstruction’. 
 
From Freedom To Imagination 
9.59   Derrida’s terminology ‘deconstruction’ is a translation of Heidegger’s   
terminologies, Destruktion and Abbau. Destruktion does not equate to destruction; but 
instead, it is a process of destructuring that: “dismantles the structural layer in a system’ 
and, Abbau means, “to take apart an edifice in order to see how it is constituted”. Both 
signify “an operation bearing on the structure or traditional architecture of the 
fundamental concepts of ontology or of western metaphysics”. Derrida’s idea is that the 
‘destructuring’ disturbs a tradition by inhabiting its structure in a way that exploits its 
metaphoric resources against itself, not to abandon the structure but to locate what it 
conceals” (ref. Wigley, 1993: 42). 
 
9.60   It takes imagination to understand what Derrida is saying and his sayings 
are known only intuitively as his interest is to discard the rules that realise structure, 
particularly the structure of language. With regard to architecture, it would be easier to 
assume that the unbuilding, which is deconstruction, has to do with demolishment; but it 
is not. It attempts instead to: “establish the conditions of possibility of the ‘traditional 
architecture’ rather than staging its fall” (Wigley, 1993: 42). Whilst it takes imagination 
to understand the point Derrida tries to make, the execution itself is a scientific process, 
like Baconian induction. Wigley explains the architectural process as follows: 
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To make a building tremble is precisely not to collapse it by subjecting it to some 
external force, but to explore it from within, even to consolidate the structure, imitating 
its every gesture, faithfully repeating its operations but in a way that exposes its limits, 
opening up its structure or, rather, finding the openings that are already there, the 
concealed points of weakness…. an appropriation of structures that identifies structural 
flaws, cracks in the construction that have been systematically disguised, not to collapse 
those structures but, on the contrary, to demonstrate the extent to which the structures 
depend on both these flaws and the way they are disguised (Wigley, 1993: 42). 
 
9.61   The inductive process as described by Wigley’s passage above is like an 
execution of a particular language, a way of architecture that also requires the interjection 
of the imagination. It is one of many ways of making architecture, embraced by some and 
rejected by others for myriads of reasons. As far back as 1917, Gropius had already 
articulated the prerequisite of imagination above all else, and he did with the surety of 
conviction – the issues raised then are equally valid today: 
 
What is architecture? The crystalline expression of man’s noblest thoughts, his 
ardour, his humanity, his faith and his religion! That it once was! But who of those living 
at this time, cursed as it is with functionalism, does still understand the all embracing 
and cheering nature of architecture…. The grey, empty, obtuse stupidities in which we 
live and work will bear humiliating testimony to the spiritual abyss into which our 
generation has slid…. Ideas perish as soon as they are compromised…. Build in fantasy 
without regard for technical difficulties. To have the gift of imagination is more 
important than all technology, which always adapts itself to man’s creative will (ref. 
Jencks, 1995: 20). 
 
Question Of Language 
9.62   The arguments above trace the lineage from the emergence of scientific 
attitude in the seventeenth century to modernism and later, to deconstruction, all of which 
seem to have begun with the method of induction that started with Bacon. However, all 
the while, other styles have run in concurrent with modernism in the twentieth century till 
today. The twentieth century have witnessed in concurrence with modernism, critical 
vernacular, ethnic vernacular and architectural postmodernism, together with 
deconstruction. Particularly with critical vernacular, function and locality form the basis 
of its formal language. From Wigley’s passages, deconstruction is an architectural 
language of choice, and by extension of the same spirit of argument, so would 
modernism, postmodernism and vernacular be extensions of chosen languages. There is 
however degrees of validity for each language at different times and localities. Some sort 
of subjective morality seems to determine this validity. For example, in opposing 
deconstruction for its ‘relativism’ and defending postmodernism, Jencks invoked plural 
architecture that is appropriate for different localities – in similar way that William Lim 
does: 
 
By contrast, the tradition of Post-Modernism to which I belong – called various 
‘restructive’, ‘constructive’ or ‘ecological’ – contends that metanarratives have not 
ended but, rather, have become contested, and are seen now in their plurality. It is this, 
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not nihilism or absolute relativism, that is the big shift in our time: a movement towards 
the fullness of different meanings and diverse ways of life, continuously created by an 
expanding universe. If plural meanings did not exist we – or any species that can feel or 
think – would soon invent them. Cosmic values, as I will argue, precede and are mirrored 
by aesthetic and social values. Truth, beauty and morality are not, pace so much Western 
philosophy, just in the eye of the beholder (Jencks, 1995: 25). 
 
9.63   This recalls the kinds of examples that Li was using to demonstrate 
innovation in architecture in the seventeenth and eighteenth century in England (ref. Li, 
2007). It seems too at the time it was all a matter of appropriate language; the difference 
being that values at the time was void without historical continuum. As acceptable 
aesthetic language, history provided some kind of certainty or truth – the formal language 
of the past was used to certify the meaning of the present. Modern architecture then 
purported to liberate architecture from the past by suggesting that architecture should not 
represent the past; but embodied its function, with the deductive conclusion that form 
followed function.  
 
9.64   With the purpose of distancing itself from historical representational 
tradition, modern architecture stripped itself of the outward trappings of historicism, 
particularly the ‘Classical’ style. Following abstract art, the process of reduction was 
often referred as abstraction. For example, a column without a base and a capital was 
thought to be an abstraction. Thus the reduced form was thought to embody function and, 
without adornment, it represented honesty. The column thus becomes the simple load-
bearing element, in the language of aesthetic honesty. However, in a critique of 
modernism, Eisenman infers that its language of function is just another accent of the 
classical language: 
 
Functionalism turned out to be yet another stylistic conclusion; this one based on 
a scientific and technical positivism, a simulation of efficiency. From this perspective the 
Modern Movement can be seen to be continuous with the architecture that preceded it. 
Modern architecture therefore failed to embody a new value in itself. For in trying to 
reduce architectural form to its essence, to a pure reality, the moderns assumed they 
were transforming the field of referential figuration to that of non-referential 
‘objectivity’. In reality, however, their ‘objective’ forms never left the classical tradition. 
They were simply stripped down classical forms, or forms referring to a new set of givens 
(function, technology). Thus Le Corbusier’s houses that look like modern steamships or 
biplanes exhibit the same referential attitude toward representation as a Renaissance or 
classical building. The points of reference are different, but the implications for the 
object are the same (Eisenman, 2004: 164). 
 
9.65   If architecture cannot be a truth then it could possibly be a language, which 
speaks in different accents to convey intended meanings. As observed in the various 
manifestations of twentieth century architecture, they (particularly the modern) purport to 
speak the language of science just as the architecture of antiquity purport to speak of the 
language of ‘truth’, where historicism often played a part. In the modern, science and 
reason are used as vehicles in the quest for origin in architecture, in the Baconian 
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inductive manner. Whereas in the architecture of antiquity, origin was self evident, 
belonging to a then universal a priori values. With the modern, the origin was thought to 
contain architecture’s original purpose and thus its inevitable destiny – that the ideal 
origin would presumably lead to an ideal end, like finding the Holy Grail. Taking all 
possible frills away, the discourse is inevitably reduced to a discourse about function. 
 
9.66   In Item 9.64, Eisenman tries to demonstrate that the language of truth and 
origin in architecture has in effect shown to be self deceiving, as it is no less only another 
accent of the classical language. Truth also infers timelessness, and modernism infers this 
with its purported being as the ‘spirit of the age’. Through Hegel’s nineteenth century 
thesis, ‘The Phenomenology of Spirit’, dialectical time became the modern idea of 
zeitgeist, where presentness is rooted in cause and effect – what it meant is that an a 
priory relationship exists with between history and all its manifestation at any given 
moment, wherein architecture should be appropriate to its age. The governing spirit 
determines the style of the time, in other words, appropriate expression – or rather, 
appropriate language. Based on the ideology of the zeitgeist, origin, or truth, then cannot 
be found as the appropriate architecture is contingent and of the present, rather than 
absolute or eternal.  
 
9.67   The difference in value between historical classicism and twentieth century 
modernism, between the eternal value of classicism and the contingent value of the 
zeitgeist in the end is aesthetic preferences – or style – or language. From the critical 
viewpoint, the historical moment of the zeitgeist seems merely the continuum of many 
historical moments – like steps of evolution. In that sense, the modern idea of zeitgeist is 
not a rupture of history as its proponents would hope. The time of modernism, in the 
twentieth century is hence not ideologically eternal – the precepts of modernism will 
again change with time. From within history it does not seem possible to argue for a case 
of timelessness or a single eternal truth, otherwise history would cease to be an objective 
source of truth. Timelessness of any idea or ideology is hence illusory. 
 
9.68   With no one single man-made timeless truth; there is hence no timeless 
meaning for the reason that the loss of self-sustaining value results also in the loss of 
timelessness of meanings. Hence architecture can be timeful, linked to history; but it 
cannot be timeless – there is a separation between timelessness and value. By the 
extension of this argument, it becomes invalid to search for a single origin in architecture. 
Much of critical architectural discussion thus seem erroneous, whether it was a discussion 
on the validity of modernism against postmodernism against deconstruction or the 
rightness of the vernacular and so on. 
 
9.69   Before the advent of what we understand now as modernity, architecture 
had naturally been mimetic – a simulation of something, whether of an object or of a 
narrative. For example, classical columns were simulation of trees and rising religious 
edifices were symbolic of religiosity. Even in the era of modernity, round windows were 
representative of portholes of ships. In this sense architecture is similar to the other arts, 
where for example in literature, metaphors and similes have wide range of nuances, 
enabling the poetic and the ironic to happen. 
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9.70   Equally, by extension of the same argument, the application of reason in 
architecture is also another form of simulation. The architectural manifestations of reason 
would naturally include the rational value of structures, rational representations, the quest 
for an ideal original leading to an eventual end and that the process would be deductive. 
That would still be the classical way of doing architecture, as the origin is left unruptured. 
Innovation would still be only incremental, whilst the classical paradigm still continues. 
The incremental innovation would have the same sense as the classical period where the 
columns were essentially the same with capitals evolving from the Doric to the Ionic to 
the Corinthian. 
 
9.71   Without the baggage of history, to be innovative then would be to modify 
the origin or to invent another origin. To get to modify the origin would then not be one 
of causal strategy, but instead a process of manipulating the origin through a non-
directional, non-dialectical and non-goal-orientated process. The ultimate motive is to 
reinvent the origin. However, the process of engaging the origin is value-laden even 
before the process could begin. For example, since the arbitrary origin cannot be known 
in advance, as it does not depend on historical tradition, hence the origin cannot engender 
a strategy – in a way it is saying that no strategy can begin without some kind of 
knowledge – if not historical knowledge, then at least knowledge that is a progeny of 
culture or domains. From the literature reviews, we have come to realise that none of the 
great innovators begin in a void, all of whom in effect are influenced by their 
predecessors, they require a period of time to develop their ideas (10-12 years) and they 
interact actively within their own and with other domains (ref. Items 5.46-60). 
 
9.72   It seems then that the way to modify the origin is to engage architecture 
outside of object representation, beyond the normal discourse that concerns appearances, 
forms and spaces – outside discussions about proportion, harmony, formal tension and so 
on. To shake the prevailing classical-dominant origin, the engagement with the origin 
could possibly move away from object and spaces to something else – pure language 
perhaps. The engagement with the origin could possibly have been the prime motivator 
behind deconstruction theory, Farrelly’s ‘New Spirit’ (ref. Davey, ed., 1986) and Jencks’ 
cosmic postmodernism (ref. Jencks, 1995). 
 
9.73   For example, deconstruction theorists attempt to convert the engagement of 
the origin from that of object representation to that of language representation. In the 
1980s, Eisenman used text to attempt to modify the origin and in the 1990s, he used 
diagrams. Eisenman suggests in the 1980s that ‘architectural writing’ evokes another 
system of signs called ‘traces’ that have no other value than to ‘signal the idea’. It does 
not simulate the real but in a complicated way, skirts around it, through the ‘idea to read’, 
which is not a simulation of reality, but an action in process: 
 
What is being ‘written’ is not the object itself  – its mass and volume – but the act 
of massing. This idea gives the metaphoric body to the act of architecture. It then signals 
its reading through an other system of signs called traces. Traces are not meant to read 
literally, since they have no other value than to signal the idea that there is a reading 
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event and that reading should take place; trace signals the idea to read. Thus a trace is a 
partial or fragmentary sign; it has no objecthood. It signifies an action that is in process. 
In this sense a trace is not a simulation of reality; it is a dissimulation because it reveals 
itself as distinct from its formal reality…. Thus the trace is the record of motivation, the 
record of an action, not an image of another object-origin (Eisenman, 2004: 163). 
 
9.74   By distancing herself from the object, and from formal reality, Eisenman’s 
‘reader’ of architecture holds a disinterested position, which recalls Kant’s aesthetic 
judge – who has no vested interest in the work of art in order to provide value judgment 
(ref. Kant (1790), 2000). Eisenman describes the qualities the ‘reader’ needs to break 
away from the classical paradigm: 
 
Such a reader brings no prior competence to the act of reading other than an 
identity as a reader. That is, such a reader has no preconceived knowledge of what 
architecture should be (in terms of its proportions, textures, scale and the like); ‘nor does 
a not-classical’ architecture aspires to make itself understandable through these 
preconceptions…. 
 
The new competence comes from the capacity to read per se, to know how to read 
(but not necessary to decode) architecture as a text. Thus the new ‘object’ must have the 
capacity to reveal itself first of all as a text, as a reading event (Eisenman, 2004: 163). 
 
9.75   What Eisenman has done through the ‘reader’ is to turn architecture into a 
linguistic activity, where the reader behaves like a linguist, and reading architecture is 
like reading a fiction novel, without commitment to a ‘truth’. By this time, Eisenman had 
already regarded architecture as fiction, more indicative than   meaningful: 
 
The architectural fiction proposed here differs from the classical fiction in its 
primary condition as a text and in the way it is read: the new reader is no longer 
presumed to know the nature of truth in the object, either as a representation of a 
rational origin or as a manifestation of a universal set of rules governing proportion, 
harmony, and ordering. But further, knowing how to decode is no longer important; 
simply, language in this context is no longer a code of assign meanings (that this means 
that). The activity of reading is first and foremost in the recognition of something as a 
language (that it is). Reading, in this sense, makes available a level of indication rather 
than a level of meaning and expression (Eisenman, 2004: 164). 
 
9.76   It is apparent that with the application of the methodologies of language 
into architecture, Baconian science began to mutate to areas of uncertainty. The quest for 
‘underlying principles’ to innovate holistically instead of incrementally, has necessitated 
the destabilising of the origin – Eisenman calls it ‘dislocation’. Baconian science had by 
necessity given way to cognitive thinking in order to progress and to enable wholesale 
innovation. In architecture, Eisenman seems to have demonstrated that the laboratory 
method is limiting and is insufficient to test the ‘origin’.  
 
Time Context – Cybernetics Theory 
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9.76   The statements Eisenman made could not have been possible before 1945, 
before Einstein’s theories of relativity and quantum mechanics began to be assimilated 
outside of the scientific circles. Since then, the paradigms of certainty and linearity were 
questioned. The frequent quest for a single truth could be done away with. Also after the 
war, ideas concerning connecting fields of interdisciplinary studies began to happen. 
Contemporary cybernetics for example, was first coined by Norbert Weiner in 1948 and 
included the study of ‘teleological mechanisms’ and included the interdisciplinary study 
of control systems, electrical network theory, logical modelling and neuroscience. It was 
popularised through his book, ‘Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the 
Animal and Machine’ (1948). Through another book, ‘The Human Use of Human 
Beings: Cybernetics and Society’ (1950), Weiner popularised the social implications of 
cybernetics, drawing analogies between the automatic systems and the human 
institutions31.  
 
9.77   Its incarnation today, termed as the second order cybernetics, under the 
direction of Heinz von Foerster at the University of Illinois since 1958, emphasises how 
observers construct models of the systems with which they interact (eg. complex 
systems) to maintain, adapt and self organise. The circularity, or self-reference makes it 
possible to make precise, scientific models of purposeful activity that is orientated toward 
a goal or preferred condition. In that sense, cybernetics proposes a revolution with respect 
to the linear, mechanistic models of traditional Newtonian science. Prior to the twentieth 
century science and cybernetics, in classical science, every process is determined solely 
by its cause, that is, a factor residing in the past (ref. 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CYBERN.html). 
 
9.78   Cybernetics has discovered that teleonomy (or finality) and causality can be 
reconciled by using non-linear, circular mechanisms, where the cause equals the effect. 
The simplest example of such a simplest mechanism is feedback. The simplest 
application of negative feedback or self-maintenance is homeostasis32. The non-linear 
interaction between the homeostatic or goal-directed system and its environment results 
in a relation of control of the system over the perturbations coming from the environment 
(ref. http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CYBERN.html). 
 
9.79   Just as Eisenman had used ‘trace’ to presumed underlying principles in 
deconstruction theory, cybernetics too presumed that there are underlying principles, 
which are applicable to complex systems, such as organisms, ecologies, minds, societies 
and machines. In the case of cybernetics, the underlying principles are used to unify the 
understanding of disparate types of systems. The characteristics of the underlying 
principles are: 
 
Complexity: Cybernetic systems are complex structures, with many 
heterogeneous interacting components. 
Mutuality: These many components interact in parallel, cooperatively, and 
in real time, creating multiple simultaneous interactions among subsystems. 
Complementarity: These many simultaneous modes of interaction lead to 
subsystems which participate in multiple processes and structures, yielding any single 
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dimension of description incomplete, and requiring multiple complementary, irreducible 
levels of analysis… 
Evolvability: Cybernetic systems are constructive, in that as they tend to 
increase in size and complexity, they become historically bound to previous states while 
simultaneously developing new traits. 
Reflexivity: Cybernetic systems are rich in internal and external feedback, 
both positive and negative. Ultimately, they can enter into ‘ultimate’ feedback of reflexive 
self-application, in which their components are operated on simultaneously from 
complementary perspectives, for example as entities and processes. Such situations may 
result in the reflexive phenomena of self-reference, self-modelling, self-production and 
self-reproduction (http:/pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CYBSNAT. Html). 
 
Mutuality 
9.80   The idea of mutuality is also a popular idea outside of cybernetics. In 
popular science prominent scientists like David Bohm and Edward O. Wilson mooted 
similar ideas. For example, Bohm states that: “The notion that all these fragments are 
separately existent is evidently an illusion, and this illusion cannot do other than lead to 
endless conflict and illusion” (Bohm, 1980: 2). Wilson comparably states this as follows: 
 
As the century closes, the focus of the natural sciences has begun to shift away 
from the search for new fundamental laws and toward new kinds of synthesis – ‘holism’, 
if you prefer – in order to understand complex systems. That is the goal, variously, in 
studies of the origin of the universe, the history of climate, the functioning of cells, the 
assembly of ecosystems, and the physical basis of the mind. The strategy that works best 
in these enterprises is the construction of coherent cause-and-effect explanations across 
levels of organisation. Thus the cell biologist looks inward and downward to ensembles 
of molecules, and the cognitive psychologist to patterns of aggregate nerve cell activity 
(Wilson, 1999: 292). 
 
9.81   Baconian science, through the laboratory method aims at getting a result 
that answers a question, in other words its purpose is to achieve certainty, which in the 
end provides a theory or a law. However, alternative science also asks questions but it 
expects uncertainty. The expectant uncertainty could be traced to the early twentieth 
century discovery of the laws of relativity and even more so, to the discovery of quantum 
mechanics that establishes the uncertainty of universal laws: 
 
Thus, the quantum theory shows that the attempt to describe and follow an atomic 
particle in precise detail has little meaning. The notion of an atomic path has only a 
limited domain of applicability. In a more detail description the atom is, in many ways, 
seen to behave as much as a wave as a particle. It can perhaps best be regarded as a 
poorly defined cloud, dependent for its particular form on the whole environment, 
including the observing instrument. Thus, one can no longer maintain the division 
between the observer and the observed. Rather, both observer and observed are merging 
and interpenetrating aspects of one whole reality, which is indivisible and unanalysable 
(Bohm, 1980: 11-2). 
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9.82   According to Bohm, relativity infers the same thing, that new observations 
requires the world to be viewed as an undivided whole:  
 
Relativity calls for this sort of way of looking at the atomic particles, which 
constitute all matter, including of course human beings, with their brains, nervous 
systems, and the observing instruments they have built and that they use in their 
laboratories. So, approaching the question in different ways, relativity and quantum 
theory agree, in that they both imply the need to look on the world as an undivided whole, 
in which all the parts of the universe, including the observer and his instruments, merge 
and unite in one totality. In this totality, the atomist form of insight is a simplification and 
an abstraction, valid only is some limited context (Bohm, 1980: 13-4). 
 
Undivided Wholeness In Flowing Movement 
9.83   Bohm calls the new form of insight ‘Undivided Wholeness in Flowing 
Movement’. This is a kind of ‘stream of consciousness’, a flux of awareness, which is not 
precisely definable (ref. Bohm, 1980: 14). Bohm suggests that the insight is: “…. prior to 
that of the ‘things’ that can be seen to dissolve in this flow…. Evidently prior to the 
definable forms of thoughts and ideas which can be seen to form and dissolve in the flux, 
like ripples, waves and vortices in a flowing stream. As happens with such patterns of 
movement in a stream some thoughts recur and persist in a more or less stable way, while 
others are evanescent” (Bohm, 1980: 14). Bohm goes on to suggest that: 
 
The proposal for a general form of insight is that all matter is of this nature: That 
is, there is a universal flux that cannot be defined explicitly but which can be known only 
implicitly, as indicated by the explicitly definable forms and shapes, some stable and 
some unstable, that can be abstracted from universal flux. In this flow, mind and matter 
are not separate substances. Rather, they are different aspects of one whole and 
unbroken movement. In this way, they are able to look on all aspects of existence as not 
divided from each other, and thus we can bring to an end the fragmentation implicit in 
the current attitude toward the atomic point of view, which leads us to divide everything 
from everything in a thoroughgoing way. Nevertheless, we can comprehend that aspect of 
atomism which still provides a correct and valid form of insight; i.e. that in spite of the 
undivided wholeness in flowing movement, the various patterns that can be abstracted 
from it have a relative autonomy and stability, which is indeed provided for by the 
universal law of the flowing movement (Bohm, 1980: 14). 
 
9.84   The new science recalls Wittgenstein’s remark regarding language and 
thought, which comes together like a stream and only in the ‘flow’: “Conversation, the 
application and interpretation of words flow on, and only in the flow (Fluβ) does a word 
have meaning” (Wittgenstein, 1980: S 135). Following the remark, Wittgenstein also 
states that, “Words only have meaning in the river of thought and life” (Wittgenstein, 
1980: S 174). This further recalls Item 1.31 earlier on in this thesis, which refers to the 
relationship between the visiocentric nature of architecture and Wittgenstein’s remarks 
regarding ‘flow’. Here he sets his river image as a visual illustration of the nature of 
boundary of every assertion and the words we use to describe the background, and also 
why the background is so hard to describe. The passages begin with a sketch of a world-
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picture, which is a graphic depiction of his understanding of the world and our place in it. 
The use of imagery is consequence to his of his conception of a world-picture, which can 
be described in terms of myth, or of the rules of a game that we may know mentally but 
not articulated. This is not ostensive analysis because the rules are implicit and normative 
rather than explicit and factual: any explicit formulation of the world-picture will not 
draw out the embedded: 
 
But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied with its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false. 
 
The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a mythology. And 
their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, 
without learning any explicit rules. 
 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical 
propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions 
as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid 
propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. 
 
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may 
shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift 
of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other. 
 
But if someone were to say “So logic too is an empirical science” he would be 
wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to 
test by experience, at another as a rule of testing. 
 
And the bank of the river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or 
only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which is now in one place now in another 
gets washed away, or deposited (Wittgenstein, 1969: SS94-99). 
 
9.85   The above image holds that change is possible against a background. It 
implies indeterminacy in the world; however some things must remain constant. 
Wittgenstein is to later point to the primacy of the background and its indeterminacy: “If 
a pattern of life is the basis for the use of a word then the word must contain some 
amount of indefiniteness. The pattern of life, above all, is not one of exact regularity” 
(Wittgenstein, 1982: S211). Once indeterminacy is introduced into the picture, the 
boundary between the subjectivity of background and objective ostensivity is blurred. He 
then says in ‘Philosophical Grammar’, “…. In our study of symbolism there is no 
foreground and background; it isn’t a matter of tangible sign with an accompanying 
intangible power or understanding” (Wittgenstein, 1969a: S43). The background that 
Wittgenstein discusses about is an indeterminable pattern of life, which is causal to our 
thoughts: “Behind our thoughts, true and false, there is always to be found a dark 
background, which we are only later able to bring into the light and expressed as thought” 
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(Wittgenstein, 1979: 36). The influence that this background has on form of life is further 
described as follows: 
 
We judge an action according to its background within human life, and this 
background is not monochrome, but we might picture it as a very complicated filigree 
pattern, which, to be sure, we can’t copy, but which we can recognise from the general 
impression it makes. 
 
The background is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within 
this bustle. 
 
And it is the very concept ‘bustle’ that brings about this indefiniteness. For a 
bustle only comes about through constant repetition. And there is no definite starting 
point for ‘constant repetition.’…. 
 
How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by showing the actions of 
a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. Not what one person is doing now, 
but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see action, and it 
determines our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions (Wittgenstein, 1980a: SS624-
626, S629). 
 
9.86   Wittgenstein’s ‘flow’ is little known among contemporary protagonists of 
‘flow’, as he is not quoted at all. However, the idea of flow began to be discussed in the 
1990s and began to be associated with Csikszentmihalyi, Gardner and Collins. When 
Csikszentmihalyi first suggested ‘flow’ in 1990, he describes it as: 
 
The optimal state of inner experience is one in which there is order in 
consciousness. This happens when psychic energy – or attention – is invested in realistic 
goals, and when skills match the opportunities for action. The pursuit of a goal brings 
order to awareness because a person must concentrate attention on the task at hand and 
momentarily forget everything else. The periods of struggling to overcome challenges are 
what people find to be the most enjoyable times of their lives…. By stretching skills, by 
reaching toward higher challenges, such a person becomes an increasingly 
extraordinary person (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990: 6). 
 
9.87   It is evident that Gardner’s ‘flow states’, Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘flow’ and 
Collins’ ‘emotional energy’ share exactly the same meaning.  
 
Gardner’s ‘heightened attention’ where, Certain brain centres and neural 
transmitters are mobilised in these states, whether they are induced by the ingestion of 
substances, involvement in a hobby, or sheer control of will (ref. 3.20) infers the same 
meaning as: 
 
  Csikszentmihalyi’s The optimal state of inner experience is one in which there is 
order in consciousness. This happens when psychic energy – or attention – is invested in 
realistic goals, and when skills match the opportunities for action. The pursuit of a goal 
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brings order to awareness because a person must concentrate attention on the task at 
hand and momentarily forget everything else (ref. 3.21).  
 
This again is the same as Collins’ A high degree of intersubjectivity, together with 
a high degree of emotional entrainment – through bodily synchronisation, mutual 
simulation / arousal of participants’ nervous systems – results in feelings of membership 
that are attached to cognitive symbols; and result also in the emotional energy of the 
individual participants, giving them feelings of confidence, enthusiasm, and desire for 
action…. These moments of high degree of ritual intensity are high points of experience 
(ref. 3.03). 
 
Therefore: Bohm’s ‘Undivided Wholeness In Flowing Movement’ = 
Wittgenstein’s ‘Fluβ’ = Gardner’s ‘Flow States’ = Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘Flow’ = Collins’ 
‘Emotional Energy’ 
 
–The psychological circumstances when innovation occurs. 
 
9.88   Although Csikszentmihalyi describes psychic energy in ‘flow’, it is not an 
existential or mystical hidden energy, but one that is overt as he later qualifies: 
 
After all, mystical experiences are not necessary to account for the performance 
of a great violinist, or a great athlete, even though most of us could not even begin to 
approach their powers…. Like all virtuosi, he must spend many years learning, and he 
must keep constantly in training. Being a specialist he cannot afford the time or the 
mental energy to do anything other than fine-tune his skill at manipulating inner 
experiences…. 
 
Because no branch of science deals with consciousness directly, there is no single 
accepted description of how it works. Many disciplines touch on it and thus provide 
peripheral accounts. Neuroscience, neuroanatomy, cognitive science, artificial 
intelligence, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology are some of the most directly relevant 
fields to choose from; however, trying to summarise their findings would result in an 
account similar to the descriptions the blind men gave of the elephant: each different, 
and each unrelated to the others. No doubt we shall continue to learn important things 
about consciousness from these disciplines, but in the meantime we are left with the task 
of providing a model that is grounded in fact, yet expressed simply enough so that anyone 
can make use of it (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990: 25). 
 
9.89   The ‘undivided wholeness in flowing movement’ as propositioned by 
Bohm is a necessary part of the process to arrive at art and poetry. It is a process that 
avoids the notion of ‘the fixed and final form’ (Ref. Bohm, 1980: 79) – to separate from 
the idea of atomistic certainty. Instead, it is to allow the free movement of the mind 
needed for clarity and perception, and thinking about totality is a necessity: 
 
As indicated earlier, thought and totality as its content has to be considered as an 
art form, like poetry, whose function is primarily to give rise to a new perception, and to 
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action that is implicit in this perception, rather than to communicate reflective knowledge 
of ‘how everything is’ This implies that there can no more be an ultimate form of such 
thought than there could be an ultimate poem (that would make all poems unnecessary) 
(Bohm, 1980: 80). 
 
From Flow To Socio-Culture 
9.90   When Csikszentmihalyi propositioned his version of flow in 1990 (Ref. 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), he speculated that it was the result of liberty of the 
consciousness from the ‘shields of culture’ (p. 11) and institutions (p. 21) – it was an 
internal act, or as Bohm puts it, an implicit order. However, he also suggested that flow is 
achievable through training:  
 
In the first place, the kind of knowledge – or wisdom – one needs for 
emancipating consciousness is not cumulative. It cannot be condensed into a formula; it 
cannot be memorised and then routinely applied. Like other complex form of expertise, 
such as a mature political judgment or a refined aesthetic sense, it must be carried 
through trial-and-error experience by each individual, generation after generation. 
Control over consciousness is not simply a cognitive skill. At least as much as 
intelligence, it requires the commitment of emotions and will. It is not enough to know 
how to do it; one must do it, consistently, in the same way as athletes or musicians who 
must keep practicing what they know in theory…. 
 
Control over consciousness cannot be institutionalised. As soon as it becomes 
part of a set of social rules and norms, it ceases to be effective in the way it was 
originally intended to be (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990: 21). 
 
9.91   Later, in 1996, new thinking about creativity emerged and the socio-cultural 
bases for creativity began to be consolidated and emphasised. In concurrence with the 
researches of Gardner and Collins at the time, creativity became part of cultural activity, 
arrived at interactively, moulded in a chain of encounters. Collins argues that progressive 
human events are a result of an interaction chain of social activities and individual 
psychology forms only part of the activities (Ref. Collins, 2004: 4-6). Earlier in 1996, 
Csikszentmihalyi stated as follows:  
 
Therefore, to understand creativity it is not enough to study the individuals who 
seem most responsible for a novel idea or a new thing. Their contribution, while 
necessary and important, is only a chain, a phase in a process. To say that Thomas 
Edison invented electricity or that Albert Einstein discovered relativity is a convenient 
oversimplification. It satisfies our ancient predilection for stories that are easy to 
comprehend and involve superhuman heroes. But Edison’s and Einstein’s discoveries 
would be inconceivable without the prior knowledge, without the intellectual and social 
network that stimulated their thinking, and without the social mechanisms that 
recognised and spread their innovations (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: 7). 
 
9.92   To Csikszentmihalyi’s later thinking, culture plays an integral part in 
creativity, and that tends to happen at the intersections of different cultures: 
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It also seems true that that centres of creativity tend to be at the intersection of 
different cultures, where beliefs, lifestyles, and knowledge mingle and allow individuals 
to see new combinations of ideas with greater ease. In cultures that are uniform and 
rigid, it takes greater investment of attention to achieve new ways of thinking. In other 
words, creativity is more likely in places where new ideas require less effort to be 
perceived (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: 9). 
 
9.93   Later again, in 2002, Florida explains the reason why creativity happens at 
these geographical locations: 
 
Creative people always gravitate to certain kinds of communities, such as the Left 
Bank in Paris or New York’s Greenwich Village. Such communities provide the 
simulation, diversity and a richness of experiences that are the wellprings of creativity…. 
These communities are defined by the impermanent relationships and loose ties that let 
us live the quasi-autonomous lives we want rather than those that are imposed on us 
(Florida, 2002: 15). 
 
9.94   Creative culture seemingly pervades at street level, where creators are able 
to interact and build upon it: 
 
You may not paint, write or play music, yet if you are at an art show opening or in 
a nightspot where you can mingle and talk with artists and aficionados, you might be 
more creatively stimulated than if you merely walked into a museum or concert hall, were 
handed a programme, and proceeded to spectate…. 
 
The culture is ‘street-level’ because it tends to cluster along certain streets lined 
with a multitude of small venues. These may include coffee shops, restaurants and bars, 
some of which offer performance or exhibits along with food and drink; art galleries; 
bookstores and other stores; small to mid-sized theatres for film and live performance or 
both; and various hybrid spaces – like a bookstore/tearoom/little theatre or 
gallery/studio/live music space – often in storefronts or old buildings converted from 
other purposes. The scene may spill out onto the sidewalks, with dining tables, musicians, 
vendors, panhandlers, performers, and plenty of passersby at all hours of the day and 
night (Florida, 2002: 183). 
 
9.95   William Lim refers to such a scene as a ‘celebration of chaos’, a 
characteristic of a postmodern city (ref. Item 8.27.1). In Singapore, a similar description 
occurred to Mohamed Sultan Road in the late 1990s, and in the turn of the millennium, 
similar activities shifted to Clarke Quay after the redevelopment there (ref. Items 8.45-9). 
Kwinter rationalises this phenomenon as part of a culture of ‘open system’: 
 
For here, all systems are open systems; they are labile and suffused with 
temporality; they are sensitive and chaotic in the sense that they are creative and 
adaptive – they ceaselessly undergo change, produce novelty; they transform or transmit 
unactualised potentials to a new milieu, in turn giving rise to a whole new series of 
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potentials to be actualised or not. Open systems are not only open to ‘outside’, but to 
wild becoming itself – the outside of all outsides (Kwinter, 2002: 48). 
 
9.96   Florida further states that creativity has both social and cultural bases: 
 
Human creativity is multifaceted and multidimensional. It is not limited to 
technological innovation or new business models. It is not something that can be kept in a 
box and trotted out when one arrives at the office. Creativity involves distinct kinds of 
thinking and habits that must be cultivated both in the individual and in the surrounding 
society. Thus, the creative ethos pervades everything from our workplace culture to our 
values and communities, reshaping the way we see ourselves as economic and social 
actors – our very identities. It reflects norms and values and both nurture creativity and 
reinforce the role that it plays. Furthermore, creativity requires a supportive environment 
that provides a broad array of social and cultural as well as economic stimuli (Florida, 
2002: 22). 
 
9.97   Florida postulates that the ‘multifaceted and multidimensional’ facets of 
creativity is the reason that creative individuals are attracted to the eclectic urban culture 
favoured also by William Lim: 
 
Think of the DJs in Harlem nightclubs of the 1970s who started the technique 
known as ‘sampling’ – frenetic mixing snatches of music from different records, on 
different turntables, for the crowd to dance to. Think of the proliferation of hyphenated 
music genres like Afro-Celt. Think of Warhol, Rauschenberg and a host of visual artists 
after them from appropriating images from new photos, comic strips, food packages, 
wherever. Eclectic scavenging from for creativity is not new. Picasso borrowed from 
African art as well as Greco-Roman classical forms; rock and roll pioneers melded blues 
and R&B; and one could argue that the literary DJ who really pioneered sampling was 
T. S. Elliot in The Waste Land, a poem built largely by stringing together, and playing 
upon, quotations and allusions from all corners of the world’s literature. Today, 
however, eclecticism is rampant and spreading to a degree that seems unprecedented. It 
is a key element of street-level culture – and eclectic taste is a social marker that can 
usually be counted on to distinguish a Creative Class person. Eclecticism in the form of 
culture intermixing, when done right, can be a powerful creative stimulus (Florida, 2002: 
185). 
 
9.98   The ‘powerful creative stimulus’ Florida speaks about involves interactive 
social and artistic happenings that intervene these urban fabrics, which could be staged 
performances, street theatre, street art or even creative conversations over a cup of coffee. 
The perceived free, eclectic and creative atmospheric setting allows these events to 
happen. Florida puts it as follows: 
 
One can meet people, hang out and talk, or just sit back to watch tonight’s 
episodes of the human comedy. To many the social milieu is indeed the street’s main 
attraction. If that sounds a bit vapid and superficial, sometimes it is. This is not high art; 
it admits amateurs. Hanging in a sidewalk café does not deliver the exquisite and 
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carefully crafted artistic intensity of Beethoven’s Ninth. It is also true that some people, 
hitting the street-level cultural scene devolves into little more than cruising the single 
scene. And even when experiencing culture is truly the goal, if hanging out in nightspots 
frequented by artists and aficionados is how you choose to pick up your creative 
stimulations, you are going to pick up a lot of chaff along with it. You run the risk of 
becoming chaff yourself: a dilettante, a poseur, a gallery gadfly, a coffee-shop talker 
(Florida, 2002: 185). 
 
9.99   Florida’s bohemian setting that reins in creativity is a cosmopolitan one, 
which would have ‘excitement and energy’, and enjoy a mix of influences. Florida 
describes the kind of place as ‘cosmopolitan’: 
 
…. a place where anyone can be can find a peer group to be comfortable with, 
and also find other groups to be stimulated by; a place seething with the interplay of 
cultures and ideas; a place where outsiders can quickly become insiders. In her book 
‘Cosmopolitan City’, Bonnie Menes Kahn puts it very simply. She says that a great city 
has two hallmarks: tolerance for strangers and intolerance for mediocrity. These are 
precisely the qualities that appeal to members of the Creative Class – and they also 
happen to be qualities conducive to innovation, risk-taking and the formation of new 
businesses (Florida, 2002: 227). 
 
Interaction Between And Within Domains 
9.100   The cosmopolitan setting is a microcosm of interaction of various 
domains. Csikszentmihalyi postulates that the interaction between domains is a condition 
for creativity – it is unlikely that creativity is achieved out of isolation: 
 
Yet it is important to keep in mind that most breakthroughs are based on linking 
information that usually is not thought of as related. Integration, synthesis both across 
and within domains, is the norm rather than the exception. Madeleine L’Engle is inspired 
by molecular biology to write her stories; Ravi Shankar finds ways of harmonising music 
of India and Europe; and almost all scientists cross and recross the boundaries of 
physics, chemistry and biology in the work that turns out to be creative. 
 
Even when not directly integrated in one’s work, other domains contribute to the 
overall mental life of creative individuals to the degree that belies the stereotype of the 
sterile, narrowly trained specialist (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002: 329). 
 
9.101   The point Csikszentmihalyi makes is not that external opportunities 
determine a person’s creativity, but something more modest – in that no matter how 
gifted a person is, he or she has no chance to achieve anything creative unless the right 
conditions are provided by the external environment, field or domain. He identified seven 
elements in the social milieu that help make creative contributions possible: 
 
In terms of what we have learned from the study, it is possible to single out seven 
major elements in the social milieu that help make creative contributions possible: 
training, expectations, resources, recognition, hope, opportunity, and reward. Some of 
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these are direct responsibilities of the field; others depend on the broader social system. 
If our argument is correct, then creativity can be substantially increased by making sure 
that society provides these opportunities more widely (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002: 330). 
 
9.102   For example, before Bob Dylan began to write and played his own songs, 
he threw himself among various musicians and audiences at different clubs at Greenwich 
Village in New York in the early 1960s, already then known for its bohemian setting, a 
magnet for musicians and artists. Cameron Crowe, Dylan’s biographer observes as 
follows: 
 
The frail-looking Dylan was a voracious learner. Once in New York, he was at the 
centre of all action. It was a chance to actually see and sometimes meet the artists he’d 
come to admire, including Woody Guthrie. Dylan listened to everybody and took it all 
in…. Dylan soon developed a style that would synthesise many different folk influences. 
At this time, it was bold move. Even the stodgiest standards sounded different Dylan’s 
way (Crowe, 1985: 6). 
 
9.103   What Dylan did was to take in all the different and rigid folk music around 
him from different parts of the U. S. and gave them a new musical attitude, which was 
influenced partly by the protest movement, and the cosmopolitan setting of Greenwich 
Village (ref. Crowe, 1985:6). Dylan’s innovation of American folk music was not at all a 
self-taught journey; but one that was at first a mastery of a particular predecessor. Dylan 
at first followed and mastered Woody Guthrie’s style before consciously breaking away, 
infusing other genre of music, like rock ‘n’ roll and rhythm and blues. What Dylan 
thought he did was merely to keep up with the times (ref. Crowe, 1985: 7). 
 
 9.104   Equally, in classical music, Boden suggests that ‘creative geniuses’ like 
Mozart does not have ‘special powers granted only to the artistic elite’; only a highly 
developed version of the power we all share (ref. Boden, 2004: 267). She suggests that 
myths were invented around these individuals, for example, letters which Mozart 
purported to have written, claiming sudden inspirations were later found to be spurious20: 
 
Musicologists have rejected this spurious ‘letter’ since the mid-1960s. Yet, a 
quarter of a century later, it is still being cited without qualifications by some writers on 
creativity. It is, of course, seductively plausible – for it fits in with the romantic and even 
inspirational views, and endorses our hero-worship of Mozart to boot (Boden, 2004: 
266). 
 
 9.105   It is similar in architecture. If we were to take Frank Lloyd Wright’s Prairie 
Houses for example, Boden dismisses the notion that Wright’s innovation is purely 
intuitive. She argues instead that Wright’s Prairie Houses follow grammatical constraints 
and is contained within a generic framework. In denigrating Koning’s and Eizenberg’s 
suggestion that Wright’s achievement of balance of the Prairie Houses is ‘occult’22 – 
“inferring that the stylistic unity is a mystery, accessible only to the intuitive genius of 
Wright”; she argues instead: “the shape grammar apparently captures the crucial aspects 
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of the Prairie Houses” (Boden, 2004: 310). She explains that Wright’s organisation of the 
Prairie Houses is explicit: 
 
Most of Lloyd Wright’s Prairie Houses have only one fireplace. Occasionally, 
however, he replaced the single hearth with several fireplaces. Because of the pivotal 
role of the fireplace in this particular style, to add a fireplace is to make a fundamental 
alteration to the overall structure. But it will still be recognised as an (unusual) form of 
the Prairie House. As the ‘grammarians’ responsible put it, varying the number of 
fireplaces generates ‘a veritable prairie village of distinct but interacting prairie-style 
designs’, all within a single building. 
 
Since the grammar allows a range of choices at each point, one can move into 
various regions of the conceptual space differing from neighbouring regions in more or 
less fundamental ways. Distinct ‘families’ of houses inhabit different regions of the space, 
and our intuitive of architectural similarity and dissimilarity can be specified 
accordingly. The principle of unity is no longer occult, but has been made explicit 
(Boden, 2004: 310). 
 
Collective Interaction Rituals 
9.106   The terminology that Collins uses for the interaction between individuals 
or groups of people, is ‘Interaction Ritual Chains’. In the purview of interaction ritual 
(IR), architecture as an activity is a result of “momentary encounters among human 
bodies charged up with emotions and consciousness because they have gone through 
chains of previous encounters” (Collins, 2004: 3). This points to the case that 
architectural innovation is a cultural activity, arrived at interactively – it has social and 
cultural premise. Unlike existentialism, IR does not accept the permanence of uniqueness 
of individuals, as: “Individuals are unique to just the extent that their pathways through 
interactional chains, their mix of situations across time, differ from other persons’ 
pathways. If we reify the individual, we have an ideology…. but we cut off the possibility 
of explaining how individual uniqueness are moulded in a chain of encounters across 
time” (Collins, 2004: 4,5). Collins thus argues that human events result from an 
interaction chain of social activities and individual psychology forms only a part of IR 
chains (ref. Item 3.01). 
 
9.107   Further to the interaction between and within domains, Collins’ 
‘Interaction Ritual Chains’ propositions a collective motivation towards innovation 
through a mutual focus of attention towards a goal. What purports to happen, according 
to Collins is: 
 
A high degree of intersubjectivity, together with a high degree of emotional 
entrainment – through bodily synchronisation, mutual simulation / arousal of 
participants’ nervous systems – results in feelings of membership that are attached to 
cognitive symbols; and result also in the emotional energy of the individual participants, 
giving them feelings of confidence, enthusiasm, and desire for action…. These moments 
of high degree of ritual intensity are high points of experience (Collins, 2004: 42) (ref. 
Item 3.03). 
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9.108   What is mutually focussed upon becomes the emblems, or cognitive 
symbols of the group. In the cult of innovators, canonical names and their works are the 
emblems that represent the group. Through the emblems the group focuses on its own 
feelings of intersubjectivity and shared emotions – it reifies its experiences. Collins 
explains IR role in this as follows: 
 
One chief result of rituals is to charge up symbolic objects with significance, or to 
recharge such objects with renewed sentiments of respect. Along with this, individual 
participants get their own reservoir of charge. The ‘sort of electricity’ that Durkheim 
metaphorically ascribes to the group in its state of heightened excitement is stored in 
batteries: one component of which is the symbol, and the other pole of which is the 
individual. Participant in the ritual gives the individual a special kind of energy, which I 
will call emotional energy (Collins, 2004: 38) (ref. Item 3.04). 
 
9.109   In Collins’ Interaction Ritual Theory, what motivates the architect in the 
cult of innovators is to be recognised as an emblem of the group. The innovative architect 
who has become an emblem, or cognitive symbol of the group equates with the way a 
politician, a religious leader, or a sports figure can become emblems for other IR groups. 
The emblems are essential for the prolongation of the group, as they become subjects for 
third-person narrations, gossips and are subjects of conversation within the network: 
“Both individual names and narratives about them are symbols, which get charged up 
with significance through the amount of momentary effervescence of the conversations in 
which they play a part” (Collins, 2004: 85). The emblem then becomes mythic as: “The 
accuracy of these accounts is a minor consideration in successful conversational ritual, 
and the further the network goes from the source, the less a consideration it becomes at 
all” (Collins, 2004: 85). There is also perceived profit in this for emblems whose names 
are canonised and mythicised, as they are situated at the pinnacle of an elitist group (ref. 
Item 3.05). 
 
9.110   In sociological terms, the emblem of the group acts also like the sacred 
symbol for the group: it provides a flow of emotional energy to the group. What the 
innovative architects, when recognised as emblem has gained over the group is 
asymmetrical power, under this circumstance, Collins explains that, “Power is an 
asymmetrical focus of attention upon such a situation, so that one side battens on the 
energy that all the participants have mutually produced. In a power ritual, the social 
battery is revved up, but the benefit goes largely to one side” (Collins, 2004: 125). It is 
thus evident that the emblem gains not only social significance (ref. 3.05) but also power 
and becomes the main beneficiary of collective emotional energy. The type of emotional 
energy associated with such gain would be joy and enthusiasm (ref. Collins, 2004: 125). 
 
9.111   According to Collins, there is asymmetrical stratification of emotional 
energy within the group, and that the emblem fits analogically, in an energised upper 
class, “Lording over a depressed lower class, with moderately energised middle-class 
persons in between” (Collins, 2004: 132). Taking this pattern, the winning innovators 
become the ‘energy stars’ – they become socially significant and would appear as such:  
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Persons with lower amounts of EE (emotional energy) are impressed by those 
who have accumulated a lot of it; such people have an EE-halo that makes them easy to 
admire. They are persons who get things done; they have an aura of success surrounding 
them. And since having high EE allows one to focus attention, one can get a certain 
amount of rise in one’s own EE by following them… This high EE gives dominant 
persons a kind of micro-situational legitimacy (Collins, 2004: 132, 133) (ref. Item 3,09). 
 
9.112   Interaction Ritual (IR) theory infers that individual behaviour is shaped by 
ritual participation, and that EE operates as the common denominator in the determinant 
of choices made between various courses of action and behaviour: “Emotional energy is 
the common denominator of all social comparisons and choices” (Collins, 2004: 172). 
Under IR theory, the investment of emotion, energy, costs and time is intended to result 
in emotional energy benefits. In architectural innovation, the benefit to the innovator is to 
be accepted as an emblem of the group with all the benefits raised in 3.08. Hence: 
 
IR maximise ratio = benefits (EE)     
                    investments ( EE + time + material) 
 
According to Collins, “the theory of maximisation ration is more powerful when 
applied to emotional currency of social life and the structures of interaction that produce 
it” (Collins, 2004: 182) (ref. Item 3.10). 
 
9.113   According to Collins’ theory, an intensive network between successful 
innovators enables architectural innovation: successful innovators have more network ties 
to other successful innovators than less successful innovators do. It infers that great 
innovators are more closely connected to other great innovators than are those in the 
lower rungs of innovation, and minor innovators have fewest ties of all. To Collins, “In 
the case of ideas we are concerned with here, the ideas which have mattered historically, 
it is possible to demonstrate that the individuals who bring forward such ideas are located 
in typical social patterns: intellectual groups, networks and rivalries” (Collins, 1998: 3) 
(ref. Item 3.11).  
 
9.114   Taking philosophers for example, Collins observe a chain of mentoring 
both upstream and downstream and, “across the generations both backward and forward 
in time. Great philosophers have more pupils and grandpupils who are relatively 
successful than lesser philosophers do; intellectual success propagates forward but also 
backward – having pupils who do important work is part of what gets an individual a 
long-term historical reputation as having had very important ideas” (Collins, 2004: 190). 
This observation could equally apply to architectural innovators, and the reasons given by 
Collins from the IR perspective could be said of architectural innovators: 
 
One of the reasons why there tend to be a chain from one highly creative 
intellectual to another is that the younger persons draws energy from the older just as 
such a symbolic hero. It is not merely a matter of transmitting cultural capital from one 
generation to the next, since we are dealing here with creative departures rather than 
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loyal discipleship. The protégé’s consciousness is filled by the image of what it is to be an 
intellectual hero, by an ideal to emulate, even while one challenges the content of the 
master’s ideas (Collins, 1998: 36) (ref. Item 3.12). 
 
9.115   In architecture, the modern movement would not be the same without the 
mentorship of Behrens on: Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, Meyer and Le Corbusier – all of 
whom were apprenticed to Behrens in the early twentieth century, albeit at different times 
(Ref. Item 9.28). The success of the Architectural Association during the chairmanship of 
Alvin Boyarsky between 1971 and 1990, in nurturing talents into important architects is 
owed to a system of mentorship, where students chose a mentored unit in a system of 
units (students were allowed to move from one unit to another), each of which was 
headed by a talented practitioner, acting as a mentor to the students. Boyarsky’s own 
innovative idea was to get rid of the standard curriculum system and replace it with the 
unit system (ref. van Schaik, 2005: 30). Van Schaik describes as follows: 
 
The innovation was quite deliberate to construct a series of enchainments through 
this web of activity. He curated a series of units into the Intermediate and Diploma 
Schools that had tentacles back and forth to three strongly contrasted positions in first 
year. Students would sample all positions during their studies, or they could choose a 
deep exploration of one (van Schaik, 2005: 194). 
 
9.116   Van Schaik observes that Boyarsky was in effect working toward a 
community of practice where enchainment could take place. Van Schaik identified the 
key elements needed by this community, which had happened at the AA at the time: 
 
– Diverse propositions in close contact with each other. 
– Enchainment structures across generations pursuing these propositions. 
– Discourse generated by these propositions. 
– Capturing the discourse as a series of platforms of mastery…. (van 
Schaik, 2005: 194). 
 
9.117   Other than vertical network between mentors and pupils, Collins also 
propositions horizontal networking between peers, where redundancy networking 
produces a strong sense of collective identity (ref. Collins, 2004: 193). In architecture, 
innovators often acquaint themselves in the same forum where they meet to propound 
their latest works, and the same innovators appear in often the same publications where 
they tend to compare works.  
 
9.118   In ‘Creative Minds’ (1993), Gardner says that even the giants of 
innovation in the twentieth century often knew one another, and they take into account 
innovative conceptualisations done in domains other than their own:  
 
It is important that individuals like Picasso and Stravinsky were friends in late 
life. Freud and Einstein had a casual acquaintance and engaged in a memorably pointed 
correspondence about war. Certain ideas associated with these creators become such 
common coin that anyone working during the era would have encountered them…. It 
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would be odd if highly creative individuals did not somehow take others’ novel 
conceptualisations into account in their own work (Gardner, 1993: 15). 
 
9.119   He is to reassert this again in ‘Multiple Intelligences’ in 1999, when 
speaking about individuals, Gardner infers that innovators do not appear from nowhere 
but are part of societal, or cultural network: “Individuals do not exhibit their intelligences 
‘in the raw’; they do so by occupying certain relevant niches in their society, for which 
they must prepare by passing through an often lengthy development process. In a sense, 
intelligences have their own developmental history” (Gardner, 1999: 38). 
 
Self -Curation 
9.120   To be an innovator, however, is not simply a matter of mere enchainment 
with mentor and peers but of possessing distinguishable differences, where there must be 
an emergence of strong ideas and originality. Van Schaik speaks about self-curation in 
the final zone of ‘Mastering Architecture’, which is a managed process that would finally 
turn mastery into creative breakthroughs, and toward innovation: 
 
This is a reflective process, which when properly understood can be managed as 
a process of ‘self-curation’. Becoming a curator of yourself is a way of: knowing how to 
handle yourself at each stage of your journey as an individual creative person; locating 
yourself in the supportive and challenging environments that forge mastery; finding those 
peers who help you to transform mastery into a platform for intellectual change; and 
seeking out those situations that clarify your creative breakthrough into innovation (van 
Schaik, 2005: 21). 
 
9.121   Van Schaik identified two orders of self-curation: a first order, which is 
the critic, and a second order. It would be the pursuit of the second order that would open 
up options toward innovation: 
 
We have encountered the critic as a curator, and we have found in this a useful 
distinction between the classicising, ‘first-order’ curating that seeks objectively to define 
a canon and close down exploration and a ‘second-order’ curating that opens up option 
for further innovation by including the subjectivity of the curator within the act of 
curating (van Schaik, 2005: 214-5). 
 
9.122   In van Schaik’s pedagogical work, he encourages innovative practitioners 
to put themselves in the position of second-order curators where they work toward: 
“creating a perspective of themselves in theatres of their mastery or in the galleries of 
their innovation” (van Schaik, 2005: 215). His intention is, in the process of self-curation, 
the practitioners become conscious of the processes. The aim seems to be for the 
practitioners to be made consciously aware through lateral processes, through the use of 
media other than those of their everyday practice: 
 
Self-consciousness equates with awareness, yes, but more than that is needed. 
Awareness must be couched with the frames of current theory, and awareness must be 
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expressed in mediums other than those of your everyday conversation and your everyday 
practice (van Schaik, 2005: 216). 
 
9.123   As a practise toward second-order self-curation, in exhibitions or 
publications, practitioners are encouraged to express themselves laterally through in 
mediums other than the presentations of their architecture. In giving an account of their 
current positions, they present as follows: 
 
– Through your visualisation of yourself as a creative innovator on a stage 
that is designed around our slowly evolving understanding of the ‘natural 
history of the creative individual’. 
– Through your visualisation of yourself as a strategic player in the theatre 
of ritualised public behaviours that characterise your chosen field within 
your chosen domain. 
– Through your visualisation of yourself as player between fields, a joiner of 
the horizons of different domains. 
– Through your visualisation of yourself as a theorist, organiser or patron 
who can choose to open up options or close them down (van Schaik, 2005: 
216). 
 
9.124   Some of the key features of the second-order self-curation are: 1) It is 
explicit and expressible, also being able to express beyond the tools of one’s domain; 2) 
Understand and being aware of one’s current position relative to others within the 
domain; 3) Strategise one’s position within one’s domain; 4) Interaction between and 
with other domains; 5) Beyond simple practice, suggestion of being a theorist, organiser 
or patron; 6) It is a continual learning process, not to close down options and seek out 
learning communities. 
 
9.125   Working with the staff at RMIT, van Schaik developed a model for a 
learning concourse (ref. van Schaik, 2005: 228). The learning concourse is to counter the 
first-order environment where learning is envisaged as ‘a lonely encounter between 
individuals and a curriculum’ (ref. van Schaik, 2005: 218). In the second-order 
environment, learners act independently as self-curators and what they seek from their 
educators are: “guidance, mentoring and facilitation, help with keeping in touch with 
what they should be seeking out for themselves as self-curators…. Clustered into fields of 
interest, they could then scan the concourse for learning opportunities that service their 
understanding of their own development” (van Schaiik, 2005: 219). Van Schaik further 
characterises the learning concourse as follows: 
 
The concourse offers an environment in which mastery can be established against 
selected local resistances and enchainment. It also allows mastery platforms, and 
accommodates connections between peer group communities from several such 
concourses. This concourse is sufficiently spatial to enable browsing and enchainment to 
take place in architectural space, rather than the click-through, page-on-page realm of 
the paper simulations of desks and filing cabinets that dominate virtual space today (van 
Schaik, 2005: 228). 
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9.126   The participants in van Schaik’s learning concourse are individuals – even 
if the participants participate in groups, individuals’ contributions to the groups are 
recognisable. Enchainment seemingly must begin with the individual’s motive, who may 
seek enchainment firstly with a group, or she may not. The learning concourse then 
provides the physical avenue for vertical and lateral enchainment. It encourages 
interaction within the domain and between domains. Many of the would-be mentors 
invited to the concourse are non-architects, providing an open portal for lateral 
interaction between domains. The learning concourse is the realisation of Collins’ 
Interaction Ritual Chains, a tailor-made portal for architectural innovation. But firstly, 
what are the things that first motivate the individual to want to join the learning 
concourse and seek mastery and innovation, and how would the mental processes work? 
 
Themata As Motivation 
 9.127   Briggs attempts to quantify the mental process leading toward innovation, 
but he first of all rejects the reductionist view. He eschews the attempts to squeeze the 
mental processes to a simple cluster of traits or attributes, and differing from say, 
Boden’s computational imagination. Following the work of Holton, Briggs suggests that 
there are hidden elements in the minds of innovators, which is termed as ‘thematic ideas’, 
which are clusters of presuppositions and ‘gut’ assumptions, which are called ‘themata’: 
themes. Using scientific discoveries as examples, Briggs explains as follows: 
 
For the most part themata are aesthetic qualities like the assumption that the 
universe is basically symmetrical, or the opposite assumption that it’s symmetrical…. 
‘normal’ science share basically the same set of underlying assumptions. Scientists who 
end up revolutionising their fields appear to have a collection of themata at variance in 
some significant ways with the theme clusters held by most of their colleagues (Briggs, 
2000: 26) (ref. Item. 7.04). 
 
 9.128   Themata are seen as guiding visionary elements connected to the 
innovator’s emotional life. Briggs speculates that when Einstein theorises on light, like 
the way he elevates the speed of light to the status as the only constant, or invariance, it 
might have something to do with unconscious biblical significance as part of his 
childhood influence; “linking him to the themes that were part of his childhood sense of a 
religious paradise. In relativity theory, light becomes the cornerstone of universal order” 
(Briggs, 2000: 30). He speculates that innovators have a higher commitment to the 
pursuit of their idiosyncratic ensembles of themes than their less creative colleagues:  
 
 Colleagues may ignore, even suppress some of their own subliminal thematic 
perceptions because they are not perceptions that people around them acknowledge….  
 
 Great creators are different in the sense that they feel compelled to show the 
world that their themata in fact point to a hidden reality that people pursuing the 
consensual themata of the moment have failed to notice. 
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The strength of this commitment is so powerful that rather than bend or suppress 
personal themata in order to carry on a successful career…. some (innovators) have 
switched fields looking for a place where their themata could attain full expression 
(Briggs, 2000: 32) (ref. Item. 7.06-7). 
 
9.129   Van Schaik’s learning concourse intentionally provides an outlet for the 
manifestation of innovators’ themata, and also through the encouragement of second-
order self-curation: 
 
What I am citing are all instances of architects searching for learning 
communities appropriate to their needs as innovators. This is what the self-curator 
begins consciously to do. Left to chance, some people stumble on the mechanisms at 
work, while others are consumed by their anger, frustration and a sense of being 
misunderstood…. This has arisen from a critique of first order modes of education and 
an espousal of a model for second-order learning. In the first-order environment, 
learning is a lonely encounter between individuals and a curriculum. They study without 
access to models of development or association within learning communities (van Schaik, 
2005: 218). 
 
Nuances In Mental Processes 
 9.130   Working in tandem with themata are ‘screen memories’, which provide 
nuances to the themata. The ‘screen memories’ are to themata as much as shades and 
tones are nuances to colours (ref. Item 7.08). Further to this, Briggs propounded 
examples of works of writers, poets, musicians and artists. He suggests that: “an 
emotional and aesthetically images can’t be verbalised. It is a matter of nuance”. After 
studying many innovators from various domains: wherein Briggs quotes Virginia Woolf, 
John Keats, Beethoven, Georgia O’Keeffe, Louise Nevelson, Albert Einstein, Isaac 
Newton, Copernicus, Kepler, Charles Darwin, Nikola Tesla and Marie Curie (ref. Briggs, 
2000: 36-47) – he concludes as follows: 
 
What do all these cases show? It appears that for many (innovators), an obsession 
with some particular nuance or complex of nuances burns at the core of vision. For other 
(innovators), a general sensitivity to certain classes of nuances may be significantly at 
play. Such sensitivity would help a scientific creator, for example, sort out the relevant 
details from what is called the ‘noise’ in the experimental situation and go straight to the 
heart of the matter. Nuance and themata are clearly related. Nuance is the aura or 
nimbus that surrounds a thema or several themata, the energy that infuses thematic 
convictions (Briggs, 2004: 47). 
 
 9.131   Nuances which have emotional contents are termed by Briggs as ‘feeling 
tones’, which was first developed in the research of William Gray and reformulated by 
Paul LaViolette24 as a psychodynamic and neuroanatomical picture of how the brain is 
organised (ref. Briggs, 2000: 48).  Feeling tones are emotional nuances that are logged in 
the brain through thoughts and memories. Gray suggests that even in the ordinary course 
of thought, emotional nuances are evoked even if no attention is paid to them. To 
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elucidate this, Briggs borrows Gray’s example of a simple cognition: take the cognition, 
2+2=4: 
 
 Try to remember what it must have felt like to learn that concept. Something 
called 2 has a feeling to it. The process of adding, the process of equalling and something 
called 4 also have feeling to them. There must have been a small amazement, a shock to 
the brain, at being shown or told that all these nuances form an order. The order, 
2+2=4, now has its own nuance that includes a sense of finality or closure, a sense that 
‘this is the way it is’. Eventually that nuance-with-closure overshadows the others until 
2+2=4 seems to be pure cognition, a rational thought with no emotion at all. That isn’t 
true of course. Thoughts always have emotion connected to them and, in humans, 
emotions are mostly set in motion by thoughts. 
 
 According to Gray, thought-emotions become associated together into structures 
vastly larger and more complex than 2+2=4. The structures include, for example, our 
knowledge of mathematics as a whole (Briggs, 2000: 49) (ref. Item. 7.12). 
 
 9.132   According to LaViolette, a closed-loop network of neurons connects the 
limbic organs of the human brain, in what is called the Papez circuit. They trigger feeling 
tone responses and generate what Gray and LaViolette call an emotional ‘theme’, which 
is similar to a musical theme – an organised pattern of feeling tones or musical notes (ref. 
Briggs, 2000: 52-3). LaViolette proposes that the waveforms that circulate through the 
Papez circuit evoke long-term memories, where these memories in turn become part of 
the evolving ‘theme’. In similar vein, Bachelard speaks metaphorically about the poet’s 
dynamic imagination, which has integrative powers that enable us to incorporate images. 
He takes the metaphor of an upside down tree, and describes it emotively: 
  
 …. whose roots, like a delicate foliage, tremble in the subterranean winds while it 
branch take root firmly in the blue sky. 
 
 I believe that there are objects which have integrative powers, things which 
enable us to incorporate images. For me, the tree is an integrative object. It is normally a 
work of art…. The imagination then took possession of all the powers of plant life…. 
Immediately, within us, we feel the roots working, we feel that the past is not dead…. The 
tree is everywhere at once. The old root – in the imagination there are no young roots – 
will produce a new flower. The imagination is a tree. It has the integrative virtues of a 
tree. It has roots and boughs. It lives between earth and sky. It lives in the earth and in 
the wind. The imagined tree becomes imperceptibly the cosmological tree, the tree which 
epitomises a universe, which makes a universe (Bachelard, 1971: 84-5) (ref. 7.13-4). 
 
 9.133   Briggs describes the mental condition that nurture emotional nuances not 
as a cognition, but a ‘brain state’, which was not mainly thought but also not mainly 
feeling, and not mainly perception. Briggs describes it as a kind of ‘pulsation in a field of 
nuance’: 
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 …. a state in which feelings, thoughts, memories and perceptions flowed vividly 
into each other and were inseparable. The words ‘emotion’, ‘nuance’ and ‘feeling-tone 
theme’ do not imply that the state is emotional in the ordinary sense of the word emotion, 
nor should we conclude that nuances do not importantly contain thoughts. 
 
 Thoughts are obviously an immense and indispensable feature of a creator’s 
mental activity in all phases of creative process. It’s only when a child begins to 
formulate cognitions that creativity as we recognise it becomes possible. However, 
creators seem inclined to keep their thoughts pulsating in a field of nuance rather than 
having them dominate the field (Briggs, 2000: 55-6) (ref. Item 7.19). 
 
 9.134   Bachelard’s proposition of childhood memories of spaces in a dwelling 
resonates something similar, which is familiar to architects: 
 
 The house that we were born in is more than an embodiment of a home, it is also 
a embodiment of dreams. Each one of its nooks and corners was a resting-place for 
daydreaming. Our habits of a particular daydream were acquired there. The house, the 
bedroom, the garret in which we were alone, furnished the framework for an 
interminable dream…. In point of fact, we are in the unity of image and memory, in the 
functional composite of imagination and memory…. What special depth there is in a 
child’s daydream! And how happy the child who really possesses his moments of 
solitude! (Bachelard, 1964: 15-6) (ref. Item 7.20). 
 
Innovator’s Individual-Universal Equation 
 9.135   Briggs suggests that innovators see their works as manifestation of 
universal truths – in holistic and cosmic terms. Mozart, for example said that a piece 
would grow on him until “the whole, though it be long, stands almost complete and 
finished in my mind so that I can survey it, like a fine picture or a beautiful statue, at a 
glance. Nor do I hear in my imagination the parts successively, but I hear them, as it 
were, all at once” (Briggs, 2000: 82). In bringing this kind of discussion to the surface, 
Bohm calls it ‘implicate order’, wherein lone images are transformed into an organic 
whole rather than a succession of images, which is common to all works of art (Bohm 
and Peat, 2000: 189) (See also Items 9.80-3).  
 
 9.136   John-Steiner explains that the innovator is driven by the largeness of her 
goal compared to the ordinary person, who is ordinarily content with repetitions: 
 
 These characteristics of creativity – its developmental nature, linking of overt and 
covert processes, and the construction of an open-ended and regenerative system – may 
also be seen in the lives lacking the distinction of creative achievements. What is the 
difference? 
 
 The difference lies in the intensity and continuity of the creative individual’s 
mental life. Work in the market place is discontinuous; one is given a task, which once 
completed leads to another, a discreet assignment. Daily thought, which accompanies 
these daily challenges, also has a certain discontinuity. Once we close the door behind 
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our paid work, we also tend to close our mind to it. Indeed, ordinary, repetitive work 
needs to be extrinsically rewarded because it lacks the intrinsic rewards of sustained, 
continuous labour (John-Steiner, 1985: 221) ref. Item 7.22). 
 
 9.137   The innovator is hence driven to recreate whole systems. The innovator 
therefore uses the products of creative activity to identify the self with the whole in the 
desire to become the centre of a universe. With deference to the creative side of art, 
particularly, in the domain of painting, Bohm and Peat attempt to make comparisons with 
of creative art with their experiences with creative science. Their objective description, 
using terms ‘matrix of ideas’ and ‘inward perception’ correlates with Bachelard’s poetic 
description of architectural spaces, which they reinforce from another perspective: 
 
 Yet all sensory data are deeply influenced by a person’s background and 
disposition. In the case of the artist, this includes everything that has gone before…. as 
well as with the artist’s relationship to the subject. 
 
 Psychological experiments have established that visual perception is clearly 
conditioned by the circumstances in which that perception takes place, for example, the 
‘meaning’ of the scene and which questions are put to the viewer at the time. Clearly the 
artist is not immune to this process and the ‘artistic vision’ arises out of an outward 
communication with a vast matrix of ideas, social predisposition and so on. In addition, 
the artist is also very much concerned with the ‘inward perception’, a vision through the 
mind that is not dissimilar to that experienced by the (creative) scientist…. Indeed the 
final painting must take its place within an artistic matrix that stretches over space and 
time (Bohm and Peat, 2000: 105) (ref. Item 7.23). 
 
Nuance Of Sense And Intelligence 
 9.138   ‘Synesthesia’ is a concept developed from the mixing of senses and 
intelligences. Some of Gardner’s intelligences like spatial and bodily-kinesthetic 
intelligences have a degree of sensory content; while others like logical-mathematical and 
linguistic intelligences are high in conceptual content. All seven intelligences25, in turn, 
are mixture of core intelligences, having various levels of sensory and conceptual 
contents. Synesthesia goes beyond the ordinary mixing of senses that takes place in the 
consciousness. Briggs describes it as “sense and intelligence mixing in unusual patterns 
of perception and thought” (Briggs, 2000: 167). Briggs uses Jean Love’s quote on Woolf 
‘s experience as an example of synesthetic experience: 
 
 “…. highly pleasant emotions came with synesthetic sensation. That is, she was 
enormously and pleasurably excited when sights, sounds, and other sensations seemed 
unified with each other. She was elated when her inner sensations seemed to be fused 
with sensations coming from the world around her. She remembered being intensely 
aware of the diffusion and unity of all her sensations and emphasised that a sense of unity 
and wholeness was essential to her feeling of pleasure…. She associated the sense of 
wholeness with her writing” (Briggs, 2000: 167) (ref. Items 7.25-6). 
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 9.139   Although ‘synesthesia’ is a mental condition, same or similar with 
Gardner’s ‘heightened attention’, Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘flow’ and Collin’s ‘emotional 
energy’, it however has an extension towards specialisation. It follows Gardner’s theory 
of ‘multiple intelligence’, and suggests that the innovator “experiences a synesthetic mix 
of intelligences that chemically alters the intelligence or talent that governs their creative 
field”. To elucidate this, Briggs proposes as follows: 
 
 For example, in the creative field of literature, the talents required for writing 
lyrical poetry or short stories are not the same as those required for writing novels. In 
novel writing dramatising characters demand a high degree of what Gardner calls the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences. That doesn’t mean the creator needs to be 
good at getting along with people or at living a well-balanced intrapsychic life – but a 
novelist does need a capacity for insights in these areas…. Woolf in fact possessed the 
kind of eidetic sense memory….  
 
 This illustrates another facet of the uniqueness of talents: Each creator embodies 
a unique constellation of ancillary intelligences which (s)he brings to bear on the field in 
which the principal creative talent is exercised (Briggs, 2000: 172) (ref. Item 7.29). 
 
 9.140   Architectural innovations could often be traced to synesthetic influences. 
Biographers have speculatively traced Frank Lloyd Wright’s geometrical innovations to 
the synesthetic interest in music, the various fields of arts, Japanese prints, love of nature 
and the Froebel blocks he played with as a child: 
 
 His sister, Maginal recalls: He couldn’t leave the (the piano) alone, and he would 
experiment, moderating tempo and tone and bring out the expression called for…. He 
loved to show off his mastery of certain passages so that they sounded as if they were 
really being played by a virtuoso (Secrest, 1992: 135). 
 
 His sons Lloyd and John recall: Soon there were Japanese prints as well, which 
Lloyd helped unwrap, unbook, clean and mount…. He introduced them to music, poetry, 
art; he had a love of nature and a Welsh belief in spirits (Secrest, 1992: 136). 
 
 Since (Wright) always organised his floor plans using the intricate patterns he 
learned from the Froebel blocks – he once said that he saw the method’s possibilities 
anew when his own children began playing with them…. this gave his designs, however 
modest or ambitious, uniform dimensions and properly orchestrated axes and directions 
to his houses (Secrest, 1992: 168) (ref. Item 7.30). 
 
Nuances In Mental Crystallisation  
 9.141   In his thesis, ‘Aspects Of The Theory Of Syntax’ (1965), Chomsky 
formulated the first model towards the mental crystallisation of language, which makes 
explicit mental structures. See Items 7.31-3 for details. The thesis was incomplete as it 
did not arrive at a schemata for creative innovation. Chomsky calls the early model 
‘Standard Theory’. In the 1970s Chomsky arrived at the ‘Extended Standard Theory’ 
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wherein, surface structure plays a primary role in semantic interpretation whereas 
previously, semantic interpretation was arrived only from deep structure (ref. Item 7.34).  
 
 9.142   What is essentially new in the ‘Extended Standard Theory’ is the concept 
of ‘trace’, t, which is a nuance, marking the position of an element that has been 
displaced by a transformation. Chomsky propositions that: 
 
 Within the framework of trace theory, one can even go further and say that all of 
the semantic representation, including thematic relations, can in a sense be derived from 
surface structure: to be sure, with a considerably enriched notion of ‘surface structure’, 
because the new surface structures contain traces, in terms of which thematic relations as 
specified by the base rules can be reconstructed (Chomsky, 1979: 164) (ref. Item 7.35).  
 
 9.143   The ‘Extended Standard Theory’ proposes a non-linear process of thought 
where traces, t, is shown in surface structure, “in terms of which thematic relations as 
specified by the base rules can be reconstructed” (Chomsky, 1979: 164). Surface 
structure is close to the location of ‘logical form’ which can be expressed ostensively. 
Conversely, the trace is returned to surface structure as, “a sort of memory of deep 
structure recorded in the surface structure” (Chomsky, 1979: 165). The resulting schema 
proposed by Chomsky is as follows (See Item 7.36 for details and further information): 
 
 
         logical  
       (t)     (t)   form  
    Base           Deep      transformations  Surface 
        Component       Structure   Structure 
            (t) ‘Trace’ 
               (t) 
 
 
 Figure 9.143   
 
 
 9.144   On ‘logical form’ above, Chomsky does not have a specific notion for it 
and infers that it is variable. The terminology, ‘deep structure’ above does not mean that 
it is something invariant: “…. people have apparently been misled by the word deep and 
confuse it with invariant. Once again, the only thing I claim to be ‘invariant’ is universal 
grammar” (Chomsky, 1979: 172). By making surface structure and deep structure 
variable, Chomsky encourages creativity within grammatical rules. Using creative work 
in science as analogy, Chomsky describes as follows:  
 
 What you expect of a scientist is to discover new principles, new theories, even 
new modes of verification…. That won’t happen by learning a fixed procedure. The same 
is true of linguistics today. It is impossible to explain to someone the procedure he must 
apply in order to find the generative grammar of some language. What one looks forward 
to is the discovery of new phenomena that will show that the theories that have been 
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proposed are false, that they must be changed – new questions that no one has thought of 
posing before, at least in a clear manner, new contributions to understanding, achieved 
perhaps with new ‘methods’. And finally, new ideas and new principles, which will reveal 
how limited, false, and superficial are the assumptions that we hold to be valid today 
(Chomsky, 1979: 179) (ref. Item 7.39). 
 
 9.145   Chomsky’s ‘deep structure’ is not something that is mysterious. It merely 
is phonetic interpretation, which is captured by trace theory, and it “designate a precise 
stage in the derivation of a sentence” (ref. Chomsky, 1979: 173, 183). It is symmetrical to 
‘surface structure’, which is semantic interpretation. Chomsky’s models for the structures 
that determine the mental process for the competency of language could possibly apply to 
other domains. He assumes that the mental requirements for visual competency, for 
example, would be similar to that for language: 
 
 It is possible that the theory for face perception resembles a generative grammar. 
Just as in language, if you suppose that there are base structures and transformed 
structures, then one might imagine a model which might generate the possible human 
faces, and the transformations which would tell you what each face would look like from 
all angles…. the human perceptual system is not learned, but is rather an innate 
capacity, perhaps specifically related to language, though this is debated (Chomsky, 
1979: 52) (ref. Item 7.41). 
 
 9.146   Using the Chomsky’s premise that the mental processes for language 
competency and visual competency are similar, Chomsky’s model for the Extended 
Standard Theory is adopted to structure the thought process for visual competency. The 
variability of the ‘Extended Standard Theory’ provides a further extension towards a 
structure for visual innovation.  
 
 The proviso for the structure is an assumption of rules, for without which 
according to Chomsky, “we have arbitrary and random behaviour, not creative acts” 
(Chomsky, 1975: 133).  
 
 The basis for Chomky’s structure is, “a system of intellectual organisation, call it 
the ‘initial state’ of the mind (Chomsky, 1975: 137) – The base for both the linguistic and 
visual abilities are innate, according to Chomsky: “Thus the theory of faces (like 
language) might be innate, though fully functional only at a particular stage of 
development” (Chomsky, 1975: 145). The modified diagram for visual innovation 
adopted from Chomsky’s model would become something like this (ref. Item 7.42): 
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     System of Rules 
 
 
         logical form 
         (Innovation) 
    Innate           Deep      transformations  Surface 
        Knowledge       Structure   Structure 
                             ‘FeelingTones’ 
   ‘Themata’       (nuances) 
   Thought-Forms 
 
 
 
 Figure 9.146    
 
 
Beyond Chomsky, Contexts In Mental Crystallisation 
 9.147   Chomsky’s type of mental structure is purely cognitive, however in 
architecture, external factors needs to be addressed. Quoting Gruber, Briggs suggests that 
contextual conditions can be created mentally: “Gruber calls this pearl-making 
‘constructing a point of view – the slow process by which the thinker constructs the 
mental circumstances of his own insights” (Briggs, 2000: 261). Briggs further suggests 
that: “Building a point of view means creating a context that unites the creator’s 
amorphous vision with the outward requirements of the creative field and its audience” 
(Briggs, 2000: 262). What is achieved through the shift of mental context, according to 
Briggs’ study of Conrad’s work, is the ‘inward voice that decides’, wherein: 
 
 The whole movement to evolve that inward voice entails linking feedback loops 
which join talent and vision, with the problem or material the creator is focussing on, 
with insight strategies, and with the tradition of the creative field. These interlocking 
loops, at a certain point (indicated in some creators by a ‘crystallising’ moment) interact 
to form what system theorists call a ‘self-organising structure’ (Briggs, 2000: 265) (ref. 
Item 7.46).  
 
 9.148   The shift of mental context is continuous, evolving from one magnum 
opus to the next. Towards the end, anything can happen – the vision may be as different 
in the early stages from its later stages: 
 
 Vision evolves, the creator evolves, the magnum opus leads to a new magnum 
opus – otherwise the creative life dies. The completion of a work, the acceptance of a 
work by its intended audience, changes in the creator’s personal life, historical changes 
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– all have an effect on   the further development of the creative enterprise…. Anything 
may happen. The vision may be as different in the early stages from the later stages 
(Briggs, 2000: 268) (ref. Item 7.47). 
 
 9.149   The prevailing mental context is thus precursor to the degree of the 
innovator’s creativity. This is thus situated early in the mental crystallisation toward 
creativity.  
 
 The only other area that needs to be included in a final model for the mental 
process leading to innovation is ‘synesthesia’, which is the “sense and intelligence 
mixing in unusual patterns of perception and thought” (Briggs, 2000: 167). ‘Synesthesia’ 
is thus located later in the process. ‘Synesthesia’ necessarily interacts with nuances.  
 
 
 
 
     System of Rules 
 
 
         logical form 
         (Innovation) 
    Innate           Mental           transformations           ‘Synesthesia’ 
        Knowledge       Context    
                              ‘FeelingTones’ 
   ‘Themata’       (nuances) 
            Thought-Forms 
 
 
 
 Figure 9.149 
 
 
Emotional And Intuitive Contents In Reason 
9.150   The structure for the generic mental process, which starts with Chomsky’s 
ostensive, objective and scientific structure (Figure 9.143), has become one that 
necessarily includes regions of subjectivity, concluding with Figure 9.149 above (See 
also Items 7.31-7.48 for further details). The lower boxes, containing ‘Themata’, or 
Thought-forms and ‘Feeling Tones’ (nuances) are necessary regions of subjectivity that 
accompany mental processes. By necessity the structure of architectural innovation needs 
also to include psychological subjectivity to complete the picture. For example, based on 
the researches of William Gray and Paul LaViolette, ‘feeling tones’ are emotional 
nuances that are logged in the brain through thoughts and memories and these are 
psychodynamic – in the sense that they cause mental pictures to shift. Wittgenstein had 
already predicted this in 1953 through pure cognitive deduction and propositioned the 
duck and rabbit picture (Wittgenstein, 1953: 194). 
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9.151   Wilson for example states that mental activity is not divorced from 
emotional content, both of which are inextricably linked. Similar to Briggs’ arguments 
for ‘themata’, Wilson provides the biological rationale: 
 
Much of the input to the brain does not come from the outside world but from 
internal body sensors that monitor the state of respiration, heartbeat, digestion, and 
other physiological activities. The flood of ‘gut feeling’ that results is blended with 
rational thought, feeding it, and being by it through reflexes of internal organs and 
neuro-hormonal loops (Wilson, 1998: 123). 
 
9.152   From the biological perspective, scenarios of consciousness is driven by 
stimuli, drawing upon memories of prior scenarios that are weighted and modified by 
emotion. Wilson describes the emotion, which recalls and rationalises Bachelard’s poetic 
narrative of his experience the house (ref. Bachelard, 1958): 
 
It is created by physiological activity that selects certain streams of information 
over others, shifting the body and mind to higher or lower degrees of activity, agitating 
the circuits that create scenarios, and selecting ones that end in certain ways. The 
winning scenarios are those that match goals preprogrammed by instinct and the 
satisfaction of prior experience. Current experience and memory continually perturb the 
states of mind and body. By thought and action the states are then moved backward to the 
original condition or forward to conditions conceived in new scenarios (Wilson, 1998: 
123). 
 
9.153   Wilson emphasised that emotion is essential to rational thought and 
suggests that rational thought slows and disintegrate without emotion, and further 
suggests that the mind cannot simply float above the irrational to become purely rational 
(Ref. Wilson, 1998: 123). To further reinforce this, he suggests that, “Consciousness is 
not a remote command centre but part of the system, intimately wired to all the neural 
and hormonal circuits regulating physiology” (Wilson, 1998: 124). This recalls again the 
work of Bohm and Peat, wherein the mental process leading toward creativity is a holistic 
one (ref. Bohm and Peat, 2000: 105, Items 7.23, 9.137). Another scientist, Leo Szilard, a 
physicist and biologist makes a similar point: 
 
The creative scientist has much in common with the artist and the poet. Logical 
thinking and analytical ability are necessary attributes to a scientist, but they are far 
from sufficient for creative work. Those insights in science that have led to a 
breakthrough were not logically derived from preexisting knowledge: The creative 
processes on which the progress of science is based operate on the level of the 
subconscious. Jonas Salk has forcefully articulated the same insight and proposed that 
creativity rests on a ‘merging of intuition and reason’ (Damasio, 1994: 189). 
 
9.154   Creativity involves decision-making out of myriads of options available, 
spreading from within the domain to available choices outside of the domain. The 
mathematician Poincaré suggests that intuition is a covert mechanism in the mind that 
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makes the relevant decisions in the act of creation. For example, speaking about 
creativity within his domain, he states: 
 
In fact, what is mathematical creation? It does not consist in making new 
combinations with mathematical entities already known. Anyone could do that, but the 
combinations so made would be infinite in number and most of them absolutely without 
interest. To create consists precisely in not making useless combinations and in making 
those which are useful and which are only a small minority. Invention is discernment, 
choice…. 
 
To invent, I have said, is to choose, but the word is perhaps not wholly exact. It 
makes one think of a purchaser before whom are displayed a large number of samples, 
and who examines them, one after another, to make a choice. Here the samples would be 
so numerous that a whole lifetime would not suffice to examine them. This is not the 
actual state of things. The sterile combinations do not even present themselves to the 
mind of the inventor. Never in the field of his consciousness do combinations appear that 
are not really useful, except some that he rejects but which have to some extent the 
characteristics of useful combinations. All goes on as if the inventor were an examiner 
for the second degree who would only have to question the candidates who had passed a 
previous examination (Damasio, 1994: 188-9). 
 
9.155   From the neurological perspective, Damasio suggests that subjectivity 
happens when the brain is producing not just images of the object, not just images of the 
organism’s responses to the image, but a third kind of image: “that of  an organism in the 
act of perceiving and responding to an object. I believe the subjective perspective arises 
out of the content of the third kind of image” (Damasio, 1994: 242-3). To Damasio, the 
minimal neural device that makes subjective thinking possible is only quite basic, 
wherein the narrative can be accomplished without language, using the elementary 
representational tools of the sensory and motor systems in space and time, and he sees no 
reason why animals without language would not make the simple narratives  (ref. 
Damasio, 1994: 243). 
 
9.156   However, what is important to us is the second-order of narrative 
capacities which is available only to humans and it comes with language ability, and a 
refined form of subjectivity is possible with this: 
 
Humans have available second order narrative capacities, provided by language, 
which can engender verbal narratives out of non-verbal ones. The refined form of 
subjectivity that is ours would emerge from the latter process. Language would not be the 
source of the self, but it certainly is the source of the ‘I’ (Damasio, 1994: 243). 
 
Background For Second-Order Narratives 
9.157   Damasio’s second-order narrative is obviously an ontological intelligence 
as it is unique to humans, and it forms a pervasive referential background that enables 
architectural innovation. As Damasio infers, and so has Chomsky and Pinker, language is 
a genetic instinctive mental device, which humans are already born with. However, it 
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takes prolonged training to transform basic language abilities to become a springboard 
toward greater intelligence. One of these branches of intelligence leads to architectural 
innovation, but as the argument develops, we can now appreciate that the mental make-
up is structured around language abilities, together with other accompanying abilities. 
 
 9.158   Latest researches, exemplified by Csikszentmihalyi, Gardner, Collins, 
Boden, van Schaik and, lately by Weisberg (See Weisberg, 2006) demonstrate that 
creativity is learned, and can be explained. Damasio points out that although there is a 
subjective content in second-order narrative capacity, which encompasses ‘themata’ and 
‘feeling tones’, the spirit of Damasio’s argument is that mental activity can be explained. 
What then is the ostensive background for these mental activities, particularly those that 
lead to architectural innovation? For architectural innovation to happen, with the view of 
second-order narrative, the proceeding contents suggest the following:  
 
(1)  The first of which is ‘synthetic imagination’ which has a grand narrative and   
positive, pro-active quality, a synthesis of utopian possibilities.  
(2)  The second is ‘historical testimonials’, to retrieve what is to consult known  
historical knowledge and use the knowledge discriminatorily. 
(3)  The third is ‘projective empathy’ which is a moral concern, examples are 
empathy with about the state of our cityscape and our environment, having a 
subjective quality about it. 
 
Synthetic Imagination 
 9.158.1   In ‘synthetic imagination’, the imagination is engaged to discern the 
‘similar’ in the ‘dissimilar’, synthesise them and form a ‘grand narrative’ in order to 
organise the random array of available information. Designing in architecture is 
unavoidably, an activity that organises first our minds, and then the spaces and artefacts 
of architectural concerns based on the information available to us (ref. Wilson, 1999: 44).  
 
 9.158.2   Also in design or if we are to it put liberally, in the making of meanings, 
‘synthetic imagination’ is required to transform the myriad of experiences into temporal 
and spatial unity. Architect need to do this all the time in the act of design, as opposed to 
say, design done by computer programming which rely on software. For example, this is 
recognisable in Frank Lloyd Wright’s prairie houses, where despite his ideological 
attempts to ‘break the box’ and let his plans project out at various planes, he inevitably 
unify and conjoin them poetically around the hearth of the house, the fireplace, in the 
application of ‘synthetic imagination’. There is synchronisation in the synthesis and the 
vast variety of solutions are created out of meaningful coincidences as a result of this 
imaginative synthesis, hence, this is also why no two works of architecture are the same. 
 
 9.158.3   Without the possibility of commonality made possible by ‘synthetic 
imagination’, there would be no goals and no moral motivation and hence there would be 
no possibility of rising above the fields of indifferences. With the schematising power of 
‘synthetic imagination’, architects could thus provide themselves with a sense of purpose 
for the creation of meaningful architecture. The goal ought at first to be provisional, 
fragile and tentative. Once differences are allowed to converge, or synthesise without 
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fusing, totalitarian ideologies are avoided. A target is given through the synthetic goal, 
without which, solutions cannot be arrived at. 
 
9.158.4   It is thus the intention of ‘synthetic imagination’ to provide the 
framework to achieve unity-in-difference and difference-in-unity. Or to put it in another 
way, without ‘synthetic imagination’, there no possibility of critical transcendence 
because there is no capacity to imagine things exist otherwise. What ‘synthetic 
imagination’ also does is it enables us to reason ourselves over the prevailing 
circumstances. The broad aspect of synthetic imagination provides the possibility of 
standing firm to function properly and, according to Peat:  
 
 This ‘firm understanding’ must find its appropriate place in the broader context 
of the flowing movement of intuitive reason. It is only in the broader context that thought 
can become the vehicle of creative perception.... In such a case the mind will be able to 
respond with creative intelligence, to perceive new orders and new categories that 
generally lie between the static and isolated extremes presented by pure logic (Bohm, et 
al, 1987: 146). 
 
Constitutive and Descriptive Orders 
 9.158.5   In the act of architectural design, abstraction is applied to rationality. 
Instead of the fragmentative nature of objective science, what needs to be applied with 
‘synthetic imagination’ is to unify the differences into a form of holistic structure. Design 
cannot be separated from the whole and assigned only defined fragments. In the act of 
abstraction in design, a ‘constitutive’ and a ‘descriptive order’ would emerge. The 
‘constitutive order’ has an ontological value and the ‘descriptive order’ has an open value 
to it. The ‘descriptive order’ can be a creative result of open exploration or a result of 
thought and experience. For example, in the architect’s drawings, the drawings have a 
‘constitutive’ basis in paper and ink, where this would have little bearing on the 
architectural description of the building. However, once it is manifested into setting-out 
lines, it begins to lie midway between a ‘constitutive’ and ‘descriptive orders’. On 
furthering the drawings, the building could thus be described with dimensions, scale, 
specifications, hatching and so on. The ‘constitutive’ and ‘descriptive order’ is intended 
to have an intelligent quality about it as it explains the act of design from the rational 
point of view. 
 
 9.158.6   Subjectivity can have a level of rationality, which need not defy 
explanation and, this is crucial to sustain architecture by evoking depth and meaning. 
Creative works of architecture could be interpreted with excursions into depths at various 
levels – they are designed with perceptive intelligence and with control of the intellect. 
Designing architecture is still an artistic and subjective act despite our ability to explain 
to some extent to rationale behind this act. The way architectural design is scripted in the 
mind bears resemblance to say, calligraphy. Analogically, the ideograms contain subtle 
variations with aesthetics and other subjective meanings shared between the author and 
the reader while the lexicon meaning would remain consistent. The brush acts like a 
seismograph of the mind, revealing on the media, every pressure and shift of the wrist. 
Like the sketches in the act of design in architecture, calligraphy responds to the eye and 
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is an art of space. In architecture, this is translated into ‘constitutive’ and ‘descriptive 
orders’ to become technical architectural drawings, in an ordered manner, in a language 
which is later concretised into built forms. 
 
9.158.7   We could say that in ‘constitutive’ and ‘descriptive orders’, the language 
of architecture has an internal structure, like semantics and syntax, yet each work is still 
perfectly free, not rigid as we would necessarily do in assigning signifying vehicles in 
objective semiotics. This will not be unlike other fields of the aesthetics like painting, 
sculpture, plays, novels and poems. Likewise music, for example, is free creation of the 
mind, having its own ordering rationale, such as modulation, counterpoint, resolutions 
and tension as well as having definable properties such as overtones, scales and harmonic 
proportions. The various fields of aesthetics could be synthesised imaginatively, thus 
expanding the creative perspective of each of these fields and that meanings in each of 
these aesthetic fields would be used as analogy to expand the understanding of the other 
fields. In comparing architecture with music, Elizabeth Martin says that:  
 
 The eye and the ear resemble each other in construction, number and in the 
function of their parts resulting in the obvious analogous properties of matter. The eye 
lends itself to a visual field, and the ear to an aural field. Architecture represents the art 
of design in space; music, the art of design in time (Martin, 1994: 8). 
 
9.158.8   Also, like architecture, music has ‘constitutive’ and ‘descriptive orders’, 
where constitutive order’ is manifested in the first musical bar. If we take a well-known 
musical composition, Beethoven's Fifth Symphony for example, the first four notes of the 
symphony, when they are first heard, occur out of a situation of perfect silence, which is 
without meaning or context. In Peat's description:  
 
 The first four notes sound out in this void, establish their resonance within the 
mind, and produce a variety of dispositions and expectations within the listener. This is, 
in effect, the generator of their first context. But now, as the music continues to play, the 
context starts to grow. The initial pattern of notes is played over and over again, but this 
perception takes place in an ever-changing context which acts to transform the way that 
they are heard. The context is created out of this platform of notes and, in turn, acts back 
on them to change their meaning (Bohm, et.al., 1987: 218). 
 
Historical Testimonials 
 9.158.9   ‘Testimonial’ implies recounting and valuing the experiences of the past. 
With several millennia of architectural experiences in the past and with innumerable 
notable architecture built when the ontological aspects of architecture had hardly 
changed, it is inconceivable that the past could be detached from present activities. The 
architect need not necessarily work only with the prevailing idiom. In fact the greatness 
of the architect rests with his ability to create a new, personal idiom, an individual set of 
rules that deviates from the conventional rules and yet contain profound authenticity that 
reflects presentness. This is not to belittle the creativity of architects but to point out that 
every innovative architect has acquired some form of recipe for the basis of the 
architecture he wishes to undertake. As Constable, the artist puts it, "an artist who is self-
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taught is taught by a very ignorant person indeed" (Koestler, 1964: 379). What however 
distinguishes the true master from his imitators is his ability to invent the new set of rules 
from his own apprenticeship and the prevailing cultural ethos. He does not do it from a 
situation of void; but from a situation of knowledge and experience and a good grasp of 
‘historical testimonials’. 
 
 9.158.10   Researches by Csikszentmihalyi, Gardner, Collins, Boden, van Schaik 
and Weisberg point to the suggestion that creativity is learned and it does not begin in a 
void. Other than the mental link with historical exemplars, van Schaik suggests that 
innovators also seek out mentors from all over the world: “Sometimes these relationships 
are based on actual meetings, often they are remote but enduring admirations leading to 
intense study and attempts at replication” (van Schaik, 2004: 32). Other researchers have 
often quoted great innovators being influenced by their mentors before breaking out. 
 
9.158.11   From the psychological perspective, the accumulation of ‘historical 
testimonials’ form part of the unconscious state of the architect. The architect in 
designing his buildings intermittently throws himself back to his unconscious state to find 
the roots of his accumulated skill and knowledge. This periodic immersion into the 
unconscious is accompanied by temporary disintegration of matrixes of logical thinking, 
relying instead on intuition. They are also entailed with a loss of identity and freedom of 
play. Besides the architectural masters, most architects of the same generation will share 
some degree of equipotentiality. As Murray Stein puts it:  
 
The unconscious at this level, is structured by larger cultural patterns and 
attitudes, and these end up influencing the individual’s conscious attitude and the more 
unique complexes within a nexus of unconscious cultural assumptions (Stein, 1997: 47). 
 
 How then does the architectural innovators break away from the restraining 
collective unconscious to come up with a new recipe of rules? 
 
 9.158.12   As suggested earlier, perception forms part of human intelligence and 
there is a subjective nature about it and that it cannot be divorced from past experience. 
There is a continuous scale of gradation where at one end; there is classical conditioning 
that would happen in everyday life in every society. In the intermediary ranges of the 
scale, there are the various blends of proportions between ‘bit’ knowledge and ‘whole’ 
knowledge and there is a perceptual hierarchy, until it is saturated with ‘meaning’, that is, 
insight. Insight, according to Koestler, is a matter of degree and not an all-or-nothing 
process as prescribed by the Gestalt school (Koestler, 1964: 522). Thus an insightful act 
is something that is above learning, but still depends on learning, accumulated experience 
and knowledge. As it is not something that is not learned, it can be performed 
instantaneously; not perfected through practice in the first place; but appears all at once in 
recognizable form. 
 
 9.158.13   Therefore new insight depends on a combination of historical 
testimonials acquired through learning and experience and a mediating process and it 
does not happen out of nowhere. The non-historical process of the ‘depthless simulacra’ 
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avoids historicism and tries to rely instead on the observable, thus becoming devoid of 
meaning, or that itself is a meaningless statement as the natural mental process shows that 
nobody is in actual fact really devoid of ‘historical testimonials’ in their actions. What the 
architectural innovators will instead have is a higher gradation of insight, which at its 
higher levels is perceptive intelligence, which has a subjective nature about it. 
 
Projective Empathy 
 9.158.14   The other background that is needed to become meaningful innovators 
is having the sense of ‘projective empathy’. In any architectural activity, subjective value 
is developed, in the sense that any architectural activity is empathetic to a subjective 
value. The receptive capacity that comes with ‘projective empathy’ lies at the basis of our 
moral capacity to respect the otherness and respect things of value around us. In another 
perspective what it means is that without projective empathy we would not have the 
capacity to imagine ourselves in a decent environment of habitation or an environment of 
substance – we would be building meaningless artefacts instead of architecture. 
 
 9.158.15   Valuable innovative architecture is the result of our emotive response 
in placing meanings through moments of experience as individuals. We value places 
through our ‘projective empathy’ as we remember the sounds, sights, smells and texture. 
A place is remembered for our participation in the activities around it, the way we 
remember light is dramatised in the spaces and the way light is received and projected by 
the walls, floors, screens, forms and so on. We also remember the sounds around it, the 
change of decibels and tonality of the sounds. We remember perhaps an incident that 
happens in a place and the pleasure we might have out of a particular event. Each element 
of a place is part of a conjugation of unique moments of experience that cannot be 
separated without nullifying the essence of overall experience. 
 
 9.158.16   The sense of empathy is thus the result of the combination of mental 
and physical events. As architects we also look for a deeper order beyond the mere 
experience of events. Every detail of a valued building and specific nook has its own 
unique story to savour and in conjugation; gives us an overall sense of satisfaction. 
Analogously with music, while listening to a piece of music, a flood of variety of feelings 
is unified with the total listening. It is only when attention is drawn to a particular 
movement that it becomes possible to differentiate the fleeting differential feelings at 
frozen periods of the musical time. The discrimination at the different musical time is 
imprecise in the way that feelings are evoked but we connect the differentiated moments 
to an overall composition through ‘projective empathy’. Briggs’ ‘feeling tones’ 
exemplifies this. 
 
 9.158.17   There is subjective emotion and subjective intelligence in the way we 
empathise with the aesthetics. Although there is a cultural factor in the manner good 
architecture is discerned from bad, and in the way that a building can be intelligibly 
critiqued; a good building is recognised as the result of a heightened and developed sense 
of ‘projective empathy’ through what is culturally considered as valuable and meaningful 
in architecture. In a way it is like developing connoisseurship through empathetic 
experience. But so-called connoisseurship is required to recognise what is sublime from 
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the mundane. There will thus be an absurd division in the community of architects into 
two cultures resulting in the paradoxical situation, where the average architect will be 
reluctant to admit his inability to comprehend the sublime, compared with the architect 
who has mastery over his vocation. 
 
 9.158.18   This dulling of empathy is the consequence of the dominance of 
scientific objectivity to things and that the products of science and technology have 
dominated the life of the average person to the extent that things are looked upon as 
objects to be possessed, used and exploited without comprehension or emotional 
attachment. His relationship with the objects of his daily use, the button to his computer, 
the plug to his electrical socket, the switch to his air-conditioner, the environment in 
which he lives, are all impersonal and objective: Like the investor’s attitude to the share 
prices that appear on the monitor; not the artist's attitude to his paintings which he 
cherishes because of the long hours and emotional commitment spent with his canvas. 
The architectural critic and the architect innovator have instead developed with energy 
and effort, a ‘projective empathy’ with what is sublime and they understand these through 
subjective intelligence (Damasio’s Second-order Narrative), not by objective reasoning. 
It is not the products of science in themselves that make the existence of the man 
unnatural; but his complacency and not taking an interest beyond the things that he 
observes and uses around him. By being entirely dependent on science, yet closing his 
mind to things beyond the surface, he leads a life in urban ignorance. 
 
9.158.19   Earlier it was suggested that ‘synthetic imagination’ is required to 
engage a building beyond its appearance. ‘Projective empathy’ is equally crucial in 
sensing the materiality and tactility of a building beyond its appearance. This sensibility 
engages all the human senses, or as the Swedish architect Erik Gunner Asplund puts it in 
a lecture in 1936:  
 
 The idea that only design, which is comprehended visually, can be art is a narrow 
conception. No, everything grasped by our other senses through our whole human 
consciousness and which has the capacity to communicate desire, pleasure, or emotions 
can also be art (Asplund, 1936, quoted by Webb, 1980: 153).  
 
Summary of Discussion 
 9.159    Summary of the Discussion is as follows: 
(1) Attitude towards innovation in architecture began as an inculcation of the 
laboratory attitude in the seventeenth century. 
(2) Manifestation of the laboratory attitude in architecture started to emerge only 
in the early twentieth century with inter-domain and intra-domain 
enchainment – the seed began with other forms of visual arts that would also 
engulf architecture. 
(3) The process of architectural innovation follows patterns of language – visual 
and literary. It becomes apparent when architecture becomes critical, 
exemplified by the writings of critiques and works of critical architects, such 
as Eisenman’s. 
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(4) Earlier literature reviews demonstrate a place for the unquantifiable, 
subjective imagination in architectural innovation (eg. Sartre). However, 
substantive recent researches (Csikszentmihalyi, Gardner, Collins, Boden, van 
Schaik and Weisberg) demonstrate that subjective imagination is only part of 
an overall mental process, which is mainly ostensive. 
(5) There is an identifiable mental structure that leads to innovation. The 
objective part of the structure is demonstrated by Chomsky’s syntactic 
structure. The final structure for architectural innovation contains context as 
well as subjective nuances (‘themata’ and ‘feeling tones’). 
(6) The act of architectural innovation contains second-order narrative, which is a 
refined form of subjectivity. 
(7) The second-order narrative is anchored by: 
– Synthetic Imagination 
– Historical Testimonial 
– Projective Empathy 
(8) In the review of the questions and answers in relation to the bulk of questions 
and answers (Item 9.03-5), the weightage of the discussion and literature 
reviews point to the following: 
 
Purposes of innovation:  
For emotional energy, group emblem and synthetic imagination. 
 
Innovators are made: 
It involves learning over a period of time (10-12 year rule), usually in 
enchainment with a mentor, and then breaking away. 
 
Innovation is equally an individual quest and a collective pursuit:  
However, it is unlikely to be a solipsistic activity. 
 
Innovation is an extension of domain:  
It requires inter-domain and intra-domain enchainment. 
 
Process of innovation is ostensive:  
However, refined subjectivity is involved, which is regarded as second-order 
narrative – involving imaginative and emotional nuances. 
 
There is the presence of structure in innovation:  
It is based firstly on Chomsky’s syntactic structure and then necessarily modified 
to include subjective nuances. 
 
There is the requirement of context:  
This then becomes part of the mental structure.  
 
 There is mastery of rules and experience:  
 It is extended into the mastery of visual, and/or literary language 
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Recalling Summary Of Discussion 
10.01   The Discussion above demonstrates the processes and structure of 
architectural innovation, summarised in Item 9.159 and outlined in the diagram in Item 
9.149 (Figure 9.149). It essentially demonstrates that architectural innovation is an 
ostensive process, with an objective base, but containing subjective nuances. The 
discussion shows also that the processes of innovation are not solipsistic, but happen 
within cultural framework and having contexts. Recent authorities on the subject of 
creativity suggest that enchainment within and outside of the domains form also an 
essential factor for innovation to occur. Recent authorities suggest in addition that 
innovation is the result of lengthy development and hard work, following a 10-12 year 
period. The typical process, before reaching the tipping point is not a linear one, but one 
that is in continual loops, feeding to and fro along internal and external networks. It is 
also clear that innovation happens in open, complex systems and not in closed systems. 
The processes of innovation are also similar across domains, be it in the arts or in the 
sciences, or in architecture. 
 
10.02   In the latest substantial survey and analysis on creativity, by Robert W. 
Weisberg (Weisberg, 2006), spanning across the arts, the sciences and inventions in a 
600-page document, he re-affirms the summary above and the works of recent authorities 
(the ones used in this thesis, for example are Csikszentmihalyi, Collins, Gardner, van 
Schaik, Boden, Wilson, Bohm, Damasio and others) by way of case studies across 
domains. His ranging case studies include for example, Watson and Crick, Picasso, the 
Beatles, Edison, Darwin, the Wright brothers and Mozart. Weisberg’s emphasis is 
however: that the premise for creative work may not go beyond ordinary thinking and 
that all creative products are less than completely novel, that all creative products are 
incremental advances (ref. Weisberg, 2006: 52-111). To Weinsberg, what distinguishes 
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an innovator to that of the ordinary person is having a developed expertise in problem 
finding and that the process is heuristic rather than systematic (ref. Weinsberg, 2006: 
140-4). This echoes the suggestion of the protagonists of second-order cybernetics (ref. 
Items 9.77-9). Weinsberg also subscribes to the 10-year rule, being the period of 
coaching, incubation and mastery (ref. Weinsberg, 2006: 173, 212, 386, 409, 484). To 
emphasise the ostensiveness of creativity, Weinsberg suggests that creative insight is the 
result of an extended period of analysis and experience; it is not the product of pure 
imagination (ref. Weinsberg, 2006: 317, 339). 
 
 
Attitudes Of Creativity 
10.03   Weinsberg’s specific references to architects is to do with personality 
traits. He uses Feist’s findings in 1999 to suggests that there is essentially little difference 
between the personalities of ‘creative’ and ‘less creative’ architects, further emphasising 
the ordinariness of creative thinking: 
 
This result indicates that there were more similarities than differences in the 
personality structures of the creative architects and their noncreative (or less-creative) 
former assistants. Such a finding raises questions about differences in personality 
between more–versus less-creative individuals, at least in that study, and also about the 
role of personality characteristics in creative accomplishment (Weinsberg, 2006: 494). 
 
10.04   However, citing the work of Amabile (1983), Weinsberg infers that 
creative individuals carry particular ‘attitudes’, which he calls personality factors: 
 
Some of these personality factors are a high degree of self-discipline, the ability 
to delay gratification, a tolerance for ambiguity, and perseverance in the face of 
frustration and lack of success. Other personality factors are independence of judgment, 
a high degree of autonomy, an internal locus of control (i.e., the person works under his 
or her own direction rather than taking orders and direction from others), a high level of 
self-initiated striving for excellence, and, perhaps most important, independence in 
thinking and an absence of dependence on social approval. Finally…. there is a 
willingness to take risks…. 
 
– the most influential aspect of the model has been its emphasis on motivation 
(Weinsberg, 2006: 525). 
 
Environment That Encourages (The Third Place) 
10.05   Weinsberg’s emphasises that the premise for creative work may not go 
beyond ordinary thinking and that all creative products are less than completely novel 
(ref. Weisberg, 2006: 52-111) suggests also that the external factors play a role in 
sustaining creativity, other than that of personality factors such as motivation, etc. 
William Lim and Florida point toward an open, transient and tolerant urban environment 
of mixed ethnicity and cultures to encourage innovation. Collins points toward an 
environment that encourages enchainment, and van Schaik points toward a pedagogical 
environment (concourse of architecture), which is like a market place for mentorship, 
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enchainment and exchange of ideas. All modern researchers share the view that creativity 
is not an isolated solipsistic act. Indeed as one of his prescriptions to cultivate creativity, 
Shermer suggests: “Communicate your new ideas with others in the field. Intellect dies in 
isolation. The conflation of old ideas into new configurations comes from outside 
stimulation” (Shermer, 2001: 271). 
 
10.06   With reference to Ray Oldenburg’s A Great Good Place (1999), Florida 
notes the importance of what he considers as ‘third places’ in modern society. The first 
two places are home and work, whereas the third places are “the heart of community’s 
social vitality where people hang out for the pleasures of good company and lively 
conversation” (Florida, 2002: 226). By extension, van Schaik’s architectural concourse at 
RMIT, which is within the university at the centre of Melbourne with its proximity to 
coffee shops, bookstores and cafes, is consistent with the idea of the third place. This 
concourse is the necessary alternative to the: “click-through, page-on-page realm of the 
paper-based simulations of desks and filing cabinets that dominate the virtual space 
today” ((van Schaik, 2005: 228). Florida reason for the third place is essentially the same 
as van Schaik:  
 
The importance of third places also arises from the changing nature of work. 
More of us do not work on fixed schedules and many of us work in relative isolation – for 
instance, in front of a keyboard at home, as I often do. Reliable human contact is thus 
hard to come by, and e-mail and phone interruptions provide only a limited form. So I 
frequently take a break and head to the coffee shop down the street just to see people on 
the street…. (Florida, 2002: 226). 
 
10.07   Van Schaik’s concourse however has specific aims, propelled by the need 
for support structures so that innovation can be realised. The concourse is evolved from 
the realisation of today’s intellectual milieu wherein architecture is no longer considered 
as a single Platonic ideal and we inhabit in the condition of second-order modernity 
where, “we need to acknowledge that there are many fields in a domain of knowledge” 
(van Schaik, 2005: 234). Influenced by Alvin Boyarsky’s vision of the learning 
community, van Schaik laid out the essential components of the learning concourse: 
 
– An enchainment between mentors, beginners and emerging innovators. 
– A patron who understands the need for formal ritual behaviours of a 
community. 
– A process of knowledge-capture that ensures that cultural capital is not 
lost. 
– A cockpit for the discourse that feeds the development of three clearly 
different positions or fields within the domain (van Schaik, 2005: 235). 
 
Network Culture 
10.08   Van Schaik’s second-order modernity is unavoidably contemporaneous to 
today’s world – it is today’s reality that necessitates the change in pedagogical structures 
toward an open one, which encourages enchainment and network. The nature of second-
order modernity is termed by Taylor as the ‘moment of complexity’, which is immersed 
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in a network culture (ref. Taylor, 2001: 5). Taylor suggests the circumstances in which 
the ‘moment of complexity’ and its network culture lead to innovative change. There is 
however a biological analogy in Taylor’s description: 
 
Expanding networks of communication promoting rapid symbolic exchange 
generate a density and diversity of symbolic and mythic resources that make creative 
innovation though not inevitable. If innovation occurs, it is a function of what Calvino 
describes as ‘combinatorial play’. While such play is not necessarily deliberate and is 
not always the result of creative individuals, different strategies can be deployed to 
facilitate it. New meanings are rarely planned or programmed but usually emerged in 
surprising ways. At the cusp of purpose and chance, words, images, and symbols are 
thrown together to create new meanings that are as unpredictable as they are 
uncontrollable…. As interpretative schemata change to adapt to each other, they 
eventually reach the tipping point where new comprehensive patterns suddenly emerge 
(Taylor, 2001: 214). 
 
10.09   The network culture is inclusive of Oldenburg’s and Florida’s ‘third 
places’ and van Schaik’s ‘learning concourse’, which are tangible places of events, and 
which encourage creative innovation. Taylor’s network culture also includes intangible 
places: Following the work of Pierre Levy, a ‘fourth space’ (ref. Taylor, 2001: 220) is 
described, which is a virtual world termed by Levy as ‘cosmopedia’, where knowledge 
evolves beyond the bounds of humanity: 
 
The cosmopedia is based largely on the possibilities made accessible to us 
through computer technology for the representation and management of knowledge…. 
Instead of one-dimensional text or even hypertext network, we now have a dynamic and 
interactive multidimensional representational space. Instead of the conjunction of image 
and text, characteristic of the encyclopaedia, the cosmopedia combines a large number of 
different types of expressions: static images, video, sound, interactive simulation, 
interactive maps, expert systems, dynamic ideographs, virtual reality, artificial life, etc. 
At its extreme the cosmopedia contains many semiotics and types of representation as 
exist in the world itself. The cosmopedia multiplies nondiscursive utterances (Taylor, 
2001: 220). 
 
Pedagogy In Network Culture 
10.10   The impact of the ‘fourth place’ (‘fourth space’) or cosmopedia, on 
pedagogy is becoming clear, particularly when more and more on-line courses seem to be 
emerging. Taylor describes the impact as follows: 
 
Most important, the classroom has expanded and now is global. Anyone 
anywhere in the world can, in principle, sit down around the same virtual table and learn 
together. What is studied in the global classroom will be as different as how it is studied. 
Disciplinary boundaries are becoming as mobile and permeable as the screens on which 
the courses are cast. Since the organisational structure of knowledge is always bound to 
the modes of production and reproduction in a particular society, technology changes 
issue in the reconstitution of knowledge. In the future, the curriculum will look more like 
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a constantly morphing hypertext than a fixed linear sequence of prepackaged courses. 
When knowledge changes and both seminar tables and lecture halls become global, 
traditional classrooms will not remain the same. Like a growing number of businesses, 
colleges and universities will become click-and-mortar operations in which the old and 
new economies intersect and interact in unpredictable ways. Without in any way 
minimising the challenges and difficulties these changes pose, it is vitally important for 
educators to appreciate the new opportunities e-Ed creates for people around the world 
and to develop new   strategies for a rapidly changing educational environment (Taylor, 
2001: 234). 
 
10.11   The notion that future pedagogy will become more open is shared by 
several modern researchers (ref. Item 10.15). Taylor however speculates even further – 
that future institution of learning would effectively become wall-less, with an open 
structure and less predictable – which ‘structure and function more closely approximate a 
Nasdaq than a Ford assembly line’ (Taylor, 2001: 257). Taylor views the positions of 
institutions as if in a competitive commercial market, and limited financial resources are 
constraining effective responses to the new network culture and environment. As a result, 
new alliances would be created among the institutions and they would enter into 
unprecedented partnerships with business to afford and upgrade new hardware and 
software. Taylor’s vision is however, vague, and he outlined the problems associated 
with copyright, royalty and tenure that arise from a multi-media concentrated and open 
structure. Another problem would be that departments at lesser institutions would close 
as students connect with more renowned universities with distance learning (ref. Taylor, 
2001: 260-6). 
 
10.12   Using biological analogy, Taylor sees that creative work in universities are 
necessarily hosted in complex adaptive systems, which would hover at the edge of chaos 
and there would be uncertainty for both the structure and the tenureship of the educators. 
In a way this recalls Boyarsky’s prescription during his stewardship of the AA School of 
Architecture (1971-1990) sans the multimedia hardware and software. Taylor describes 
as follows: 
 
Creative work usually emerges between fields in areas that are far from 
equilibrium and often seem to hover at the edge of chaos. Separate disciplines as 
currently constituted can no more be justified than the departments they serve. To be 
effective in today’s world, knowledge and the curriculum must assume the form of 
complex adaptive systems, which are in process of constant formation and reformation. 
New technologies of production and reproduction not only facilitate but actually 
necessitate these changes. As these developments continue to unfold, the organisational 
structure of colleges and universities will have to become much more flexible and 
adaptable to accommodate the ongoing transformation of the substance and organisation 
of knowledge. For faculty members, the most important consequence of curricular 
change will be the continual erosion of tenure (Taylor, 2001: 265). 
 
Autopoiesis 
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10.13   Taylor includes Maturana, Varela ‘autopoiesis’ as part of the network 
culture that makes up his ‘moment of complexity’. Autopoiesis has its basis in biology 
between the observer and the observed, where: “With self-consciousness, the reflexive 
relation between subject and object, or observer and observed, bends back on itself and 
becomes self-reflexive – The observer as an observer necessarily always remain in a 
descriptive domain, that is, in a relative cognitive domain” (Taylor, 2001: 89). Taylor 
then quotes Maturana and Varela: 
 
No description of absolute reality is possible. Such a description would require an 
interaction with the absolute to be described, but the representation which would arise 
from such an interaction would necessarily be determined by the autopoietic 
organisation of the observer, not by the deforming agent; hence, the cognitive reality that 
it would generate would unavoidably be relative to the observer (Taylor, 2001: 89). 
 
10.14   This infers that the observer can never transcend the perspective from 
which she observes – that the data of experience are already always processed. In 
welding art to its social system, Luhmann suggests that: “each observation immediately 
observes something that can be distinguished – objects or events, movements or signs. 
We cannot get rid of the immediately given world…. Nor can we completely divorce 
ourselves from the intuitively apprehended world, not even in our imagination; we can 
only simulate what we observe under different circumstances” (Luhmann, 2000: 55). 
What Luhmann infers is that our social system influences our art or architecture33. 
 
10.15   Luhmann suggests further that the theory of autopoietic social systems 
requires the replacement of action theory by communication theory as elementary 
operative level of the system. The elements of communications are recursively 
reproduced by a network of communications that cannot exist outside of such a network. 
The circularity of the autopoietic systems does not necessarily preclude their openness, as 
according to Luhmann, they are both closed and open: “the concept of autopoietic closure 
has to be understood as the recursively closed organisation of an open system” – the 
interplay of openness and closure in autopoietic systems is the result of the necessary 
interaction between system and the environment (Taylor, 2001: 91). Luhmann explains 
further as follows: 
 
Systems are oriented by their environment not just occasionally and adaptively, 
but structurally and they cannot exist without an environment. They constitute and 
maintain themselves by creating and maintaining a difference from their environment, 
and they use their boundaries to regulate this difference. Without difference from the 
environment, there would not even be self-reference, because difference is the functional 
premise of self-referential operations. In this sense boundary maintenance is system 
maintenance (Taylor, 2001: 91). 
 
Cities As Complex Adaptive Systems 
10.16   What Luhmann describes above is termed by Holland34 as ‘complex 
adaptive systems’, the characteristics of which can be found in natural, social and cultural 
phenomena. By extension, it describes happenings at a city’s sub-strata – the layer 
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beneath Florida’s third place, parallel to van Schaik’s architectural concourse and 
William Lim’s alternative, rebellious postmodern city. The networks of the complex 
adaptive systems appear to be isomorphic and seem to share a common logic, like a 
typical city; but underneath it is complexity, poised at the edge of chaos, between too 
little and too much order. By examples of today’s cities, Holland’s complex adaptive 
systems seem to provide the appropriate analogical explanation. 
 
10.17   Seen in the context of Holland’s complex adaptive systems, the city 
becomes the product of progressive adaptations. Progress in this context is measured by 
the increase in diversity and correlatively, and the growth in complexity. The increasing 
complexity is seen by Holland as positive. The accruing complexity also explains the 
underpinning systems of a lively, heterogeneous city, and the complexity increase 
through multiple loops:  
 
In the strange loops of these systems, complexity breeds diversity, which increases 
complexity; which breeds diversity…. Second, it is possible to account for the directed 
increase in complexity is systems without recourse to teleology and finalism…. On the 
one hand, system and environment are joined in recursive circuits that create booth 
unexpected and disproportionate changes, and, on the other hand, the openness of 
complex adaptive systems leads to aleatory changes in schemata   that distinguish the 
point of departure from the point of arrival (Taylor, 2001: 169). 
 
10.18   As part of the arguments for accrued complexity, Goodwin’s neo-Darwin 
work argues for an evolved complexity. Like Holland’s, his work is biological driven. 
However, his suggestions provide a similar platform to explain complexity in a city. With 
reference to organisms, Goodwin35 suggests that forms of life are ‘emergent as well as 
mutable’, following the attempt to revive morphology (ref. Taylor, 2001: 183). Similar to 
Bohm’s ‘Wholeness and the Implicate Order’ (1980), Goodwin suggests that the 
organism cannot be understood as the sum of its parts but must be considered as a whole. 
He suggests also that: “Metamorphosis is a process that has intrinsic properties of 
dynamic order so that particular forms are produced when the system is organised in 
particular ways” (ref. Taylor, 2001: 183). This is a kind of ‘morphing’ when changes 
occur, and a useful analogy to interpret changes in a city. 
 
10.19   The theory of complex adaptive systems provides an understanding of the 
interrelation of emergence and self-organisation, which makes it possible to reinterpret 
the principles of rational morphology such as that propositioned by Goodwin, in a way 
that takes advantage of insights. The insight is what we use if we were to borrow the 
ideas of complex adaptive system to analogise events in the city.  Kauffman speaks about 
self-organisation in a way that extends Goodwin’s ‘metamorphosis’. He suggests that: 
“self-organisation may be the precondition to of evolvability itself” (Kauffman, 1995:  
185). The fundamental conviction about Kauffman’s work the emergence of order is 
spontaneous but not accidental (ref. Taylor, 2001: 184). 
 
10.20   Kauffman suggests: from it simplest to its most complex forms, life 
emerges in networks of interconnected webs. Kauffman’s network diagram shows the 
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way nodes proliferate and the way interconnections grow. The networks “evolve to a 
natural state between order and chaos, a grand compromise between structure and 
surprise” (Kauffman, 1995: 15). Self-organisation emerges between too much and too 
little order. Where there is too much connectivity there is chaos; and where there is too 
little connectivity the systems are frozen. “At a critical juncture, more becomes different. 
This is the tipping point where order emerges from disorder and patterns develop from 
noise” (ref. Taylor, 2001: 187). 
 
10.21   If Kauffman’s self-ordering dynamics were to be applied to the city, it has 
to be applied to everyday events outside of static structures. Considering Oldenburg’s 
inferences of places: the first place, which is the home, and the second place, which is the 
work place are static places. There is some self-ordering dynamism in Oldenburg’s third 
place of cafes, restaurants and bookshops, where the network culture thrives. There is yet 
another transient space, which is the place of continuous change, where in Melbourne, it 
could be exemplified by the temporary market at Queen Victoria Market. Every city has 
its own equivalence to the bazaar and what happens at the bazaar is usually predictable – 
they exist for the selling and purchase of carried items. Kuala Lumpur, for example has 
many of these places, commonly known as ‘night markets’, and they are found all over 
the city. These transient places have a time dynamics about them, as well as physical 
dynamics. 
 
10.22   In autopoiesis, where, “with self-consciousness, the reflexive relation 
between subject and object, or observer and observed, bends back on itself and becomes 
self-reflexive” (ref. Item 10.23), time determinant is not governed by rules, but by events 
that involve the observer and the observed. There will then be a multiplicity of 
perspective – which cannot be reduced to a single angle of vision that is true for all 
observers. From this argument, the architectural narrative of the city is not made just by 
static forms; but also by human activities, or events. This narrative is necessarily built 
upon local idiosyncrasies.  
 
10.23   These transient, idiosyncratic events in the city can happen at a large scale, 
such as the transient markets, or larger still – such as the coming together for New Year’s 
day celebration, or for independence day. However, everyday occurrences are also 
events, the accumulation of which has more profound meaning to the narrative of the 
city. If time is determined by events, then, event is the determinant of change. 
Architecture is only the resulting physical manifestations of these changes, and using 
Goodwin’s biological analogy, the edifices of architecture as forms of life are ‘emergent 
as well as mutable’ (ref. Item 10.28). 
 
10.24   Every event prompts a change in the city – it is an interruption to 
normality and it leaves traces behind; indeed, a change has to happen before it can be 
described as an event. For example, William Lim narrated the phenomenal forms of life 
at Mohamed Sultan Road in Singapore, when two rows of dilapidated low-rise shops and 
houses inexplicably attracted the attention of the creative class and. “morphed into the 
most exciting nightlife district in the city. Buildings have been restored and transformed. 
Bars, dance clubs and restaurants have swarmed the area, which booms with the sound of 
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the ringing cash registers” (Lim, 2001: 155). The transformation began with a single 
property, which then spread like a deluge to quickly encompass the whole district. This 
happened in the late 1990s; by the mid-2000s, the same forms of life moved on to Clarke 
Quay just a short walking distance away and today Mohamed Sultan Road has quietened 
considerably. Nevertheless the traces left behind are tangible with the rehabilitation of 
old buildings and the gentrification of the streets around it. Kuala Lumpur has its own 
equivalence to Mohamed Sultan Road, in the Heritage Row, which is now what 
Mohamed Sultan Road was in the late 1990s. The same forms of life are expected to 
move on, and likewise the area would be left gentrified. 
 
Dynamics Of Everyday Spaces 
10.25   Everyday dynamics of the city usually exclude its buildings, as buildings 
are necessarily static; instead they have to do with daily human activities, whether within 
or outside the buildings. Whilst physical meanings (codes and symbols) remain largely 
unchanged, intangible meanings are shifted by human activities, be they spatial, aesthetic, 
political, social, cultural, economic or ethical. The multiplicity of meanings and 
perspectives shift as forms of life activate. For example, routine human activities like 
commuting, working, recreating, shopping and running errands continually modify the 
multiplicities of spatial, aesthetic and social meanings. Lefebvre for example, explains 
this somewhat as follows:  
 
The actions of social practice are expressible but not explicable through 
discourse: they are precisely acted – and not read…. (ed. Leach, 1997: 140). 
 
Architectural volumes ensure a correlation between the rhythms that they 
entertain (gaits, ritual gestures, processions, parades, etc.) and their musical resonance. 
It is in this way, and at this level in the non-visible, that bodies find one another. Should 
there be no echo to provide a reflection or acoustic mirror of presence, it falls too an 
object to supply this mediation between the inert and the living: bells tinkling at the 
slightest breeze, the play of fountains and running water, perhaps birds and caged 
animals…. (ed. Leach, 1997: 142). 
 
Any object – a vase, a chair, a garment – may be extracted from everyday 
practice and suffer a displacement which will transform it by transferring it into 
monumental space…. (ed. Leach, 1997: 143). 
 
10.26   Lefebvre suggests that the privileging of appearances has led to an 
impoverished understanding of space, where architects are complicit in turning rich social 
spaces into alienating abstraction. He instead pointed that the everyday space is the real 
concrete one, and suggests that this ‘private’ realm asserts itself over the public one: 
 
  The user’s space is lived – not represented (or conceived). When compared with 
the abstract space of the experts (architects, urbanists, planners), the space of the 
everyday activities is a concrete one, which is to say, subjective…. It is in this space that 
the ‘private’ realm asserts itself, albeit more or less vigorously, and always in a 
conflictual way, against the public one (ed. Leach. 1997: 145). 
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10.27   The dynamics of the everyday space stands in contrast with the static 
forms around it. It is everywhere and yet, at the same time, nowhere, as it is activated by 
events or human activities: as Lefebvre suggests, it is ‘non-visible’. Forms in the 
dynamics of everyday spaces are mutable, and they morph, and they transform. The 
borders of the dynamic everyday space are uncertain, as there is no totalising parameter. 
There is openness about the dynamic everyday spaces and this openness provides 
existential freedom and encourages innovation. It is equivalent to the way information is 
transmitted and received; wherein the amount of information transmitted and received is 
inversely proportion to the rigidity of the borders. Today’s explosion of information is 
enabled by the removal or borders that thwart freedom to transmit and receive 
information. 
 
10.28   There also is uncertainty about time in the dynamic everyday space: below 
is a poetic narrative of time and events in the context of KL as a local city. 
 
KL – A Thick Crust Of Time 
–  A Narrative of Time, Events and the City 
 
There are three popular types of indigenous cakes: The monolithic light 
brown cake mixed with brown sugar (gula Melaka) and strands of 
coconut; the second is the dual layer cake made up of an upper layer of 
green pandan leaves and a lower layer of white rice and sago, and then 
thirdly, there is the ‘Kueh Lapis’, which literally means layered cake – 
made up of a variety of ingredients in different layers, each with its own 
visually delicious colour, alternating between red and white. There are 
also layered cakes that come in various shades of brown. 
 
KL is the acronym for both Kuala Lumpur and Kueh Lapis, and both 
are metaphors of one another. At non-linear time in KL, the city stays at 
the upper layer made up of events that bustles with life with everyday 
happenings – the layer in which the populace takes for granted as it 
lives, and spaces morphs around the events. Time on the upper layer is 
noted from one event to another rather than by linear time. 
 
The lower layers of KL, the city are encrusted historical time: The 
uppermost layer is the daily events that make the city alive, and when 
recent events are concretised, they are encapsulated at the second tier 
into memories. Collectively, the concretised memories affect collective 
behaviour to become the local culture. Even lower, are the tiers of urban 
forms – the upper most of these lower tiers house transient events such 
as the wet markets, the roadside stalls and the sidewalk cafes. The tier 
below is made up of forms of permanence, such as restaurants, 
bookstores, cafes and convenient stores. The layer below this comprises 
of the larger-scale urban forms, such as the rows of shophouses, rising 
to residences, hotels and offices. The lowest and the thickest layer is an 
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independent layer, which forms the base for the Kueh Lapis: it is the 
dead, fossilized thick prehistoric layer which has no life. 
 
Consumption of KL, the layered cake is like the consumption of time. 
Surface observation and the participation of the daily events mean that 
we are consuming only the upper layer. Awareness of the history of 
places and the layers of meanings that are eventually concretised into 
the urban forms enable us to consume the whole cake. Tourists 
participate only at the upper layer of the Kueh Lapis as they drop in at 
the cafes, bars and restaurants and then move on, not to be seen again. 
There are also the nomads of the city – the buskers, and the street 
vendors who move from one part to another. They slither along the 
upper layer of events and then dip into the lower layer as they are 
encapsulated into memories. Then there are the various idiosyncratic 
events that make KL memorable – the bad drivers, the ‘buzz-ling’ 
motorcycles that meander in and out between cars and the constant 
battle between pedestrians and traffic, the skimpy dolls who walk 
alongside covered-up women. 
 
The city, as an observation demonstrates the twentieth century 
proposition that time is not linear although most of the time it seems so – 
if anything in life that seems constant, it is the flow of time. Through the 
layers of time encrusted in the Kueh Lapis metaphor, relative time is 
encountered as we compare one encapsulated layer with another. What 
the assumption (or law) of relativity tells us is that the flow of time at a 
location of high, or intense events (‘high velocity’) is slower than at 
another location with lower intensity of events (‘lower velocity’).  
 
That is also the way time is perceived outside the clock. It is often said 
that time flies when we are busy – is an axiom. By perception, this 
means that the duration between the ticks of a clock in the high-E (or 
high events) is longer than the duration between ticks of a clock at low-
E (or low events). These perceived differences in time’s passage is as 
valid as astro-physics time dilation. 
 
The concept of time being a constant flow is only a recent percept. Time 
used to be cyclical, depending on harvest cycles, the rhythm of sunrise 
and sunset, the movement of the constellations and the cycles of life and 
death. With the invention of writing, things began to change and, our 
language and thought process became more precise. The stimulus for 
the invention of writing came with the need to record economic 
translation, and with it the detail record of linear time and the clock. 
One thing led to another and as we became more successful in 
agriculture and economics, population began to grow and cluster in 
cities – for economic reasons of course. It is at the cities that time 
 224
became non-constant, perceived differently, depending on the intensity 
of events. 
 
The theories of relativity say that the dimensions of space, time and 
matter are ever changing and always dependent on the way in which 
they are observed. There are only two constants in the universe: the 
speed of light, at approximately 300,000,000 meters per second in a 
vacuum; and the other constant being the rate of expansion of the 
universe since the Big Bang when time began at zero. 
 
In KL the city, time is captured and framed by myriads of events, some 
quick and others, not so quick. Some events are large events and others 
are little, everyday narratives; some events are transient and annual 
events like festivals and Independence Day celebrations come in cycles. 
There are millions of montages of faces with moods: some moods seem 
to stay permanently among the faces and others quick to change. KL is a 
potpourri of endless things, events and different ethnic groups. Nothing 
stays the same and nothing seems to pass away permanently. Time 
enfolds and warps, it slithers horizontally layer over layer: it isn’t 
permanent but it doesn’t escape either. The city encrusts it but it doesn’t 
own it. 
 
 
Practice In Context 
10.29   Located in Kuala Lumpur, our works possibly carry the recursive loops of 
perception, consciousness, self-consciousness and reason as our minds self-organise our 
comprehension of the city, which is part of the everyday world around us. In the theory of 
complex adaptive system, our works are apprehended by the context which forms a part 
of our psyche. Not only that; myths of the local context mingle and mix with global ones 
and are continually being transformed. 
 
10.30   Practise is far from stable and is continually being transformed by external 
and internal events. Increasingly expanding network of communication promotes rapid 
symbolic exchanges, therefore resulting in change all the time. In that way, the 
probability of innovation is higher as processes become more and more open and 
unstable. When innovation occurs, it is the linguistic combinatorial play of all the various 
symbols and myths. The meanings that are created are likely to echo the combinatorial 
play of local symbols and myths as well as global myths. Just as in the case of rapidly 
changing Kuala Lumpur, the local designer may find herself creating meanings that are as 
unpredictable and as uncontrollable as the events of Kuala Lumpur. In Kuala Lumpur, 
events make up the meanings, and meanings must be understood as events, and not as 
forms. 
 
Wickham Apartments 
10.31   The Wickham Apartments, located in a residential district near the centre 
of Kuala Lumpur is a current project in the office which is reaching the end of its design 
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development phase. It is constrained by planning regulations to five-stories and need to 
achieve a saleable area of 80,000 sq. ft. on a site just under an acre to be viable. The 
design was initially based on environmental issues and achieving a variety of spatial 
experience. Spaces were initially conceived to be heterogeneous, with variances of 
volume in each apartment. Every apartment is to have a breezeway where the living areas 
are located, and for the breezeway to be effective, one or both ends of the apartment is 
have a large volume to encourage the flow of air. The breezeway was to be like streets, 
where at the large volumes, rooms would project over its spaces to break up monolithic 
large volumes. 
 
10.32   The spaces in the Wickham Apartments were to be eventful, rather than 
say, static. There would be movement of air and people and the spaces would be thick 
with experiences and sensuality. According to Kwinter’s interpretation of Kafka’s events, 
“The primary role of events is not as a vehicle of signification, but much more simply, 
and literally, to shape or carve out paths and ensembles within such a manifold, initiating 
elaborate series of consequences from even minute shifts and transformations. All the so-
called movements are tactical, and they are all aimed at carving out terrain, or passing 
from one level terrain to another” (Kwinter, 2001: 134). 
 
10.33   To achieve the narrative qualities as intended, an interlocking strategy was 
adopted for vertical as well as horizontal spaces. Differentials in levels and variances in 
spatial volumes, together with changes of tactility within the apartment are also strategies 
that are intended to evoke narrative experiences. Volumes expand and contract, there is 
intended to be a rhythmic flow of space as it traverse through each apartment. Water 
features inscribe the spaces at various levels; at the ground level, they meander in and out 
of spaces and eventually surround the buildings. At the common deck, the landscape is 
treated as a mat of experiences, where levels rise and drop to provide change of 
experiences. 
 
10.34   When the tactical ideas were first conceived at the beginning of the 
project, the strategies for design were intended to be as different as possible from other 
apartment buildings that were already designed or built. The final building was to be 
visibly novel. However, as the design developed, it gradually became apparent that every 
design component that emerged has already been done before. Borrowings happen 
unconsciously as the problems that were created to be solved have been repeated over 
generations. The idea of creating breezeways in the tropical environment is always 
desirable and has been done in places all over the tropics. Charles Correa had already 
created variances of volumes for his Kanchanjunga Apartments completed in Mumbai in 
the early 1980s. Equally, it is likely that Correa borrowed the idea from elsewhere. 
Interlocking of spaces is a logical way of creating narratives, or storytelling as the spaces 
are traversed. It was later found that SCDA of Singapore conceived of similar idea for 
their Lincoln Modern in Singapore in 2001. Meandering water features are already 
components that are popular at tropical resorts and there is nothing that is novel in this 
regard, regardless of design strategy. This enforces the point that “designs are woven 
from borrowed threads” (ref. Item 10.57). 
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10.35   However, the spaces at Wickham Apartments are busy; they could have 
been less busy and still achieve some of the design strategies originally conceived. It is 
unlikely that something like this would appeal to say, northern European aesthetic 
sentiment. It however echoes some of the underlying complexities now found in Kuala 
Lumpur that it should appeal to the local developer. Environmental context plays a 
significant part in the acceptance of the rising volumes of the apartments at the external 
face of the building due to the constant warm temperature, that it would be desirous to 
loose the warm air rather than containing it. When the air is cooler, say at night, the semi-
outdoor court would become a place of repose and to have conversations. 
 
10.36   It is apparent that there is an unconscious attempt to create myths in the 
sense that symbols are used as reference and they become semantic topology where 
symbols are turned into myths. The structure of the thought process has a definite 
semantic topology that determines the ways that narrative and the environment symbols 
are used to modify each other in different combinations. In Deacon’s jargon, “The system 
of representational relationships, which develops between symbols as symbol systems 
grow, comprising an ever more complex matrix. In abstract terms, this is a kind of 
tangled hierarchy network of nodes and connections that defines a vast and constantly 
changing semantic space” (Deacon, 1997: 100). 
 
10.37   The myths and symbols of the Wickham Apartments function like a 
complex adaptive system. A coherent, dynamic language has been developed as the 
design evolved, and with it comes a dimension of dynamics operating in the myths. In 
other words, the language, with its syntax and semantics has become part and parcel of 
the design process. Following the theories of complexity, Deacon maintains that language 
resembles emergent self-organising systems (ref. Deacon, 1997: 110). The spaces, myths 
and forms eventually organise into a recognisable language that is acceptable to the 
observer.  
 
10.38   What has emerged at the end of the process is like a tipping point, when 
all the disparate parts come together in a coherent language and a recognisable whole. 
Taylor provides a biological analogy to the tipping point, which could explains the basis 
for an architectural creation, with reference to Per Bak’s ‘self-organised criticality’: 
 
Four points in this description of self-organised criticality must be emphasised at 
this juncture. First, as the term implies, self-organised criticality displays the typical 
features of other self-organised systems. The state results from interactions among 
components rather than from the intervention of any external forces or agents. Second, in 
the state of self-organised criticality, nonlinear events can have effects disproportionate 
to their causes. Third, the dynamic interactions among individual elements of the system 
generate global events that require a holistic description, which cannot be reduced to an 
account of the individual elements (Taylor, 2001: 148-9). 
 
Review Of Hypothesis 
10.39   Based on the arguments developed in the Discussion (Section 9) and 
Conclusion (Section 10), the hypothesis which set the thesis at the beginning of this 
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thesis: “Architectural innovation is ostensively meaningful. It is validated through 
context and launched from the mastery of Language Games and Form of Life” is 
revised to: 
 
 
Architectural innovation is autopoietic*, which culminates* a 
period of learning, borrowing and mastery through 
enchainment. It is syntactic and synesthetic*, and validated 
through context and culture. 
 
 
*‘Autopoiesis’, which is the “Self-conscious reflexive action and recursive closed 
organisation of an open system” (ref. Item 10.13-5).  
 
*At culmination, a tipping point is reached, “where order emerges from disorder and 
patterns develop from noise” (ref. Item 10.20). 
 
*‘Synesthesia’, which is the “sense and intelligence mixing in unusual patterns of 
perception and thought” (Item 9.149). 
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NOTES 
1. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). 
 
2.     On Certainty, S139 (Wittgenstein, 1969). 
 
2. Mastering Architecture, pp 160, 174, 175. 
 
4.     Mastering Architecture, pp 101-6. 
 
5. Mastering Architecture, pp 20, 21. 
 
6.     Mastering Architecture, p 22. 
 
7.  Lawson for example, quotes Hertzberger, who infers that creativity in   
architecture must firstly be problem-solving: 
 For me creativity is, you know, finding solutions for all these things that are 
contrary, and the wrong type of creativity is that you just forget about the fact 
that sometimes it rains, you forget that sometimes there are many people, and 
you just make beautiful stairs from one idea you have in your head. This is not 
creativity, it is fake creativity (Lawson, 1980: 157). 
 
8.    To Hertzberger, architectural innovation is something that is learned: 
 Everything that is absorbed and registered in your mind adds to the collection of 
ideas stored in the memory; a sort of library that you can consult whenever a 
problem arises. So, essentially the more you have seen, experienced and 
absorbed, the more points of reference you will have to help you decide which 
direction to take: your frame of reference expands (Lawson, 1980: 159). 
 
9.     Kneller, for instance, says that: 
  One of the paradoxes of creativity is that, in order to think originally, we must 
familiarise ourselves with the ideas of others…. These ideas can then form a 
springboard from which the creator’s ideas can be launched (Lawson, 1980: 
161). 
 
10. Sant-Elia for example appears to have the ability to visualise architecture based   
on a manifesto: Manifesto of Architecture, 1914. 
 
11.   Speaking about phenomenology, Sartre reminds us that: 
 They are internally united through the synthetic acts of the mind. Husserl has 
given a remarkable description of these particular intentions of which, beginning 
with the living in concrete ‘now’ direct themselves towards the immediate past in 
order to retain it and towards the immediate future in order to seize it (Sartre, 
1994: 96). 
 
12. It is wide accepted today that cognition is typically the interaction of many   
functionally individuated parts. Fodor, for example, says, in furtherance to the 
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‘modularity thesis’ that, “for better or worse, the neologistic usage according to 
which modules are informationally encapsulated mechanisms of cognititive 
processing is now common in the field” (Fodor, 2000: 57). 
 
13. According to Collins, Chambliss has studied interaction in athletic contests 
(competitive swimmers), and found that there is a major difference in outlook 
between the high-level performers (consistent winners) and lesser performers 
(losers). The difference is manifested in the detail of behaviour: winners are 
meticulous in performing their routines in ways that they have deliberately 
developed; they have built up their own rhythms and stick to them in the face of 
competitive opposition. The winners make themselves the focus of attention; thy 
set the expectations around themselves. Losers, however, let he winners become 
the focus, and adapt their micro-behaviour toward them (ref. Collins, 2004: 122).  
 
14. For example, every architect and student knows the innovators who have 
changed international architectural paradigms in the 20th century. Some of the 
names like Le Corbusier, Mies van der Rohe, Frank Lloyd Wright, Louise Kahn, 
Frank Gehry and now, Francisco Calatrava are on the lips of everyone familiar 
with contemporary architecture. 
 
15. Collins states that:  
Early in the twentieth century, Vilifredo Pareto proposed what has become 
known as the ‘80/20 principle’ or rule. As explained by Richard Koch in a 
charming book, ‘The 80/20 Principle’, one can in general accomplish most of 
what one wants – perhaps up to 80 percent of the target – with only a relatively 
modest amount of effort – perhaps only 20 percent of expected effort. It is 
important to be judicious about where one places one’s efforts, and to be alert to 
‘tipping points’ that abruptly bring a goal within (or beyond) reach (Collins, 
2004: 7, 8).  
 
16. Kearney explains the three traditional preconceptions that restrict creative 
imagination as: (1) ‘Dualism’ – images were generally considered as allies of 
the lower corporeal order and thus inimical to the elevated pursuits of the 
intellect; (2) ‘representationalism’ – images were construed as mere copies of 
our sensible experience; and (3) ‘reification’ – images were treated as quasi-
material things (res) in the mind rather than acts of consciousness (Kearney, 
1998: 13). 
 
17. Moran summarises the concept of ‘noesis’ and ‘noema’ as follows: 
In order to get away from all psychologistic and naturalistic misconceptions, 
including those of descriptive psychological psychology (instead, rely on eidetic 
moments), he introduced a new terminology, drawing on the ancient Greek 
terms for the ‘act of thinking’, noesis, and ‘what is thought’, noema, terms which 
carried less philosophical baggage than traditional terms for the intentional 
structure, for example ‘act’, ‘content’, ‘meaning’, and so on. For Husserl, the 
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most important thing to emphasise is that noisis and noema are correlative parts 
of the structure of mental process…. 
 
The noesis is ‘the concretely complete intentive mental process’ approached in 
such a way that its noetic components are clearly emphasised. The noesis 
includes what Husserl formerly called the ‘quality’ of the act, that which all acts 
of hoping, or remembering, have in common. But the noesis has a larger 
function in that it is responsible for bestowing sense, for constituting the 
meaning of what it grasp (Moran, 2000: 155, 156). 
 
18.  Husserl describes ‘neutrality modification as follows: 
As we can also say, the situation is that the neutrality modification is not a 
specific modification attached to actional positings, which are the only ones 
which are actual; it is instead, an eidetically fundamental peculiarity concerning 
any consciousness whatever, expressed in the attitude toward actual protodoxic 
positableness or non-positableness. Whence the necessity to exhibit them just in 
the actual primal positings or in the modification which they undergo (Husserl, 
1998: 269). 
 
19.   Ref. Le Corbusier, 1931: 37. 
 
20.   Boden states, for example: 
 
To be sure, anecdotes are unreliable. A supremely creative individual such as 
Mozart attracts an accretion of anecdotes, not to say myths, some of which are 
downright false. One famous passage, quoted by Hadamard and often repeated 
by his readers, is probably a forgery. Mozart probably did not write these 
words: “[Sometimes] thoughts crowd into my mind as easily as you could wish. 
Whence and how d they come? I do not know and I have nothing to do with it. 
Those which please me I keep n my head and hum them; at least others have told 
me that I do so”. Nor did he write (a few lines later) “Then my soul is on fire 
with inspiration”, nor (later still) “It does not come to me successively, with 
various parts worked out in detail, as they will later on, but it is in its entirety 
that my imagination lets me hear it” (Boden, 2004: 266). 
 
21.  In correlation to this, Gardner uses the 10 + 10 year rule. He estimates that it 
takes 10 years to become an expert and another 10 years to make a truly original 
contribution to the domain: 
  
 From my perspective, this is the chief reason for remaining in school. It has been 
estimated that it takes ten years to become an expert in the domain (and perhaps 
another ten years to make truly original contributions to that domain) (Gardner, 
2004: 139). 
 
22. Koning and Eizenberg, ‘The Language of the Prairie: Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
Prairie Houses’, Environment and Planning, B, 8 (1981), pp. 295-323. 
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23. The Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy began after twelve 
editorial cartoons, most of which depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammad, were 
published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 2005-09-30. The 
newspaper explained that this publication was a contribution to debate regarding 
criticism of Islam and self-censorship. In response, Danish Muslim organisation 
held public protests and spread knowledge of Jyllands-Posten publication. As 
the controversy grew, examples of the cartoons were reprinted in newspapers in 
more than fifty other countries, which led to violent as well as peaceful protests, 
including rioting particularly in the Muslim world. 
 
Critics of the cartoons describe them as Islamophobic and argue that they are 
blasphemous to people of the Muslim faith, intending to humiliate and 
marginalize a Danish minority, and that they are manifestation of ignorance 
about the history of western imperialism, from colonialism to the current 
conflicts in the Middle East. 
 
Supporters of the cartoons claim that they illustrate an important issue in a 
period of extremist Islamic terrorism and that their publication is a legitimate 
exercise of the right of free speech. They also note that similar cartoons of other 
religions are frequently printed, arguing that the followers of Islam were not 
targeted in a discriminatory way. 
 
Danish Prime Minister Andus Fogh Rasmussen described the controversy as 
Denmark’s worst international crisis since World War II (ref. 
en.wikepedia.org/wiki/Jyllands-Posten_Muhammad_cartoons). 
 
24. Paul La Violette is head of the Starburst Foundation, an interdisciplinary 
research organisation based in Portland, Oregon. 
 
25. The original seven intelligences outlined by Howard Gardner are: 1) Linguistic 
Intelligence; 2) Logical-mathematical Intelligence; 3) Musical Intelligence; 4) 
Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence; 5) Spatial Intelligence; 6) Interpersonal 
Intelligence; 7) Intrapersonal Intelligence (ref. Gardner, 1999: 41-3). 
 
26. The term ‘post-modern’ was first used in 1938 by Arnold Toynbee and in 1971 
by the literary critic Ihab Hassan in a work entitled ‘The Dismemberment of 
Orpheus: Toward a Post-modern Theory of Literature (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971). However, it is in architectural theories of the mid-
nineteen seventies that it first achieved international recognition as a critical 
term through the writings of Charles Jencks and Robert Venturi, and the works 
of Michael Graves, Charles Moore and Paulo Portoghesi. The two most 
influential literatures were Jencks’ ‘The Language of Postmodern Architecture’ 
(London: Academy Editions, 1977) and Venturi’s ‘Complexity and 
Contradiction in Architecture’ (London: The Architectural Press, 1977) – it was 
first published by New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1966. 
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27. Baudrillard’s ‘America’ was published in 1989. 
 
28. Here, Lim is referring to the Morley Road House, Singapore, 1996 by Mok Wei 
Wei, as example. 
 
29. Here, Lim is referring to the East Gate Plaza Renovation, Taipei, 1999 by W. 
Chiu, as example. 
 
30. In 1943, Warren MeCulloch published a paper, “A Heterarchy of Values 
Determined by the Topology of Nervous Nets”. His starting point was 
neurology, and he showed that the nervous system builds a sensomotory circuit 
via the so-called ‘reflex arc’. A stimulus produces a response that leads to a 
motor activity, which in turn leads to another stimulus.  
 
In organisational terms, what we have here is a sensori-motor circuit, a loop 
consisting of seeing and acting, acting and seeing which leads to a stability of 
action (ref. von Foerster, 2002: 85). 
 
31. Cybernetics grew out of Shannon’ Information Theory, which was designed to 
optimise the transmission of information through communication channels, and 
the feedback concept used in engineering control systems. In its present 
incarnation of ‘second order cybernetics’, its emphasis is on how the observers 
construct models of the systems with which they interact to maintain, interact 
and self-organise (http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/CYBERN.html). 
 
32. A person threatened by the environment (or informed of an approaching   
pleasure or danger) prepares for action. The body mobilises reserves of energy 
and produces certain hormones such as adrenalin, which prepare it for conflict or 
flight. This mobilisation can be seen in familiar physiological reactions.   In the 
presence of emotion, danger, or physical effort the heart beats faster and the 
body perspires. The individual may experience shortness of breadth, cold sweats, 
shivering and trembling legs. These physiological manifestations reflect the 
efforts of the body to maintain its internal equilibrium. Action may be voluntary 
– to drink when one is thirsty, to eat when hungry, to put on clothing when cold, 
to open a window when one is too warm – or involuntary – shivering, sweating 
(http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/HOMEOSTA.html). 
 
33. With regard to judgment and criticism in art, Luhmann speaks about ‘second-
order observation’, which is observation upon observation: A work of art is 
usually an observation of something, and a judgment is an observation of that 
observation. Each artist interprets the object he sees differently from another 
artist who sees the same object, and equally, each critique in the mode of 
second-order observation sees the work of art differently to the other critique 
(ref. Luhmann, 2000: 286). By the same token, all architects are observers and 
interpreters of the first order, and their critiques are second-order observers. 
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Luhmann infers that the differences in first and second-order observations are 
the caused by self-programming, which is influenced by the prevailing social 
system (ref. Luhmann, 2000: 55). 
 
34. Reference: John Holland: Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity, 
1996, published by Helix Books. 
 
35. Ref. Brian Goodwin: How The Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution Of 
Complexity, 2001, published by Princeton University Press. 
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